AI Native Developer Platform

Reimagining the software development lifecycle for agents, evidence, and governed action

Chris Collins and Sol 5.6

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The published site carries the current build (auto-refreshed on every push to `main`). *Engineering Intelligence* is the companion volume on the measurement half of this argument — how the evidence this document keeps demanding is produced, validated and governed; Appendix V maps the two against each other and flags two places where they use the same word for different things. The résumé link is a stable static-asset URL — bookmark it. The GitHub profile lists every public repository; a curated set of worth-surfacing projects is catalogued at the back of this document (Appendix X).

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
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- **~230-page concise edition** at https://geekychris.github.io/ai-native-sdlc/concise.pdf — every chapter of the full document with the operating-detail scaffolding subsections removed. Best for a reader who wants the complete chapter-by-chapter argument without the reference architectures and dropped appendices.
- **~20-page abridged edition** at https://geekychris.github.io/ai-native-sdlc/abridged.pdf — the complete argument as one flowing long-form article. Same pitch points, same landmark numbers, no chapters.
- **~13-page cliff-notes companion** at https://geekychris.github.io/ai-native-sdlc/companion.pdf — the terse skim for someone deciding whether to invest in the full document at all.

Abstract

This document proposes how AI changes the complete engineering operating system: how teams organize and divide responsibility; how customer signal becomes intent and intent becomes architecture and code; how testing is designed and executed; how changes are reviewed and deployed; and how production systems are observed, protected, investigated, remediated, and improved. The proposal is not that engineers simply sit back while agents write code. Engineers increasingly orchestrate a continuous loop of planning, implementation, verification, delivery, operation, and learning, with clear authority and accountability at every stage. For each major subject, the document states the viewpoint, business driver, concrete proposal, organizational requirements, investment, risks, safeguards, and relationship to the wider plan.

Decision inbox and human attention



Central proposition: AI changes the entire software lifecycle and the organization around it. The platform must coordinate agent execution, human judgment, testing, delivery, production operations, security, and learning as one system.

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Chapter 1. How to use this document

This document proposes a direction rather than a finished reference architecture. It gives the strongest ideas appropriate emphasis, identifies the business forces behind them, and leaves consequential design choices open where enterprise context is still required.

1.1. The main body develops one argument in sequence

The main body develops the argument in sequence: execution becomes orchestration; AI changes both throughput and exploration; human attention and context become scarce; customer signal, not a specification handed over the wall, is where the lifecycle starts; the developer platform becomes the orchestration platform; organizational knowledge moves into runtime; paved roads become accessible to agents; support latency, security, cost, evaluation, and organizational learning become platform concerns; and enterprise products participate in agentic workflows.

1.2. The lifecycle this document walks

The chapters trace one software development lifecycle (SDLC) loop, and about half of them are stages in it while the other half are the concerns that apply at every stage. The loop runs: **discovery** (customer signal becomes a specification), **intent and planning**, **implementation and testing**, **review and decision**, **delivery**, and **operation and learning** — with learning returning to discovery rather than to a backlog.

The map below says where each chapter sits, so a reader can enter at the stage they care about instead of reading in sequence. In the printed order these group into six parts — the operating model, what the platform provides, constraints and consequences, the organization and what it sells, how the work runs in practice, and work with no human trigger — each announced with a short preamble as you reach it.

Chapter	Where it sits	The question it answers
The argument in one page	The thesis	Why attention, not generation, is the constraint.
Engineer as orchestrator and the agentic SDLC	The whole loop	What each stage looks like when agents do bounded work and people decide.
The maturity journey	Across the loop, over time	Which stages can safely run at which autonomy tier today, and how that advances.
Requirements, discovery, and intent debt	Before intent	Where specifications come from, and what evidence they owe.
Platform foundations for agentic work	Beneath every stage	The Model Context Protocol (MCP), skills, agent-to-agent work (A2A), orchestration triggers, and runtime context.

Chapter	Where it sits	The question it answers
Soft rails: skills, plugins, and the shared capability layer	Beneath every stage, on top of the foundations	What an organization shares with itself so agents work the way the house works — and how that differs from the rails that enforce.
Trust, economics, and continuous adaptation	Constraints on every stage	Security, customer data, cost, residency, regulation, constitutions.
Debt, comprehension, and continuous understanding	The counter-signal	What the platform accrues while it is delivering, and how to see it.
Organizational and enterprise product implications	The people around the loop	Roles, permeability, change management, career paths.
Making a product agent-ready	Outward, at the product boundary	What an offering has to provide before other people's agents can use it safely — set authorization, disclosure surfaces, delegation, and what you owe the developer integrating you.
Reference operating models	Review, delivery, verification, in depth	How the middle stages work concretely — PR review, workspaces, spec-to-production, the evidence chain.
Autonomous and ambient agents	Alongside the loop	Work with no human trigger, and how a portfolio of it is governed.

1.3. The appendices carry the evidence, the reference models, and the open decisions

The appendices contain elaboration, evidence, metrics, citations, background reading, and the topics that recur across any enterprise AI-native platform review and still need enterprise-specific resolution. Those topics appear as provisional positions and explicit decision questions rather than unsupported conclusions.

1.4. The document marks which claims it proposes and which it borrows

- Viewpoint — the position this document proposes.
- Implication — a consequence that follows from the proposed viewpoint.
- Supporting material — external evidence for a premise; it does not prove the whole thesis.
- Open question — an issue deliberately left for further discussion.

Chapter 2. Glossary and conventions

This document uses one term per concept. Where earlier drafts named the same object several ways, later chapters and appendices adopt the entries defined here.

2.1. Roles and platform

Developer orchestrator

The human role that defines intent, constraints, architecture, acceptance criteria, and authority; delegates bounded work to agents; reviews synthesised evidence and exceptions; takes accountability for consequential decisions; and descends into direct inspection or execution when judgment, debugging, or experiential evaluation requires it. The default interaction is asynchronous delegation rather than continuous supervision, and the abstraction stays escapable. Not a job title; a mode of working available to product managers, architects, engineers, security engineers, and site reliability engineers.

Orchestration platform

The software platform that coordinates agent execution, human decisions, evidence, delivery, and operations as one governed system. Where earlier drafts used "developer platform becomes a decision platform" or "coordination layer," this document uses "orchestration platform." The decision-coordination responsibility is one facet of the platform, not the whole platform.

Skill

A reusable capability an organization publishes for its agents: an internal SDK with its conventions, an auth wrapper, a review checklist, a scaffold, a runbook bound to real queries. Carries an owner, provenance, a freshness contract, permissions, tests, and a retirement path. Distinct from documentation — a skill executes at the point of work rather than describing the work elsewhere. See the soft-rails chapter.

Plugin

A distributable package that may carry several soft rails at once — skills, commands, hooks, subagent definitions, MCP server wiring. The word spans surfaces with materially different trust models, so the platform classifies entries by who invokes them and whose credentials they run with rather than by packaging format.

Soft rail

Anything that shapes the default path through the permitted space without prohibiting alternatives: skills, review commands, hooks, scaffolds, prompt fragments. Adopted because it is available and good; an agent can ignore it. Contrast **hard rail**.

Hard rail

Anything that bounds the space of permitted actions and is enforced regardless of cooperation: MCP gateway policy, autonomy tiers, the agent constitution, the security control plane. Where a soft rail and a hard rail disagree, the hard rail wins, and that ordering belongs in the constitution rather than in the skill.

Paved road

An internal software development kit, service template, deployment pattern, or support pathway that the organization supports as the default, low-friction way to build a class of system. Paved roads are the durable investment that turns organizational knowledge into runtime context for both humans and agents.

2.2. Work objects

Decision packet

The durable platform object representing a question that requires human judgment. It carries: the question, the owner, the deadline, the applicable authority tier, the current evidence, the recommended action, the blast radius, the rollback plan, and a continuation reference so the calling agent can resume when the decision is made. Formerly called "decision-request object," "review packet," "evidence packet," or "decision object" in earlier drafts.

Evidence

The artifacts attached to a decision packet: test results, static-analysis output, policy checks, replay traces, supply-chain attestations, prior human decisions on similar changes, and links to source artifacts. Evidence is **inside** a decision packet, not a separate object type.

Agent workspace

The governed logical work context in which an agent or a human performs a bounded engineering task. It binds source revision, task intent, environment and toolchain requirements, permitted dependencies, relevant state, evidence, and continuation context. A workspace is not a container: it may be instantiated on any authorised execution substrate, suspended, resumed, shared, or reconstituted elsewhere. Formerly called "workspace," "sandbox," "task workspace," or "execution task" in earlier drafts. This document reserves "execution task" for the **scheduled work item** the workspace is created to perform.

Execution substrate

The concrete runtime a workspace is placed on — a Linux container or VM, a Windows or macOS worker, an emulator, a simulator, a physical-device pool, specialised hardware, or the engineer's own machine. Placement is chosen from toolchain, data classification, residency, latency, hardware, and cost. Isolation separates execution from the engineer's laptop; it does not separate the engineer from the running system.

Workspace execution

One instantiation of a logical workspace on a particular execution substrate. A workspace may have several over its life. Identity, secrets, privileged data access, and network authority are re-brokered at every execution boundary rather than travelling with the workspace.

Change set

The concrete output of an execution task: source-code patches, configuration changes, generated tests, documentation, and evidence. A change set is the payload that enters the review and delivery flow.

Signal

An atomic piece of customer or operational evidence in the discovery corpus: a support ticket, an interview excerpt, a call recording, a session replay, an NPS verbatim, a funnel measurement. Carries source system and identifier, date, tenant and segment, consent scope, retention class, and references to every derived representation built from it. The upstream anchor of the evidence chain. See the requirements and discovery chapter.

Opportunity

A clustered, sized problem statement linking the signals it rests on to the outcome it would serve. Carries a named owner, sample size and segment coverage, a validation state, and its disposition history including invalidation. A specification links to an opportunity the way a work item links to a specification. See the requirements and discovery chapter.

Validation state

The evidentiary standing of an opportunity or requirement: **hypothesis** (no traceable signal yet), **evidenced** (signal exists and is cited), **validated** (tested against customers or an experiment), or **invalidated** (tested and rejected, evidence retained). Committing to a hypothesis is legitimate; not knowing that it is one is the failure mode.

Consent scope

The data class recording what a customer actually agreed to when a signal was captured — a research interview consented to a researcher listening, not to indexed processing by a third-party model. Travels with the signal from ingest, constrains retrieval and outbound egress, and propagates to every derived representation. See the requirements and discovery chapter.

Point authorization

The decision whether a principal may perform an action on one known resource. The question most product permission models were built to answer. See the product agent-readiness chapter.

Set authorization

The decision of which resources satisfy both a query and the policy, under a defined view of identity, relationships, attributes, and time. Governs every observable output of a search — titles, snippets, citations, facets, counts, ordering, and whether a continuation page exists — not only whether a document body is returned. The question an agent asks constantly.

Eligible set

The intersection of a query's matching set and the caller's authorized set at a stated policy version. Written $\mathbf{E} = \mathbf{Q} \cap \mathbf{A}$. Four independent promises attach to it: authorization soundness (nothing disclosed that is not permitted), authorization completeness (nothing eligible lost to a stale filter), retrieval quality, and exact top-k.

Security projection

Any derived representation of authorization used to make retrieval fast — group identifiers on documents, ancestor references, access bitmaps, materialized audience views. Always replaceable, never authoritative; carries a declared schema, compiler version, source watermark, and rebuild procedure. See the product agent-readiness chapter.

Revocation deadline

The bounded interval between a named authority event (for example the committed removal of a collaboration) and a named disclosure boundary (for example the last permissible release of a newly requested passage). Measured separately from **grant freshness**, which is the interval before a widened permission takes effect; the two fail in opposite directions.

Capability ledger

The published, per-tenant statement of which capabilities and controls are generally available, which require enablement, which are in preview, and which the administrator can verify themselves. Distinguishes an announced control from an enabled safeguard. See the product agent-readiness chapter.

Owner domain

The organization authoritative for a resource, which is not always the tenant retrieving it. External collaboration makes legitimate cross-organization access an ordinary case; the audience of a synthesis is the intersection of recipients permitted for every source it used.

2.3. Protocols and interfaces

MCP (Model Context Protocol)

The open protocol by which an agent discovers and invokes tools, reads resources, and receives prompts from a server. It standardises the **vertical** connection from an agent down into its working environment — source control, ticketing, observability, an internal paved road. It is a capability boundary and not a control plane: exposing `deploy` as an MCP tool settles nothing about whether this agent, acting for this person, on this task, may invoke it. See the foundations chapter.

A2A (agent-to-agent)

The open protocol for collaboration **between** independently operated agents across framework, runtime, organizational, or vendor boundaries. Where MCP is vertical, A2A is horizontal: a coordinating agent discovers specialists through capability cards, delegates bounded work, and recombines verified artifacts. The two nest — a testing agent reached over A2A may use MCP internally. An interoperability mechanism, not an orchestration strategy.

SDLC (software development lifecycle)

The full path from customer signal through specification, implementation, verification, delivery, operation, and learning. This document uses it for the whole loop rather than for the coding portion, which is the narrower sense the term often carries.

LSP (Language Server Protocol)

The protocol that supplies code intelligence — definitions, references, diagnostics — to an editor or an agent. Distributed in this context as one of the components a plugin may carry.

SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts)

A framework of provenance and integrity levels for build artifacts. Appears here as one of the minimum fields of a review decision packet, alongside the SBOM.

SPIFFE and SPIRE

An open standard for workload identity and its reference implementation. Named as one way an ambient agent's standing service identity is authenticated, alongside a cloud IAM role.

2.4. Identity

Agent identity

The workload identity of the agent process itself, with its own credentials, audit trail, and policy attachment. Distinct from the identity of the human whose intent the agent is executing.

Delegated user identity

The identity of the human the agent is currently acting on behalf of, propagated through tool calls so that resource access reflects the human's authorization, not the agent's ambient privilege.

Task identity

The per-task credential bundle that combines agent identity, delegated user identity, and a scoped authorization envelope that shrinks the agent's effective privilege to the minimum required for the current task. Task identity is short-lived and tied to a specific execution task and workspace.

2.5. Ambient and autonomous agents

Ambient agent

An agent that runs continuously or on a schedule, not in response to a single feature request or bug ticket. Ambient agents watch, sweep, migrate, monitor, and produce evidence without a direct human trigger. See the ambient-agents chapter.

Autonomous agent

Interchangeable with **ambient agent** in most usage; some literature reserves "autonomous" for agents that additionally act on what they observe (as opposed to purely observational ambient agents). This document uses **ambient** as the parent term and marks operational tier per capability using the T0–T4 ladder below.

Standing service identity

The workload identity assigned to an ambient agent that has no per-task human sponsor. Combined with a scoped authorization envelope (per task identity) and periodic Autonomy Council reauthorization, it is the canonical identity model for unattended agents.

Signal-to-noise budget

The maximum rate at which an ambient agent may emit false positives, low-value findings, or interruption-worthy alerts before it is demoted a tier or retired. Every ambient agent has an explicit signal-to-noise budget written into its constitution.

Ambient portfolio

The set of all ambient agents an organization currently operates, tracked as a first-class inventory with owners, autonomy tiers, cost profiles, and health metrics. Prevents the "silent

army" failure mode.

Agent constitution

The declarative document that specifies what an agent may do, must do, and must not do, together with the escalation, sunset, and reauthorization rules. Sits above the prompt as a policy artifact enforced by the runtime, not by hope. Distinct from Anthropic's **Constitutional AI** (Bai et al. 2022), which is a **training** methodology; the enterprise constitution is a **runtime** policy artifact. See Section 10.7.

2.6. Autonomy

Autonomy tier

One of five ordered levels of automated action that an agent may take. This document uses a single ladder across all chapters and appendices:

Tier	Name	Effect
T0	**Observe**	Agent monitors and records; takes no action; may produce reports.
T1	**Recommend**	Agent proposes a change or action; a human executes.
T2	**Apply reversible**	Agent applies a change to a reversible surface (branch, staging, dry-run, non-production configuration); a human reviews before promotion.
T3	**Apply bounded**	Agent applies to a production surface, but only within a policy-bounded class (pre-approved runbook, low-risk change type, capped blast radius). Human oversight is asynchronous and by audit.
T4	**Autonomous within class**	Agent operates end-to-end within a well-defined class of work. Humans remain accountable for the class definition, the guardrails, and the periodic re-authorization.

Movement between tiers requires measured performance against the evaluation harness and an explicit authorization from the Autonomy Council (see below). Tier assignment is per capability, not per agent.

Autonomy Council

The standing review body that authorizes tier changes, reviews evaluation evidence, and can revoke authority. Membership: Product, Engineering, Security, Reliability, and Compliance representation. The Council owns the class definitions that T3 and T4 tiers reference.

2.7. Technical debt and comprehension

Technical debt

The gap between the code as it currently exists and the code as it would exist if the team had all its current understanding at the time of writing. Term coined by Ward Cunningham in 1992 (R344) as an intentional trade-off; most real-world debt is accretion rather than intent — dependencies age, patterns fall out of favour, the **why** is forgotten. See the debt chapter for how the orchestration platform surfaces, prioritizes, and remediates it.

Comprehension debt

The expanding gap between the volume of code in a system and how much of it any human genuinely understands. Term from Addy Osmani (2026, R350). Distinct from technical debt: the code may be objectively fine; the problem is that no reviewer can articulate what it does or why. Grows invisibly because "the tests pass" masks it. Measured via comprehension quizzes, review-latency, and reviewer override patterns. The Anthropic RCT cited by Osmani found passive-delegation users scored ~40% on comprehension while inquiry-driven users scored ~65%, using the same tool.

Cognitive debt

The lost **shared** team-level theory of a system. Term from Margaret-Anne Storey (2026, R351), building on Peter Naur's "Programming as Theory Building" (1985, R352). Distinct from comprehension debt: comprehension debt is one reviewer failing to explain a change; cognitive debt is the whole team having no reliable common model of how the service currently behaves. Cognitive debt is what makes a team hit a wall at week seven or eight of AI-accelerated work — the code is running, no one can safely change it. Detected only by exercises that force a team member other than the last committer to explain the system from memory.

Intent debt

Work in flight that nobody in the organization can explain the reason for, because the reason was never held by a person — only rendered into an artifact. The upstream twin of comprehension debt: comprehension debt is a reviewer who cannot explain a change, intent debt is a team that cannot explain why the change was commissioned. Grows when specifications are synthesised faster than customer contact is made, because a specification drawn from three tickets reads exactly like one drawn from forty interviews. Countered by carrying provenance and a validation state on the requirement record. See the requirements and discovery chapter.

Speed without understanding

The condition where output rate exceeds the team's ability to reason about what was produced. This document's shorthand for the failure mode of AI-native development: agents can generate correct-looking code faster than humans can accumulate the mental model needed to maintain or safely change it later. Every accretion of speed-without-understanding becomes technical debt on a shorter timescale than in a human-only team, because the **authors** aren't people who remember.

Comprehension record

A machine-generated short explanation of the code an agent-generated change depends on,

attached to the change as evidence. Reviewers accept it ("yes, that matches what I know about this surface") or correct it; corrections feed back into the review agent's context. Comprehension is a first-class output of every T2+ change, not an assumption.

Debt delta

An estimate of whether a specific change moved the affected surface's debt score up or down, computed against the debt inventory (see Appendix R.25 pattern). Debt delta is a field on every decision packet at T2+; T3+ autonomous change classes are forbidden from merging changes with net-negative debt delta.

Mikado Method

A refactoring / migration technique (Ellnestam & Brolund, 2014, R347): attempt the goal state, note every failure, back out, address each failure as a smaller goal, repeat until the tree of prerequisites can be executed leaves-inward. Agents are particularly effective at Mikado work because they can attempt-observe-decompose in an isolated workspace before opening a decision packet with the full prerequisite graph.

Strangler Fig

An incremental replacement pattern (Fowler, 2004, R334): wrap the legacy system, route calls incrementally to the new implementation, retire the old surface only when the new one is proven. Agents can maintain the shim, migrate consumers one at a time, and continuously verify no behaviour change.

2.8. Vendor, roles, and adoption

Portability contract

The set of platform primitives that let a capability survive a vendor deprecation without product-code changes: model-agnostic prompt templates, per-capability evaluation harness, dual-vendor routing for T3+ capabilities, and a substitution playbook. Enforced by the Autonomy Council through the capability constitution. See the trust and governance chapter.

Substitution playbook

The defined sequence the platform runs when a model tier is announced end-of-life: 30-day evaluation of alternatives against the capability harness, 60-day re-qualification against production traces, parallel-run cutover. A T3+ capability without an approved substitution playbook cannot remain at its current tier.

Tolerance window

A defined quarter or two during which existing shadow-IT usage stays sanctioned while the platform posts convergence targets and offers migration credits. Ends only when the sanctioned alternative has beaten the shadow-IT version on the pilot team's own numbers. See the organizational chapter.

Ambient-agent product manager

The role that owns the ambient portfolio as a product: capability roadmap, constitution authorship, signal-to-noise budget setting, sunset decisions, and cross-team coordination. Distinct from a platform PM. See the ambient-agents chapter.

Agent SRE

The on-call role for the ambient agents themselves — runbook ownership for the portfolio, health monitoring, runaway response, feedback-loop detection, and evaluation-harness health. Distinct from a platform SRE: the platform SRE keeps the platform **running**; the agent SRE keeps the ambient agents **behaving**. See the ambient-agents chapter.

2.9. Customer data and model-vendor access

Data-egress event

Every outbound call to an external model treated as a governed data flow subject to redaction, contractual constraints, audit, and customer preferences — not as an opaque API call. See the trust and governance chapter.

Zero data retention (ZDR)

An enterprise-tier contractual commitment from a model vendor that customer prompts and completions are not stored beyond the immediate inference request (with narrow safety-review exceptions typically bounded to 30 days). The default for capabilities that touch customer content in an AI-native platform. Reference implementations: Anthropic Zero Data Retention (R364), OpenAI Enterprise (R365), Google Vertex AI no-log (R366), AWS Bedrock (R367), Azure OpenAI (R368).

Redaction pipeline

The service that runs before every outbound external-model call, removing or reversibly tokenizing PII, secrets, credentials, unique identifiers, and content classes marked sensitive in the source system's classification. Reversible on the way back so the model's response can be reconstructed. Prompts that cannot be safely redacted for a given capability's classification are refused.

Data-class permission set

Per-model-route metadata declaring which customer-data classifications the route is contractually permitted to process. Independent of residency and IP posture. The workspace broker refuses tasks whose declared inputs exceed the route's data-class permissions.

Sub-processor

Under GDPR Article 28 and equivalent language in most enterprise contracts, any third party that processes personal data on behalf of a data controller. Model vendors count. Every model vendor the platform uses appears on the enterprise's customer-facing sub-processor page.

Outbound-flow audit

Per-outbound-call record of {caller identity, vendor, model, version pin, tenant, redaction outcomes, prompt hash, token counts, timestamp, decision-packet correlation}. Queryable by tenant so a subject-access request can be answered without reconstructing prompts.

2.10. Conventions

Viewpoint

A position this document proposes.

Implication

A consequence that follows from the proposed viewpoint.

Supporting material

External evidence for a premise. It does not prove the whole thesis.

Open question

An issue deliberately left for further discussion.

References are numbered R1 through R283 (with ambient-agent additions R284+) and consolidated in Appendix P. Cross-references between chapters use the short form Glossary.

2.11. Acronyms

Every acronym the document uses more than in passing, in one place, so a reader who meets one mid-chapter does not have to hunt for where it was introduced. Terms with a conceptual definition have a full entry above; this table is for lookup.

Acronym	Expansion
A2A	Agent-to-agent — the protocol for collaboration between independently operated agents
ABAC	Attribute-based access control
ADR	Architecture decision record
BYO	Bring your own — usually of a model key or a cloud account
CDC	Change data capture
CI/CD	Continuous integration and continuous delivery
CICD-SEC	The identifier scheme for OWASP's CI/CD security risks
CLI	Command-line interface
CNCF	Cloud Native Computing Foundation
CRUD	Create, read, update, delete
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures — the public identifier scheme for disclosed vulnerabilities
DLP	Data loss prevention
DORA	DevOps Research and Assessment — the research programme behind the four keys
DX	Developer experience
ELSA	European Lighthouse on Secure and Safe AI
ETL	Extract, transform, load
FedRAMP	US Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
FSE	The ACM Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering

Acronym	Expansion
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
HIPAA	US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IAM	Identity and access management
IP	Intellectual property. Not an internet address anywhere in this document
ISO 27001	The international standard for information-security management
JDK	Java Development Kit
LLM	Large language model
LSP	Language Server Protocol
MCP	Model Context Protocol — the agent-to-tool boundary
METR	Model Evaluation and Threat Research
ML	Machine learning
MTTR	Mean time to restore
NDCG	Normalised discounted cumulative gain — a ranking-quality measure
NIST	US National Institute of Standards and Technology
OIDC	OpenID Connect
OWASP	Open Worldwide Application Security Project
PII	Personally identifiable information
PHI	Protected health information
PKCE	Proof Key for Code Exchange — an OAuth extension
RAG	Retrieval-augmented generation
RBAC	Role-based access control
RCA	Root-cause analysis
RCT	Randomised controlled trial
ReBAC	Relationship-based access control
RPO	Recovery point objective — how much data loss is acceptable
RTO	Recovery time objective — how long recovery may take
SBOM	Software bill of materials
SCM	Source control management
SDLC	Software development lifecycle — used here for the whole loop, not only the coding part
SEC	US Securities and Exchange Commission
SKU	Stock-keeping unit — a purchasable product tier
SLO	Service-level objective

Acronym	Expansion
SLSA	Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts
SOC 2	The AICPA service-organisation control report on security and availability
SOX	US Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SPIFFE	Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone — a workload-identity standard
SPIRE	The SPIFFE Runtime Environment, its reference implementation
SR 11-7	US Federal Reserve guidance on model risk management
SSE	Server-sent events
SWE	Software engineering, usually in a benchmark name
T0–T4	The five autonomy tiers. Defined under **Autonomy** above
VPC	Virtual private cloud
ZDR	Zero data retention — a contractual commitment that a vendor keeps no copy

2.12. Vocabulary provenance

This document borrows working vocabulary from several external traditions. Terms are attributed here so a reader can trace them back to their canonical source and read further. Where a term was coined by an identifiable author or publication, that source is cited inline. Where a term is documentary convention (T0, decision packet, ambient agent as used **this way**) originated by this document, that is noted as well.

Term	Origin	Notes
Paved road	Netflix engineering vocabulary, popularized by **Adrian Cockcroft** c. 2013	The idea that infrastructure choices should have an easy, supported path and a self-service exception path. Widely adopted.
Strangler fig application	**Martin Fowler**, 2004 (https://martinfowler.com/bliki/StranglerFigApplication.html)	Incremental replacement pattern. Central to the debt chapter (debt, comprehension, and continuous understanding); also referenced in the operating-models chapter's evidence chain and Appendix E migration patterns.
Technical debt	**Ward Cunningham**, OOPSLA 1992 experience report; expanded in his 2009 "Ward Explains Debt Metaphor" video	The metaphor the debt chapter builds on. Cunningham's original meaning was a deliberate trade-off; industry usage has expanded it to include unintentional accretion.

Term	Origin	Notes
Mikado Method	**Daniel Brolund and Ola Ellnestam**, 2010 (blog); **The Mikado Method** (Manning, 2014)	Refactoring / migration technique. See the debt chapter for the AI-assisted variant.
Continuous delivery	**Jez Humble and David Farley**, 2010 (Addison-Wesley)	The discipline that the operating-models chapter's verification ladder operationalizes.
Feature toggle / feature flag	**Martin Fowler**, 2010 (https://martinfowler.com/articles/feature-toggles.html)	Used throughout the orchestrator chapter (testing chapter) and the ambient-agents chapter (ambient agent T2 reversible mitigations).
Blameless post-mortem	**John Allspaw**, Etsy, 2012	Underpins the "learning" stage of Appendix N and the ambient learning-capture agents in the ambient-agents chapter.
Error budget	**Google SRE Book** (Beyer et al., O'Reilly, 2016)	Underpins the promotion criteria for T3/T4 autonomy tiers.
Toil	**Google SRE Book**, ch. 5	The category of work ambient agents are designed to reduce. The ambient-agents chapter opens with this framing.
DORA metrics (four keys)	**Nicole Forsgren, Jez Humble, Gene Kim, Accelerate** (IT Revolution, 2018)	The scorecard basis for Appendix B and Appendix N.
Wardley mapping	**Simon Wardley**, 2005-2015	Underpins the maturity classification in Appendix H and the landscape framing in Appendix Q.
Team topologies	**Matthew Skelton and Manuel Pais**, 2019 (IT Revolution)	Underpins the organizational chapter's role permeability and the ambient-agent-PM / agent-SRE roles.
Chesterton's fence	**G. K. Chesterton**, 1929	Cited implicitly in the ambient-agents chapter's discussion of why ambient agents must not silently remove code they do not understand.
Constitutional AI	**Bai et al.**, Anthropic, 2022 (arXiv:2212.08073)	A **training** methodology for aligning model behavior. Distinct from **agent constitution** as this document uses the term, which is a **runtime** policy artifact — see Section 10.7 for the distinction.

Term	Origin	Notes
Agent constitution (as runtime policy)	Coined in this document; the term is emerging in industry usage 2025-2026 to describe explicit runtime policy for agents (see Cursor `.cursorrules`, Anthropic `CLAUDE.md`, OpenAI Model Spec)	See Section 10.7.
Ambient agent	This document adopts the term from LangChain's 2025 usage; the concept predates the label and appears in industry writing as "background agent," "autonomous agent," or "always-on agent." This document standardizes on **ambient**.	Decision packet
Coined in this document. Prior drafts used "decision-request object," "review packet," and "evidence packet"; those are retained in the glossary as historical synonyms.	Autonomy tier T0–T4	Coined in this document. Synthesizes the operational-authority ladders in Google SRE and the review-tier ladders in GitHub Copilot review documentation into one canonical five-level scheme.
Signal-to-noise budget	Coined in this document by analogy with SRE's error budget.	Standing service identity
Adopts terminology from NIST agent identity work (R256) and Microsoft Entra Agent ID (R272); the specific **"standing"** qualifier is used here to distinguish from per-task delegated identity.	Orchestration platform	This document. Earlier working drafts referred to "the developer platform becomes a decision platform"; the current term is chosen to avoid narrowing to any one platform aspect.

Reading further. Fowler's bliki (https://martinfowler.com/bliki/) and the Thoughtworks Technology Radar are the single densest sources for the software-engineering vocabulary this document builds on. The **Google SRE Book** and **SRE Workbook** (free online at https://sre.google/books/) supply the operational vocabulary. **Accelerate** supplies the delivery-metric vocabulary. The MCP and A2A

specifications supply the interoperability vocabulary (Appendix D, Appendix M).

Chapter 3. The argument in one page

The net claim. Net delivery capacity rises, but only when human attention is engineered as carefully as compute. Agents raise the ceiling on how much work can be generated; the number of **verified** outcomes rises only in proportion to how much high-quality human intervention the organization can supply. This document treats attention as a first-class capacity to be budgeted, routed, and measured — not as an unlimited free input. Every proposal that follows is scored against this net-verified-outcome standard, not against raw agent throughput.

Viewpoint

The engineering organization of the future increasingly orchestrates outcomes rather than manually executing every lifecycle step. "Execution to orchestration" applies beyond coding. AI changes how teams frame work, explore designs, implement, generate and maintain tests, assess change risk, deploy progressively, detect failure, investigate incidents, remediate production issues, validate resilience, and turn operational evidence into better software and standards. Faster code generation is only the most visible effect.

That changes the constraint. If ten agents can create ten changes, a human still has limited capacity to review, resolve ambiguity, and reconstruct the context of work they did not personally perform. The next bottleneck is not writing code. It is human attention, ownership, and context reconstruction. The orchestration platform therefore needs to manage interruptions and decisions as durable platform objects — decision packets — not merely offer another place to generate code.

The claim reaches upstream of the specification as well. Delivery getting cheaper does not make the choosing better, and a verified outcome nobody wanted still consumed the attention it took to verify. So the evidence discipline this document applies to code applies to requirements too: where the work came from, who validated it, and what state that validation is in (the requirements and discovery chapter).

The same logic applies to organizational knowledge. A generic model does not know which internal SDK, security wrapper, service template, OpenAPI convention, or runbook the company expects. That knowledge needs to arrive at the point of work and be reused in generation, review, testing, support, and operations. Existing developer portals and paved roads must be available to agents, not only humans clicking through forms.

Cost, model quality, and the tool landscape move too quickly for a permanent one-vendor answer. Near term, engineers need informed choice, budgets, and immediate cost feedback. Longer term, routing can become smarter. Security cannot remain a late diagram review; it needs continuous, AI-assisted analysis wrapped in deterministic controls enforced independently of the agent runtime. The organization itself needs a learning system — alpha cohorts, communities of practice, measures, vendor scanning, and a budget for bounded experiments.

Data residency, model intellectual-property terms, **customer-data controls on outbound calls to model vendors**, and emerging AI regulation (see the trust and governance chapter) are first-order constraints on which agents can run where, on which data, with which retention and audit posture. Every prompt sent to an external model is a governed data-egress event, not an opaque API call. These are not afterthoughts to add once the platform works; they are inputs to the architecture from day one.

Implications

The future developer platform is not principally a coding platform. It is the orchestration platform for the engineering operating system: decisions, context, agent execution, verification, deployment, production control, security, and organizational learning. This is the central synthesis proposed by the document rather than a claim borrowed from an external report.




Figure 1. Agentic software lifecycle

Agentic software lifecycle. Intent, execution, verification, delivery, operation, and learning form one evidence-bearing loop. The loop shown here begins at intent; the signal and opportunity that produce intent attach in front of it (the requirements and discovery chapter).

Architecture map




Figure 2. Architecture map

Architecture map. Human intent guides governed orchestration; MCP-centered platform services connect specialist agents to enterprise systems; evidence, security controls, and production learning close the loop.

Chapter 4. Ten principles: orchestrate by default, dive in when needed

The architecture in this document is a means. This chapter states the end: what working this way is like, and why an engineer would choose it over the alternative.

The ten principles below are invariants. The chapters that follow are implementations of them, and a platform decision that breaks one is a decision to reopen this chapter. Appendix A carries the design principles that follow for the platform itself (Appendix A).

4.1. Asynchronous by default

The normal mode is delegation, not supervision. An engineer states an outcome, hands over bounded work, and goes to do something else while agents build, test, inspect, and gather evidence. Nobody sits watching an agent type.

The loop is: delegate, execute, accumulate evidence, return a decision or an exception, judge, resume. Concurrency comes from the engineer not being inside each execution — which is what makes several tasks in flight a normal Tuesday rather than an act of heroism.

4.2. Interactive on demand

Interactivity is the escalation path, not the default. It earns its place when a UI needs to be felt rather than described, when a root cause will not resolve from a trace, when the agent cannot settle an ambiguity, or when an engineer wants to watch the exact failing runtime. Then the loop becomes delegate, observe, inspect, intervene, resume.

4.3. Abstraction is escapable

An engineer can descend from a decision packet to logs and traces, to a shell, to a running preview, to a debugger attached to the live process, and back out again. This is not a concession. A senior engineer will reject a platform that puts them one layer above the system and offers no way down, and they will be right to — the debt chapter names what a platform costs the organisation when understanding stops being available on demand.

4.4. Workspaces are shareable

A running work context can be handed to another person under differentiated access: a live preview for a designer, acceptance evidence for a product manager, a shell and debugger for an engineer, policy findings for a security reviewer. Colleagues collaborate on the running artifact rather than on a description of it, often before a pull request exists.

4.5. Workspaces are resumable and portable

A workspace is a logical package of work context, not a process. It can be suspended, resumed a


week later, handed to a colleague, or reconstituted somewhere else without the work being reconstructed from memory. Identity, secrets, and privileged data access are re-brokered at each boundary rather than travelling with it.

4.6. Execution is heterogeneous

Linux containers, Windows and macOS workers, emulators, simulators, physical-device pools, and the engineer's own laptop are all legitimate substrates. Build tooling for Apple platforms needs macOS; a tight UI loop often wants the machine on the desk; a thousand-service sweep wants managed infrastructure.

4.7. Execution follows the work

Where a task runs is a scheduling decision made from toolchain, data classification, residency, latency, hardware, and cost — not a fact the engineer has to hold in their head. The workspace broker is a placement engine as much as a security boundary, and reserving a scarce macOS executor while an agent reads source is a waste it should refuse to make.



A workspace is the logical package of work context; the substrate is where it happens to run. The broker chooses placement from toolchain, data classification, residency, latency, hardware, and cost — an Apple toolchain needs macOS, a tight UI loop often wants the machine on the desk, and a fleet-wide sweep wants managed infrastructure. The dashed return is the property that matters most: the workspace outlives any single execution, so it can be suspended, resumed, handed to a colleague, or reconstituted somewhere else. Identity, secrets, and privileged data access are re-brokered at each boundary rather than travelling with it.

4.8. Evidence is discipline-specific

Backend work proves itself with contracts and integration tests; UI work with visual diffs, accessibility checks, and a device matrix; data and machine-learning work with provenance and drift; security work with policy and supply-chain evidence; operations with canary health and rollback. Autonomy ceilings follow the strength of the available evidence, which is why some classes of work will sit at a lower tier for a long time.


4.9. Capabilities are governed

An agent receives bounded capabilities rather than credentials, under an identity, a delegated authority, a scope, an expiry, an audit trail, and a revocation path. The model proposes; independent infrastructure constrains, records, and can stop the action.

4.10. Human judgment stays the scarce resource

The platform exists to concentrate attention on the decisions that need it, not to maximise autonomous activity. Every principle above is in service of that one.

The adoption argument follows from the list rather than from a claim about speed. An engineer working this way delegates the boring half, runs more work at once, is interrupted when their judgment is worth something, can see everything, can take the controls, can hand a live problem to an expert, and does not rebuild the same understanding of the same system every week.



The solid path is the normal one. The dashed path is the escape hatch: available, deliberate, and not where the engineer spends most of their day.


Part One — How the work is defined and run

How work gets done when agents perform bounded execution and people decide. Three chapters: the orchestration model itself, the journey that gets an organisation there one cell at a time, and the upstream half that produces something worth building in the first place.

Chapter 5. Engineer as orchestrator and the agentic SDLC

Engineer as orchestrator is the operating model for the complete software development lifecycle (SDLC), not a description of someone waiting for code to appear. Engineers and teams define intent, architecture, constraints, tests, service levels, failure policy, and authority; agents perform bounded work and assemble evidence; and accountable people intervene for consequential decisions, ambiguity, novel failure, and exceptions. Coding, testing, review, delivery, security, reliability, and operations are stages in one supervised system.

The end-to-end pattern is intent and planning, parallel implementation and testing, AI-first verification, human decision where required, progressive delivery, production observation, and learning returned to the platform. Intent is where this chapter starts and not where the work does — the requirements and discovery chapter covers the half that produces a specification in the first place, and the same evidence discipline applies there. The value comes from optimizing the whole path to a verified outcome. Accelerating one step while creating review queues, unsafe automation, or **technical debt no one on the team understands** is not success — see the debt chapter for how the platform surfaces and remediates that debt rather than letting it accrete silently.



Engineer as orchestrator. Parallel bounded workstreams return evidence and exceptions to accountable human judgment.

5.1. Engineers move from executing every step to orchestrating outcomes

Viewpoint

The most economical description of the change is that engineers move from execution toward orchestration. Today, engineers still spend much of their day translating intent into code, running tools, waiting on builds, diagnosing failures, and coordinating handoffs. As agents become more capable, an engineer can state a goal, delegate work, inspect intermediate results, redirect the work, and decide whether the outcome is acceptable.

This is not a claim that coding disappears or that engineers can become detached from the systems they own. The risk runs in the opposite direction: if the machine performs the work, the engineer may be less immersed in the details at precisely the moment a consequential decision is needed. The platform must compensate by preserving evidence, intent, changes, and unresolved questions.

Concrete proposal Create an orchestration platform that accepts outcomes and constraints, decomposes work into bounded tasks, assigns agent workspaces, records intermediate evidence, and returns consequential decisions to an accountable engineer.

Business driver and expected gain Agent execution lowers the cost of routine implementation and tool work. The business opportunity is to increase delivery capacity without making engineers the manual orchestration platform for every agent action.

Organizational requirements Product and platform teams must define task classes, ownership, approval boundaries, and evidence requirements. Engineering managers must protect time for reviewing agent outcomes and maintain clear accountability for services.

Cost and investment Primary investment falls in orchestration services, isolated execution capacity, integrations, evaluation, and developer training. Compute cost rises with concurrency, while coordination and routine implementation effort should fall.

Risks and safeguards Engineers can lose system understanding, agents can create excessive work in motion, and ambiguous ownership can hide behind automation. Bound task scope, preserve execution traces, cap concurrency, and keep humans responsible for production consequences.

Relationship to the wider plan This role change establishes the need for orchestration, bounded authority, a decision inbox, and better context delivery. Every later platform capability exists to help engineers direct work while retaining understanding and accountability.

Supporting material Current agent products demonstrate parallel, scoped execution in configured environments, while industry research warns that AI amplifies the surrounding delivery system — DORA, the DevOps Research and Assessment programme, is the source cited most often in this document. See [R1, R7, R8, R11].

This chapter and the ones after it implement the invariants set out in the ten principles.

5.2. Cheap exploration matters more than raw throughput

Viewpoint

Concurrency has two different meanings, and the distinction matters. The first is straightforward throughput: select ten well-scoped defects and let ten isolated workers address them concurrently. That compresses a queue of known work. It is useful, but it is not the whole change.

The second is exploration. A designer or product team can ask for three genuinely different treatments and test them in parallel. An architect can ask for two implementation techniques, build enough of each to expose the difficult parts, and compare them with evidence. An infrastructure idea that previously seemed too expensive to try may become a proof of concept completed in hours rather than months.

This creates cheap optionality: the organization can learn through working alternatives before committing. The value is not the extra code. Much of that code should be discarded. The value is reducing the cost of finding out which direction is promising.

Concrete proposal Offer two explicit workflow modes: production work for bounded, outcome-oriented delivery and exploration work for parallel prototypes evaluated against a stated decision hypothesis.

Business driver and expected gain The return comes from two sources: more known work can proceed concurrently, and teams can afford to test alternatives before making expensive commitments. The second source improves decision quality rather than merely increasing output.

Organizational requirements Teams need lightweight experiment templates, decision owners, evaluation criteria, time limits, and rules for discarding losing branches. Portfolio governance should fund learning rather than reward the volume of generated code.

Cost and investment Exploration consumes additional model tokens, environments, test execution, and reviewer time. Budgets should be tied to the value and reversibility of the decision, with cheaper models and smaller prototypes used first.

Risks and safeguards Teams may create polished alternatives with no decision process, overwhelm review queues, or allow experiments to leak into production. Require an explicit question, comparison method, expiry date, and promotion gate.

Relationship to the wider plan Exploration depends on cheap agent workspaces, reusable paved roads (internal SDKs, service templates, and support pathways the organization treats as the default way to build a class of system), explicit evaluation criteria, and disciplined disposal of losing options. It therefore connects orchestration, testing, cost controls, and organizational learning.

Supporting material Agent systems already support parallel scoped tasks. DORA provides a useful boundary: faster local work only improves outcomes when the broader delivery system can absorb it. See [R1–R3, R7, R8].


5.2.1. A practical distinction

Mode	Question	Failure mode
Throughput concurrency	Can known independent work proceed at once?	The review and integration queue becomes the bottleneck.
Exploration concurrency	Can we cheaply test meaningfully different approaches?	We create polished variants without a decision hypothesis.
End-to-end delegation	Can low-risk work move left to right with exception handling?	Humans approve work they no longer understand.

5.2.2. A discipline for cheap experiments

Define the question and comparison criteria first. Isolate alternatives. Hold important constraints constant. Compare product usefulness, safety, maintainability, performance, cost, and migration consequences—not simply which demo looks most complete. Stop when the additional option is unlikely to change the decision.

AI native software delivery flow



Illustrative lifecycle view. The key point is the change in where human judgment enters the flow.

5.3. Human attention, not code generation, becomes the bottleneck

Viewpoint

Traditional cycle-time analysis often separates active development from the time a pull request waits. The coding period usually involved direct attention. Once the PR was raised, ownership became ambiguous: several people might be requested, nobody might accept responsibility, and the senior person everyone wanted could be in meetings. Engineers are not continuously polling every review queue, so delays accumulate invisibly.

AI increases the number of items that can reach those queues. Background execution time is not necessarily a problem when the human can do something else. Waiting becomes a problem when agents repeatedly need a person to answer a question, interpret a failed test, approve a change, resolve a policy exception, or review work produced without the person's participation.

That is why human attention and context reconstruction become the scarce resources. The concurrency ceiling is not how many agents can run. It is how many high-quality interventions the organization can supply without exhausting people or degrading judgment.

Implications

This is one of the document's most differentiated propositions. External research on queues, review latency, and AI-assisted delivery supports the premises, but the architectural conclusion remains a synthesis rather than a generic productivity claim.

Concrete proposal Instrument the entire delivery flow so agent execution, system waiting, human decision waiting, and context reconstruction are visible separately. Optimize the longest constraint rather than the fastest local task.

Business driver and expected gain More generated work creates little value if it waits for ownership, review, clarification, or recovery of lost context. Reducing human wait and reconstruction time becomes a direct lever on cycle time and developer capacity.

Organizational requirements Platform engineering, developer experience, and delivery leaders need shared flow metrics and service-level expectations for review, escalation, ownership routing, and decision aging.

Cost and investment The work requires event integration across source control, CI, ticketing, review, deployment, and support systems plus analytics and process change. Most cost is organizational integration rather than model inference.

Risks and safeguards Poorly chosen metrics can reward shallow throughput, pressure reviewers, or conceal quality loss. Pair speed measures with verified outcomes, escaped defects, rollback, rework, and developer cognitive load.

Relationship to the wider plan This bottleneck motivates the decision inbox, AI-first review, organizational knowledge at runtime, intelligent routing, and metrics that separate agent execution time from human decision delay.

Supporting material DORA's research supports treating AI as an amplifier of the surrounding sociotechnical system and reports tensions between perceived productivity, verification effort, throughput, and stability. See [R1–R3].

5.3.1. Questions the platform must answer

- Who owns the next decision?
- What does that person need to know without replaying the entire task?
- Which interruptions can be grouped, deferred, or resolved automatically?
- When should an agent stop instead of guessing?
- How do we measure decision waiting separately from agent execution?


5.4. Decisions become durable platform objects, not notifications

Viewpoint

A developer orchestrator can begin by organizing pull requests a developer created, was assigned, is watching, or needs to review. In an agentic lifecycle, the unit becomes a decision request: a test

does not build; the task is ambiguous; two approaches have different risks; an approval is required; or a production signal contradicts the plan.

A future developer experience could therefore resemble a command center or work inbox. Many concurrent processes continue in the background. The human is called only where judgment is needed, and the request arrives with enough context to make a quick, confident decision. This is different from aggregating notifications. It requires prioritization, ownership, evidence, and a resumable workflow.



Developer orchestrator. Concurrent workflows are filtered into prioritized, evidence-rich decisions and then resumed.

Concrete proposal Build a common decision packet and an inbox that prioritizes by risk, urgency, age, customer impact, and ownership. Each request should arrive with the question, context, evidence, options, and recommended next action.

Business driver and expected gain Concurrency produces more exceptions and approval requests than people can continuously poll. A prioritized, owned decision queue can shorten waiting time while reducing interruption and context switching.

Organizational requirements Teams must define decision ownership, escalation paths, interruption policies, and expected response windows. Product design must treat attention management and context quality as core developer experience concerns.

Cost and investment Investment includes a normalized decision schema, integrations, prioritization logic, notifications, user experience, and instrumentation. The operational cost comes from generating and refreshing decision packets.

Risks and safeguards The inbox can become another noisy queue, recommendations can anchor

judgment, and stale summaries can mislead. Deduplicate requests, show provenance and uncertainty, support deferral, and measure whether packets reduce decision time.

Relationship to the wider plan The inbox is the human surface over orchestration. It receives evidence from coding, testing, security, CI, support, and operations, and it applies the same ownership and escalation model across the lifecycle.

Supporting material Multi-agent command-center products demonstrate the supervision pattern, but the durable decision packet and required context packet are architectural proposals in this document. See [R8] and Appendix A1.

5.4.1. The minimum decision packet

- The outcome being pursued and why it matters.
- The precise question and why this person is the decision owner.
- What the agent tried, what changed, and what evidence passed or failed.
- The viable options, recommendation, uncertainty, and consequences of delay.
- The expected blast radius and how the work can be reversed.
- A compact way to approve, redirect, ask for more evidence, or escalate.

The platform should record the decision and its rationale, resume the workflow, and make the result available to future work. That turns an interruption into organizational knowledge rather than a private moment in a chat thread.

The Decision inbox flow — Concurrent work → Triage → Decision packet → Human action → Resume — is summarized in the frontmatter table (Abstract); the full field list of a decision packet is defined in the glossary and the operational surface for review is specified in Appendix I.

Developer orchestrator cockpit — Decision Inbox with runtime access




Figure 3. Developer orchestrator cockpit

Developer orchestrator cockpit. The Decision Inbox (top) surfaces a prioritized queue of decision packets on the left and the expanded packet — outcome, recommendation, evidence, blast radius, rollback, action buttons — on the right. The runtime pane (bottom) puts the underlying agent workspace one click away: a code tree and file view of the change under review on the left, and a tmux-style terminal multiplexer on the right where the engineer can inspect the agent's own shell, run tests, or tail the evidence log without leaving the window.

5.5. Review shifts left but does not disappear

Viewpoint

The first reviewer should increasingly be AI. Before a human sees a pull request, an automated reviewer can check obvious defects, organization-specific rules, tests, security patterns, and presentation quality; it can also propose fixes and iterate with the coding agent. That should reduce the number of mechanical issues consuming human attention.

Human review remains important because software is not merely a set of locally correct edits. A person may need to judge intent, architecture, maintainability, operational behavior, security boundaries, and whether the evidence is enough. The review needs an owner, not a broadcast request to a group in which everyone assumes somebody else will respond.

Concrete proposal Place automated review before human review, resolve mechanical findings where confidence is high, and assign every consequential review to a named owner with architecture, security, test, and operational evidence attached.

Business driver and expected gain AI-generated change volume can overwhelm scarce reviewers. Automated pre-review can remove mechanical issues before a person spends attention, while explicit ownership prevents requests from aging in an unowned queue.

Organizational requirements Code owners, platform teams, and security must agree on review policy, severity, suppression, escalation, and evaluation datasets. Senior expertise should focus on high-risk changes rather than reviewing everything.

Cost and investment Costs include review inference, replayable evaluation corpora, CI integration, policy maintenance, and human labeling. Savings come from fewer low-value comments, faster first review, and less rework.

Risks and safeguards Automated review can create noise, false confidence, duplicated findings, or pressure to accept unsafe fixes. Measure precision and recall on known defects, preserve human override, and prohibit autonomous approval outside proven low-risk classes.

Relationship to the wider plan Review consumes organizational standards, test evidence, security findings, and change history. Consequential judgments return through the decision inbox and feed evaluation data about review precision and missed defects.

Supporting material The proposed division of labor aligns with current agent workflow capabilities and with research emphasizing verification and system-level delivery outcomes. See [R1–R3, R7, R11].

5.5.1. Measure review precision and queue age, not comments generated


If AI produces more changes faster, review can become the pressure point. Measuring comments generated or issues raised is not enough. The desired outcome is faster, higher-confidence integration with less human noise. Review precision, issue coverage, severity agreement, fix acceptance, queue age, time to first meaningful response, time to merge, rework, and escaped defects all matter.

5.6. Testing becomes a parallel agentic discipline



TL;DR. Test authoring, test-impact selection, CI diagnosis and repair, UI/end-to-end scenarios, and security probes all run as parallel bounded agentic loops, not as a single test-writing bot. The value is **independent evidence**, not more assertions: tests that generate themselves to make coverage gates pass are counter-productive. Agents may recommend and repair; promotion to authoring-and-merging is per class of change, gated by measured precision/recall against a labelled defect corpus.

Viewpoint



Parallel agentic testing. Specialist test agents converge their results into one evidence bundle, escalating exceptions for human review.

Testing should not wait until a coding agent declares the feature complete. As the implementation agent builds, a testing agent can work in parallel from the same intent and acceptance criteria. That separation matters: the testing agent should challenge assumptions, identify boundaries and failure modes, and create evidence against which the implementation is judged rather than merely encode the implementation it sees.

Concrete proposal Run a testing agent from the same outcome contract as implementation, generate boundary and component evidence independently, select impacted suites cautiously, and permit test healing only under strict invariant checks.

Business driver and expected gain Generated code can outpace manual test creation and maintenance. Independent test generation and targeted execution can shorten feedback while preserving evidence that the implementation meets acceptance, compatibility, and risk requirements.

Organizational requirements Quality engineering, service teams, and platform owners must define acceptance traceability, mandatory suites, flake policy, contract ownership, synthetic-data rules, and approval for changed baselines.

Cost and investment Investment includes ephemeral environments, test data generation, additional model work, test-impact analysis, browser execution, and maintenance of evaluation corpora. Selective execution can offset part of that cost.

Risks and safeguards Agents may mirror implementation errors, weaken assertions, delete coverage, approve visual drift, or miss dependencies. Separate test and implementation reasoning, retain periodic full suites, and block silent changes to assertions and baselines.

Relationship to the wider plan Testing runs beside implementation, feeds review and CI, constrains self-healing, supports deployment decisions, and supplies evaluation data for agent workflows. Production failures should become future regression cases.

Supporting material Testcontainers supports realistic short-lived dependencies, Pact supports consumer-driven contracts, and Playwright documents planner, generator, and healer agents. These tools demonstrate mechanisms, not automatic test quality. See [R25–R28].

5.6.1. Generated fixtures must carry enterprise shapes, not copied production records

AI can generate contextual mocks and synthetic fixtures that reflect enterprise shapes, edge cases, invalid combinations, tenancy boundaries, and randomized values without copying production records. It can map the new code's dependencies and create component-level integration tests using short-lived databases, queues, or services in containers. Testcontainers documents this pattern of exercising applications against real containerized dependencies in a known state. [R25]

For APIs and event contracts, an agent can identify existing consumers, generate or update consumer-driven contracts, verify the provider, and ask whether a proposed change remains deployable with current consumer versions. Pact's documentation describes consumer and provider verification, CI/CD integration, and compatibility checks across versions. [R26][R27] The agent should not infer a meaningful consumer contract solely from the provider schema; that risks allowing the producer to mark its own exam.

5.6.2. CI becomes an execution and repair loop

Once the pull request enters CI, an agent can analyze the diff, dependency graph, coverage history, ownership, and prior failures to select the tests most likely to be affected. Selective execution can shorten feedback for large suites, but it creates a false-negative risk: an omitted test produces no visible failure. The platform should retain mandatory suites for high-risk changes, periodically run the full suite, measure missed-impact cases, and broaden selection when confidence is low.

When a test fails, a healer agent can read the diff, stack trace, logs, recent flaky-test history, and test intent; decide whether the likely defect is in application code, test code, fixture, environment, or timing; propose a repair; rerun the relevant evidence; and recommit to the PR branch when policy allows. The essential guardrail is that "healing" must not mean weakening assertions, deleting coverage, increasing timeouts, regenerating a golden result, or changing expected behavior merely to make the pipeline green.

5.6.3. Assert user-visible outcomes, not CSS paths or screenshot equality

For UI changes, agents can explore the application as virtual users, build test plans from product intent, generate end-to-end tests, and repair selectors when presentation details change. Prefer semantic roles, accessible names, stable application contracts, and assertion of user-visible outcomes over brittle CSS paths or raw screenshot equality. Visual evidence remains useful for layout and regression detection, but a changed image is not by itself proof of a defect.

Playwright now documents planner, generator, and healer test agents that can be chained: the planner explores user flows, the generator produces tests, and the healer executes and repairs

failures. [R28] This is strong evidence that the agentic testing loop is emerging in mainstream tooling, while still leaving the enterprise responsible for test intent and release policy.

5.6.4. Security testing moves inside the pull request

Testing agents can add adversarial cases, fuzz structured inputs, exercise permission boundaries, validate audit behavior, and test prompt injection or unsafe tool use for AI-enabled features. Static analysis remains valuable, but AI can interact with a running system and vary hypotheses based on what it observes. High-severity findings need reproducible evidence, controlled test environments, and established disclosure and remediation processes.

5.6.5. A safer summary of agentic responsibility

Testing layer	Traditional pressure	Agentic contribution	Evidence and guardrail
Unit and property	Coverage is often deferred under deadline pressure	Generate tests from requirements, boundaries and invariants in parallel with code	Require failure-before-fix where possible; mutation or fault checks detect vacuous tests
Fixtures and mocks	Hand-built data is narrow, stale or copied from production	Generate varied, contextual synthetic cases	Preserve referential and domain constraints; test for privacy leakage and unrealistic distributions
Component integration	Shared environments are slow and fragile	Provision ephemeral real dependencies and test state transitions	Pin versions, isolate tenants, control external calls and preserve failure artifacts
Contracts	Downstream breakage appears late	Generate and verify consumer-provider expectations in CI	Exercise real consumer code; do not derive the entire contract from the provider
Test impact	Large suites delay feedback	Rank and run affected tests first	Keep risk-based mandatory tests and full-suite sampling; measure missed dependencies
Maintenance	Selectors and fixtures produce recurring toil	Diagnose and propose narrow repairs	Never silently weaken assertions or accept a new baseline without review

Testing layer	Traditional pressure	Agentic contribution	Evidence and guardrail
UI and E2E	Brittle selectors and expensive manual journeys	Plan, navigate and verify user flows with semantic element understanding	Assert accessible, user-visible behavior and retain reviewable traces
Security and compliance	Periodic checklists and static scans miss runtime behavior	Interactive fuzzing, permission and prompt-injection tests	Run in controlled scope; require reproducible findings and deterministic release policy

Important qualification


“One hundred percent automated” is best treated as an aspiration for test creation on suitable work, not as the quality claim. The platform should measure meaningful requirement and risk coverage, defect detection, mutation survival, compatibility, flake rate, missed test impact, escaped defects, and human trust. A generated test suite is evidence only when it can fail for the right reasons.

5.7. Operations becomes an agentic inner loop



TL;DR. Operations is not a downstream activity — it is the fastest inner loop where AI creates evidence for the rest of the platform. Agents assemble incident context, correlate telemetry and changes, propose diagnostics, execute allowlisted mitigations, and turn incidents into runbook and evaluation-suite updates. Progression from **observe** through **bounded autonomy** uses the canonical T0-T4 ladder (see Autonomy tier); tier definitions live once, in Appendix N.

Viewpoint



Agentic operations inner loop. Telemetry drives diagnosis, bounded remediation, recovery verification, evidence capture, and continuous improvement.

Operations is not the final handoff after software is built. It is a continuous engineering loop in which production evidence changes what the organization deploys, tests, designs, and prioritizes. With governed access to source, topology, deployment history, observability, incident systems, security findings, runbooks, configuration, and infrastructure actions, agents can assess change risk, detect weak signals earlier, investigate issues, test competing explanations, recommend or perform bounded remediation, verify recovery, and turn the outcome into new tests and platform knowledge. Human accountability remains explicit, especially where an action changes customer traffic, data, regional posture, or security state.

Concrete proposal Build an operations capability in stages: continuous system review and change-risk assessment; conversational investigation and evidence assembly; recommendations with predicted impact; approval-gated runbook execution; and bounded autonomous remediation for proven, reversible actions. Keep probabilistic reasoning separate from a deterministic actuation control plane that enforces identity, scope, preconditions, rollback, verification, rate limits, and emergency stop.

Business driver and expected gain The gain is not only lower incident toil. Earlier detection reduces customer impact; stronger change assessment prevents incidents; progressive deployment limits blast radius; faster investigation reduces time to understand; safe automatic remediation reduces time to restore; and continuous resilience review finds zone, region, dependency, capacity, and security shortfalls before a real event exposes them.

Organizational requirements SRE, service owners, platform engineering, security, release engineering, and incident management must jointly own service health models, SLOs, dependency and topology data, action catalogs, authority tiers, escalation, rollback, verification, game days, and

the continuing role of the incident commander. Every production action needs a named owner and an evidence-retention policy.

Cost and investment Investment includes reliable telemetry and topology, service ownership data, deploy and incident integrations, executable runbooks, isolated operational tooling, an actuation control plane, resilience environments, fault-injection capacity, evaluation using past incidents, and around-the-clock ownership. Multi-zone and multi-region validation also consumes real infrastructure and specialist engineering time; AI can reduce analysis effort but does not remove redundancy cost.

Risks and safeguards False root-cause claims, malicious log content, correlated failure, and unsafe fleet-wide action can increase incident impact. Preserve hypotheses as hypotheses, require preflight and post-action checks, use cohorts and canaries, and support immediate downgrade or stop.

Relationship to the wider plan Operations closes the lifecycle loop. Telemetry, incidents, rollback outcomes, and runbooks become context for future development, testing, risk assessment, support, and orchestration policy.

Supporting material Datadog documents AI-assisted investigation; Google sources describe canary deployment, change controls, and graduated operational autonomy. Splunk documents natural-language assistance for operational queries. See [R20–R24].

5.7.1. Five operating responsibilities, and a sixth that closes the loop

The operating loop has five related responsibilities: prevent avoidable failure, deploy changes safely, detect abnormal behavior early, investigate and explain what is happening, and restore service through controlled action. A sixth responsibility closes the loop by converting incidents, near misses, and successful interventions into tests, runbooks, architecture changes, and evaluation cases.

5.7.2. Agents can connect a weak signal to a recent change before a threshold fires

Agents can continuously review code, infrastructure definitions, runtime configuration, dependency health, certificate and secret expiry, capacity trends, error-budget burn, replication lag, backup freshness, queue growth, saturation, unusual permission changes, and divergence between regions or zones. They can connect a weak runtime signal with a recent deploy or configuration change before a static threshold fires. The output should include evidence, confidence, affected services and customers, predicted urgency, and the next safe diagnostic action.

Continuous review should also search for latent problems: single-zone dependencies hidden inside a nominally multi-zone service; a passive region that lacks capacity; an untested failover path; inconsistent configuration or schema versions; a recovery procedure that depends on the failed control plane; missing telemetry; excessive retry amplification; and security controls that differ across regions. Findings should become owned work, not another untriaged dashboard.

5.7.3. Safe automatic actions are narrow, observable, reversible, and already understood

Suitable automatic actions are narrow, observable, reversible, and already understood operationally. Examples include restarting or replacing an unhealthy instance or pod; scaling a constrained service; rescheduling work away from an unhealthy node or zone; shifting a limited share of traffic to healthy capacity; rolling back a release or configuration; disabling a feature flag; activating load shedding, rate limiting, a circuit breaker, or a degraded-service mode; draining a bad host; quarantining a workload; refreshing a stale cache or search index; reconciling configuration drift; rotating or revoking a compromised credential; blocking a known malicious source; replaying an idempotent dead-letter queue; and opening a tested dependency or configuration patch across affected repositories.

Higher-consequence actions need stronger gates. Promoting a database replica, initiating regional failover, restoring data, changing consistency behavior, dropping or replaying non-idempotent messages, modifying network or identity policy, or applying a fleet-wide change can create data loss or correlated failure. An agent may prepare and simulate the plan, but execution should require deterministic preconditions and, where the risk warrants it, explicit human approval.

5.7.4. A change-risk assessment should change the release plan, not just annotate it

Before deployment, an agent can combine the diff, service criticality, ownership, dependency graph, database and schema changes, permission changes, affected customer paths, historical incidents, current error budget, regional health, test evidence, and rollback readiness into a change-risk assessment. The assessment should change the release plan: low-risk work may use a faster path, while uncertain or high-impact work receives a smaller canary, longer observation, additional tests, specialist review, or a scheduled window.

During deployment, the agent can compare the canary with controls across technical and business signals, detect asymmetric behavior by tenant, zone, region, version, or dependency, and recommend advance, pause, rollback, or containment. Deterministic deployment limits remain authoritative. AI contributes interpretation and adaptive investigation; it should not be the only mechanism protecting production.

5.7.5. AI can find paper resilience — redundancy that exists in a diagram and has never been exercised




Figure 4. Paper resilience

The same architecture as designed and as built. Redundancy that exists in a diagram and has never been exercised under realistic load and failure sequencing is the thing continuous review is looking for.

AI can help review whether multi-zone and multi-region designs actually meet their intended recovery objectives. It can trace critical user journeys through regional and zonal dependencies; compare active-active, active-passive, warm-standby, and restore-based strategies; expose shared failure domains; assess replication, data-loss, latency, capacity, and control-plane assumptions; and generate a prioritized resilience-gap plan. The business requirement must still define the target RTO, RPO, availability, data residency, and acceptable degraded behavior.

Agents can design and coordinate fault-injection tests for loss of an instance, node, zone, region, dependency, network path, identity provider, queue, database replica, or observability component. They can verify traffic evacuation, failover capacity, state convergence, alerting, customer experience, rollback, and return to normal operation, then draft fixes for shortfalls. This is particularly valuable for identifying paper resilience: redundancy that exists in a diagram but has not been exercised under realistic load and failure sequencing. See [R33, R34].

5.7.6. Further operational opportunities converge on the same decision inbox

Additional opportunities include customer-impact estimation and affected-tenant identification; automated incident timelines and handovers; status-page and stakeholder communication drafts; error-budget and change-freeze recommendations; capacity and cloud-cost optimization that respects resilience headroom; compliance evidence collection; detection of recurring toil and automation candidates; validation that alerts remain actionable; and comparison of an incident with previous events across the fleet. These capabilities should converge in the same decision inbox used elsewhere in the lifecycle so that operators receive an owned question with context, options,

risk, and a safe next action.

5.7.7. Fleet-wide work magnifies leverage and correlated failure equally

Fleet-wide operational work is one of the most productive homes for ambient agents — those triggered by schedule, signal, or continuous condition rather than by a per-request user. the ambient-agents chapter develops the ambient surface in full; the operational patterns below are among its Phase 1 candidates.

A newly disclosed vulnerability can initiate a cross-fleet workflow: understand the advisory, identify affected dependencies and reachable services, rank exposure, draft compatible upgrades, add or update tests, open pull requests, and track remediation. A tracing library or logging-agent schema change can be rolled through cohorts while the agent watches service health and pauses on regression. Cloud and Kubernetes usage can be analyzed for idle capacity, orphaned resources, or cheaper placement opportunities.

The important distinction is between analysis, change preparation, and autonomous actuation. Preparing evidence-backed PRs across thousands of repositories may be suitable earlier than merging them. Recommending cluster resizing is lower risk than executing it. Fleet-wide work magnifies both leverage and correlated failure, so representative canaries, cohort limits, ownership, rollback, and stop conditions are part of the capability—not later operational details.

5.7.8. Evidence-backed hypothesis generation, not guaranteed root-cause analysis

Natural language can remove query-language friction: an engineer asks for checkout-service 5xx errors over the last two hours, and the system generates and explains the corresponding Splunk or Datadog query. The deeper value is iterative investigation. The agent can correlate traces, logs, metrics, deployment events, database signals, source changes, topology, and similar historical incidents; update competing hypotheses as evidence arrives; and show the on-caller what supports or contradicts each one.

This should be described as evidence-backed hypothesis generation rather than guaranteed root-cause analysis. Datadog documents an observation-reasoning-action investigation loop across metrics, traces, logs, changes, source, and third-party systems, and explicitly allows an investigation to finish as inconclusive when evidence is insufficient. [R20] That is the behavior an enterprise platform should encourage: disclose uncertainty instead of manufacturing a cause.

5.7.9. AI augments progressive delivery; deterministic limits stay authoritative

During a canary, AI can compare multidimensional behavior—latency, error rate, resource usage, business outcomes, and dependency signals—with historical and control populations. It can detect subtle deviations, recommend whether to advance, halt, or roll back, and explain the evidence. Before deployment, it can combine a diff with ownership, dependency, incident, and migration history to flag changes that resemble past failures.

AI should augment proven progressive-delivery mechanics rather than replace them. Google Cloud documents phased canaries and metric-based deploy analysis, while its production change process

can pause or roll back when health signals fail. [R21][R22] Static safety limits, maximum traffic exposure, deterministic health gates, and a known rollback remain authoritative even when AI contributes anomaly detection or risk interpretation.

5.7.10. A resolved incident should leave behind a test, a runbook, or an evaluation case

Operational knowledge is fragmented across runbooks, incident records, Slack discussions, ticket histories, command traces, dashboards, and individual memory. AI can assemble a provisional runbook during a novel incident, summarize unresolved alerts and changes for an incoming shift, and reconstruct a time-ordered incident narrative. The human owner must validate commands and causal claims before provisional material becomes authoritative guidance.

This closes the organizational-knowledge loop. A resolved incident can create a regression test, alert improvement, new diagnostic tool, corrected service owner, revised runbook, safer paved road, or evaluation case. Google SRE describes capturing human incident trajectories as evaluation data and combining human-verified examples with continuous agent evaluation. [R23]

5.7.11. Operational authority moves on the same ladder as review and change

Operations is not a downstream activity that inherits whatever authority defaults the platform provides; it is an inner loop whose authority must be measured, promoted, and revoked on the same canonical five-tier autonomy ladder defined in the glossary. The ladder is the same one that governs review and change; the platform enforces one ladder, not several.

For the full operational T0–T4 tier definitions — with the agent's contribution, the human role that remains, and the controls required at each tier — see Appendix N. This chapter's contribution is the framing: operations is an inner loop, not a downstream activity, so an operational capability's authority tier is a first-class attribute of the capability, not an afterthought.

5.8. Measure verified outcomes and attention, not agent activity

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Decision-packet volume** — packets opened per accountable engineer per week. The primary throughput signal for the orchestrator layer.
- **Attention-per-packet** — median accountable-engineer minutes from packet-open to sign-off, per packet class. Trending downward with volume constant is the meter moving in the right direction; trending downward while volume rises requires pairing against comprehension-record completion.
- **Deduplication rate** — fraction of new packets the platform deduplicated against existing or resolved packets. High deduplication is the platform earning its keep against the interruption tax the industry has under-invested in solving.
- **Escalation rate** — fraction of packets that expired without action and escalated to a secondary

owner. Rising escalation signals attention is being routed away from work that needed it.

- **Auto-approval share by autonomy tier** — fraction of merged changes at each tier that were auto-approved under evidence. Grows on measured evidence per task class, never granted globally.
- **Comprehension-record completion rate on T2+ packets** — the quality-shaped counter-metric that keeps the throughput metrics honest.

The Autonomy Council reviews these six numbers per quarter, paired with the debt-trajectory metrics from the debt chapter.

Chapter 6. The maturity journey

the orchestrator chapter argues **what** the future developer platform is: an orchestration platform where engineers direct outcomes and agents perform bounded work under evidence. This chapter argues **how you get there** — and why the arrival is a journey rather than a launch.

Two dimensions of maturity move at different speeds. **Complexity** grows from a one-shot library upgrade to a multi-service feature that includes UI, data model change, and downstream migration. **Breadth** grows from a single repository to a coordinated change across dozens or hundreds of repositories inside one organisation or across a partner ecosystem. Both dimensions are the same journey — a spectrum of agent autonomy — travelled at the pace the platform, the repositories, and the organisation can safely absorb.

The far target is a spec for a large multi-service feature, with UI, planned and executed to deployment with minimum human interaction, humans intervening only on the consequential decisions. That is a north star, not a claim of what is shippable in the next twelve months. What **is** shippable in the next twelve months — the routine and mechanical slice that most engineering hours are spent on — is where the platform earns most of its return. Covering the 80/20 case well is a larger prize than solving the far target poorly.




Figure 5. The maturity matrix

*The maturity matrix. Rows are complexity bands (CVE bump through cross-repo sweep). Columns are the SDLC phases (trigger through validate). Cell shading is the autonomy tier viable **today** — green for auto-approvable, blue for agent-executed with human sign-off, amber for agent-assisted with heavy review, gray for target-state work still led by humans. The point is not any single cell — it is that the coloured region grows over time as MCP surfaces, A2A coordination, decision-inbox routing, and repository readiness mature together.*

6.1. Start from the pipeline you already have

The matrix describes a destination and says nothing about the thing an organisation is standing on. That thing is usually a complete lifecycle already — it just runs on people as the connective tissue.

Today a CVE lands and somebody reads the advisory, somebody else works out which services are exposed, a third person opens the tickets, an engineer per repository makes the change, CI runs, a reviewer looks, release goes out, and someone watches the dashboards. Every arrow in that sentence is a human carrying context from one tool to the next, and most of the elapsed time is in the arrows rather than the steps.

The assisted version, which most organisations now have, speeds up the **steps**. An engineer drafts the patch faster, writes the ticket faster, summarises the advisory faster. The arrows are untouched, which is why the aggregate improvement is so much smaller than the per-step improvement, and why the measured results are so much weaker than the felt ones.

What this document proposes changes the arrows. A durable work object carries the intent, the evidence and the decisions between stages, so the context does not have to be rebuilt by a person at each hop. That is the whole delta, and it is worth naming plainly because it sets what to look for when assessing a platform: not whether agents can do the steps — they can — but whether anything carries state across them.




Figure 6. Above: people carry the context. Below: the work object does, and the gaps close

The practical first move follows. Before scoring a single matrix cell, map the lifecycle you run today and mark every arrow a person is currently being paid to be. Those are the candidates, and they are usually not where the enthusiasm is.

6.2. Complexity and lifecycle phase decide what is automatable today

Viewpoint

The matrix is the platform's shared vocabulary for scoping any agent capability. A team saying "we've automated CVE bumps" is naming **row 1, columns 3–7 in green**. A team saying "we've begun agent-executed complex features with review" is naming **row 3, middle columns in blue**. The vocabulary makes ambitions and progress commensurable — nobody has to argue about whether their level of automation is "the same" as another team's.

The rows, from simplest to hardest:

- **CVE / library bump.** A dependency version change with tests and CI as evidence. The archetypal one-shot.
- **Small feature (single service).** A bounded change inside one service — new endpoint, new field, new metric — with contract and unit tests.
- **Complex feature (single service).** Cross-cutting logic change, data model migration, non-trivial concurrency — still within one service boundary.
- **Feature with UI.** Adds accessibility, browser variance, and visual regression concerns to the complex-feature case.
- **Cross-service feature.** Coordinated change across two or more services with the multi-service test problem in play.
- **Cross-repo sweep.** A single mandated change (CVE class, telemetry rollout, deprecation) applied across many repositories.

The columns are the SDLC phases the change moves through, from **trigger** (CVE alert, bug report, feature spec, incident postmortem) through **plan**, **implement**, **test**, **review**, **deploy**, and **validate** in production. A cell is one (complexity, phase) pair.

The matrix begins at the trigger, which means the work that produces a feature spec sits outside it — upstream of column one, on its own shorter ladder. the requirements and discovery chapter covers that half. Reading the two together matters for one reason: a matrix cell can reach a high tier while the specifications feeding it arrive unevidenced, and the tier map will look healthy the whole time.

Concrete proposal Score every proposed agent capability against the matrix before funding it. The score is (a) which cells it touches, (b) what autonomy tier it delivers in each cell, and (c) which platform prerequisites (MCP surface, skill, gateway policy, workspace class) it depends on. The score becomes the capability's public identity in the internal-platform roadmap and Autonomy Council decisions.

Business driver and expected gain Multiple empirical studies of open-source and enterprise commit distributions place the routine slice — small corrective changes plus simple adaptive changes plus mechanical sweeps — in the 70–85% range of engineering activity. See Appendix P for the sourcing (R3, R346, R353, and the commit-taxonomy line starting at R365). This document treats the **80/20 mark** as directional rather than as a pinned constant — the exact number varies by

organisation, team, and codebase — but the shape of the opportunity is consistent across studies: **the largest single lever is the top rows of the matrix, not the bottom**.

Investing in the top three rows first, and in the leftmost columns of the bottom three rows, yields the highest ratio of **verified outcomes delivered** to **scarce human attention consumed**. That is the meter the platform is measured on (the trust and governance chapter).

Organizational requirements The Autonomy Council owns the matrix. Every quarter it publishes the current **tier map** — which cell is at which autonomy tier, what evidence supported the last movement, and what will need to be true to move the next cell. The tier map is public inside the engineering organisation and is a first-order input to platform roadmap decisions.

How we measure this Metrics tied to this section (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Coverage share** — percentage of PRs, by count and by business-impact-weighted score, that fall inside cells currently shaded green or blue.
- **Tier-map movement per quarter** — how many (row, column) cells advanced one autonomy tier or better, and how many regressed.
- **Human-attention-per-verified-outcome, by cell** — average minutes of accountable engineer time spent per merged, verified change in each cell. The direction of change matters more than the absolute number.

6.3. The automatable region grows only as platform, repositories, and governance mature together




Figure 7. The maturity journey over time

Four panels showing what an accountable engineer's day looks like as the matrix fills in. Today, most work is local — the engineer juggles a couple of tasks on a laptop. Twelve months on, a few routine tasks run against ephemeral compute in the background. Eighteen to twenty-four months on, the engineer's primary interface is the decision inbox and a dashboard of agent tasks. In the target state, spec-to-deployment for the routine and mechanical bands runs mostly hands-off; the engineer intervenes on the consequential decisions.

Viewpoint

The value of the matrix is not the picture at any single moment. It is that the picture changes. The platform's job is to move cells rightward and downward over time as three things mature together: the MCP surfaces that let agents access enterprise systems (the foundations chapter), the A2A coordination that lets specialist agents cooperate under one decision packet, and the decision-inbox / autonomy-council governance that keeps human attention sharp on the consequential slice.

Two dynamics deserve to be named explicitly:

Auto-approval at the trivial band. At row 1 (CVE / library bump), the platform should not merely execute the change and notify a human — it should be able to **auto-merge under evidence** when the evidence is dispositive. The evidence includes vendor security advisories, the diff scope, tests before/after, CI green, no runtime signal degradation in canary, and a comprehension record that names the risk class. Auto-approval is not an abdication of human accountability — the Autonomy Council chartered the policy, and the auto-merged changes are still visible in the comprehension record and debt-delta accounting. It is a recognition that requiring a human keystroke on a change with overwhelming positive evidence **destroys** the value the platform was built to deliver.

The far target is a wish, and useful anyway. No one shipping today can plan and execute a large multi-service feature, with UI, spec-to-deployment, with minimum human interaction. Multiple prerequisites are unsolved — see the **open question** on multi-service testing later in this Part. But naming the target state matters because it disciplines every intermediate investment. Every capability shipped should be justified in terms of how much closer it moves the platform to that state, and how much of the 80/20 slice it captures on the way.

Concrete proposal Publish a **twelve-month journey plan** alongside the tier map. The journey plan states which cells the platform intends to advance, in what order, and what evidence will be considered dispositive for each advancement. The plan is public inside the engineering organisation and is refreshed quarterly with the tier map.

Business driver An unstated journey lets vendor promises, senior manager pet projects, and the loudest team's asks compete for platform attention on equal footing. A stated journey — grounded in the matrix — turns platform prioritisation into an evidence conversation. It also becomes the internal answer to the CFO's "where is the ROI on all this" question, in terms (cells advanced, coverage-share delta, human-attention-per-outcome delta) that a CFO can audit.

How we measure this * **Cells advanced per quarter**, and the ratio of **advancements** to **regressions**. * **Time from capability first-shipped to full auto-approval** for each row-1 subclass (the archetypal one-shot). * **Auto-approval rate at row 1**, and the **auto-approval blast radius** (average number of files, services, and downstream callers touched by an auto-merged change).

6.4. A repository cannot receive agent work it has no way to verify




Figure 8. Agentic readiness of the repository

Five tiers of repository readiness. Each tier unlocks the next class of automation. You cannot skip tiers — a repository at Tier 0 cannot receive agent-executed complex features because the prerequisites for verification and safe rollback are absent. Investing in tier lift is often the highest-leverage platform work available.

Viewpoint

The maturity matrix is a claim about the platform. The readiness ladder is a claim about each individual repository. Both must advance for the coloured region of the matrix to grow, because even a fully mature platform cannot safely run agent work against a repository that lacks the prerequisites — deterministic tests, runnable sandboxes, dependency manifests, safe rollback, and (critically at the higher tiers) MCP surfaces that expose the repository's capabilities to agents.

The five tiers:

- **Tier 0 — Agent-hostile.** No documentation of intent, flaky or absent tests, no sandbox, monolithic build. Agents cannot verify their changes. Human review cannot rely on tests. Any agent work here is a bet the platform should refuse.
- **Tier 1 — Agent-tolerable.** README exists. Some tests. Runs in a container. An agent can execute a bounded change and produce a diff, but verification depends on human judgment.
- **Tier 2 — Agent-friendly.** Good documentation of intent. Deterministic tests. Sandboxed builds. Explicit dependency manifests. An agent can execute row-1 and row-2 changes with verification the platform can trust.
- **Tier 3 — Agent-ready.** MCP surfaces expose the repository's capabilities. Capability queries return structured metadata. Rollback is a first-class operation. Dependency graph is queryable. Agents can execute row-3 and row-4 changes with human sign-off on the decision packet.
- **Tier 4 — Agent-native.** Full MCP + A2A. A multi-repository coordinated change harness exists.

Evidence chain integrated end-to-end. Sandboxed multi-service test environment. Agents can drive row-5 and row-6 changes.

Concrete proposal Score every repository against the ladder. Publish the score. Fund the **lift from Tier 1 to Tier 2** as the highest-return platform investment for organisations that have not yet done so — this is the tier boundary at which agent verification becomes trustworthy and the middle of the matrix opens up. Fund **Tier 3 investment** selectively, in repositories that anchor sweeps or coordinate across services. **Tier 4** is a strategic bet, not a universal target — only the repositories that anchor cross-service and cross-repo change need it.

6.4.1. Open question — multi-service testing before deployment

The prerequisite that gates the bottom rows of the matrix, and the top of the readiness ladder, is one the industry has not solved: **how do you test a coordinated change across many services before deployment, with confidence?** Partial answers exist — ephemeral environment provisioning, consumer-driven contract testing, hermetic staging pools, canary analysis with statistical acceptance — but none of them, alone or combined, gives a definitive verdict on a genuinely large multi-service change.

This document names multi-service pre-deployment testing as a **target-state wish**, not a solved problem. The platform must have an answer over time — likely a composition of the partial answers above plus mechanisms this document does not attempt to prescribe. Any team promising row-5 or row-6 automation today, without a credible answer to this open question, is either automating something smaller than they claim or accepting a risk profile their organisation should audit before it ships.

How we measure this * **Repository distribution across tiers** — histogram, updated quarterly. The direction of the histogram matters more than any single count. * **Tier lift per quarter** — repositories that advanced one tier or better, and repositories that regressed. * **Correlation of tier with matrix cell autonomy** — the check that ladder investment is actually paying off in matrix coverage.

6.5. In a sweep, coordination cost dominates the cost of any single change




Figure 9. Cross-repository sweep orchestration

A single mandate — a CVE patch, a tracing SDK rollout, an auth wrapper migration — fans out across every affected repository. Each repository gets an ephemeral agent workspace running the same change with the same evidence contract. The platform batches PRs into waves and produces one aggregated evidence pack for a human sign-off at the sweep level. The human decides once for hundreds of repositories, not once per PR.

Viewpoint

Cross-repository sweeps are the **broad-simple** corner of the matrix: row 6 (many repos), left-half columns (mechanical implementation and verification per repo). They deserve their own treatment because the coordination cost — not the per-repo change cost — dominates the human effort today. A CVE that requires touching one hundred and thirty repositories currently consumes the same hundred and thirty **human-hours of coordination attention** regardless of how trivial each change is. The platform's opportunity is to collapse the coordination attention into a single human decision at the sweep level, backed by an aggregated evidence pack.

The mechanism:

- One **sweep specification** — a machine-readable statement of the change to apply, the repositories in scope, the evidence criteria for each per-repo application, and the acceptance criteria for the sweep as a whole.
- One **fanout** across the dependency graph or a curated repository set. The platform discovers scope, checks readiness (Tier 2 or better for participation), and reports the reachable coverage.
- One **ephemeral workspace per repo**, running the same skill and reporting the same evidence.
- **Batched PR waves** — the platform groups PRs by risk class and timing so that a single reviewer sees one wave at a time, not a wall of hundred-and-thirty notifications.
- One **aggregated evidence pack** — a decision packet at the sweep level (blast radius, coverage

percentage, failure rate, notable exceptions requiring per-repo attention) that a human signs off once.

Concrete proposal Adopt sweeps as a first-class capability of the workspace broker (Appendix J) and the decision-packet system (the orchestrator chapter). Sweeps have their own autonomy tier — starting at **sweep-T1 (agent-executed per repo, human sign-off per repo)** for early adoption and progressing to **sweep-T3 (agent-executed with a single sweep-level sign-off)** as evidence accumulates.

Business driver Sweeps are the most under-served corner of the matrix in the industry pitch. Most agent-development tools address the **narrow-complex** corner (a smart pair-programmer for one file at a time). The economics of the **broad-simple** corner are unusually attractive because the human coordination cost is the dominant cost. Halving the coordination overhead for CVE waves alone can free a meaningful fraction of the security-response workforce for work that is not toil.

Risks and safeguards The primary risk is **sweep-level errors that propagate through the fanout** — a bad change applied to one hundred and thirty repositories at once. Safeguards:

- Sweeps **must** progress through a canary set (typically 3–5% of scope) before the general fanout, with mandatory hold-time and observability review.
- Sweep-level rollback is a first-class operation and must be demonstrated in a preproduction environment before the sweep is authorised.
- The sweep-level decision packet includes an explicit **failure budget** — the number of per-repo failures the sweep tolerates before automatic pause and human escalation.

How we measure this * **Sweep throughput** — sweeps executed per quarter, by class. * **Coordination-hour reduction** — human hours consumed per sweep, compared to the pre-platform baseline for the same class of change. * **Sweep failure and rollback rate** — sweeps that hit the failure budget and paused, sweeps that required rollback, and the root-cause distribution.

6.6. End to end first, then widen the frontier

The matrix invites a reading it does not intend: that the job is to shade cells, and any cell will do. Read that way an organisation lights up **plan** across every complexity band, declares progress, and has automated nothing anyone can ship.

The sequencing that works is the opposite shape. Take one narrow class of change — the lowest row, the one with the most instances and the clearest evidence — and prove it through the **entire** loop before widening anything. Trigger to plan to implementation to test to review to deploy to production validation, with the evidence chain intact at every hop. One row, all columns.

That first slice is worth more than its own volume, because it is the only way to find out which part of the platform is missing. A gap in the trigger substrate, a repository that cannot be verified, a review policy nobody wrote down, an evidence store with no schema — these are invisible while the work stops at the fourth column and unmissable the first time something has to reach production without a person carrying it. Every slice proves the whole loop, or exposes where the loop is not yet a loop.

The order to widen in is then a question about evidence rather than ambition: dependency and CVE work first, because the volume is high and the correct answer is checkable; then simple corrective changes; then bounded features; then the broader workflows. Each step inherits a loop that already closes, so the new work is the new work rather than the new work plus the plumbing.

The cost of the other approach is not just slower progress. An organisation that widens before it deepens ends up with many half-automated stages, each needing a human to carry work across the gap to the next — which is more attention spent, not less, and the platform's own meter says so.

6.7. This is a journey, not a rollout

The claims in this Part are only useful if the organisation reads them as **directional**. The platform will not be at the target state in twelve months. It will not be at the target state in twenty-four months. What it **will** be, if the matrix, the journey plan, the readiness ladder, and the sweep capability are all funded as **concurrent** investments, is meaningfully further along the journey than the alternative — which is a series of disconnected demos and vendor evaluations with no shared vocabulary and no measurement of progress.

The next Part turns to what has to be **built** to make any of this possible: the MCP-mediated foundations, the skills registry, the gateway, and the A2A coordination — the plumbing without which the matrix has no cells to shade.

Chapter 7. Requirements, discovery, and intent debt

Ask an engineering organisation where a feature came from and you get a ticket. Ask where the ticket came from and the trail goes cold about one hop later — a planning session, a conversation with a customer that two people remember differently, a slide from an offsite.

Everything downstream of the specification in this document carries evidence. Tests, review findings, deployment health, incident lineage, a comprehension record on anything consequential. The specification arrives with none. A pull request without tests is blocked by policy; a specification without evidence gets scheduled.

That asymmetry did not matter much when delivery was the expensive part. An organisation that could ship four things a quarter chose carefully, because choosing badly cost a quarter. The platform in this document is aimed at making delivery two to five times cheaper, which changes what the choosing is worth and does nothing at all to make it better.

This chapter is about the half of the lifecycle that happens before the specification exists: what product managers actually do to produce one, what changes when an agent can read every support ticket the company received last quarter before lunch, and what the platform owes that work.

7.1. The reading, the calls, and the argument are where the judgment lives

A product manager facing a renewal problem does roughly this. Pull the last six months of tickets for the accounts at risk and read a couple of hundred of them. Listen back to three or four sales calls. Talk to five customers, two of whom say something that contradicts the theory. Notice that the same workflow shows up in eleven tickets under four different descriptions. Write that up, size it, argue for it against six other things, and turn the survivor into acceptance criteria.

The artifacts this produces are familiar to engineering — opportunity briefs, PRDs, journey maps, user stories, acceptance criteria, prototypes. The reading, the calls, and the argument are not, and they are where the judgment lives.

Three practitioners define the modern version of this work. Marty Cagan frames it as answering four risks before spending engineering capacity: value, usability, feasibility, and business viability (R371). Teresa Torres makes it continuous rather than a phase, with weekly customer contact and a tree that keeps proposed solutions attached to the problems they claim to solve (R372). Jeff Patton supplies the line this chapter turns on: shared documents are not shared understanding, and the written artifact is a record of a conversation rather than a replacement for having had one (R375).

Patton’s distinction survives contact with agents badly. When the record takes thirty seconds to produce, the conversation it was supposed to record becomes optional, and nothing in the finished document says which happened.

7.2. Cheaper delivery multiplies the bets without improving the hit rate

Microsoft's experimentation platform reports that roughly a third of tested ideas improve the metric they were designed to improve. A third do nothing and a third make things worse (R373). Pendo's feature-adoption work puts around 80% of features in cloud products at rarely or never used (R374). Older feature-utilisation studies point the same way on weaker methodology, and the direction is not seriously disputed by anyone who has looked.

Hold those next to a platform that triples delivery throughput. The hit rate does not move; the number of bets placed at that hit rate does. Each miss then carries maintenance, a share of reviewer attention, and a claim on the roadmap for as long as it stays in the product.

The upside here is real, and it is not "choose better." Cheap delivery makes being wrong cheap, which is the only route to a better hit rate anyone has ever demonstrated: smaller bets, faster invalidation, more of them. The cheap-experiments discipline in the orchestrator chapter is the delivery-side half of that. This chapter is the input side.

7.3. The agent does the reading; the human does the choosing

Take the case above and run it through the platform, because the mechanisms only make sense against a specific piece of work.

Monday. Three enterprise accounts have flagged renewal risk. A retrieval agent pulls every ticket, call transcript, and session recording associated with those accounts for the last two quarters, plus the same material from the twenty accounts most similar to them by size and usage pattern. It returns clusters with counts, each one linked to the tickets underneath it. Nine hundred tickets become fourteen candidate themes in about an hour. Nobody has been convinced of anything yet.


Tuesday. The product manager reads the underlying tickets for the four largest clusters, discards two of them as artifacts of how the support team files rather than what customers experience, and finds the eleven-tickets-four-descriptions problem in cluster three. An agent drafts the brief, with every claim carrying the ticket IDs behind it and a count of how many distinct accounts appear — six, out of twenty-three. That number is the interesting part of the draft, and no agent decided it mattered.

Wednesday and Thursday. The product manager calls five of the six accounts. Three describe the problem the cluster found. Two describe something adjacent that the cluster had split across two other themes, because the words they used share no vocabulary with the ticket text. The brief gets rewritten by hand.

Friday. The opportunity is recorded as evidenced rather than validated — the signal is real and the fix is a guess — and the specification that follows says so. It goes to delivery with the ticket IDs, the call notes, the sample size, and the product manager's name attached.

Ten weeks later. Usage of the changed workflow is measured against the accounts the signal came from. If it moved, the opportunity closes as validated. If it did not, the invalidation is recorded

against the same object, and the next person who proposes it finds out what happened last time before they spend a quarter rediscovering it.



One renewal problem, five days. Blue is agent work — retrieval, clustering, drafting against citations. Green is the work that stays human: reading the source material, the calls, the choice, and the name on the outcome. The reading collapsed from weeks to an hour; the calls did not move.

The agent did the reading. The human did the choosing, made the calls, and owns the outcome. That division is the whole design, and it is the same division the rest of the platform applies to code.

7.4. The feedback corpus already exists, and nobody reads it

The material in that walkthrough already exists in every enterprise I have worked in, and mostly nobody reads it. Support tickets and resolution notes. Win/loss records and sales calls. Churn and renewal conversations. Session replays. Survey verbatims, community threads, feature requests, postmortems with customer impact, funnel telemetry. A quarter of it is more text than a product team can read in a year, and today the sampling is done by whoever is loudest in the Monday meeting.

High volume, unstructured, cheap to summarise and expensive to judge — the same shape as the work the platform already handles elsewhere. The adjacent pattern is in the ambient catalog as support triage (R.23), and the vendor space is mature enough that this is a build-or-buy decision rather than a research project (Enterpret R312, Kraftful R313, Unwrap R314, PostHog session-replay analysis R315, Productboard R104).


What the platform adds is the part vendors leave out: this material gets an owner, a schema, a freshness contract, and a retrieval path with the same permission model as everything else. A product manager asking why enterprise customers are churning should not get back verbatim text from tenants their role has no business reading, and the filter belongs at retrieval rather than on the way out.

7.5. What the customer agreed to travels with the recording

Research transcripts and call recordings are the most sensitive raw customer data most companies hold, and they sit with the teams least likely to have a threat model. Source code belongs to the company. An interview recording belongs to a person who agreed to something specific.

What they agreed to was a researcher listening and taking notes. Processing by a third-party model was not on the table, and the processing being useful does not widen the grant after the fact. So what the customer consented to travels with the recording from the moment it is captured, and it constrains retrieval and outbound calls the same way a data classification does.

Deletion is where this gets hard, and discovery is the worst case in the platform because synthesis is the entire point of the material.



Five derivatives from one recording, each one further from the source and closer to a person who will read it. All five inherit the deletion, which is why a discovery pipeline that cannot say where a quote came from cannot honour the request. A customer asks for their interview to be deleted. The recording goes. Left behind: its transcript, its embedding, the theme it was clustered into, the quote pulled into a brief, and the slide that quote reached. All five inherit the deletion, and a pipeline that cannot say where a given quote came from cannot honour the request.

7.6. T4 is closed upstream, because nothing can check a problem choice before the act

Discovery agents earn authority the same way every other agent in this document does: per task class, on measured evidence.

Tier	Upstream behaviour	Evidence that earns it
T0	Reads, summarises, clusters. Retrieves the material behind a question. No writes.	Retrieval scoping holds; citations resolve to real sources.
T1	Drafts a brief with every claim linked to the tickets or calls it came from. A named product manager owns and edits it.	Citation precision on sampled review; no unsourced claims.
T2	Proposes acceptance criteria, non-goals, and the test list against an approved outcome. A person signs before it reaches delivery.	Acceptance-criteria rework rate; sign-off recorded, not implied.
T3	Bounded writes inside one product area: files new material against existing opportunities, deduplicates, routes. Reversible.	Deduplication precision; reversal rate; area owner reviews the log.
T4	Not authorised.	—

T4 is closed here, and the reason is about evidence rather than nerve. A code change can be checked before it ships — tests, policy, a canary. A problem choice cannot: the thing that tells you whether it was right is the market, and it answers months later. Where nothing can close the loop before the act, a person signs.

One exception holds. An organisation running live experiments with metric guardrails and automatic rollback has built something that does check a choice before it commits, for a narrow class of change — copy, layout, thresholds, ordering. Those can run at T3 under the experiment's own kill switch, and the Autonomy Council names which classes qualify. That set is smaller than the

enthusiasm for it suggests; a guardrail on click-through does not catch a change that quietly trains customers out of a workflow.

7.7. Intent debt is work in flight nobody can explain the reason for

Comprehension debt is a reviewer who cannot explain the change. Cognitive debt is a team with no shared theory of the system. **Intent debt** is the third in the family: work in flight that nobody can explain the reason for, because the reason was never held by a person — only written down.

Naur's argument that a program is a theory in the developers' heads rather than a text file (R352) holds for the product too. A specification is a theory about a customer, held by the team that built it. When the theory was never built, only rendered, the team keeps shipping plausible things and loses the ability to say which ones matter.

The mechanism is new even if the failure is not. A brief drawn from three tickets reads exactly like one drawn from forty interviews, because the writing is no longer produced by the person who did or did not do the work. Reviewers used to catch thin thinking by its prose. That signal is gone, and the only one left is where the evidence came from — which means it has to be attached to the document rather than remembered by its author.

So the record carries the ticket IDs, the sample size, the segments represented, and the person who will defend it. And it carries one of four states: hypothesis, evidenced, validated, invalidated. Committing to a hypothesis is a normal thing to do; committing to one while believing it is validated is how a quarter disappears.

Synthetic participants deserve naming before someone buys one. Simulating customer interviews with generated personas is appealing to a team under discovery pressure, and the research does not support it: models match some aggregate human judgments and diverge on others, with no reliable way to know in advance which kind of question yours is (R376). It reproduces the result from METR, the Model Evaluation and Threat Research group (R354), one stage upstream — faster work, weaker contact with reality, and a bill that arrives when the launch lands flat. Rehearsing an interview guide against a simulated participant is fine. Recording one as evidence is not.

7.8. The prototype is the specification, not a head start on the code

The organizational chapter notes that a product manager can now build a working prototype. Make that a supported path rather than a curiosity: the same ephemeral workspace engineering uses, at T0, with the auth wrappers and tenant scoping already wired, torn down on the same schedule.

A prototype answers usability and value questions a document can only assert, and its acceptance criteria feed the test generation described in the orchestrator chapter. Three things keep it from becoming a debt source:

- Promoting prototype code into a real change without the readiness ladder is how debt enters from the product side, and it arrives owned by someone who cannot maintain it. The prototype


is the specification.

- Producing a plausible interface got cheaper much faster than evaluating one did. A prototype that looks finished is not evidence that the interaction works — the shallow-familiar problem the organizational chapter describes for engineers, arriving in product.
- A prototype pointed at a production tenant is an egress event regardless of who built it.

7.9. Signal and opportunity sit in front of the specification

Appendix K gains two objects in front of the outcome, with their fields listed there. A **signal** is one piece of customer or operational evidence with its source, date, tenant, segment, consent, and retention. An **opportunity** is a clustered problem statement with the signals underneath it, a sample size, an owner, and a validation state.

The lineage then runs end to end — signal, opportunity, specification, work item, execution task, change set, decision packet, release, operational event, learning — and the learning step writes back to the opportunity instead of stopping at the platform.



The evidence chain with its upstream half attached. The two blue objects are new; everything from the specification rightward already existed. The dashed return is the part that was missing — what production learned lands against the opportunity that proposed it, so the next person to raise the same idea finds the answer. Two rules come with it: nothing enters delivery without a named owner and a validation state, and an invalidated opportunity keeps its evidence.

Three questions become a query rather than an excavation. Which customer signal motivated the change behind this incident. What shipped for the accounts that churned, versus what they asked for. Which specifications entered delivery with nothing linked at all — the one that can be enforced at the gate.

7.10. What to build, and what to watch

Five pieces, in the order they pay back:

1. **The feedback corpus as a managed repository** — owner, schema, freshness, retrieval path, provenance, retirement — holding tickets, transcripts, recordings, verbatims, and telemetry summaries, with retrieval scoped by tenant and by consent.
2. **Product and support tools behind the MCP gateway** (R104, R312–R315), so retrieving customer voice carries the same identity, scoping, quota, and audit as a code search.
3. **An upstream tier map**, published and reauthorised quarterly alongside the engineering one, with T4 closed and any experimentation exception named per change class.

4. **Workspaces for product and design**, at T0, on the existing broker.
5. **Validation state and signal links on every specification** entering delivery, reported next to the debt trajectory the Autonomy Council already reviews.

Platform Engineering builds the repository, the gateway integrations, and the workspace profile. Product Operations owns the schema and the consent classification. The Autonomy Council authorises the tier map. The cost is modest against the rest of the programme: the material is text, the agents are continuous low-burn, and the expensive part is the retrieval and consent plumbing rather than the inference.

Three failure modes are worth watching from the first sprint. A system that clusters customer conversations at volume is one permission change away from profiling individuals, and the distance is a policy rather than a rewrite. Clustering also amplifies whatever bias the material already has — customers who file tickets are systematically not the customers quietly leaving, and a synthesis engine states the resulting picture with more confidence than a human reader would. And if agents absorb the reading while customer-contact hours stay flat, the organisation has automated the activity that produces senior product judgment, which is the learning-pathway collapse the organizational chapter identifies for junior engineers, arriving in a different function.

7.11. Signal traceability is the one upstream metric you can enforce at the gate

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Signal-traceability rate** — fraction of specifications entering delivery with at least one linked signal. Cheap to instrument, and the one that can be enforced at the gate.
- **Validation-state mix at commitment** — share of committed work that is hypothesis, evidenced, or validated. A healthy portfolio carries hypotheses deliberately; the failure is not knowing which is which.
- **Idea hit rate** — fraction of shipped changes that moved the metric they were meant to move. Microsoft's third (R373) is a reference point, not a target; the value is in knowing your own number.
- **Feature-usage share at 90 days** — fraction of shipped features with meaningful usage three months on, against the 80% rarely-used baseline (R374).
- **Specification rework rate** — fraction materially rewritten after implementation began. Separates discovery that stopped too early from delivery that started too late.
- **Signal-to-decision latency** — median time from material arriving to appearing in a committed opportunity or being set aside.
- **Cluster acceptance rate** — fraction of agent-produced clusters a product manager accepts without material reframing. Falling acceptance means the clustering is fitting the corpus rather than the customer.
- **Customer-contact hours per product manager** — the counter-metric. If reading time falls and contact hours do not rise, the platform bought throughput on the activity that was producing the judgment.

- **Consent violations** — retrievals or outbound calls against material outside what the customer agreed to. Zero is the only acceptable number; anything else is an incident.

Nine metrics, and the first one carries most of the weight. It costs a field on an existing object, it is hard to argue with, and it turns the claim this chapter makes into something the platform can enforce rather than recommend.

Part Two — What the platform provides

Two chapters on the layer beneath every stage of the lifecycle. First the connective tissue: MCP as the single path to enterprise systems, A2A for multi-agent work, and the trigger and context machinery that decides when an agent runs and with what. Then the capability layer built on top of it — the skills, plugins, and commands an organisation shares with itself, which steer how work is done rather than bounding what is permitted.

Chapter 8. Platform foundations for agentic work

the orchestrator chapter established that engineers move from execution to orchestration and that human attention becomes the scarce resource. This chapter names the platform substrate that orchestration depends on. Agents need current organizational knowledge, discoverable and governed tools, safe execution environments, and support paths that can resolve missing context or capability. These are runtime dependencies of useful agent work, not optional documentation improvements.

This part explains how knowledge, paved roads, the Model Context Protocol (MCP), REST, agent-to-agent collaboration (A2A), gateways, developer portals, and support services combine into an internal ecosystem. Each mechanism should be judged by whether it helps an agent complete more valid turns without hiding authority, provenance, or ownership — the net-verified-outcome standard set out in the one-page argument.

8.1. Paved roads must become agent accessible

Viewpoint

Mature engineering organizations already have internal developer portals and paved roads. A human can enter a few details and create a repository, scaffold a service, connect CI/CD, register ownership, and provision standard infrastructure. These systems are not necessarily AI, but they embody years of operational and security learning.



Figure 10. The prompt as a new front door

The paved path is the internal developer portal, carrying years of security and operational learning. The worn track is what happens when the prompt can reach the building and the paved road cannot.

The next step is to make those capabilities accessible from the developer's prompt. An agent should be able to retrieve internal documentation, discover the approved SDK, ask the service catalog who owns a dependency, or invoke the same service-creation path used by the portal. Otherwise the prompt becomes a new front door that bypasses the organization's best investments.

This does not mean wrapping every web page in a chatbot. It means exposing stable, well-described capabilities. The point-and-click portal can remain a valuable human surface over the same underlying contracts.

A peer example. Spotify's Backstage is the canonical implementation: their Golden Paths encode approved templates, ownership, and lifecycle inside a service catalog beneath the human portal. An AI-native platform should expose the same catalog and template APIs as MCP tools so agents scaffold services through the paved road rather than re-inventing it in a prompt (R356).

Concrete proposal Expose high-value platform capabilities through stable, well-described MCP or REST interfaces and publish approved specialist agents through A2A where stateful delegation adds value. Place enterprise policy at the access boundary.

Business driver and expected gain If the prompt becomes a new front door but cannot reach approved platform capabilities, agents will bypass years of security and operational learning or send the developer back to manual work.

Organizational requirements Capability owners need publication standards, versioning, support obligations, permission models, evaluation, and deprecation processes. Security and platform teams must jointly operate catalogs and gateway policy.

Cost and investment Costs include interface hardening, MCP servers, A2A endpoints, gateway infrastructure, identity integration, observability, and lifecycle support. Reuse the contracts beneath existing portals to avoid parallel implementations.

Risks and safeguards Credential sprawl, brittle interfaces, tool poisoning, excessive permissions, recursive delegation, and incompatible versions can undermine the benefit. Prefer least privilege, short-lived credentials, signed provenance, loop limits, revocation, and documented REST fallback.

Relationship to the wider plan Agent-accessible paved roads join knowledge, tool interfaces, orchestration, and governance. MCP and documented REST expose capabilities; A2A supports collaboration with independently operated specialist agents; gateways apply cross-cutting controls.

Supporting material The MCP and A2A specifications support complementary agent-to-tool and agent-to-agent interaction models. A2A reported broad ecosystem support in 2026, though adoption should still be evaluated workflow by workflow. See [R9, R10, R29–R32].

8.1.1. What agent-accessible capability demands of the people who design it

- Capabilities need names and descriptions an agent can distinguish.
- Permissions and the acting identity must survive the hop from prompt to tool.
- Errors must explain whether the agent should retry, change input, use another path, or ask a human.
- The paved road must remain easier than the workaround.

- The organization needs to know which capabilities agents actually choose and where they fail.

8.1.2. A gateway is what makes agent tool use governable

Viewpoint

If engineers use MCP services to reach internal tools and data, those connections need the same kind of governance expected elsewhere in the enterprise ecosystem. Direct agent-to-server connections can otherwise create a parallel access path with scattered credentials, inconsistent controls, and little central visibility. An MCP gateway belongs in the developer-platform picture because it provides a governed entry point between engineering agents and the MCP services they consume.

The gateway should centralize access control, apply least-privilege policy to agents and tools, inspect interactions for threats such as poisoned tool descriptions or malicious returned instructions, and record tool discovery, parameters, and execution results for investigation and audit. The goal is not simply traffic routing. It is to make agent tool use governable at enterprise scale.


The decision is not binary, and treating it as binary is what makes a gateway hated. An agent proposes an action carrying a principal, a task and a target; the control plane answers with one of four things, not two:

- **Allow.** The rule is satisfied and the action proceeds. Most traffic, and the case that has to be fast.
- **Deny.** The rule is violated. The agent is told which one, in terms it can act on, so the next attempt is a corrected attempt rather than a retry.
- **Require evidence.** The action is permissible once something is shown — a passing suite, a provenance attestation, a fresh scan, a comprehension record. This is the outcome that does the most work and is the one usually missing. It converts a refusal into a task the agent can complete on its own.
- **Route an approval.** The rule cannot settle it, so the gateway opens a decision packet against a named owner and the work suspends rather than failing. The distinction from a denial matters to the engineer waiting on it: nothing has been rejected, something has been asked.

A gateway with only allow and deny pushes every interesting case into deny, and an agent that cannot tell "you may not" from "not yet" from "someone has to look" will retry all three identically.

Technical boundary

The current MCP specification does include an HTTP authorization profile based on OAuth mechanisms. [R10] The more precise claim is therefore that MCP does not, by itself, supply the complete enterprise governance system: organization-wide inventory, centralized policy, identity and credential mediation, tool- or argument-level enforcement, inspection, unified observability, lifecycle control, and revocation across many MCP servers. Gateway products and emerging architectures address that broader operational gap. [R13–R18]



MCP gateway trust boundary. Identity, authorization, inspection, limits, and audit govern every path from agents to enterprise capabilities.


8.1.3. MCP and REST change the agent inner loop

Viewpoint

The largest developer-experience effect is not the protocol itself. It is the longer inner loop that becomes possible when an agent can reach the systems surrounding the code. Without tools, the agent produces a suggestion and returns control to the developer. With governed access to tools and data, it can search for relevant code, inspect documentation, read a Jira ticket and its history, retrieve architecture decisions from Confluence, create or configure resources through the developer portal, run tests, inspect Splunk or another operational system, compare the result with the intended behavior, consult a UI design source, and continue working. Several turns of observation, action, and verification can happen before human intervention is necessary.

MCP should be enabled wherever it provides a reliable, discoverable agent-facing capability. It should not become a protocol mandate. Well-documented REST interfaces may be more robust or less brittle for some tools and agents; in practical use, a documented REST interface may prove more reliable than a fragile MCP integration. That is a practical observation rather than a universal product claim. The objective is agent-accessible capability with clear semantics, strong governance, and good failure behavior; MCP and REST are complementary ways to reach it.

8.1.4. More turns help only while each one yields trustworthy evidence



This loop is virtuous only when each action yields trustworthy evidence and the next step remains bounded. More turns are not automatically better: the orchestrator still needs budgets, stopping conditions, loop detection, and clear rules for escalation.

8.1.5. Two families of capability, and the internal one matters more

The MCP surface an organisation ends up with has two halves, and they are worth naming separately because they are funded, governed, and valued differently.

The first is what the organisation already buys: source control, work management, collaboration, observability, security tooling, release and feature management, artifact stores, CI. These arrive as vendor MCP servers and are largely a procurement and integration question. A vendor may publish several servers or several tool sets; nothing guarantees one server per application, and an inventory built on that assumption will be wrong.

The second is built in-house, and it is the half that encodes how **this** organisation engineers software — the paved roads, reachable from the prompt:

- Retrieve the approved implementation example, or the architectural context behind a decision.
- Find the owner and the escalation path for a service.
- Discover the sanctioned SDK; create a compliant service.
- Provision an agent workspace, or a test dataset.
- Run the approved integration suite; fetch the design-system guidance.
- Open a canary; execute an operational runbook.

Golden-example retrieval deserves particular attention, because it shows that the boundary is not only about actions. A capability that returns the organisation's own approved implementation of a pattern is supplying authorised context, and that is often worth more to the output than any action the agent could take.




Figure 11. Capability rings, with governance at the centre

The nesting is the argument. Vendor capabilities are the outer ring and mostly a procurement question; the internal paved roads inside them are what encode how this organisation engineers software. Governance sits at the centre rather than around the outside, because a ring drawn around the ecosystem still lets anything inside it call anything else. There is one way in — every call resolves identity, delegated authority, policy, audit, cost, and revocation before it reaches a capability, and what comes back is a bounded capability rather than a credential.

8.1.6. Expose governed outcomes, not application surfaces

The common failure is mechanical: a work-management system has a hundred and fifty REST endpoints, so the organisation publishes a hundred and fifty tools. The result is an enormous

surface that no agent selects from well (the soft-rails chapter carries the measurements on what happens to selection accuracy as a catalogue grows), and that encodes the vendor's data model rather than the organisation's intent.

The useful shape is smaller and named for outcomes. `get_work_context`, `record_decision`, `update_delivery_status` — rather than the CRUD surface underneath them. `create_agent_workspace`, `provision_test_dataset`, `deploy_canary` — rather than several dozen infrastructure APIs. The tool boundary is a place to state what the organisation supports, and a mirror of an application's API states nothing.


8.1.7. MCP is a boundary, not the architecture

MCP is doing useful work in this document and should not be mistaken for the thesis. The durable abstractions are discoverable capabilities, organizational context, delegated authority, policy, evidence, work objects, execution substrates, orchestration, traceability, and human decisions. MCP is one current way to make the first of those reachable.

The protocol will change; a successor may replace it. An architecture that survives that is one where the capability boundary is an implementation detail of something more durable — which is also why "number of MCP servers" is a poor maturity metric, and why this document does not use it.

8.1.8. A2A extends the inner loop across agents

Viewpoint



Governed A2A collaboration. A coordinating agent discovers specialists, delegates bounded work, recombines verified artifacts, and escalates excess authority.

A2A appears to be an important part of the agentic SDLC ecosystem because the workflow will not always remain inside one agent or one vendor's runtime. An orchestrating agent may need to delegate a bounded task to a specialist coding, testing, security, design, or operations agent; exchange context and artifacts with it; follow a long-running task; and incorporate the result into the wider plan. A shared agent-to-agent protocol makes that collaboration less dependent on proprietary point-to-point integrations.

Relationship to MCP and REST

MCP and documented REST interfaces connect an agent to tools, data, and focused capabilities. A2A connects independent agents to one another across framework, runtime, organizational, or vendor boundaries. The distinction is useful shorthand: MCP and REST support vertical integration from an agent into its working environment, while A2A supports horizontal collaboration among agents. The protocols can be nested. A testing agent reached through A2A may use MCP internally to obtain source context, start an ephemeral environment, run CI, and retrieve evidence.

Supporting evidence and qualification

A2A is a Linux Foundation hosted open standard originally contributed by Google. Its specification covers capability discovery through Agent Cards, messages, artifacts, task state, streaming, and asynchronous work without requiring agents to expose their internal reasoning or tools. In April 2026, the Linux Foundation reported support from more than 150 organizations, integrations across Google, Microsoft, and AWS platforms, and production use in several industries. [R29–R31] This is strong evidence of ecosystem momentum, but "foundational industry standard" should remain a dated assessment rather than an assumption that adoption is universal or technically settled.

Governance implications

A2A broadens the gateway problem. Governance must cover not only which tool an agent may call, but also which remote agent it may discover, what task it may delegate, which user authority and credentials cross the boundary, what artifacts may return, how budgets and recursion limits apply, and how the organization revokes trust. Delegation must preserve or reduce the initiating user's authority; it must never amplify it merely because another agent performs the work.

Limits of the approach

A2A is an interoperability mechanism, not the orchestration strategy itself. It does not choose the plan, allocate the reasoning budget, decide when humans approve a consequential action, or guarantee the quality of another agent. A single orchestrator with private subagents may not need A2A at all. The protocol becomes most valuable when agents are independently operated, stateful, long-running, or separated by ownership and vendor boundaries.

8.2. Organizational knowledge becomes runtime context



TL;DR. Enterprise-specific engineering knowledge (approved SDKs, service templates, ADRs, runbooks, ownership records) is a **runtime dependency** of

> useful agent work, not documentation. Treat it as a supply chain — owners, versions, provenance, tests, permissions, retirement. The same governed knowledge should feed generation, review, testing, support, and operations; anything less lets stale guidance scale across the fleet.

Viewpoint


A sufficiently large organization has its own ways of building software. A team may require an approved Spring security component around REST controllers, an internal Kafka wrapper rather than direct Kafka usage, or an OpenAPI-first approach that generates controllers. There are SDKs, code styles, architecture decisions, service ownership records, runbooks, approved examples, and security practices that a general model cannot infer reliably.

This material has traditionally lived in wikis, developer documentation, tribal knowledge, examples, and point-and-click portals. In an AI-native lifecycle, it must reach the agent inside the task. A defect-fixing agent running in an agent workspace should not make “industry average” choices when the organization already has a supported paved road.

The same knowledge should participate in generation, review, testing, migration, support, and operations. If a security standard changes, the organization should not separately update a wiki, onboarding deck, reviewer checklist, prompt snippet, and runbook with no assurance that they agree.


Implications

The phrase “organizational knowledge as a runtime dependency” captures the idea. Skills can be thought of as compiled organizational knowledge: policy, conventions, examples, and procedures transformed into something agents can apply. The metaphor is useful, but it implies lifecycle responsibilities—ownership, provenance, freshness, permissions, tests, and retirement.



Organizational knowledge as runtime context. Governed sources are curated, evaluated, permission-filtered, and improved through verified outcomes.

Organizational knowledge as a runtime dependency



Context flow. The model is not the organization's intelligence; governed internal knowledge is supplied at the point of work.

Concrete proposal Treat engineering knowledge as a governed runtime supply: identify authoritative sources, assign owners, version important guidance, retrieve only task-relevant material, and record which context influenced each outcome.

Business driver and expected gain Generic models do not know an enterprise's approved libraries, architectural decisions, ownership, or operational history. Missing this context creates rework, policy violations, and plausible solutions that do not fit the organization.

Organizational requirements Architecture, security, platform, service teams, and documentation owners must curate canonical guidance and resolve conflicts. A knowledge product owner should govern freshness, access, feedback, and retirement.

Cost and investment Investment covers content cleanup, metadata, indexing, retrieval, permissions, provenance, evaluation, and ownership. Ongoing maintenance can exceed initial technology cost if source quality is poor.

Risks and safeguards Stale, contradictory, overshared, or poisoned context can scale mistakes across the fleet. Enforce source authority and permissions, expose citations, evaluate retrieval, and provide a route to correct the underlying source.

Relationship to the wider plan The knowledge supply serves generation, review, testing, support, security, and operations. MCP, REST, retrieval, skills, and portals are delivery mechanisms; ownership, freshness, provenance, and evaluation make the knowledge dependable.

Supporting material MCP formalizes resources, prompts, and tools, while current context-engineering practice emphasizes careful context selection and tool design. The supply-chain framing remains this document's synthesis. See [R9–R11].

8.3. Organizational latency is the time it takes the right knowledge to reach the work

Viewpoint


Documentation is only one part of how knowledge reaches an engineer. In a large organization, developers often need to discover the right Slack channel, wait across time zones, find the current owner, and reconstruct a problem for a scarce expert. The cost is not just support effort. The entire delivery flow pauses while the right knowledge is located.

An AI-native platform can attempt self-service first: retrieve the relevant knowledge, inspect the actual failure, run safe diagnostics, and propose a known remediation. When that is insufficient, it should route the issue to the correct person with the task context already assembled. Once resolved, the answer should improve documentation, routing, skills, or diagnostics so the organization does not pay the same latency repeatedly.

Implications

"Organizational latency" is the elapsed time required for the right knowledge—documented, encoded in tools, or embodied in people—to reach the work. This is broader than developer support ticket time. It connects the attention thesis, ownership, internal platforms, and organizational learning.

Developer support and organizational latency



Developer support loop. Self-service and AI assistance precede a context-rich escalation; the resolution improves the system.

Concrete proposal Create a support agent that starts with permission-aware retrieval and safe diagnostics, routes unresolved issues to the correct owner with context assembled, and converts each resolution into improved knowledge or automation.

Business driver and expected gain Delivery pauses while engineers locate the right owner, wait across time zones, or reconstruct a problem for a scarce expert. Repeated support questions also consume expert capacity that could improve the platform itself.

Organizational requirements Support channels need explicit ownership, escalation agreements, feedback loops, and incentives for experts to improve reusable guidance. Platform teams should own recurrence reduction, not only ticket closure.

Cost and investment Investment centers on integrations with support channels, ownership data, diagnostics, retrieval, and capture workflows. Value comes from shorter waits, fewer repeated questions, and more expert time returned to platform improvement.

Risks and safeguards A confident but wrong answer can delay recovery, sensitive context can leak, and automation can hide ownership gaps. Preserve provenance, start with read-only diagnostics, make escalation easy, and measure recurrence and correct-owner routing.

Relationship to the wider plan The support loop uses the same context supply, ownership graph, diagnostics, decision packets, and learning system as the SDLC. A resolved escalation should improve documentation, routing, tools, or automated remediation.

Supporting material The organizational-latency term is a synthesis in this document. DORA's system-level findings support measuring the surrounding delays and constraints rather than treating local coding speed as the outcome. See [R1–R3].

8.4. Every agent invocation is four decisions: why it runs, whose authority it carries, what it sees, what it may do

Viewpoint

Every previous section in this chapter has treated the **what** of agent access — MCP, skills, paved roads, developer support. This section names the **when** and the **with-what**: the infrastructure that decides when an agent runs, and the infrastructure that assembles the right context around that agent at runtime. Both are platform capabilities that the industry pitch tends to leave implicit inside "the agent does its work." At enterprise scale they are the difference between an agent that behaves as a governed platform citizen and one that behaves as a security incident waiting to happen.

An agent invocation is not a function call. It is the composition of **four decisions** the platform must make explicitly:

1. **Why is this agent running now?** — the trigger.
2. **What identity and authority does it carry?** — the delegation.
3. **What context does it need to see to do its job?** — the runtime context assembly.
4. **What actions may it take on that context, and how are those actions verified?** — the tool policy and evidence chain.

The MCP gateway and the workspace broker (the operating-models chapter) answer the second and fourth. This section answers the first and third.

8.4.1. Agent orchestration — the trigger and coordination layer

An agent needs a reason to run. Left to their own devices, agent frameworks default to **human-prompted** triggers only — the developer types a question, the agent responds. Enterprise agentic work spans a much wider set of trigger patterns, each with distinct governance and cost implications. The platform must recognise and manage all of them.

Table 1. Trigger classes the platform must support

Trigger class	Examples	Governance concerns
Human-directed	Developer opens a PR review agent from the IDE; product manager asks a research agent to summarise a customer segment	Consent is explicit; delegated authority is the operator's; attention economics apply as reactive work
Event	Git webhook on merged PR fires code-review agent; deployed service crashes and fires incident-triage agent; CVE feed fires sweep-planning agent	Every event must map to a chartered agent + constitution; no "listen and figure it out"; blast radius must be pre-declared

Trigger class	Examples	Governance concerns
Scheduled	Nightly dependency-drift scan; weekly runbook-freshness sweep; quarterly audit of architecture decision records (ADRs) for currency	Cron alone is not governance; each schedule needs an owner, budget, and signal-to-noise budget
Signal / threshold	Cost anomaly exceeds threshold; error rate crosses SLO; drift metric exceeds bound	Signal source must be authoritative; false-positive fatigue is a real risk; escalation policy per agent
Continuous	Ambient security-posture monitor; real-time observability agent; long-running data-quality watcher	Cost is continuous; standing identity mandatory; runaway detection critical
Curiosity / proactive	Agent proactively scans for opportunities the operator did not ask about (e.g. deprecated API found across the codebase)	Hardest to govern; most likely to produce toil; requires explicit signal-to-noise justification per finding

The trigger infrastructure the platform must provide. Every one of the trigger classes above is a public failure-mode if the enterprise does not provide standard infrastructure for it. Teams left to build their own cron plumbing, their own webhook receivers, their own signal thresholds, and their own agent launchers produce dozens of **scripts-with-a-personality** — the **silent army** failure mode named later in the ambient-agents chapter. The platform's contribution is a **unified trigger substrate**:

- A **webhook / event router** with authenticated inbound endpoints, event-to-agent binding, replay/dedup, and per-source observability.
- A **scheduler** with standing service identity, budget accounting, and Autonomy Council reauthorization tied to the schedule entry itself.
- A **signal-and-threshold engine** pulling from observability, security, and cost telemetry — with debounce, hysteresis, and correlation so a single upstream anomaly does not fan out into a hundred agent invocations.
- A **continuous-agent runtime** with checkpoint discipline, liveness probes, and forced-restart windows so continuous agents do not drift into unbounded state.
- A **curiosity budget** framework — the maximum rate at which proactive agents may open decision packets against the human attention pool.

The trigger substrate is a **first-class platform product**, not a per-team implementation exercise. When it is treated as infrastructure — one owner, one API, one dashboard — the ambient portfolio is governable. When it is not, the org accretes untraceable trigger endpoints that expire only when someone notices them.

Coordinator patterns. Beyond the trigger, some agent work involves multiple specialists (test generator + security reviewer + migration planner) cooperating on one decision packet. The platform's **A2A coordinator** (see earlier in this chapter) owns cross-agent orchestration; the trigger substrate hands off to the coordinator after routing. The invariant: **no agent invocation happens**

without a chartered trigger, a bounded delegation, and a coordinator that owns the decision packet.

8.4.2. Runtime context assembly — the "with-what"

Once an agent is triggered, it needs the right **context** to do its job. Context is not one thing; it is the assembly, at runtime, of many different sources into a bounded, permission- valid input that the model can reason over. The platform must manage that assembly explicitly.

Table 2. Common context sources an agent may need

Source	Content	Assembly considerations
Source code	The repository the change targets, plus its dependencies within the dependency graph	Trim to relevant files; respect visibility (private submodules, security-sensitive paths); attach commit provenance
MCP-accessible tools	Live queries against enterprise systems — CI status, feature flags, config, service registry, work items	Query at runtime rather than pre-fetching; the freshness of the answer is often the point
Managed knowledge repositories	Architecture decision records (ADRs), runbooks, design docs, incident postmortems, style guides, glossary	Version-pinned; staleness metadata visible; retrieved by task class, not shotgun-loaded
Ticket / work-item context	Jira / Linear / GitHub Issues history for the affected system; prior related work; owner and severity	Access rights on the ticket flow through; PII redaction on customer-reporter fields
Constitution	The agent's chartered constitution for the current task class — what it may do, must do, must not do, escalation triggers	Injected at runtime, above the prompt, enforced by the runtime; version-pinned so an agent cannot execute against a stale constitution
Skills catalogue	The specific skills (compiled paved roads) available to this task, with their current versions and freshness	Filtered by task-class permission set; unavailable skills fail closed rather than silently omitted
Task-specific evidence	The decision packet the agent is servicing — the evidence already gathered, prior recommendations, blast-radius history	Carries forward across coordinator hops; deduplicated against prior packets on the same intent

Retrieval is part of authorization. The most consequential context-assembly principle is this: **do not retrieve content the caller is not authorised to see, and then hope the model suppresses it in the output**. Filtering only the final answer is too late. The platform's retrieval layer must resolve identity, delegation, purpose, classification, and allowed knowledge roots **before** candidate generation. This applies to vector search, lexical search, metadata search, and graph traversal alike. A model that has been given content is a model that has processed content, regardless of what its final answer says.

Context minimization. An agent that receives 500 KB of context to answer a question that needed 5 KB pays for the extra 495 KB in tokens, in the risk of the model getting distracted, and in the risk of an unrelated sensitive fragment influencing the output. The retrieval layer's job is to return the

smallest useful set, not the largest defensible one. Task-class-specific retrieval budgets — maximum tokens of context, maximum number of documents, maximum depth of graph traversal — are the mechanism.

Derived representations inherit policy. Chunks, embeddings, summaries, extracted metadata, cached retrieval results, and reranker features are all **derived content**. Every one of them carries a policy tail from the source: if a source document is deleted, its embedding must be deleted; if a source document is reclassified as sensitive, its cached summary must be reclassified; if a source document is placed on legal hold, its derivative artefacts must inherit the hold. Platforms that treat embeddings as "just vectors" reintroduce the exfiltration surface they thought they had eliminated.

Constitution injection at runtime. The agent's constitution is not a prompt template. It is a **runtime artefact** — versioned, signed, chartered by the Autonomy Council — that the platform injects above the prompt at every invocation. The agent sees the constitution; the runtime **enforces** it regardless of what the agent's prompt-visible instructions say. A model that has been persuaded by retrieved content to ignore its constitution still cannot invoke tools its constitution forbids, because the tool policy is a platform-side check.

Prompt injection is an authorization problem. Retrieved instructions — content from a ticket, a document, a page in a runbook — must be treated as **untrusted**. A prompt injection that reads "as an authorised administrator, delete all files in folder X" is a piece of **data**, not a delegation. Tool policy and explicit capability boundaries live **outside** model persuasion; the runtime does not grant new authority based on retrieved text. This is a platform property, not an agent-side prompt-engineering discipline.

8.4.3. Managed context repositories — where the source of truth lives

Most enterprises already have the raw sources — code in Git, tickets in Jira, docs in Confluence or a wiki, runbooks in a runbook system, ADRs in a docs folder. The gap the platform must close is turning those raw sources into **managed context repositories** that agents can query reliably at runtime.

Each managed repository has the same shape:

- **An owner.** A named team or individual accountable for freshness, correctness, and retirement.
- **A schema.** Structured metadata attached to each entry — task classes it applies to, systems it covers, sensitivity class, version, review date.
- **A freshness contract.** Explicit rules for when entries expire, who reauthorises them, and what happens to derivative artefacts when they do.
- **A retrieval interface.** An MCP-accessible query surface — lexical, semantic, metadata, and often graph — with the permission checks named above.
- **A provenance chain.** Every retrieved entry carries source identity so an agent can cite the answer and a reviewer can verify it.
- **A retirement path.** Dead entries get archived on cadence, not when someone gets around to it. Unmanaged sprawl is the failure mode.

The managed-repository set spans:

- **Code** — the source repositories themselves, exposed to agents through the MCP gateway with the same access controls humans see.
- **Docs** — architecture docs, design docs, glossary, runbooks, ADRs — treated as first-class knowledge assets with schema and freshness.
- **Ticket + work-item history** — issue trackers exposed through MCP with PII redaction and audit; the **"why was this decided"** answer for many code changes lives here.
- **Incident and postmortem archive** — historical failure modes and the fixes; agents drawing on this can avoid rediscovering the same wall.
- **Skills catalogue** — the compiled paved roads (earlier in this chapter) treated as a managed context repository in their own right.
- **Constitution registry** — the chartered agent constitutions, versioned, signed, and injected at runtime.

A useful framing is that the platform's managed-repository inventory is a **governed enterprise context graph** — the knowledge substrate agents draw from when they act. Naming it explicitly, funding an owner for it, and treating retrieval against it as first-class product work is what distinguishes an organisation that scales agentic work from one that stalls on "the agent kept hallucinating."

8.4.4. Project structure for agent-readiness — what needs to be on hand

The maturity-journey chapter introduced the **agentic-readiness ladder** for repositories. This section names the concrete project-structure elements the ladder tiers depend on. A repository that wants to receive agent-executed work at row 2 or higher on the maturity matrix must present the following elements **in discoverable, structured form**:

- **Runtime configuration.** The environment the code expects — language version, package versions, environment variables, service dependencies. Present as a machine-readable manifest, not folklore.
- **Sandbox specification.** How the code runs in isolation — container image, resource limits, network policy, secret binding. The workspace broker uses this to instantiate a workspace that matches production.
- **Tests.** A test suite that runs deterministically, produces machine-readable output, and covers the surface the agent might change. Freshness matters: a test suite that has not run in six months is a false-positive risk.
- **Documentation.** README, architecture doc, ADRs, and — for agent consumption — an **agent-facing overview** that names task classes the repository accepts, invariants that must not be violated, and pointers to authoritative context.
- **Dependency manifest.** Explicit dependency graph with version pins, so an agent can reason about upstream change safely.
- **Rollback contract.** How a change is reverted safely — feature flags, blue/green switch, database migration reversal. Agents operating at row 2 or higher on the matrix cannot ship without a rollback story.
- **Owner and escalation.** Named human owner and escalation path for decisions the agent

cannot make. Present in a structured metadata file the platform can query.

- **Constitution binding.** Reference to the agent constitution(s) the repository accepts work under, versioned and reviewed.

The agent-ready project spec. Increasingly, the platform's role is to publish and enforce a **standard project layout** that meets the above requirements — an opinionated schema that a repository either satisfies (and is eligible for agent-executed work at higher matrix tiers) or does not (and stays at row 1 until it does). This is analogous to how the twelve-factor-app methodology once codified web-application readiness for cloud deployment. The AI-native platform benefits from a comparable **agent-ready** specification with the same clarity of "you either meet the checklist or you do not."

Concrete proposal The trigger substrate, the runtime context assembly, and the managed context repositories should all be treated as **first-class platform products** with named owners, roadmap representation on the Autonomy Council's tier-map decisions, and measurable service commitments. Specifically:

- Ship a unified trigger substrate — webhook router, scheduler, signal engine, continuous-agent runtime, curiosity budget — with one API surface and one dashboard.
- Ship a runtime context-assembly service that owns permission- aware retrieval, context minimization, derived-representation policy inheritance, and constitution injection.
- Ship the managed context repositories inventory — code, docs, tickets, incidents, skills, constitutions — with ownership, schema, freshness contracts, and MCP-accessible retrieval.
- Publish the agent-ready project specification and score every repository against it as part of the readiness-ladder inventory.

8.5. Five agent shapes, and what each one can prove

"Agent" names a category, not a construction. Inside it sit a handful of recurring shapes, and the choice between them is not a matter of sophistication — it decides what evidence the thing can produce, and therefore how much authority it can ever earn.

That is the connection this document cares about. The patterns below are well described elsewhere as engineering choices; here they are read against the autonomy ladder, because a capability's tier ceiling is set by the strength of the evidence its shape can generate, not by how capable the underlying model is.

The grouping and its sequence are taken from a practitioner infographic that circulates widely under the title **AI Agent Design Patterns** (R405); the individual shapes are older than it and are sourced to their own papers below. The descriptions, the evidence table, the tier ceilings and the composition figure are this document's.

8.5.1. The shapes




Figure 12. The five shapes, in order of increasing structure

Structure increases through the sequence, and so does the evidence each shape leaves behind. Only the last one can gate an action, which is why it is the only one that reaches the upper tiers.

Single-shot. One model call, no loop, no tools. A request goes in, an answer comes out. Classification, extraction, summarisation, reformatting — work where the input contains everything needed and the output is checkable by inspection. It is the cheapest shape and the one to reach for first; most of what gets built as an agent did not need to be one.

Reason–act loop. The model alternates between reasoning about what to do next and acting against the world, observing each result, until the goal is met. Yao et al. introduced the interleaving and showed that reasoning updates the plan while actions gather information the model does not hold (R402).

This is the workhorse shape for anything that touches a real system, and the one the inner loop earlier in this chapter describes. Its failure modes are the loop that never terminates and the loop that wanders — which is why budgets, stopping conditions and loop detection are platform concerns rather than prompt concerns.

Planner–executor. Planning is separated from doing. One call decomposes the goal into ordered sub-tasks; separate executors carry them out, in parallel where dependencies allow; a final step aggregates and validates. The separation buys observability — a plan is a reviewable artifact before any of it runs — and it is what makes a sweep possible at all, because the plan is the thing a human can sign off on once for many repositories.

Reflexive. The agent critiques its own output and redrafts before anyone else sees it. Shinn et al. formalised this as verbal reinforcement: the agent turns a failure signal into natural-language

guidance held in episodic memory and does better on the next attempt, reaching 91% pass@1 on HumanEval against 80% for the model without it (R403). The gain is real and the limit is structural — self-critique is not independent, so it catches sloppiness reliably and its own blind spots not at all.

Verifier-gated. An independent check sits between the proposed action and the action. The verifier is deterministic where it can be: a policy engine, a schema validator, a test suite, a rule about who may approve what. It is the only shape on this list that constrains rather than persuades, and the only one whose guarantee survives the model being wrong or manipulated.

8.5.2. What each shape can prove

Shape	The evidence it can produce	Tier ceiling it supports
Single-shot	The output itself. Nothing about how it was reached.	T0–T1. Fine for reads and recommendations; nothing that writes.
Reason–act loop	A trace: what it looked at, what it called, what came back. Reviewable, and enough to reconstruct a decision.	T2 with a trace and a passing suite. The common working tier.
Planner–executor	A plan reviewable before execution, plus per-sub-task results and an aggregate.	T2–T3. The plan is what a human signs off on for work too broad to review item by item.
Reflexive	Everything the underlying shape produces, plus the critique history — what it thought was wrong and what it changed.	No ceiling of its own. It raises quality inside a tier; it does not earn one, because the check is not independent.
Verifier-gated	A pass or fail from something outside the model, with the rule that fired.	T3–T4, and the only shape that reaches them. Authority follows the verifier's strength, not the agent's.

Two consequences follow, and both cut against the instinct to reach for the most elaborate shape available.


The first is that reflexive and verifier-gated are different kinds of thing, and are routinely confused. Self-critique improves output; independent verification constrains it.

A capability that self-checks is a better capability at the same tier. One gated by something deterministic can be promoted. Substituting the first for the second is how a platform ends up trusting an agent's opinion of its own work.

The second is that the shapes compose, and a real capability is usually several of them. Which is easier to see against a piece of work this document has already used.

8.5.3. The block that recurs

The shapes are not alternatives to choose between once. They nest, and the nesting is the same at almost every stage of the lifecycle: a planner decomposes, reason–act executors do the work in parallel, each one critiques itself before anyone else sees the result, a deterministic verifier decides whether the action may be taken, and every layer deposits into the evidence chain on the way past.


Stage input
an outcome, its constraints, and the authority it carries
Planner — decompose into sub-tasks
the plan is reviewable before anything runs
Executors — one per sub-task, parallel where dependencies allow
Executor
reason–act loop against real tools
below bar
reflexive self-check
Executor
reason–act loop against real tools
below bar
reflexive self-check
Aggregate and validate
N results reduce to one
Verifier
deterministic, outside the model
policy · schema · tests · who may approve
pass
fail
Evidence chain
plan · traces · critiques · verdicts
Stage output — the permitted action, taken
Escalate — a decision packet, only when the rule cannot settle it

One stage, four shapes. The reflexive loop sits inside the executor, not beside it — it improves what the executor produces and has no authority of its own. The verifier sits outside everything, because a check the agent could talk its way past is not a check. A human appears only on the fail path, and only when the rule cannot settle the question.

Read it as a template rather than an architecture. A discovery stage may have one executor and no verifier worth the name; a fleet migration may have four hundred executors and a gate that refuses most of them. What does not change is the ordering: plan before work, critique before exposure, verification before action, evidence throughout.

8.5.4. The pipeline, stage by stage

The same eight phases the capability wheel uses, with the shape each one tends to take and the evidence it leaves behind. The point of reading it as a column of shapes rather than a column of tools is that the shape predicts the tier, and the tier is the decision the platform is really making.

Phase	What the agent does	Shape	What it deposits
Discover	Cluster signal, retrieve the material behind a question	Reason–act	Citations that resolve, a sample size, the segments represented
Design	Scaffold an approved service shape, capture the decision	Planner–executor	A plan reviewed before anything is built, and an ADR in house format
Build	Make the change against the internal SDK and house conventions	Reason–act, with a reflexive pass	The diff, the trace, which tests ran, the comprehension record
Test	Challenge the change from the acceptance criteria, not from the code	Planner–executor	Evidence generated independently of the implementation
Review	Clear the mechanical findings, classify what remains	Reflexive, then verifier-gated	One decision packet, with precision and recall measurable against it
Deliver	Promote by risk class, watch the canary, hold or roll back	Verifier-gated	Deployment evidence and production health per cohort
Operate	Detect, correlate, investigate, remediate inside the envelope	Continuous reason–act	Incident lineage, and a hypothesis marked as a hypothesis
Govern	Attach the debt delta, assemble the pack, reauthorise the tier	Planner, then verifier-gated	The evidence a promotion is granted or refused on

Three things fall out of the column that are not obvious from the rows.

Verifier-gated appears exactly where authority changes hands. Review, deliver and govern are the three stages that can commit something, and all three are gated. Build and discover are not, because nothing irreversible happens there. A platform that gates everywhere is paying latency for nothing; one that gates nowhere cannot promote anything.

Reflexive never appears alone. It is always a pass inside another shape. That is the practical form of the distinction drawn above — self-critique raises the quality of what a stage produces and never changes what the stage is permitted to do.


The planner shows up wherever the work is too broad to read. Design, test and govern are the stages where a human signs off on a plan or an aggregate rather than on every item, which is the same move the sweep makes and the reason a sweep is possible at all.

8.5.5. The CVE sweep, as a composition



This section reads the sweep as a composition of agent shapes and stays free of product names. For the same eight stages mapped against the tools that run them — scanner, tracker, catalogue, workspace, pipeline, rollout controller — with the agentic integration point named in each cell, see Appendix W. It also collects the thirteen steps that descriptions of this workflow usually omit.

The maturity-journey chapter describes a cross-repository sweep as the broad-simple corner of the matrix, where coordination cost dominates the cost of any individual change. Read as a composition of shapes, the sweep stops being one agent and becomes eight steps with four different shapes in them.


Trigger · CVE feed fires
event, not a person
1 · Assess the advisory
which packages, which versions, is the vulnerable path reachable
reason–act loop over the CVE feed, dependency graph, service catalogue
2 · Scope the sweep
repos in scope · readiness tier ≥2
canary set · wave order · failure budget
planner — emits the sweep specification
3 · Change each repository
bump, build, run the suite, read the failure
one reason–act executor per repo, N in parallel in ephemeral workspaces
4 · Check its own work
is the diff only the bump · did tests really run
· is the comprehension record honest
reflexive — critique and redraft before anyone sees it
5 · Policy gate
verifier-gated — deterministic, outside the model
passes policy at this tier
needs a human
what the rollout learns rescopes the next wave
Auto-merge
row-1 evidence is dispositive
Hold for the wave
joins the batched PR wave
6 · Aggregate the evidence
coverage · failure rate · blast radius
· exceptions needing a human
planner again, reducing N results to one
7 · One decision packet
the human decides once for the sweep, not once per repository
8 · Watch the canary
health per cohort, pause on regression
continuous reason–act; feeds the next wave

The shapes are chosen per stage, not per system. The reason–act loop appears three times and does different work each time. The only stage that can auto-merge is the one behind a deterministic gate, and the only stage a human sees is the one where the evidence has already been reduced to a single packet.

Three things in that picture are worth stating plainly, because they are the reason the composition matters.

The parallel stage is the cheap one and the gate is the load-bearing one. Running one executor per repository is what makes a hundred-and-thirty-repository sweep tractable, and it is also the part that would be reckless without the gate. Fan-out multiplies leverage and correlated failure in equal measure.

The reflexive step earns its cost here and not everywhere. A dependency bump has a narrow, well-understood correct shape — the diff touches the manifest and the lockfile, the tests ran, the comprehension record names the risk class. Self-critique catches the sloppy version of that reliably. It would not catch a bump that is correct and unwise.

A human appears once. Not at the trigger, not per repository, and not at the gate. The sweep's whole economic argument is that the coordination attention collapses into a single decision backed by an aggregated evidence pack — which only works because every stage before it was producing evidence in a form that aggregates.

8.5.6. Choosing, in practice

Anthropic's guidance on building effective agents draws the sorting question sharply: a **workflow** orchestrates models and tools along predefined code paths, while an **agent** directs its own process, and the advice is to find the simplest thing that works and add structure only when it does not — which "might mean not building agentic systems at all" (R404). That is the right default, and it is the one this document's autonomy ladder enforces from the other direction: a shape that cannot produce evidence cannot be promoted, however impressive it looks in a demonstration.

Three questions settle most cases:

1. **Does it need to touch anything?** If not, single-shot. Most classification and extraction work stops here.
2. **Is the work reviewable as a whole, or only as a plan?** Review the whole where you can; separate the planner where the work is too broad or too parallel to read item by item.
3. **What would have to be true for this to run without a person?** If the answer is a rule you can write down, the shape is verifier-gated and the tier can rise. If the answer is judgement, the shape does not matter — the ceiling is a human either way.

8.6. Ten properties decide whether an agent is safe to point at production

An engineer evaluating a coding agent, an ambient monitor, or a customer-built agent needs a checklist. Ten properties tell you whether an agent is safe to point at production or customer data.

- **Standing service identity.** The agent carries a cryptographic identity distinct from the requesting user's session token. Compromised compute cannot borrow the user's reach.
- **Least-privilege delegation.** Explicit scope, purpose, time bound. A ticket-summary agent has no source-code access; a code-review agent posts nowhere external; a deploy agent merges only authorised changes.
- **Execution isolation.** Ephemeral sandbox, torn down on completion. Cross-workspace traffic only through the A2A coordinator.
- **Egress control.** Outbound calls flow through the egress proxy — model vendors, tool calls, third-party APIs — with allow-list and DLP inspection.
- **Tool policy that separates read from write.** Discover, read, transform, write, share, delete, and administer are distinct capability classes. A single `admin` grant that enables all of them is the anti-pattern.
- **Retrieval-as-authorization.** The agent does not receive content it is not authorised to see. Filtering the model's output is too late — the model has already processed the text.
- **Derived-representation policy tail.** Embeddings, summaries, and cached retrievals inherit the source's policy. Source deletion propagates to derivatives.
- **Comprehension record on consequential changes.** T2+ decision packets carry evidence — what changed, why, what risk class, what tests were trusted.
- **Per-request outbound audit.** Identity, delegated principal, invoked model or tool, content identifiers, policy decision, correlation ID. Tenant-queryable for subject-access response.
- **Reauthorization cadence.** The Autonomy Council reviews the agent's constitution quarterly. No standing authority. No perpetual delegation.

An agent that fails any of these is held at a lower autonomy tier until the property lands. That is the platform's answer to "is this agent safe to deploy."

8.7. Local and cloud MCPs — different threat models, one gateway

MCP servers come in two shapes and the platform treats them differently.

Local MCPs run on the engineer's laptop or inside the agent's workspace, over stdio transport. They give the agent access to things at the same trust boundary as the agent itself: the local filesystem, a specific git repo, a sqlite database, `puppeteer` for browser automation, a bespoke CLI tool. The official reference servers — `everything`, `filesystem`, `git`, `sqlite`, `puppeteer` — are the canonical shapes.

Local MCPs are governed by the workspace broker's placement: what compute the workspace runs on, what filesystem it can see, what network it can reach. There is no over-the-wire auth because there is no wire — the MCP is a subprocess of the agent's runtime, dying with the workspace.

Cloud MCPs run remotely and expose enterprise systems over HTTP with server-sent events. Public examples: the GitHub MCP server, Linear's MCP, Notion's MCP, PagerDuty's MCP, Slack's MCP, Google Drive's MCP, and the hosted MCP servers shipped by the major content platforms.

Enterprise-hosted equivalents cover Jira, ServiceNow, Salesforce, internal service catalogues, feature-flag systems, and cost telemetry.

Cloud MCPs are the case OAuth 2.1 with resource indicators, PKCE, audience-bound tokens, and no token passthrough was designed for. Every cloud MCP call flows through the platform's MCP gateway; the gateway holds delegated authority on the agent's behalf and mediates identity, scope, quota, and audit. When a local MCP reaches out to a cloud MCP, the local server routes through the gateway too — the workspace placement policy makes that enforceable.

The failure mode when the distinction is not enforced: an agent running a "local" MCP that quietly proxies to a public API, bypassing the gateway's audit and DLP. The workspace broker's egress control catches this; placement plus egress proxy together are the enforcement.

8.8. MCP-enable throwaway tools by default, and sunset them on a clock

The tools an engineer builds for one-off work — a script that queries an internal API, a wrapper around a stubborn CLI, a throwaway scraper — get MCP-enabled by default. Ten-line stdio server, one manifest, one paragraph of documentation. That gets the tool identity, scope, audit, rate limiting, and composability into agent workflows for free.

The alternative — engineers pipe raw API keys into agent prompts, or paste the tool's source into a chat window and hope the model figures it out. Both leak credentials, defeat audit, and make the tool uncomposable with any other agent workflow.

Retirement matters as much as authoring. Ad-hoc MCPs go into the skills registry with a `provisional` flag and a 90-day sunset. Renewal requires a maintainer, a test, and a use case. Ad-hoc MCPs that survive 90 days become skills; the rest disappear.

At any given month in a mid-sized enterprise the number of throwaway tools engineers write is measured in hundreds. MCP-enabling them by default turns that tail into a governable surface instead of a proliferation of loose scripts each with its own credential.

8.9. The platform that governs the work can become the queue it was built to remove

Viewpoint

Every proposal in this document funnels through platform primitives — the workspace broker, the MCP gateway, the decision packet, the Autonomy Council, the ambient-portfolio scan, the constitution review. That funneling is the point: it is what makes the system governable at all. It is also, if left unmanaged, how the platform becomes the new bottleneck it was meant to remove. If the platform team is 12 people and 40 product teams are waiting on constitution reviews and capability approvals, "organizational latency" has merely shifted address: the wait now lives in the platform queue rather than in the wiki, and the developer experiences it as the same delay under a different name.

Implication and counter-measures

The failure mode is real but not automatic. The platform must be designed to **escape** it, not merely to hope it does not happen. Four counter-measures belong on the platform roadmap from day one:

- **Self-service tiers with post-hoc audit.** T0 and T1 capabilities should be self-service — teams instantiate them from a paved-road template, the audit surface samples the resulting usage, and only outliers escalate. Pre-approval belongs at T3 and above where the blast radius warrants the wait.
- **Delegated authority.** Allow senior engineering leadership across business units to authorize specific capability classes within declared envelopes, subject to the Autonomy Council reviewing their outcomes after the fact. Centralization is a decision point, not a physical location.
- **Explicit throughput SLA on the Autonomy Council.** Publish and measure the median approval latency, the 90th percentile, and the queue depth. A Council that cannot promise a decision cadence is a Council that will be routed around, and shadow-IT will fill the gap.
- **Periodic anti-pattern review.** On a quarterly cadence, ask directly: is the platform organization becoming the new PR queue? Look for signals — approval-latency drift, rising rate of local workarounds, teams re-inventing capabilities the platform already offers because the platform's version is too slow to adopt. Prune the platform's own gates when the evidence says the gate cost more than it saved.

8.10. Measure whether knowledge and capability actually reach the point of work

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Skills coverage** — fraction of documented paved roads exposed via an MCP-accessible skill with ownership, provenance, tests, and freshness metadata. Coverage below the platform's reachable-scope percentage is the primary this chapter backlog.
- **Skill freshness** — median age since last freshness check per skill. Skills exceeding the freshness threshold trigger automatic revalidation or retirement.
- **MCP gateway coverage** — fraction of enterprise-system access from agents that goes through the MCP gateway versus any bypass path. Non-zero bypass is a the trust and governance chapter security concern as well as a this chapter coverage concern.
- **Silent-reinvention rate** — fraction of agent-authored code that duplicates capability already available in an existing skill. Measured by structured-diff comparison during PR ingestion. Rising rate signals the skills registry is not reaching agents at the point of work.
- **A2A coordinator load and specialist depth** — packets per coordinator per week, plus mean specialist chain depth per packet. Bounds the complexity the platform is asking the coordinator to manage.
- **Developer-support routing latency** — median time from an agent hitting a missing capability or broken paved road to routing to the right human owner. The org-latency metric that this chapter argues is a platform capability, not a team problem.
- **Trigger substrate share** — fraction of agent invocations that reach the runtime through the platform's chartered trigger substrate (event router / scheduler / signal engine / continuous

runtime / curiosity budget) versus unregistered bespoke plumbing. Rising share is how the **silent army** failure mode gets closed off before it starts.

- **Context minimization ratio** — average tokens of context actually cited in the agent's decision packet versus tokens loaded into the model. A low ratio is a signal to tighten retrieval budgets per task class.
- **Derived-representation policy propagation latency** — median time from a source-content deletion / reclassification / hold event to the propagation of that policy change to every derivative artefact (chunks, embeddings, summaries, caches). Non-zero drift is a compliance exposure.
- **Managed-repository freshness** — median staleness (days since last authoritative review) across the docs, runbooks, ADRs, and skills catalogue. Bounds the reliability of the context agents assemble at runtime.
- **Agent-ready project spec adoption** — fraction of repositories meeting the agent-ready project layout specification. Tied to the readiness-ladder inventory.

Eleven metrics; each pairs with a mechanism from this chapter.

Chapter 9. Soft rails: skills, plugins, and the shared capability layer

Two engineers, the same model, the same repository, the same ticket. One agent produces a change that uses the internal HTTP client, files the tests where review expects them, and arrives with the comprehension record already filled in. The other produces something plausible and foreign — a hand-rolled retry loop, a test in the wrong place, a PR that a reviewer has to reconstruct from scratch. No policy was violated in either case. No gateway blocked anything. Both agents were inside their authority the whole time.

Most of this document has been about the things that say no. The MCP gateway, autonomy tiers, agent constitutions, the independently enforced security control plane — those are **hard rails**. They bound what an agent may do, and they are enforced whether or not anyone cooperates. They have nothing to say about how the organisation wants work done.

Soft rails are the other half: the reusable capability layer an organisation builds, shares, and loads by default. A skill that supplies the auth wrapper. A review command that applies the house checklist. A hook that attaches the debt delta to every change. A scaffold that produces a service the paved road already knows how to operate. None of them prohibit anything. They make the expected path the cheapest one.

An organisation that builds only hard rails gets compliance without competence. Every agent stays inside the fence and every agent reinvents the same wheel differently, which is the failure mode the foundations chapter describes as agents reinventing paved roads that only speak to humans.

9.1. A soft rail encodes a decision already made, in a form an agent loads at the point of work

A soft rail encodes a decision the organisation has already made, in a form an agent loads at the point of work, so that nobody re-litigates it in a prompt.

That is the whole definition, and the forms it takes are varied: a skill packaging an internal SDK with its conventions and tests; a review command that runs the security checklist a staff engineer would apply; a hook that fires on every commit; a subagent definition with its own narrow prompt and tool set; an MCP server that exposes the deployment path; a scaffold; a prompt fragment that states how this organisation writes commit messages.


The distinction from documentation is the one that matters. A wiki page describing the auth wrapper is read when someone already knows to look for it. A skill that supplies the auth wrapper is loaded at the point of work, and it fails loudly when it is wrong.

The gap between a convention an agent can load and one it cannot is close to total. In an evaluation of repository context files across three coding-agent harnesses, a build tool named in the context file was invoked 1.6 times per task on average, and under 0.01 times per task when the file did not name it (R387). Documentation describes; soft rails execute. Organisations with excellent documentation and no soft rails are the common case, and their agents behave as though the documentation does not exist — because, from the agent's position at the moment of work, it does

not.

Adherence is not the same as benefit, and the distance between them is the argument for a review bar. On a benchmark where agents had to find the relevant skill themselves, curated skills lifted the average pass rate from 33.9% to 50.5%, while skills the agents wrote for themselves moved it slightly negative and the gain ranged from +4.1 to +25.7 points depending on the model and harness (R386). Publishing a capability an agent will load is easy. Publishing one worth loading is the harder half, and the reason the publication tiers below carry a rising review bar.

The relationship to the agent constitution is worth stating precisely, because the two are easy to conflate. A constitution says what an agent may not do and what it escalates; it is enforced by the runtime and an agent cannot opt out. A skill says how this organisation does a thing; it is adopted because it is available and good, and an agent can ignore it. When they disagree the constitution wins, and the constitution is where that ordering belongs — otherwise a well-meaning skill that says "always deploy after tests pass" quietly grants an authority the tier map withheld.



The hard rails pass both changes, because neither violates anything. Hard rails bound the space of permitted actions; soft rails decide which path through that space an agent takes by default. This is why an organisation that invests only in enforcement gets agents that stay inside the fence and reinvent everything differently.

9.2. The surfaces differ, and so do their trust models

"Plugin" has become a broad word. In practice an organisation ends up with soft rails on many more surfaces than the word suggests, and the temptation is to govern them as one category because they arrive through similar registries. That under-protects one end and over-governs the other.

Two properties classify them. **Who invokes it** — a person, or an event. **Whose credentials it runs with** — the user's, an ephemeral workspace's, a pipeline's, or a standing service identity — which also settles what it can reach. The failure that matters in each row below follows from those two: a review command a developer types is a different risk object from a hook that fires on every push with pipeline credentials, even when both ship in the same bundle.

Surface	Invoked by	Runs with	The failure that matters
Skill / capability package	The agent, when relevant	The agent's workspace identity	Encodes a stale convention, and every agent applies it confidently.

Surface	Invoked by	Runs with	The failure that matters
Slash or review command	A person, deliberately	The invoking user	Low blast radius; the person sees the output and can discard it.
Hook	An event, automatically	Whatever the event runs as	No human at the moment of invocation. A bad hook fires everywhere, silently, on everyone's work.
Subagent definition	A coordinating agent	A delegated, narrowed identity	Authority creep — a subagent whose tool set grows every time someone needs it to do one more thing (the product agent-readiness chapter).
MCP server wiring	The agent, per tool call	Delegated user or service authority	A cloud server reaches further than a local one, and the two carry different threat models (the foundations chapter).
IDE extension	The developer's editor	The developer's own credentials, outside the workspace broker	Sits outside the platform's isolation and egress control entirely.
CI or pipeline step	The pipeline	Pipeline credentials, often broader than any human's	Broad by default. Over-privileged pipeline access is CICD-SEC-5 in the CI/CD top ten published by OWASP, the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (R390).
Developer-portal plugin	A shared server-side surface	A service identity, seeing many users' data	One tenant's plugin observing another team's material.

The classifying facts are invocation and authority; file format is a packaging detail. Set the review bar per class. A skill that only supplies text into a context window and a hook that executes with pipeline credentials do not deserve the same approval path, and a registry that cannot tell them apart will either wave the second one through or bury the first in process.

Two of these surfaces deserve an explicit position because they sit outside the platform's control plane. **IDE extensions** run on the developer's machine with the developer's credentials — the

workspace broker never sees them, the egress proxy never sees them, and the audit trail does not include them. Treat them as personal tooling with a published allowlist, and keep anything that touches customer data out of them. The platform cannot govern what it never observes.

Pipeline steps have the opposite problem: they are fully governed and routinely over-credentialed. OWASP ranks insufficient pipeline-based access controls fifth in its CI/CD top ten, and names the mechanism — credentials shared across contexts and never rotated, so the population of things holding valid credentials only grows (R390, R391). Most estates have not reached short-lived credentials at all: 58% of organisations running AWS with GitHub Actions still authenticate their pipelines with long-lived IAM-user keys (R392). A soft rail that runs in CI inherits whatever those keys can do.

9.3. The registry is the product; the catalogue is not

A skill that lives in one engineer's home directory is a personal tool, which is a fine thing to be. The organisational value appears only when it is discoverable by someone who did not write it, and that requires a registry with the same contract the platform applies to managed context repositories: a named owner, a schema, a freshness contract, a retrieval interface, provenance, and a retirement path.

Four mechanics carry most of the weight.

Tiered publication. Personal, team, and organisation-wide, with the review bar rising at each step and the blast radius rising with it. Most soft rails should never leave the team tier, and a registry that pushes everything to org-wide produces a catalogue nobody trusts. The provisional flag already described for MCP entries applies here too: publish provisionally with an expiry, and require evidence of use before graduation.

Versioning and pinning. An agent that silently picks up v2 of a review skill mid-sprint produces different output than it did yesterday, and the engineer has no way to know why. Pin versions in the workspace definition, make upgrades a visible change, and keep the previous version resolvable for as long as anything references it.

Discovery at the point of work. A registry nobody searches is a folder. The test is whether an agent finds the right skill without the engineer knowing it exists — which means the registry is indexed into the same retrieval path as everything else, and each entry carries a description written for that purpose.

Usage telemetry as the curation input. Which skills are loaded, by whom, how often, and whether the output was kept. Without it, curation is opinion, and the catalogue fills with well-intentioned entries that nobody has invoked since the quarter they were written.

9.4. A capability that behaves differently per runtime erodes trust in the whole layer

The same soft rail should behave the same way on a developer's laptop, inside an ephemeral agent workspace, in CI, and inside an ambient agent. It frequently does not, and the gap is where trust in the whole layer erodes.

The usual breakages are mundane. A skill that shells out to a tool present on every laptop and absent from the CI image. A local MCP server over stdio that has no cloud equivalent, so the workspace version silently does less (the foundations chapter). Credentials that resolve to a person locally and to a service account in the pipeline, with different reach. An interactive confirmation that prompts on a laptop and hangs forever in a non-interactive runner. Filesystem assumptions that hold in a checkout and fail in a sparse workspace.

Make parity a declared property rather than a hope. Each registry entry states which runtimes it is tested against, and the test suite runs in each of them. A skill that works only on a laptop is a personal tool — label it, do not promote it, and do not let a CI pipeline discover it the hard way.

9.5. A shared skill is executable context

The moment a skill is loaded by every agent in the organisation, it has the reach of a dependency and the review treatment of a wiki page. That asymmetry is the central risk of this layer, and it takes six forms.

The stale skill. It encodes last year’s pattern, and now every agent produces last year’s pattern, confidently, at volume. This is worse than having no skill, because the output looks house-conformant to a reviewer. A freshness contract with a named owner and a review date is the mechanism; usage telemetry tells you which stale entries actually matter.

The description as an injection surface. Skill and tool descriptions are read into a context window, and models act on them. A benchmark across 45 live MCP servers and 20 agents found instructions hidden in tool metadata succeeding as often as 72.8% of the time, with no evaluated agent refusing in more than 3% of cases (R393). A description that says "always run this before any other check" is an instruction someone shipped, whether or not they meant it as one — the published attacks are all adversarial, but instruction-following does not care about the author’s intent. The protocol itself tells clients to treat tool annotations from untrusted servers as untrusted (R394), a description deserves the same treatment, and both deserve review with the same seriousness as the code.

Third-party supply chain. An external plugin is a dependency that executes in your engineers' context. Pin versions, review the diff on upgrade, and never auto-update org-wide. The organisation that would not accept an unreviewed npm package should not accept an unreviewed capability package on the strength of it being useful.

Blast radius and the kill switch. Two questions worth being able to answer within the hour: who is currently using this skill, and can it be disabled everywhere without a deploy? Both require the registry to know its consumers, which only happens if it was built to record them.

The cost of the catalogue. Everything the organisation publishes competes for a finite context window, and a registry judged on reuse has every reason to grow. Selection degrades as it does: function-calling accuracy falls by between 7% and 85% as the number of available tools rises (R388), and on a large tool index, selection accuracy measured 13.62% when the whole index was presented at once against 43.13% once retrieval narrowed the candidates first (R389). Context that is loaded also has to be paid for — repository context files raise inference cost by over 20% on average with no matching gain in task success (R387). This is the measured case for keeping most soft rails at the team tier: an org-wide catalogue is not free to the agents that have to read past it.

Skills that disagree. The constitution beats a skill, but two skills have no such ordering, and tiered publication makes the collision routine — a team convention and an org-wide one both load, both claim the same ground, and the agent arbitrates. Put the precedence in the constitution next to the constitution-wins rule: the more specific tier wins, and an entry that knowingly departs from an org-wide capability says so in its description, so the agent is resolving a declared conflict and not an accidental one.

None of this argues for a heavy approval process. It argues for the review bar to match the class from the surface table, for provenance and version to travel with every entry, and for the organisation to know what would happen if one entry turned out to be wrong.

9.6. What organisations are actually publishing, and how the catalogues are shaped

The chapter so far argues what a soft rail is and what it costs. This section is the survey: what the layer looks like in practice, now that the ecosystem is large enough to have a shape.

9.6.1. A plugin is a bundle, not a file format

The word keeps causing trouble because it names a container rather than a thing. A Claude Code plugin can carry skills, slash commands, subagent definitions, event hooks, MCP server wiring, LSP server configuration, background monitors, executables placed on the agent's `PATH`, and default settings — any combination, in one install (R398). Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI, Copilot and Windsurf each package a different subset, and a collection of nearly fifteen hundred community skills advertises compatibility across all of them (R399).

That is the reason the surface table earlier in this chapter classifies by invocation and credentials rather than by packaging. A single install can add something a person types, something that fires on every push, and something that reaches an enterprise system on a standing identity. Reviewing it as one artifact reviews the least dangerous part of it.

9.6.2. The lifecycle taxonomy has converged faster than the vocabulary

Published libraries have settled on roughly the same divisions, whatever they call them. One framework-agnostic enterprise library organises thirty-four skills into engineering, backend, database, security, frontend and production — running requirements, architecture, API and service design, data access, authentication and authorisation, OWASP review, secrets handling, accessibility, forms and async UI states, containers, CI/CD, observability, performance and deployment (R400). The academic survey arrives from the other direction and defines a skill as a reusable procedural artifact that coordinates tools, memory and runtime context under task-specific constraints, then splits the population by what backs it: text-backed skills carrying references, templates and rubrics; code-backed skills carrying scripts and wrappers; and hybrids (R395).

The split is worth keeping, because the two fail differently. A text-backed review rubric goes stale quietly and keeps producing confident output. A code-backed migration script fails loudly the first time an interface moves.

9.6.3. The variant question, which nobody has settled

The obvious move is a review skill per language and per product area — a Go backend review, a React accessibility review, a payments-domain review with the regulatory checks attached. Some of the best published libraries refuse it: the enterprise library above is framework-agnostic by choice, on the reasoning that separate skills for NestJS, React and Next.js duplicate the same guidance and drift apart (R400). The counter-example sits in the same ecosystem, where per-language tooling is recommended as the default and custom work is reserved for languages not already covered (R398).

Both positions are defensible, and the difference is not about languages. It is about which layer the variation belongs to.

Splitting by **language** multiplies entries that mostly agree and then diverge by neglect. Splitting by **risk class** — the payments review, the tenant-boundary review, the migration review — produces fewer entries that genuinely differ, because the thing being checked is different rather than the syntax it is checked in. Where a language needs its own entry, the reason is usually a toolchain fact rather than a convention: the parser, the analyser, the build.

A reasonable default: one review capability per **risk class**, with language-specific tooling composed underneath it rather than forked above it.

9.6.4. The catalogues are already past the point of browsing

Public marketplaces are counted in the hundreds of thousands of entries, the largest reporting seven hundred thousand and several others between forty and ninety thousand (R395). At that scale discovery is the product. A retrieval benchmark built on sixteen thousand public agent skills finds that off-the-shelf retrievers struggle on realistic libraries, that purpose-built retrieval improves ranking by 12.9 points of NDCG@10 over the strongest prior model, and that skill retrieval "remains far from solved" (R397).

This is the same finding the catalogue-cost section reaches from the other side, and it settles the tiering argument. An organisation publishing everything org-wide is not being generous. It is degrading selection for every agent that now has to read past the entries it does not need.

9.6.5. The governance metadata is converging on this document’s vocabulary

The most useful recent work treats a skill as a contract rather than an instruction sheet. The GovernSpec framing packages a capability with its goals, input boundaries, permissions, human approval points, evidence requirements, output contracts, quality criteria, verification steps and handoff rules — and reports that rewriting skills this way raised mean quality from 4.692 to 4.914 and cut critical errors from 0.083 to 0.013 on a public benchmark (R396).

Those fields are the decision packet, the autonomy tier and the agent constitution, arriving from a different direction. The paper is careful about what it claims: contractual skills work as a governance layer that makes intent and acceptance criteria explicit, **not** as a standalone safety mechanism (R396). That is the same boundary this document draws between soft rails and hard rails, and it is reassuring to find it holding in someone else’s evidence.

9.6.6. Measure what a capability contributes, not that it exists


The honest problem with this whole layer is the one the chapter opened with: publishing a capability an agent will load is easy, and publishing one worth loading is the harder half. Tooling has started to close that gap. An evaluation harness now ships alongside the plugin system, running a set of prompts several times with and without the plugin loaded, so a team can see what the capability contributes and catch a regression when the plugin changes or a new model ships (R398).

That is the mechanism the review bar has been waiting for. A registry that gates promotion on a measured contribution rather than on an author's confidence can defend an org-wide tier honestly — and can retire an entry on evidence rather than on someone noticing.

9.7. The marketplace is internal, and the unit of adoption is the project

The public ecosystem is where capabilities come from. It is not where an organisation should let its agents shop. A marketplace measured in hundreds of thousands of entries is a supply, and what an engineer needs at the point of work is a short list that is already true for their project.

So the registry described earlier grows into something with a sharper job: an internal marketplace that curates from outside and inside, recommends against a context rather than a search box, and binds a chosen set to a project the way a dependency manifest binds libraries.



Outer ring: the lifecycle phase. Inner ring: the soft-rail themes an organisation ends up publishing for it.

Figure 13. The capability wheel: themes by lifecycle phase, marketplace at the centre

The themes, not the entries. An organisation will publish dozens of capabilities per phase and no two organisations will publish the same ones, but the shape of the coverage is stable — and the gaps are visible from the picture. The centre is what makes the ring a platform rather than a folder.

9.7.1. Recommendation beats search once the catalogue is real

Discovery at the point of work was named earlier as the test a registry has to pass. At internal scale it stops being a search problem. The platform already knows what an engineer is working on: the repository, its declared stack, its risk and data classification, the readiness tier, the task class in flight, the person's declared areas of depth. That is enough to propose a set rather than return a list.

The recommendation has two axes and they are not the same. **Per project** — a payments service

pulls the tenant-boundary review and the regulated-data checks whether or not anyone asked. **Per developer** — an engineer working outside their declared depth gets the deep-familiar review routed in, which is the cross-stack mechanism the organizational chapter describes, arriving as a capability rather than as advice.

9.7.2. A project declares its capabilities the way it declares dependencies

The useful shift is from installing to **binding**. A capability set belongs in the repository, version-pinned, reviewed on change, and resolved at workspace creation — next to the project's rules and the constitution its agents run under.

Those three are only meaningful together. The constitution says what may not happen, the rules say what this project expects, and the capabilities say how the work is done here. An agent loading one without the others has a partial picture of the same decision.

Binding at the project level buys four things a catalogue cannot:

- **Reproducibility.** Two engineers, and every agent workspace, resolve the same versions. The scenario this chapter opened with — same model, same repository, two different changes — stops being possible by accident.
- **A review surface.** A change to the capability set is a diff, with an owner and an approver, rather than a preference someone set once.
- **Blast radius that can be computed.** The registry can answer which projects bind a capability, which is the precondition for the kill switch already required of it.
- **Coverage that can be measured.** Lifecycle coverage stops being an estimate and becomes a query across bound sets — the metric this chapter defines, finally computable.

The bundle problem returns here, and binding is where it is solved. A plugin carrying a skill, a hook and an MCP server is three risk objects, and a project should be able to take the skill without the hook. Binding is per component, with the bundle as the delivery mechanism and not the unit of trust.

9.7.3. This is the glue, and it is worth naming as such


The platform chapters describe governed capability: agents reach enterprise systems through one gateway, execute in brokered workspaces, and produce evidence. That is what makes agentic work **safe**. It is not what makes it **fast**.

The capability layer is what closes the distance. A lifecycle where the discovery skill cites its sources, the scaffold produces a service the paved road can already operate, the review command applies the house checklist, the deploy path is a tool an agent can call, and the runbook is bound to a real query — that lifecycle runs from intent to production with the human at the decisions. The same lifecycle without those capabilities runs too, and stops at every step for a person to supply what the organisation already knew.

Which is the argument this chapter has been making in another form. Hard rails decide whether the work is allowed. Soft rails decide whether it is any good, and whether it happens without a person in the loop for each hop.

9.8. Good soft rails die in the directory they were written in unless graduation is a path

Nearly every valuable soft rail starts as somebody's one-off. The graduation path matters more than the authoring guidance, because the failure is not that people write bad skills — it is that good ones never leave the directory they were written in.



The graduation path, with retirement as a first-class exit. The provisional tier is the important one: publishing with an expiry and requiring evidence of use before graduation is what keeps the catalogue trustworthy.

The same path applies to a one-off script becoming a registered MCP tool, which the foundations chapter describes from the tool-surface side. What makes a good entry is unglamorous: narrow enough to compose, tested against golden cases, explicit about its failure mode, and named for its function — `rotate-tenant-keys`, not `platform-tools-v2`. The anti-pattern is the mega-skill that encodes an entire workflow end to end — it cannot be recombined, it goes stale as a unit, and the first team whose process differs slightly forks it.

Soft rails belong across the whole lifecycle, not only in code generation, and the coverage gaps are usually obvious once someone looks:

Lifecycle phase	What a soft rail looks like here
Discovery	A skill that pulls the signal behind a question with citations (the requirements and discovery chapter).
Design	Scaffolds for the approved service shapes; an ADR command that captures the decision in house format; the design system as a loadable capability rather than a site someone is expected to visit.
Implementation	The internal SDK with its conventions; the auth wrapper; tenant scoping; the standard error and logging shapes.
Testing	Golden-case harnesses; the contract-test template; the fixture factory nobody wants to rewrite.
Review	The house checklist as a command; a security-review skill; the comprehension-record prompt.
Delivery	The deploy path as a tool an agent can call, and rollback with the same interface everywhere.
Operations	Runbook skills bound to real telemetry queries; the incident-triage command.
Governance	Debt-delta attachment; evidence-pack assembly; constitution-aware escalation.

9.9. The design system is a paved road, and should be loadable as one

Design systems are treated as a discipline apart, and for soft-rail purposes they are not. A design system holds exactly what the rest of this chapter describes: tokens, approved components, accessibility rules, interaction patterns, brand standards, layout conventions, reference implementations, and the dependencies the organisation accepts. That is organisational knowledge, and an agent needs it at the point of work for the same reason a backend agent needs the internal HTTP client.

An agent left to infer UI primitives will invent them, competently and inconsistently, in the same way it hand-rolls a retry loop when the auth wrapper is a wiki page. The failure looks different — a component that behaves almost like the real one, an accessible name that is nearly right — and it is harder to catch in review, because the result looks house-conformant to anyone who does not know the system well.

So the design system belongs in the registry on the same terms as everything else: an owner, a version an agent can pin, a freshness contract, and a retrieval path that reaches the agent rather than waiting to be browsed. Where it already exists as a component library, most of the work is publishing it as something loadable and keeping the guidance and the code from drifting apart.

9.10. Nobody is promoted for writing a skill that saves other teams a week

Platform engineering builds the substrate — the registry, the parity test harness, the telemetry — and the handful of highest-leverage capabilities that everyone needs. Teams build their own, because the conventions worth encoding are mostly local. The registry is the shared surface between them, and the platform team's real product is that surface rather than the catalogue.

The incentive problem is real and rarely named: nobody is promoted for writing a skill that saves other teams a week. Usage telemetry is the cheapest available fix, because it turns "I wrote a thing" into "four hundred agent sessions used this last month", which is evidence a promotion committee can read. The change-management chapter's argument applies directly — this is platform adoption work, and it fails for the same reasons platform adoption usually fails.

One caution against over-centralising. A platform team that insists on authoring every org-wide capability becomes the bottleneck it was meant to remove, and teams route around it with private scripts that nobody can see. Own the review bar and the substrate; let the authorship be wherever the knowledge is.

9.11. Reuse rate says the layer exists; lifecycle coverage says whether it exists everywhere the work does

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Soft-rail reuse rate** — fraction of agent sessions that loaded at least one organisation-published capability. The adoption number; near zero means the registry is a folder.
- **Lifecycle coverage** — how many of the eight phases above have at least one maintained capability. Most organisations discover they have several capabilities for code generation and none for review or operations.
- **Staleness exposure** — sessions that loaded a capability past its review date, and the count of consumers on deprecated versions.
- **Graduation and expiry rate** — how many provisional entries graduated, and how many expired unused. Both should be non-zero; if nothing expires, the catalogue is accreting.
- **Parity failures** — capabilities that behaved differently across laptop, workspace, CI, and ambient runtimes, caught by the parity suite before an engineer hits them.
- **Time from ad-hoc to shared** — median interval from a script's third use to a registered team capability. The friction measure for the graduation path.
- **Consumer visibility** — can the platform list every consumer of a given capability, and disable it, inside an hour? Answered as a tested drill, not as an assertion.
- **Convention divergence** — rework attributable to house-convention violations in agent-authored changes. The outcome the whole layer exists to move, and the hardest of these to measure honestly.

Of these, the first two are the ones to instrument first. Reuse rate says whether the layer exists in practice; lifecycle coverage says whether it exists everywhere the work does, which is usually where the surprise is.

Part Three — Constraints and consequences

What bounds the platform, and what it accrues while it runs. Security, customer data, cost, residency, and regulation on one side; technical, comprehension, and cognitive debt on the other.

Chapter 10. Trust, economics, and continuous adaptation

the orchestrator chapter argued that engineers orchestrate outcomes and the foundations chapter named the platform substrate that orchestration runs on. The objective is bounded freedom: teams can experiment and choose effective tools, while the organization can see spend and outcomes, enforce non-negotiable controls, detect regressions, and change policy when evidence warrants it.

This chapter names the control loops that deliver it, in the order the architecture depends on them. First, whether an action is permitted at all: the security control plane, the constitution that bounds an agent, and the residency, IP, and regulatory posture that decide what data it may touch. Then how permitted work is optimised: cost feedback, the honest upside range, vendor substitution, and multi-vendor routing.

None of it is an administrative function bolted on after the platform ships. These are the architecture inputs that decide **which** agents run **where**, on what data, with what audit and retention posture. The autonomy tier of a capability (glossary) is the mechanism by which those controls express themselves — a capability with weak evidence, unclear IP posture, or unmet residency requirements does not advance past T0 until those gaps close.

10.1. Agent security becomes an independently enforced control plane



TL;DR. Security cannot remain a late review of an already-shipped agent surface. It becomes a continuously enforced control plane sitting outside the agent runtime: identity + workload attestation, least-privilege authorization, credential mediation with just-in-time tokens, action inspection with irreversible-action gates, provenance/audit, anomaly detection, and revocation. Six independently enforced layers, all machine-checked, with different fail-closed defaults per capability class. The agent gateway is where this lands.

Viewpoint

Security cannot remain a late meeting in which a security representative receives an incomplete architecture diagram and is asked for approval. AI-assisted development creates an opportunity for code and systems to be reviewed and re-reviewed continuously, using specialized analysis where useful, while security experts concentrate on novel threats and difficult judgment.

The urgency also rises because attackers can use AI to search for weaknesses. The organization needs AI for assurance as well as feature creation and defect fixing. This includes code review, dependency and configuration analysis, policy checks, architecture evidence, threat discovery, and support for remediation.

Supporting evidence and boundary

NIST’s AI risk guidance and secure-development profile support lifecycle risk management, while

OWASP's agentic guidance highlights tool misuse, identity and privilege abuse, behavior hijacking, and poisoned context. [R4–R6] These sources support continuous controls; they do not determine where human security expertise or approval belongs in a particular enterprise.

Concrete proposal Embed security agents and deterministic controls throughout design, coding, review, testing, deployment, and operations. Separate reasoning from enforcement and require progressive authority for any action that changes protected systems.

Business driver and expected gain Agent speed increases both the volume of change and the reachable attack surface. Periodic review based on stale diagrams cannot provide adequate assurance when code, tools, dependencies, and runtime conditions change continuously.

Organizational requirements Security engineering must co-own policies, threat models, evaluation data, exception handling, incident response, and gateway controls with the developer platform. Service owners remain accountable for accepted risk.

Cost and investment Investment includes security models and scanners, policy enforcement, sandboxing, identity, audit retention, red-team exercises, and specialist review. Earlier detection should reduce late remediation and incident cost.

Risks and safeguards Agents can misuse tools, inherit excessive privilege, follow injected instructions, expose data, or generate noisy findings. Use isolation, least privilege, trusted context, independent verification, approval gates, revocation, and emergency stop controls.

Relationship to the wider plan Security participates in the context supply, gateway, review, test, deployment, and operations loops. Identity, least privilege, isolation, provenance, approval, and rollback form a control plane across every lifecycle stage.

Supporting material NIST provides lifecycle risk and secure-development guidance; OWASP catalogs agentic threats; MCP specifies authorization mechanisms but does not replace an enterprise governance program. See [R4–R6, R9, R10, R13–R19].

10.1.1. MCP exposes capability; it does not grant authority

The confusion worth heading off is that a capability boundary looks like a control plane and is not one. An MCP server may expose `deploy`, `query_logs`, `create_workspace`, or `update_work_item`. None of that settles whether this agent, acting for this person, on this task, may invoke it against this resource right now.


Identity, delegated authority, authorization, policy, secrets, isolation, audit, rate limits, quotas, evidence requirements, approval, and revocation are enforced outside the model and outside the protocol. Governance mediates the path between the orchestrator and the capability rather than forming a perimeter around a set of tools — a ring around the outside still lets anything inside it call anything else.

The identity question changes shape accordingly. It is no longer only whether this developer may deploy. It is who this agent is, on whose behalf it acts, what authority was delegated for this task, for how long, and against which resources. Agents get capabilities, not credentials, and the authority attached to them stays bounded, observable, and revocable.

10.1.2. An agent cannot be the sole judge of whether its own action is permitted

AI should help produce security evidence, but deterministic identity, authorization, isolation, secrets, policy, audit, and rollback controls remain outside the model. An agent cannot be the sole judge of whether its own action is permitted.


Security and trust control plane



Security and trust flow. AI-assisted analysis operates inside an independently enforced control system.

10.1.3. Agent security is a platform responsibility

Model-level safeguards are necessary but insufficient once a model can invoke tools. Agent security must constrain the entire action path: the execution environment, the identity and authority carried by the workload, the systems it can reach, the arguments it can send, the sequence of actions it takes, and the evidence retained afterward. The same control plane should protect coding agents operating on source and cloud resources and customer-facing agents acting on enterprise content, workflows, and production services. [R255–R260]



Agent security control plane. The model proposes actions; independent infrastructure constrains, inspects, records, revokes, and stops them.

10.1.4. Six independently enforced layers

- Execution isolation. Run generated or untrusted code in a short-lived sandbox with an immutable base image, a dedicated writable workspace, non-root execution, resource quotas, restricted host interfaces, and explicit teardown. Container boundaries alone may not be sufficient for higher-risk or multi-tenant work; stronger VM, microVM, gVisor, or operating-system isolation may be appropriate. Filesystem and network isolation must work together. [R257, R258, R261, R262]
- Identity and delegated authority. Give every agent run a workload identity linked to a human sponsor, task, repository, tenant, purpose, and expiry. Mint short-lived credentials outside the sandbox and deliver only the narrow capability needed for the next action. Do not place reusable Git, signing, cloud, database, or production credentials inside an agent-controlled environment. [R256, R257]
- Mediated resource access. Route privileged access through capability-aware proxies or gateways rather than exposing general credentials. A Git broker can restrict repository, branch, ref, operation, and destination; a CI broker can limit approved workflows and inputs; an artifact broker can separate read, publish, and promote; and a cloud-control broker can limit accounts, regions, resource types, plans, and budgets. Tool and MCP gateways need equivalent identity propagation, schema validation, rate limits, policy, and audit. [R257, R258]
- Pre-action enforcement. Use agent-harness hooks, policy engines, branch protection, admission controllers, and transaction checks to stop unsafe actions before execution. Examples include denying pushes to public repositories, protected branches, force pushes, unapproved package registries, destructive cloud operations, production writes, bulk exports, or tool arguments that exceed the task's delegated scope. Repository-provided hooks are useful, but enterprise hard stops must live in an administrator-controlled layer that a compromised repository or agent cannot alter. [R259, R260]
- Runtime inspection and behavioral guardrails. Inspect prompts, retrieved content, tool descriptions, tool results, model output, and multi-step action sequences for indirect prompt injection, sensitive-data leakage, malicious URLs or files, unsafe tool chaining, scope drift, and anomalous behavior. Keep deterministic authorization and transaction policy outside the model even when learned detectors contribute signals. [R263–R270]
- Evidence and response. Record append-only task identity, model and harness version, context sources, tool calls, arguments with appropriate redaction, policy decisions, approvals, outputs, artifacts, network decisions, and resulting side effects. Support rapid credential revocation, session termination, quarantine, rollback, incident correlation, and a global kill switch. Audit should explain both what ran and what was blocked.

10.1.5. A cloud workspace starts with no ambient production authority

A cloud workspace should begin with no ambient production authority. Separate dependency acquisition from agent execution where practical: resolve through approved package and artifact proxies, scan and cache dependencies, then lock the execution phase to the destinations required by the task. Mount source and test data selectively, keep secrets in brokers rather than environment variables, and produce signed output artifacts and a teardown receipt. An agent may need broader read access for diagnosis, but write authority should increase only through explicit stages: local workspace, isolated branch, pull request, non-production deployment, and finally a separately

approved production action.

10.1.6. Customer-facing agents need the same fundamentals plus tenant and consent semantics

Customer-facing and operational agents require the same fundamentals with stronger tenant, consent, and transaction semantics. Bind each action to an agent identity and, where it acts for a person, a verifiable delegation from that user. Enforce row, object, tenant, purpose, and data-class policy at the resource; treat retrieved content and tool output as untrusted; separate planning from committing; require confirmation or dual control for consequential transactions; limit rate, spend, recursion, and side effects; and provide customer-visible activity, revocation, retention, and appeal. Model-output filtering does not replace authorization at the system of record.

10.1.7. A moving target requires progressive authority

Capability, attack technique, business context, and guardrail performance will all change. The durable strategy is therefore a control architecture rather than a fixed deny list. Maintain adversarial and accidental-failure evaluation suites; replay production traces safely; measure false blocks, missed unsafe actions, escalation quality, and time to revoke; red-team multi-step workflows; and increase authority only when evidence supports it. Better models may reduce some errors, but richer context and more capable tools also increase the value and blast radius of each successful action (R255, R271).

10.2. An agent that can act needs a reviewable policy artifact, not a prompt buried in code



TL;DR. Every agent capability carries an explicit **constitution** — a versioned, reviewed, signed policy artifact enforced by the gateway on every call, tested by the evaluation harness, and required before Autonomy Council authorization at T2+. It composes hierarchically: enterprise principles bind all agents; team constitutions narrow (never widen); capability constitutions add per-capability rules; agent-instance context is bound at task start. Distinct from Anthropic's **Constitutional AI** — that's training-time. This is runtime.

Viewpoint

An agent that can act needs an explicit answer to three questions before it takes its first action: **what may it do**, **what must it do**, and **what must it never do**. Prompt engineering has been the informal answer since 2022, but a prompt buried in application code is not a policy artifact — it is not reviewable, not versionable, not auditable, and not enforceable independently of the runtime that executes it. The industry-emerging term for the reviewable, versionable, enforceable artifact is the **agent constitution**.

Distinguish this from Anthropic's **Constitutional AI** (Bai et al., 2022, R284), which is a **training** methodology that shapes model behavior at pre-training time by giving the model a set of principles to critique its own responses against. The enterprise agent constitution is a **runtime** policy artifact — a document read by the platform, enforced by the gateway, tested by the


evaluation harness, audited on every use, and versioned like code. Both matter; they operate at different layers.

Implication

The orchestration platform must treat an agent constitution as a first-class artifact with:

- An **owner** (a named person or team, not "the platform")
- A **version** (semantically versioned; changes go through review)
- A **scope** (which agent, which capability, which tier)
- A **machine-readable rule set** (constraints the runtime can enforce, not only aspirations the model can consider)
- An **evaluation contract** (the eval harness proves the agent observes the constitution before promotion)
- A **sunset clause** (when the constitution is reviewed or expires)

Constitutions compose in a hierarchy:


Enterprise constitution
do not exfiltrate secrets · never act at T3+
without Autonomy Council authorization
always emit evidence
inherited — non-overridable rules stay
Team or domain constitution
default residency zone · allowed model routes
incident-response conventions
inherited — may narrow, may not widen
Capability constitution
per-capability rules — a dependency updater
never bumps a major version without approval
bound at task start
Agent instance context
who requested · what the target is
what the budget is · which tier is authorized

Constitution hierarchy. Enterprise principles bind all agents; team constitutions add domain-specific rules and may narrow but not widen the enterprise scope; capability constitutions specify per-capability behavior; agent-instance context is bound at task start. A rule denied at any higher level cannot be granted at a lower level.

Concrete proposal

Every agent capability in the registry references a constitution document (stored in version control, reviewed like code, signed before deployment). The gateway loads the composed constitution at task admission and enforces the machine-readable rules; the model receives the human-readable principles as part of its system prompt; the eval harness tests the agent against a scenario suite derived from the constitution before the capability is promoted to a higher autonomy tier. A capability that changes constitution version requires re-authorization by the Autonomy Council for T3+ tiers.

Two examples

- **A dependency updater ambient agent** (T3, standing service identity): the constitution says (a) never bump a major version without opening a decision packet for the service owner; (b) never bump when CVE data is unavailable; (c) fail closed if the supply-chain attestation is missing; (d) emit evidence linking the version diff, the changelog excerpt, and the CVE posture; (e) sunset review every 90 days.
- **A PR review agent** (T2, per-request delegated identity): the constitution says (a) never post more than N findings per PR without severity ranking; (b) never claim confidence above C without a citation to code or policy; (c) never rewrite the author's branch; (d) always emit a decision packet, even for approved PRs; (e) the signal-to-noise budget is Y false positives per 100 reviews before the capability is demoted.

Risks and safeguards

The failure mode is treating the constitution as marketing copy — a document that sounds good in a review meeting but the runtime does not actually check. Safeguards: every machine-readable rule has a test in the eval harness; every human-readable principle is quoted in the runtime system prompt (not paraphrased); the gateway logs every rule evaluation and its outcome; the constitution version and its evaluation status are fields in every decision packet.

Relationship to the wider plan

The constitution is the class-definition mechanism the Autonomy Council uses to authorize T3 and T4 capabilities. The autonomy ladder in the glossary refers to "class definitions" as what the Council owns; the constitution **is** the class definition. Constitutions also underpin the ambient-agent governance model in the ambient-agents chapter: an ambient agent with no per-task human sponsor is only trustworthy because its constitution is trustworthy.

A peer precedent. The Autonomy Council mechanism has direct precedent in Amazon's Bar Raiser — an independent, trained authority attached to a consequential decision (hiring) that a local team otherwise owns (R358). Amazon's Correction of Errors document is a similar shape for post-incident learning: a structured artifact written for organizational memory rather than blame, with mandatory actions. Both patterns show that a standing cross-team review body can scale without

becoming a queue if its scope is bounded and its decisions carry weight.

Open questions

- How is the constitution communicated to the model reliably? Is the system-prompt reproduction of the principles sufficient, or does the constitution need to be enforced by parallel deterministic checks?
- What is the versioning and dependency model when a capability's constitution depends on the enterprise constitution and the enterprise constitution changes?
- How does the constitution interact with A2A delegation — when agent A delegates to agent B, does B inherit A's constitution, its own, or a composition?

10.3. An agent processing regulated data is a production system, and residency binds it

Viewpoint

An agent that reads a repository, browses a wiki, calls an internal tool, or executes a task is **processing regulated data** the same way a production service does. The residency, retention, and cross-border posture of the customer's data must be respected by the workspace the agent runs in, the model the agent calls, the evidence store the platform writes to, and the audit surface the compliance team reads. Silence on residency turns the orchestration platform into a compliance regression.

Implication

The orchestration platform must expose residency as a first-class attribute of every workspace class, model route, and evidence store. Model routing (see the cost and routing section later in this chapter) must be residency-aware: a request that carries EU-tenant data cannot be answered by a US-only model endpoint even when that endpoint is cheaper or faster. The workspace broker (see the operating-models chapter) must refuse to place a task whose inputs cross a boundary the tenant has not authorized. Evidence packets must record which region processed which input, so that a subject-access or deletion request can be honored across the whole chain, not only at the point of ingestion.

Concrete proposal

Every workspace class, every model route, and every MCP tool registration carries a residency attribute drawn from a small enumerated set (US, EU, UK, JP, IN, sovereign-cloud, and customer-attested). The workspace broker enforces the residency policy before task placement; the model router enforces it before model selection; the evidence store partitions writes by residency. FedRAMP, SOC 2, and ISO 27001 posture become build-time attributes of the workspace class rather than manual reviews at deployment time.

A peer example. Databricks' Mosaic AI Gateway combined with Unity Catalog is a working implementation of residency-aware model routing (R362): model endpoints carry region attributes, requests are matched to endpoints by data-classification tag, and prompt/response is logged into a governed store. The IP-posture record proposed here is one metadata field away — the routing and

gating primitives already exist and are documented.

Open questions

- How does the platform behave when a task legitimately needs to combine EU-resident and US-resident inputs? (Likely answer: it does not; the task decomposes into per-region subtasks and the results are combined by a policy-approved reducer.)
- What is the retention period for the reasoning transcript of a model call that touched regulated data, and where is that transcript stored?
- Which sovereign-cloud offerings (AWS GovCloud, Azure Government, Google Assured Workloads, EU sovereign clouds) are supported out of the box, and which require customer engineering?

10.4. Model choice is an IP-posture decision, not only a cost and quality one

Viewpoint

Enterprise customers do not adopt an AI-native platform on capability alone. They adopt it once they can answer three questions from legal review: **who owns the output**, **who indemnifies the enterprise if the output infringes**, and **what training data the model was built on**. A strategy document that treats these as procurement details rather than architectural inputs will not survive first contact with an enterprise legal team.

Implication

Model choice and vendor selection are not only cost/quality decisions; they are IP-posture decisions. The platform must record, per model route, the vendor's position on output ownership, indemnification (with any caps and carve-outs), training-data opt-out for customer inputs, and audit rights over training-data provenance. That posture becomes a routing input alongside quality, latency, and cost — a low-cost model with weak indemnification is not interchangeable with a higher-cost model that carries full IP protection for the same task class.

Concrete proposal

The model registry carries an **IP posture** record per route: output ownership statement (customer owns / vendor owns / mixed), the indemnification tier the vendor offers (none / capped / full), the training-data opt-out status for customer prompts and outputs, and the vendor's own commitments about training on customer data. Sensitive change classes (production code, security-relevant patches, customer-content transforms) route only to models with full indemnification and confirmed training-data opt-out. The platform publishes an IP-posture report per pull request as part of the decision packet, so the merge decision includes IP posture, not only technical correctness.

Open questions

- How does the platform handle the **transitive** IP question — an agent that composes output from multiple model calls, some indemnified and some not?

- What is the enterprise's exposure when an agent reads customer-owned content, transforms it with a model, and writes the result back into the customer's tenant?
- How is training-data opt-out enforced across vendors that update their terms without notice?

The IP posture above governs **who is liable for the output**. The operational counterpart — **who saw the input, where it went, and how the customer sees and constrains that flow** — is a separate discipline covered in the next section.

10.5. Every prompt to an external model is a governed data-egress event



TL;DR. Every prompt sent to an external model is an outbound data flow to a third party. Six controls the platform must ship: (1) **data minimization / redaction** before every external call; (2) **enterprise-tier vendor contracts** with zero-data-retention, no-training, and bounded abuse-log policies; (3) **model registry gates** that only route customer-content-touching capabilities to vendors with the right contractual posture; (4) **sub-processor inclusion** — every model vendor listed on the customer-facing sub-processor page; (5) **outbound-flow audit** with per-request records of vendor, model, tenant, redaction outcomes, prompt hash, timestamp; (6) **customer preferences** — tenant-level allow-lists and stricter-tier opt-ins. The IP section handles **who is liable for the output**; this section handles **who saw the input**.

Viewpoint

Every prompt sent to an external model is an outbound data flow to a third party. The moment an agent reads customer content, generates a prompt from it, and calls an external LLM API, that content — or some derivative of it — has crossed the enterprise trust boundary. If the enterprise has customer contracts stipulating how customer data is handled, those contracts now bind the model vendor whether the customer knows it or not.

This is separate from the IP question addressed above. IP asks **who owns the output and who indemnifies the enterprise if the output infringes**. Customer-data controls ask **who saw the input, where did it go, how long is it kept, and can the customer see and constrain that flow**. Enterprise legal teams treat the two as independent gates — a strong IP posture with weak input controls still fails their review.

Implication

The orchestration platform must treat every outbound call to an external model as a governed data-egress event, with the same seriousness as an outbound API call carrying customer data to any other third party. That means data minimization on the way out, contractual constraints on the receiving vendor, auditability, and customer transparency.

Concrete proposal — six controls

1. **Data minimization and redaction on outbound.** A redaction stage runs before every external model call. It removes or tokenizes customer PII, secrets, credentials, unique identifiers, and

any content marked as sensitive in the source system's classification. The redaction is deterministic and reversible on the way back so the model's response can be reconstructed. Redaction outcomes (what classes were redacted, how many tokens) are recorded on the outbound-flow audit. Prompts that cannot be safely redacted for a given capability's classification are refused; the capability is demoted to a self-hosted route or the task fails closed.

2. **Enterprise-tier vendor contracts.** Every external model vendor used by the platform operates under an enterprise contract with explicit **zero-data-retention** (ZDR) or equivalent language, **no-training-on-customer-data** commitment, and bounded abuse-log retention (typically 30 days, with defined access controls on the log). Consumer-tier or default-tier APIs are not permitted for any capability that touches customer content, regardless of price. Reference implementations exist: Anthropic Zero Data Retention (R364), OpenAI Enterprise / API data controls (R365), Google Vertex AI no-log agreement (R366), AWS Bedrock data governance (R367), Azure OpenAI data-handling policies (R368).
3. **Model registry gates by data class.** Every model route in the registry carries a **data-class permission set** — which customer-data classifications it is contractually permitted to process. The workspace broker will not dispatch a task whose declared inputs exceed the route's data-class permissions. This gate is separate from residency (this chapter §Data residency) and IP posture (this chapter §Model IP); a route can be residency-compliant but data-class-restricted, or vice versa. The most sensitive change classes (customer content transforms, customer credential derivations, tenant-configuration changes) can only route to self-hosted models or a specific short-list of ZDR vendor routes.
4. **Sub-processor management.** Model vendors are sub-processors under GDPR Article 28 and the equivalent language in most enterprise customer contracts. Every model vendor the platform uses is registered on the enterprise's customer-facing sub-processor page with the standard fields (name, purpose of processing, location, material change notification). New model vendors go through the same intake as any other sub-processor — they are not chosen by Platform Engineering unilaterally.
5. **Outbound-flow audit.** Every external model call emits an audit record: caller (agent identity + task identity + delegated user identity), vendor, model, model version pin, tenant ID, prompt hash, redaction outcomes (classes and counts), input-token count, output-token count, wall-clock time, and correlation to the originating decision packet. The audit store is queryable by tenant so a subject-access request (SAR) can be answered — **"here are all model calls that processed data belonging to this customer in the last 90 days"**. Prompts themselves are not stored (the redaction already removed the sensitive parts, and reconstructing full prompts would defeat the purpose); the hash lets an investigator prove a specific call happened without recreating its content.
6. **Customer preferences and vetos.** The platform exposes tenant-level model-vendor preferences: an allow-list of vendors the customer authorizes, an opt-in for stricter tiers (self-hosted only, or a specific vendor's premium ZDR tier), and a veto mechanism for specific model families. The default is the platform-wide policy; the customer's preference overrides it. Customer preferences flow into the model router as an additional gate before the data-class check above.

Business driver and expected gain

Enterprise sales cycles increasingly require explicit answers to "where does our data go when your

platform uses AI?" before a deal closes. A platform that cannot answer this precisely — with the sub-processor page, the ZDR contracts, the audit query, and the customer preference controls — either loses the deal or eats the cost of manual audit-response work per prospect. A platform that can answer it precisely turns the question from a deal-blocker into a differentiator.

Organizational requirements

Legal owns sub-processor management and vendor-contract enforcement. Security owns the redaction rules and the audit-store integrity. Platform Engineering owns the model registry gates and the customer-preference surface. Product owns the customer-facing sub-processor page and preference UX. The Autonomy Council reviews new model vendor additions before Platform Engineering integrates them, because the sub-processor list is a customer-visible artifact.

Cost and investment

The redaction pipeline is a moderate engineering investment (a service in front of every external model call, with a rules engine and reversible-tokenization layer). Vendor enterprise tiers cost more than consumer-tier APIs but the delta is small relative to enterprise deal size. Audit infrastructure is a variant of standard event-log storage. Customer-preference UX is one screen in the tenant admin panel. The largest cost is discipline — refusing to route through consumer-tier APIs even when they are cheaper for a given capability.

Risks and safeguards

The failure modes are subtle:

- **Redaction misses.** Over-redaction reduces model utility; under- redaction leaks. Safeguards: red-team the redaction ruleset adversarially against production traces (safely replayed); maintain a labeled corpus of should-be-redacted examples and measure precision/recall per rule; publish redaction-quality metrics per quarter.
- **Vendor secretly logs at the edge.** Contracts require the ZDR commitment but enforcement depends on audit rights. Safeguards: require attestation reports (SOC 2 Type 2 or equivalent) with specific reference to the data-retention control; treat any vendor that refuses attestation as consumer-tier for gating purposes.
- **Transitive processing.** An agent may compose output from multiple model calls, some to enterprise-tier vendors and some to weaker ones. Safeguard: the workspace broker enforces the **lowest tier touched by any call** as the capability's effective classification.
- **Customer discovers via the response.** If a customer inspects model output and sees content that could only have come from their tenant plus vendor context, they may reasonably ask where the input went. Safeguard: the outbound-flow audit is queryable by the customer's own admin (with appropriate scoping), so the answer is proactive rather than reactive.
- **Right-to-be-forgotten confusion.** Customers expect a deletion request to propagate to every processor. With ZDR-tier vendors, the vendor typically has nothing to delete because they never retained the data. Safeguard: publish a plain-language explanation of **what deletion propagates and what doesn't** at the top of the sub-processor page; keep the outbound-flow audit for the shortest legally-required retention and delete on the enterprise's own schedule.
- **Model routing bypass in agent code.** An agent that calls a model directly (bypassing the model

router) bypasses every control above. Safeguard: the gateway blocks direct outbound calls to model provider endpoints; all model calls must go through the platform's router. Enforced at network policy, not at code-review honor system.

Relationship to the wider plan

This section closes the operational loop opened by this chapter's IP subsection: IP posture is about liability for output; customer-data controls are about the input path. Together they are the two halves of "what does the platform tell an enterprise customer about how their data is handled when an agent runs against it." The sub-processor obligation ties into the regulatory posture subsection because most regulated frameworks (GDPR, HIPAA, SR 11-7 in banking) treat model vendors as sub-processors or downstream service providers with enumerated obligations.

Supporting material

Anthropic Zero Data Retention (R364), OpenAI Enterprise / API data controls (R365), Google Vertex AI data-governance and no-log agreement (R366), AWS Bedrock data-governance guidance (R367), Azure OpenAI data-handling and data-loss-prevention (R368), GDPR Article 28 on processors and sub-processors (R369), and Salesforce Einstein Trust Layer as a peer example of the pattern formalized as product (R370).

10.6. Regulation is an architecture input, not a review gate applied afterward

Viewpoint

Regulation is now an input to platform architecture, not a review gate applied afterward. The EU AI Act's classification of AI systems into unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal risk determines what documentation, testing, transparency, human oversight, and post-market monitoring the platform must supply. US financial and health-sector rules (SR 11-7 for model risk in banking, HIPAA's requirements for PHI, SEC AI-related disclosure guidance for public companies) add sector-specific obligations. A platform that cannot produce the required artifacts on demand does not become "compliant later"; it becomes unusable for the workloads that most need it.

Implication

The orchestration platform must produce, per capability, the documentation and evidence the EU AI Act requires of "providers" and "deployers" of high-risk systems (technical documentation, data-governance records, human-oversight design, transparency disclosures, post-market monitoring, and incident reporting). The evidence chain (see Appendix N) becomes the substrate for these artifacts: they are not written by hand; they are derived from the evidence the platform already produces. The autonomy tier assigned to a capability must reflect its regulatory classification — a capability that touches a high-risk EU AI Act use case cannot sit at T4 without the human-oversight provisions the Act requires.

Concrete proposal

Each capability in the registry carries a regulatory-posture record: EU AI Act risk class, applicable sector rules (SR 11-7, HIPAA, GDPR Article 22, SOX where relevant), the human-oversight design

that satisfies each rule, the transparency artifact the platform will publish, and the post-market monitoring signals it will emit. The Autonomy Council reviews regulatory posture as part of every tier promotion. When the EU AI Act's implementing regulations change, the Council reviews the affected capability classes on the next quarterly cadence, and the platform's regulatory-posture reports are regenerated from the evidence chain rather than manually updated.


A peer example. JPMorgan Chase's LLM Suite deployment to 200,000+ employees was scoped explicitly against the bank's existing SR 11-7 model risk management program (R361). Every model use case is inventoried, validated, and periodically re-reviewed. This is the enterprise pattern the regulatory-posture record generalizes: the artifacts already exist for traditional risk models; the AI-native platform derives them from the evidence chain rather than reinventing model risk management.

Open questions

- Which capability classes are "high-risk" under the EU AI Act's Annex III, and how does that classification change with model or tool updates?
- How does the platform handle a capability that is high-risk in one jurisdiction and minimal-risk in another?
- What is the enterprise's disclosure obligation to customers when an agent participates materially in producing a deliverable, and how is that disclosure surfaced without swamping the user experience?

10.7. Cost feedback has to arrive while the developer still remembers the task

Viewpoint



Continuous model routing and evaluation. Quality, latency, cost, safety, and policy evidence improve each subsequent routing decision.

Model quality and vendor behavior are not static. Engineers compare notes about which model is converging on a task this week. Specialized products already split work among models, and some capabilities use small or specialized models for narrow tasks. A long-term platform may route work automatically, but that intelligence should not be assumed to work reliably today.

Near term, engineers may need choice and an explicit budget. One near-term option is a wallet model: a monthly allowance, visibility into usage, controls to disable an account or model, and a process for requesting more. The wallet is not obviously the durable answer, however: a complex task may legitimately need an expensive model, and a developer might also burn forty dollars editing a README without realizing it.

The most important behavioral point was feedback speed. A month-end report arrives too late for the developer to remember the task that caused the spend. A near-real-time burn meter or post-task notice can connect cost to behavior while the decision is still salient. The system can suggest a cheaper model for similar work without pretending cost is the only objective.

Concrete proposal Provide task-level cost and quality telemetry, immediate burn-rate feedback, recommended model choices, configurable budgets, and a path to request additional capacity. Introduce automatic routing only where evaluations support it.

Business driver and expected gain Model costs can grow quickly while quality varies by task and over time. Teams need to spend enough to converge on valuable work without using premium reasoning indiscriminately or learning about waste at month end.

Organizational requirements FinOps, platform, security, and engineering leadership need common cost attribution and exception policies. Engineers need guidance that explains trade-offs without treating spend alone as misuse.

Cost and investment The proposal requires usage aggregation across vendors, task attribution, dashboards, budgets, routing evaluation, and commercial management. It may also reduce waste and strengthen vendor negotiations.

Risks and safeguards Hard caps can interrupt valuable work, cheap-model routing can increase retries, and cost metrics can discourage experimentation. Optimize cost per verified outcome, allow justified exceptions, and compare convergence rather than token price alone.

Relationship to the wider plan Task characterization, model choice, execution evidence, cost feedback, and evaluation form one loop. Near-term human choice can gradually give way to routing policies where evidence shows that automation is reliable.


Supporting material DORA documents changing patterns of adoption, verification, and outcomes; model and agent providers document routing, evaluation, and tool-design practices. The wallet and immediate burn-rate interface remain design proposals. See [R1, R2, R11].

10.7.1. Optimise cost per verified outcome, not tokens consumed

- Cost per task and cost per accepted or verified outcome.

- Retries, time to convergence, and human correction—not tokens alone.
- Quality and safety by task type, model, tool, and context strategy.
- Budget exhaustion, requests for exception, and whether limits stop valuable work.
- Savings recommendations that preserve outcome quality.

Model cost and evaluation loop



Cost and evaluation loop. Human choice is appropriate near term; measured routing can increase as evidence improves.

10.8. The upside case, quantified

Viewpoint

This document has evidenced the downside of AI-assisted development with numbers: McKinsey on the size of the existing tech-debt estate, Liu et al. on the persistence of AI-introduced debt, METR on the gap between perceived and measured productivity. The upside deserves the same discipline. It is cautious but not absent.

The strongest positive evidence is a set of randomised trials rather than a survey. Cui et al. ran three of them across Microsoft, Accenture and an anonymous Fortune 100 company — 4,867 developers in total — and measured a 26% increase in completed tasks for developers given an AI coding assistant, with the larger gains going to the less experienced (R406). It is the cleanest causal result in the field and it needs one caveat stated immediately: it tests coding assistance, not the architecture this document proposes. Completed tasks are also not verified outcomes, which is the whole distinction the book turns on.

Set that against the skeptical anchor and the picture is neither flattering nor damning. METR measured 19% longer task time — but on 16 maintainers across 246 tasks, using early-2025 tooling, and the 2026 follow-up carries selection bias (R354). A 4,867-developer trial and a 16-developer study are not the same kind of evidence, and the honest reading is that assistance helps on task throughput while the question this document actually asks — what happens to verified outcomes per unit of attention — remains unmeasured by either.

Practitioner self-report sits in between and should be weighted as what it is. Stack Overflow's 2025 survey reports 69% of agent users claiming higher productivity, and, from 31,476 responses, 45% saying that debugging AI-generated code takes them more time (R407). The second number is the more interesting one, and it is self-reported friction rather than a measured increase — which is exactly the gap METR was built to find.

DORA's 2024–2025 research finds teams with strong underlying practices see genuine throughput **and** stability improvements under AI adoption — the amplifier effect works in both directions, and a team already operating with continuous delivery, small batch sizes, trunk-based development, and disciplined observability captures throughput gains without paying them back in incident rate

(R1, R2, R339). Meta's CodeCompose report at FSE 2024 (R359) is the largest peer-reviewed example of a well-instrumented enterprise deployment: 30,000+ engineers, careful separation of suggestion acceptance from productivity, and outcomes measured against system-level rather than individual metrics.

The honest range

For a well-executed AI-native platform program targeting classes of change the platform is designed to accelerate — bounded features, routine bug fixes, dependency and framework upgrades, test generation, documentation drift, and Class-1/Class-3 ambient work — the honest range for **cost per verified outcome** reduction is **20-40 %** on the change classes the program covers, sustained over an eighteen-month window. Anything above that range should be treated as marketing until measured against DORA four keys and a debt-delta on the touched surface. Anything below suggests the program's foundations are weaker than assumed and the platform is being asked to compensate for organizational latency it cannot remove.

Implication

The upside is a curve, not a constant. Returns are logarithmic as more change classes are covered: the first two ambient classes deliver a large step; the tenth delivers a smaller marginal gain. The curve plateaus when comprehension debt catches up — a team that ships more per unit of human attention without ever measuring comprehension will eventually hit the cognitive-debt wall described in the debt chapter, at which point the marginal gain flattens or reverses. The upside compounds only when the debt chapter is executed in parallel, not skipped.

10.9. A platform that assumes today's model tier still exists in twelve months will spend a quarter migrating

Viewpoint

Every major model vendor has by now (2024-2026) issued 90-day end-of-life notices on capability tiers that many enterprise deployments actively depended on. Model versions get deprecated, capability tiers get restructured, pricing bands shift, and the underlying "same" model behaves subtly differently across releases. A platform that assumes the current model tier will still exist in twelve months is a platform that will spend a quarter of its next year in unplanned migration.

Implication and portability contract

The orchestration platform must ship a **portability contract** that survives vendor churn:

- **Model-agnostic prompt templates.** Prompts are stored as templates against a capability, not against a specific vendor model. The platform's model router binds template to model at task time; the same template can be re-bound to a substitute model without touching product code.
- **Per-capability evaluation harness.** Every capability the platform supports has a reproducible evaluation suite — the same scenarios, graded the same way, run against any candidate model. Substitution is not a matter of engineering opinion; it is a matter of harness output.
- **Dual-vendor routing for T3+ capabilities.** Any capability operating at T3 or T4 is required to have a **qualified alternate vendor** — a model from a second vendor that has passed the

evaluation harness within the last quarter. Cost may still route traffic primarily to the preferred vendor; the alternate exists so that a deprecation notice does not become a production incident.

- **Substitution playbook.** When the current model tier is announced end-of-life, the platform runs a defined sequence: 30-day evaluation of alternatives against the capability harness; 60-day re-qualification including regression testing on production traces; cutover with parallel run so that the substitute's output can be graded against the incumbent's before full traffic shift.
- **Multi-vendor active routing, not standby.** The alternate is not a shelf artefact activated only when a deprecation notice arrives. Real production traffic must flow to more than one vendor in steady state — see the following section — so that the alternate's evaluation and operational shape stay current with production reality rather than atrophying between quarterly reviews.
- **Autonomy Council rule.** No capability at T3 or T4 may depend on a single vendor without an approved substitution plan in the capability's constitution. Sole-vendor T3+ capabilities are demoted to T2 automatically on the next quarterly review.

Relationship to the wider plan

Vendor substitution is not a procurement exercise; it is an architectural property that the model router, the evaluation harness, the capability registry, and the Autonomy Council jointly enforce. Treating it as a procurement fire-drill is what turns a 30-day EoL notice into a 90-day panic.

10.10. One vendor's day-to-day quality jitter becomes your product quality

Viewpoint

Substitution readiness (the previous section) is defensive: the platform can survive if a vendor deprecates a tier. Multi- vendor as an **active** strategy is offensive: the platform routes production traffic across more than one frontier vendor in steady state, for two reasons that the substitution-only story does not address.

Frontier-model quality wavers day to day. Any team operating at scale on frontier models observes it: the same prompt, the same temperature, the same evaluation suite produces meaningfully different results across days as vendors ship silent updates, retrain, adjust safety filters, rotate model cards, or shift the default routing behind their own "same" model endpoint. The variance is real and irregular. A platform that treats any single frontier vendor as authoritative for a capability inherits that vendor's day-to-day quality jitter as its own product quality. A platform that routes across two or three qualified alternates and grades every output against the evaluation harness in-flight can **detect** the jitter, **route around it**, and treat the variance as an operational signal rather than an unexplained regression that customers are the first to notice.

Frontier-vendor availability is not enterprise-tier. The public status pages of the frontier model vendors record visible degradations, elevated error rates, capacity throttles, and full outages on a cadence that the enterprise systems these agents support do not. An enterprise SLO of 99.9% for the agent-served capability cannot be built on top of a single vendor whose own observed availability sits below that threshold. Multi-source routing with automated failover is the standard mechanism for composing an application-level SLO out of upstream services that individually miss it — the same discipline applies to model vendors.

Concrete proposal

The model router treats the multi-vendor set as a **pool with health**, not as a primary-plus-backup. Concretely:

- **Continuous evaluation in production.** A small fraction of production requests (typically 1–5%) is scored against the capability's evaluation harness in-flight, per vendor. Rolling windows produce a **live quality score per vendor per capability**. Vendors that drop below the capability's quality floor are temporarily excluded from that capability's routing pool until they recover.
- **Health-check budget per vendor.** Standard availability monitoring — synthetic probes, error-rate signals, latency distributions — produce per-vendor health scores updated at sub-minute cadence. The router excludes unhealthy vendors from the pool automatically.
- **Weighted routing across the qualified pool.** Traffic weights are a function of quality score, health score, cost score, and contractual quota. Preferred vendor may hold the majority of traffic when everything is nominal; weights re-balance automatically when signals shift.
- **Sticky sessions where correctness demands.** Multi-turn interactions that require conversational continuity stay on the chosen vendor for the session; only **new** sessions rebalance.
- **Fail-open to a qualified alternate, not to error.** When the primary vendor is excluded (quality or health), the router fails over to the next-qualified alternate rather than returning an error to the calling agent. The alternate is, by definition, already passing the harness — this is a routing event, not a degraded experience.
- **Failover event = decision-packet event.** Every automated failover produces a decision-packet entry for the on-call agent SRE. If failover frequency exceeds a threshold, the packet escalates for policy review — a pool that has to fail over constantly is a pool that needs re-qualification, not a pool operating normally.
- **SLO composed at the platform, not at the vendor.** The capability's SLO — availability, latency percentile, quality floor — is a platform-level commitment computed from the weighted pool. Customers see one number and one contract; the platform manages the composition.

The router is one of the platform components most under-invested in the industry's current AI-development pitches. Vendors sell a single-vendor experience; the platform buys optionality by insisting on more than one, actively, in production.

Cost, quota, and business-continuity implications

Multi-vendor active routing carries a real cost. Vendor A's committed-use discount is only earned on the traffic actually routed to Vendor A; splitting 60/40 means less committed discount per vendor than a 100/0 split. The platform accepts that cost as the price of the **availability and quality-jitter insurance** the pool provides. The Finance conversation frames it that way explicitly — the incremental spend is compared to the expected annualised cost of an SLO breach and the reputational cost of a customer-visible outage that the platform could have avoided.

Contractual quotas across vendors are managed together — the platform buys just enough capacity from each vendor to survive the failure of any single one, not enough at each to run independently. This is the standard availability-engineering trade-off applied to a new class of upstream service.

Relationship to the wider plan

The multi-vendor active routing pattern depends on the model router, the per-capability evaluation harness, the workspace broker's placement policy, and the Autonomy Council's willingness to defend the incremental cost as an architectural property. It compounds with the **substitution readiness** discipline (previous section) — every vendor in the active pool is by definition already a qualified substitute — and with the **governed egress** posture in the customer-data section: adding a vendor to the pool requires the sub-processor and ZDR contract terms already covered.

10.11. The field moves faster than annual platform planning

Viewpoint

The field moves too quickly for an organization to settle permanently on one vendor, model, workflow, or technique. A team or set of accountable individuals needs to scan what is emerging, work with vendors, run trials, involve developers, and determine whether a new capability changes the SDLC. Backend, UI, review, and operations work may each favor different tools.

Engineers are often hungry to learn and willing to experiment. Brown bags, internal talks, newsletters, hackathons, early-access cohorts, alpha testers, and communities of practice are not peripheral communications. They are the social system through which useful practices spread and weak practices are challenged.

There also needs to be a budget and a measurement method for trying new things. "Everything in this presentation may be out of date tomorrow" was partly a joke, but it points to a real design principle: the platform should be adaptable, and the operating model should continuously evaluate both technology and its effect on developer behavior.

Concrete proposal Establish a continuous technology-evaluation function with early-access cohorts, reproducible workflow benchmarks, communities of practice, vendor engagement, and a governed path from experiment to supported platform capability.

Business driver and expected gain Models, tools, and effective working techniques change faster than traditional annual platform planning. Without a deliberate evaluation and adoption function, the organization either freezes too early or chases novelty without evidence.

Organizational requirements A small accountable team should coordinate trials while practitioners across disciplines contribute evidence. Leaders must fund experiments, recognize contributors, and retire practices that no longer work.

Cost and investment Recurring spend includes evaluation environments, licenses, model usage, vendor pilots, enablement, and staff time. This is an option-preservation budget rather than a one-time transformation program.

Risks and safeguards The organization may chase novelty, create tool sprawl, or let central standards lag behind practitioners. Use time-boxed trials, published evidence, adoption thresholds, security review, and explicit retirement decisions.

Relationship to the wider plan Evaluation connects new-tool trials with cost, quality, security, workflow metrics, paved-road updates, and progressive authority. Communities of practice turn local discoveries into reusable organizational capability.

Supporting material Current research and vendor engineering material emphasize evaluation and the dependence of AI outcomes on the surrounding system. Prior internal programs illustrate practical mechanisms for cohorts, brown bags, and bounded experiments. See [R1, R2, R11] and Appendix E.

10.12. Debt, comprehension, and continuous understanding

The economic argument above connects to a first-class discipline of managing three kinds of debt — technical, comprehension, and cognitive — developed in full in the debt chapter. Read that part as the third pillar of this chapter's economic argument rather than as a separate topic.

10.13. Two of these are hard constraints, not trend indicators

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Data-egress event count per tenant** — every prompt sent to a model vendor recorded as a governed event. The per-tenant audit trail queryable for subject-access.
- **Subject-access-request response time** — median time from a customer subject-access request to a complete answer. Target: less than the regulatory 30-day window with wide margin.
- **Sub-processor change-notification cadence** — days between a model-vendor change taking effect and customer notification under GDPR Article 28. Target: notification precedes activation by the contractually agreed lead time.
- **Model-vendor mix and abandonment rate** — routing distribution across vendors and rate of full-vendor abandonment per quarter. Concentration risk indicator.
- **Constitution reauthorization completeness** — fraction of agent constitutions with a current Autonomy Council reauthorization inside the required cycle.
- **Security control-plane bypass attempts** — attempted bypasses of any of the six independent security layers. Target: zero successful bypasses; a non-zero count triggers immediate Council review.
- **Model-cost-per-verified-outcome** — model spend divided by the count of verified outcomes attributable to model-assisted work. The CFO-facing ratio that pairs the cost signal with the meter.

Seven metrics; two of them (SAR response time, bypass attempts) are hard constraints rather than trend indicators.

Chapter 11. Debt, comprehension, and continuous understanding

The previous three chapters defined the orchestration platform, its substrate, and the economic and legal control loops that keep it defensible. Debt, comprehension, and the shared team-level theory of the system are not another economic control loop; they are the **negative-space** measurement of every claim the previous parts make about net-verified outcomes. An orchestration platform that measurably delivers more verified changes per unit of human attention while silently accreting technical, comprehension, and cognitive debt has not moved the enterprise forward — it has moved a hidden liability onto the balance sheet.

This chapter promotes this discipline to its own part because it deserves its own vocabulary, its own control loop, and its own promotion criteria. Three kinds of debt (technical, comprehension, cognitive) need three kinds of measurement; two proven refactoring patterns (Mikado, Strangler) become newly practical at agent scale; and a comprehension record becomes a first-class output of every consequential change. The chapters below take each of those in turn, then wire them back into the DORA scorecard and the evidence chain so debt work is defended by the same evidence as feature work.

11.1. Speed without understanding is technical debt

Viewpoint

Ward Cunningham introduced the technical-debt metaphor in 1992 to describe the **deliberate** trade-off of shipping something rough-but- working with the intention to refactor later (R344). Four decades of practice have shown that most tech debt is not deliberate — it is accretion: dependencies age, patterns fall out of favour, the team that owned the code moves on, the **why** behind a decision is forgotten even when the **what** is still running. AI does not change this dynamic. It changes the **rate**.

An engineer writing code at 100 lines per hour and understanding all of it accretes debt at one rate. An engineer supervising four agents that each produce 400 lines per hour of plausible-looking code accretes debt at a fundamentally different rate — even when the code is correct today, because the engineer's understanding of **what got written and why** has not scaled with the output. Speed without understanding is technical debt. Faster speed without understanding is faster debt.

This is not an alarmist claim. It is a call to make the trade-off visible.

11.2. Three layers of debt, not one

The literature that has appeared since generative AI arrived in mainstream development distinguishes three related but distinct kinds of debt. The debt-management program has to address all three:

- **Technical debt** (Cunningham 1992, R344) — the code-and- architecture layer. Code smells, aged dependencies, brittle tests, dead branches, ADRs whose rationale has been forgotten. This is what static analysis and dependency graphs measure.

- **Comprehension debt** (Osmani 2026, R350) — the individual reviewer layer. The gap between how much code is in the system and how much of it any human genuinely understands. Grows invisibly because "the tests pass" masks it; measurable via comprehension quizzes, review-latency, and reviewer override patterns.
- **Cognitive debt** (Storey 2026, R351) — the **shared** team-level layer. The lost common mental model of the system. Storey draws on Peter Naur's "Programming as Theory Building" (1985, R352): a program is a theory in the developers' heads, not a text file; when the shared theory decays, the ability of the team to safely change the system decays with it. Cognitive debt is what makes a team hit a wall at week seven or eight of AI-accelerated work.

Technical debt is what static analysis sees. Comprehension debt is what a single reviewer notices when they try to explain a change and can't. Cognitive debt is what an on-call engineer discovers at 3am when the person who "wrote" (delegated) the code is not on the team, and neither is anyone else who understands the intent.

These three are the debts the literature names, and all three sit downstream of a decision to build the thing at all. There is a fourth one upstream — **intent debt**, work in flight nobody can explain the reason for — which arrives by the same mechanism and is covered in the requirements and discovery chapter. The measurement apparatus in this chapter deliberately stops at the three that attach to code.

11.3. Enterprises already carry more debt than is comfortable, before AI amplifies anything

Enterprises already carry more tech debt than is comfortable, before AI amplifies anything:

- McKinsey's 2020 estimate: technical debt amounts to **20–40 % of the value of a company's entire technology estate** (R345).
- Stripe's 2018 Developer Coefficient study: engineers spend **~17.3 hours per week on bad code and maintenance** — roughly 42 % of their time (R346).
- DORA's cross-year research: teams with high tech debt are consistently in the bottom performance quartile on the four keys (deployment frequency, lead time, change fail rate, and mean time to restore) — the gap is not marginal (R1, R2, R339).

The AI-native platform inherits this baseline. Any argument about how much faster agents make development has to reconcile with how much of the resulting work is being spent servicing debt rather than adding value.

11.4. 22.7% of AI-introduced issues are still present in the latest version

Direct longitudinal measurement of AI-created debt has arrived. It supports the argument this chapter makes rather than contradicts it:

- **Liu et al. (2026)**, "Debt Behind the AI Boom: A Large-Scale Empirical Study of AI-Generated Code in the Wild" (R353): analyzed **302,600 verified AI-authored commits across 6,299**

GitHub repositories using static analysis. Findings: **code smells make up 89.3 % of the ~484,000 issues found**; **more than 15 % of commits from every AI coding assistant introduce at least one issue**; and critically, **22.7 % of AI-introduced issues are still present in the repository's latest version** — the debt persists, it is not transient churn that self-corrects.

- **Anthropic RCT on skill formation** (52 engineers, cited by Osmani R350): participants using AI assistance scored **17 % lower on comprehension quizzes after the task** (50 % versus 67 %). Largest declines in debugging. **Passive delegation impairs learning more than active question-driven use.** The same research found a stark usage-pattern gap: passive AI users scored **below 40 %** on comprehension, inquiry-driven users **above 65 %**.
- **METR (July 2025)** study of 16 experienced OSS maintainers on their own codebases (R354): developers **felt** AI made them ~24 % faster; measured result was ~19 % **slower**. The gap between perception and measurement is itself evidence of comprehension debt — a team optimizing on developer self-report will make worse decisions than a team optimizing on outcome measurement.
- **DORA 2024–2025** extends the amplifier framing with more per- team detail: teams with weak underlying practices got worse on stability under AI adoption; teams with strong practices got better. AI is **not** a productivity constant applied uniformly.
- **MIT Sloan Review** (Dec 2025) frames the composite effect as the **productivity trap**: "short-term coding-speed gains mask long-term system vulnerabilities that may emerge months or years later," particularly in brownfield systems (R355).

The Liu et al. figure — **22.7 % of AI-introduced issues persisting to the latest version** — is the single number to put in front of a skeptic. It refutes the "the churn washes out" argument and matches the Cunningham "debt" metaphor precisely: it accrues interest.

A peer example. Meta's CodeCompose report at FSE 2024 (R359) is instructive at scale: with 30,000+ engineers instrumented, they had to distinguish **suggestion acceptance** from **productivity** because a suggestion accepted and then rewritten is not the same as work saved. Enterprise measurement of AI-native platforms should treat acceptance as a leading indicator only and reserve outcome credit for the DORA four keys and the debt-delta on the touched surface.

11.5. AI can make debt legible, and execute controlled remediation at scale

First, **AI can make debt legible.** Static analysis, dependency graphs, and inline documentation-drift detection have existed for years, but they emit findings faster than any team can triage. An agent that reads the codebase alongside its git history, incident ledger, and change classification can produce a **debt inventory** that is prioritized by risk, blast radius, and cost of remediation — not a JSON dump. See Appendix R for the R.25 pattern.

Second, **AI can execute controlled remediation at scale.** The industry has two well-tested patterns for making high-risk change manageable, both defined before generative AI existed:

- **The Mikado Method** (R347). Start with the goal state ("upgrade this service to the new SDK"), attempt it, note every failure, back out, address each failure as a smaller goal, and repeat until the tree of prerequisites can be executed from the leaves inward. Agents are unusually good at

Mikado work: they can attempt the goal in a workspace, observe the failures, decompose, and emit the prerequisite graph as a decision packet for a human to review before starting the actual campaign.

- **The Strangler Fig** (R334, Fowler). Wrap the legacy system, route calls incrementally to the new implementation, retire the old surface only when the new one is proven. Agents can maintain the shim, migrate consumers one at a time, and continuously verify that no consumer's behaviour changed under the migration.

Both patterns require a discipline the platform must enforce: **every change carries evidence**. The evidence chain (Appendix N) does the enforcement — a Mikado leaf or a Strangler migration hop only advances when the acceptance and regression suites for the affected surface stay green.

11.6. Defend debt work with the same measures as feature work

The four DORA keys measure delivery outcomes. Tech-debt work is often defended with prose ("this makes the codebase healthier") but should be defended with the same measures as feature work:

- **Change lead time** trends downward when debt is genuinely reduced in the touched area.
- **Change fail rate** on the affected surface stays flat or drops during the campaign, or the campaign is off-track.
- **Deployment frequency** stays flat or rises; a debt campaign that suppresses deployments is generating a different kind of debt.
- **MTTR** stays flat or drops for incidents in the affected surface; otherwise the campaign has introduced new failure modes.

An ambient DORA-attribution agent (Class 3, see the ambient-agents chapter) can attribute changes in these metrics to specific debt campaigns and feed the attribution back into the next campaign's priority ranking. This closes the loop so debt work is measured by outcome, not by lines of code changed.

11.7. Comprehension as a first-class output

The orchestration platform must treat **comprehension** as an evidence type, not an assumption. Every substantial agent-generated change should carry:

- A machine-readable **change summary** that names the intent and the files/functions touched.
- A **comprehension record** — a short model-generated explanation of the surrounding code the change depends on, with citations. The first time a human reviews the change, the reviewer either accepts the comprehension record ("yes, this matches what I know") or corrects it. Corrections feed back into the review agent's training context.
- A **debt delta** — a computed estimate of whether the change moved the surface's debt score up or down, using the debt inventory above.
- A **reversibility class** — how hard is it to undo this change if we later decide it was a mistake? The reversibility class informs the autonomy tier the change is allowed at.

Comprehension is a first-class output of the platform. Without it, "the tests pass" becomes the only understanding anyone has of what just shipped — and that is the definition of accumulated debt.

11.8. Ship four capabilities as one bundle

Ship four capabilities as a coordinated bundle:

1. **A debt inventory agent** (Appendix R.25). Runs continuously, maintains a per-service debt score with citations, and opens decision packets for spikes.
2. **Comprehension checks on generated changes.** Every T2+ agent- generated PR carries a comprehension record. Reviews accept or correct it. Corrections flow to the review agent's context.
3. **Mikado and Strangler harnesses** on the paved road. Templates for both patterns, wired to the workspace broker and the evidence chain. A team starting a migration adopts the harness rather than inventing the tooling.
4. **DORA-attributed debt outcomes**. The debt inventory and the DORA signal streams share correlation IDs so any change in the four keys can be traced to (or ruled out from) a specific debt campaign.

Business driver and expected gain

If the pre-AI baseline is 20–40 % of tech-estate value spent on debt, the **worst** outcome of AI adoption is that number climbing because agent-generated code accretes faster than the team's comprehension does. The **best** outcome is that number falling meaningfully because AI-assisted Mikado, Strangler, and drift correction execute campaigns that would have been too expensive to staff manually. Neither outcome is automatic; the difference is whether comprehension is measured and whether debt work is prioritized by evidence.

Organizational requirements

Platform Engineering owns the debt inventory agent, the Mikado / Strangler harnesses, and the comprehension-record contract. Engineering leadership includes debt outcomes in the same review as feature delivery. The Autonomy Council authorizes tier promotions for debt-remediation agents. Each service owning team accepts or rejects the decision packets the debt agent opens; ignoring the packets is a signal that either the packet quality is low (agent tuning problem) or the team's capacity is exhausted (an org problem).

Cost and investment

The debt inventory agent is a Class 3 ambient agent (continuous low burn). The Mikado / Strangler harnesses are one-time platform investment plus per-campaign compute — comparable to running a short-lived batch agent per migration. The comprehension record adds per-PR model spend on the order of one extra 30k-token model call per PR; at ~$0.30 per call and enterprise PR volumes this is a rounding error against the value of catching a comprehension-mismatch before merge.

Risks and safeguards


The paradox is real: the same platform that lets agents remove debt at scale lets agents create debt

at scale. Liu et al.'s **22.7 % persistence figure** (R353) says the risk is not theoretical. Safeguards:

- **Prefer inquiry over delegation.** The Anthropic RCT (R350) shows the same tool used passively harms comprehension; used as an inquiry partner it does not. Onboarding, review conventions, and tier promotion criteria should reward inquiry patterns (developer asks agent to explain, critique, propose alternatives) and flag delegation patterns (developer accepts first output). The gap between the two usage modes was **40 % vs. 65 % on comprehension** — larger than the gap between AI and no-AI use.
- **Comprehension checks are mandatory at T2+.** An agent-generated change without a comprehension record does not merge, full stop. This attacks **comprehension debt** directly by refusing to advance a change whose reviewer cannot articulate the surrounding surface.
- **Team-level cognitive-debt monitoring.** On a monthly cadence, run a small structured exercise per service: someone other than the last committer explains the recent change history and the current architecture from memory. Track the gap. This attacks **cognitive debt** (Storey R351) directly — the shared theory decays silently and the only reliable way to detect the decay is to test it.
- **Debt-delta scoring per change.** The platform blocks a T3+ autonomous class from making changes with net-negative debt delta. This attacks **technical debt** directly.
- **Sunset for AI-generated patterns.** If a specific generated pattern shows a rising incident-attribution rate over a rolling window, the model routing policy demotes the model class that produced it and opens a decision packet. Consistent with the Liu et al. finding that some issue classes persist far more than others.
- **Human comprehension audit sample.** A small random sample of merged AI-generated changes is re-reviewed by a human within N days to test whether the comprehension records were accurate. The audit's error rate is a leading indicator of trouble.
- **No silent generation of test coverage.** Tests generated by an agent to make a coverage gate pass are marked as such and reviewed differently from human-authored tests. This prevents the "passing tests that test the wrong thing" failure mode.
- **Distrust self-reported speed.** The METR study (R354) found experienced developers were ~19 % slower with AI while feeling ~24 % faster. Decision-making that relies on developer surveys of AI value will systematically over-invest. The DORA four keys plus the debt-delta on the touched surface are the honest measures.

Debt-management feedback loop

The five-stage loop below is the same shape as the other LR flows in this document; the pastel positions carry the same meaning.



Debt-management feedback loop. Measurement feeds a prioritized inventory; controlled changes are executed via evidence-gated Mikado or Strangler harnesses; outcomes are attributed via DORA and the debt inventory updates for the next cycle.

Two worked examples

A peer case study. Airbnb migrated ~3,500 React Enzyme test files to React Testing Library in six weeks using LLM-driven per-file transformation with the test suite as the gate (R360). A manual estimate was 18+ months. The published case study is the closest public analogue to the SDK-deprecation example that follows: bounded scope, per-file evidence, Mikado-style backtracking when a transformation failed.

- **Fleet-wide SDK deprecation.** The paved road ships a replacement for an internal SDK; 400 services still call the old surface. The platform runs a Mikado agent per service: attempt migration in a workspace, observe failures, emit prerequisite graph, converge. Per-service PRs are opened with a comprehension record explaining what the migration touched and why. The debt inventory tracks the open-services count; the DORA-attribution agent watches for change-fail-rate impact on the migrated cohort. Campaign complete when the old surface has zero callers, evidence gates green.
- **Legacy authorization module retirement.** A ten-year-old authorization module handles 30 % of production traffic and one person understands it. A Strangler agent runs the new authorization service in shadow mode for six weeks, computes disagreement rates against production, opens a decision packet only when disagreement falls below a threshold. A human owner authorizes cut-over per consumer. The old module is retired when the last consumer reports green.

Relationship to the wider plan

Debt is the negative-space measurement of every claim this document makes about net-verified outcomes (see the one-page argument). More verified outcomes per unit of human attention is a durable gain only if the outcomes do not accrete an equal amount of unwatched debt. The comprehension record is the bridge: it forces the platform to produce, per change, evidence that humans still understand what got done.

Supporting material

Cunningham's original 1992 debt metaphor essay (R344), McKinsey's 2020 tech-debt research (R345), Stripe's 2018 Developer Coefficient study (R346), Fowler on Strangler Fig (R334), Ellnestam and Brolund on the Mikado Method (R347), and DORA's cross-year performance research (R1, R2, R339).

Direct AI-created-debt evidence: Liu et al. (2026) large-scale empirical study of AI-authored commits (R353); Osmani on comprehension debt with the Anthropic RCT on skill formation (R350); Storey on cognitive debt and Naur's "Programming as Theory Building" (R351, R352); METR on experienced-developer productivity perception vs. measurement (R354); MIT Sloan Review on the productivity trap (R355).

11.9. This is the measurement discipline that decides whether the platform is externalising debt

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Debt delta per change** — machine-readable per-change delta: added lines, removed lines, cyclomatic-complexity delta, test-coverage delta, dependency delta, doc-freshness delta. Aggregated per system per week.
- **Debt trajectory per system** — direction of debt-delta rolling sum over the last eight weeks per system. Flat or improving = green; two consecutive worsening quarters triggers platform intervention.
- **AI-authored-issue persistence rate** — fraction of AI-introduced issues still present in the repository's latest version, sampled on a rotating cohort of systems. Baseline: Liu et al. 2026 (22.7%).
- **Comprehension-record completion rate** — fraction of T2+ decision packets with a valid comprehension record at sign-off. Must be paired with the reviewer self-report gap; 100% on its own can mean rubber-stamp review.
- **Reviewer self-report gap** — delta between reviewer's self-assessed understanding and their actual understanding measured on a sampled subset. Directly falsifies the hypothesis that AI-assisted review is as thorough as its self-report suggests.
- **METR gap on the org's own engineers** — rolling replication of the METR 2025 methodology (self-report vs measured task- completion time) on a rotating cohort. Direction of change matters more than the absolute number; a widening gap signals comprehension debt accumulating faster than the platform is containing it.
- **Rework rate** — fraction of merged changes reverted or materially modified within 30 days. Lagging counter to velocity metrics.
- **Agent-rewrite (slop) rate, pre- and post-merge** — fraction of agent output revised before merge, and materially modified within N days after merge. Two separate metrics; both must be tracked because the failure modes differ.

Eight metrics; this chapter is the section of the platform whose measurement discipline most directly determines whether the platform is delivering net-verified-outcome or externalising debt onto the organisation.

Part Four — The organization and what it sells

Two chapters about everything outside the engineering loop that decides whether the platform succeeds. First the people: roles, permeability between disciplines, change management, and career paths — which decide adoption long before architecture does. Then the product: what an offering has to provide before other people's agents can use it safely.

Chapter 12. Organizational and enterprise product implications

The previous three chapters defined the orchestration platform, its substrate, and the control loops that keep it economically and legally defensible. This chapter names what the platform **does to the organization that runs it**: how disciplines collaborate, what skills become scarce, how career ladders shift, how change management becomes a permanent product capability, and how enterprise products themselves remain useful when customers increasingly begin work from an AI conversation rather than a destination application.

These implications should follow from the operating model and platform foundations. They are not predictions that every role disappears or that every product becomes an agent. They identify where boundaries shift and where trusted capabilities must become easier for humans and agents to compose. The autonomy tiers defined in the glossary determine what a given role can safely delegate; the residency and IP posture defined in the trust and governance chapter determine which capabilities can even be exposed externally.

12.1. Roles become permeable because execution gets cheap and judgment does not

Viewpoint

The platform affects product managers, architects, principal engineers, software engineers, QA, security, and operations. The useful point is not a prediction of job elimination. As the cost of execution falls, the boundaries between disciplines become more permeable.

A product manager may create and test a working prototype from a specification, and an agent may do the reading that used to define their week — nine hundred support tickets summarised before lunch (the requirements and discovery chapter). What does not move is the customer conversation or the choice, which is where the role's judgment was always concentrated. An engineer can use AI to understand more business context. A software engineer spends more time on constraints, evaluation, complex failures, and maintainability. Principal engineers and architects spend more time designing platforms, interfaces, guardrails, migration paths, and organizational mechanisms. Quality work does not disappear; it becomes a lifecycle responsibility supported by agents and evidence.

Implications

AI lowers the cost of execution; it does not remove the need for judgment. Deep expertise may become more valuable because it is applied to higher-consequence decisions. This topic should probably occupy one short portion of the presentation: it motivates why the platform must serve everyone who participates in software creation, not only a person typing code in an IDE.

Concrete proposal Give product, design, engineering, architecture, QA, security, and operations governed access to shared context, prototypes, environments, and evidence while preserving named ownership for consequential decisions.

Business driver and expected gain AI reduces the cost of producing artifacts across role boundaries. Teams can shorten handoffs when product, design, engineering, architecture, and operations share executable evidence rather than exchanging only documents and tickets.

Organizational requirements Leaders must clarify decision rights, update role expectations, invest in AI and systems literacy, and create joint working practices. Career frameworks should reward judgment, learning, and platform contribution as well as direct implementation.

Cost and investment The main investment is enablement, change management, shared tooling, and protected learning time. Shorter handoffs may reduce coordination cost, but broader access increases governance and support needs.

Risks and safeguards Role ambiguity, deskilling, uneven adoption, and unreviewed production work can follow. Keep accountability explicit, preserve deep expertise, use progressive access, and evaluate teams on verified outcomes rather than apparent activity.

Relationship to the wider plan The platform should expose the same governed knowledge, environments, capabilities, and evidence to different roles while preserving ownership of consequential decisions. Role flexibility increases the need for clear authority rather than reducing it.

Supporting material Industry research shows broad AI use alongside increased verification demands. The conclusion that deep expertise moves toward higher-consequence decisions remains a reasoned projection. See [R1–R3].

12.1.1. Two new roles the ambient portfolio requires

See the ambient-agents chapter for the two roles the ambient-agent portfolio requires: the ambient-agent product manager and the agent SRE. Their definition is developed there because the reader needs the ambient taxonomy in hand before the role descriptions carry their full weight.

12.2. Enterprise products must participate in agentic workflows

Viewpoint

Using AI to build software and building products for a world in which people increasingly begin from a prompt are different concerns. Adding AI features inside an application is not enough. Enterprise products also need to make trusted capabilities easy for agents and customer-created workflows to discover and compose.

A worked scenario: a user gives natural-language instructions to store a document, request an electronic signature, and then classify or extract information — potentially initiated from an external AI workspace rather than the product's own destination UI. A second path begins inside the product and lets customers safely assemble a tailored workflow without writing traditional code. The strategic point is reach: the same trusted capability should be available on every surface a user or agent might reasonably start from.

Software itself becomes easier to reproduce, so data, trust, permissions, governance, ecosystem

position, and reusable capabilities become more defensible. Being available where users orchestrate work may protect relevance and expand the surface on which a product is chosen.

12.2.1. A risk-tiered adoption sequence

Most enterprise products are not beginning from a blank sheet — they have existing APIs, permission models, audit trails, and (often) early MCP servers or agent-related surfaces. The architectural opportunity is to unify and extend that foundation rather than build a parallel agent platform (R112).

Tier one permission preserving reads

Begin with scoped search and retrieval, question answering, summarization, comparison, classification, and metadata extraction. These are frequently useful composition primitives and can preserve the requesting user's existing content permissions. Responses should carry source attribution, applied policy, and enough provenance for a person or downstream workflow to evaluate the result.

Tier two reversible and reviewable actions

Next permit agents to propose metadata changes, create draft documents, initiate governed workflows, assign review tasks, and route or copy content within approved workspaces. The system should distinguish a proposal from a committed mutation, require confirmation when confidence or sensitivity warrants it, and retain an auditable before-and-after record.

Tier three consequential actions

Initially gate external sharing, permission changes, bulk export, deletion, retention or legal-hold changes, final signatures, publication, and irreversible workflow steps behind named human approval; the most sensitive operations may require dual approval. Autonomy should expand only when evaluation shows that the action contract, policy enforcement, and recovery path are reliable.

Content-safe capabilities rather than generic CRUD

The preferred abstraction is not unrestricted resource CRUD. The product should expose **content-safe business capabilities** that carry the acting identity, verified delegation, tenant and classification context, declared purpose, provenance, permitted action boundary, evidence, and audit record. The same capability contract should behave consistently when invoked by a first-party agent, a customer-operated agent, an external AI workspace, or a no-code builder surface — the contract, not the surface, is where trust lives.



Enterprise product in an agentic ecosystem. Shared identity, policy, consent, metering, and lifecycle controls support every interaction surface.

12.2.2. Publishing capability outward depends on the primitives the internal platform already built

Publishing safely composable capabilities **externally** depends on the same primitives the internal orchestration platform already provides: verified identity and delegation, tenant and classification context, policy-as-code enforcement, evidence chain, and reversible action semantics. A product organization that has invested in the orchestration platform for its own engineering can expose those primitives outward with less bespoke work than an organization building both foundations from scratch. This is the strategic argument for treating internal developer productivity and external agentic reach as one program, not two.

Concrete proposal Make selected product capabilities safely consumable from external AI workspaces and customer-built agents through stable APIs, MCP tools, and A2A agents where richer collaboration is justified.

Business driver and expected gain Customers may increasingly begin work in an AI workspace or a generated application rather than visiting every enterprise product directly. Products risk losing relevance if their trusted capabilities cannot participate safely in those workflows.

Organizational requirements Product, platform, security, legal, ecosystem, and go-to-market teams need a shared agent-consumption strategy, partner model, developer experience, certification process, and support boundary.

Cost and investment Investment includes interface design, partner integration, identity and consent, metering, sandboxing, documentation, compatibility testing, and ecosystem marketing.

New consumption channels may expand usage beyond the application UI.

Risks and safeguards Disintermediation, loss of user experience control, unsafe composition, partner dependency, and unclear liability are material concerns. Start with narrow high-value capabilities, maintain auditable consent and permissions, and preserve direct product experiences where they add value.

Relationship to the wider plan The external product challenge mirrors the internal platform challenge: expose stable capabilities, preserve identity and permissions, support MCP or REST for tools, use A2A where agent collaboration adds value, and govern the resulting activity.

Supporting material MCP and A2A provide current interoperability mechanisms and have substantial ecosystem support, but the enterprise-specific product implications remain a strategic hypothesis for discussion. See [R9, R10, R29–R32].

12.3. Change management is a platform product



TL;DR. An AI-native platform succeeds or fails on adoption long before it succeeds or fails on architecture. Treat change management as a permanent platform capability — staffed, measured, and roadmapped like a product — not as a rollout task at launch. Three persistent concerns to design against by role: **accountability without authorship** (evidence chain), **role compression** (autonomy tier makes T0-T2 more judgment-heavy, not less), **learning-pathway collapse** (junior engineers need substitute paths). Publish a **transition contract** per role affected.

Viewpoint

An AI-native platform succeeds or fails on adoption long before it succeeds or fails on architecture. A platform that ships every capability described in this document but is used by only the alpha cohort has produced no net-verified outcomes. Change management is therefore not a rollout task attached to launch; it is a permanent product capability of the orchestration platform, staffed and measured accordingly.

Implication

Resistance to AI-assisted work is legitimate, informed by past tooling promises, and unevenly distributed across teams and career stages. Senior engineers may worry about accountability without authorship; mid-level engineers may worry about role compression; junior engineers may worry about learning pathways collapsing. Each of these concerns has a specific answer that the platform must provide as a product, not as a memo:

- **Accountability without authorship.** The evidence chain (Appendix N) gives an owner the same audit surface they would have if they wrote the code themselves — commit provenance, tool versions, model transcript hash, tests run, human decisions logged. The platform delivers this artifact, not a promise.
- **Role compression.** The autonomy ladder (glossary) makes explicit that T0–T2 tiers require more human judgment per unit of agent throughput, not less. Roles that shift from execution to orchestration should be re-scoped and re-titled on the same timescale as the platform rolls out

the capabilities that enable the shift.

- **Learning pathways.** A junior engineer whose first two years used to consist of writing code alongside a senior needs a substitute learning path: shadowing decision packets, running the same task manually and by delegation and comparing, contributing to the evaluation corpus, and rotating through review, testing, and operational agent tuning. The platform must instrument these paths so learning outcomes are visible, not folklore.

Concrete proposal

Fund a **platform adoption** team as a peer of Platform Engineering, with product management, developer advocacy, learning design, and research capacity. Its measures are activation rate per capability, time to first verified outcome, satisfaction and trust deltas by role and tenure, and — critically — the rate at which teams **decline** to adopt a capability along with the reason. Declines are inputs to platform roadmap, not signs of resistance to be overcome.

Establish a **communities of practice** cadence: alpha cohorts for new capabilities, monthly show-and-tell across teams, an internal "decisions we changed our mind on" log, and protected experimentation time for teams that want to trial a new pattern before it becomes paved.

Publish a **transition contract** per role affected: what changes in day-to-day work, what new skills are supported, what does not change (compensation band, career ladder rung, review criteria), and what the escalation path is when the contract is not being honored. The absence of an explicit contract is what turns AI adoption into a rumor-driven exercise.

Open questions

- How does the platform surface **reversals**: capabilities that were paved and then unwound because they did not deliver?
- What is the appropriate cadence of transition contract updates when the underlying capability changes model or vendor?
- How does an organization avoid the failure mode where "change management" becomes a bottleneck that slows the platform below the rate at which model capabilities change?

12.3.1. Starting when you are 60 percent down a wrong path

Viewpoint

Very few enterprises begin an AI-native platform program from a blank slate. The realistic starting state — for most 2026 enterprises — is three competing agent runtimes across BUs, Cursor paved in one product line and Copilot in another, a homegrown MCP gateway that a small team built in Q3, and a Terraform module full of ad-hoc agent scripts that nobody wants to admit ownership of. The platform proposal in this document has to be adoptable from **there**, not from a green field.

Implication and remediation sequence

Declaring the existing landscape wrong and demanding immediate migration is the failure mode. It produces a paper platform that teams route around and a shadow-IT footprint that grows because the sanctioned alternative is now painful. The following sequence is the one that has actually converged shadow-IT patterns in comparable large-org migrations (SOA in the 2000s, container

platforms in the 2010s, service mesh in the 2020s):

1. **Inventory without judgment.** Publish the shadow-IT map. Every BU, every runtime, every gateway, every ad-hoc script. Do this without threat and without deadline. Teams that hid usage will surface it only if surfacing does not immediately cost them something.
2. **Publish a tolerance window.** Announce a defined quarter (or two) during which all existing usage stays sanctioned. During the tolerance window, the platform posts **convergence targets** — the capability contract, the security floor, the audit surface a team needs to meet — and offers help meeting them, not a stick.
3. **Anoint alpha cohorts from existing choices.** Identify one or two BUs whose current choice happens to align with the platform choice. Make them the alpha cohort with amplified engagement, priority support, and public credit. Their success is the proof point that persuades the next cohort.
4. **Offer migration credits.** Headcount time, budget priority, compute credits, executive air cover — whatever the currency is in the enterprise, spend it on BUs willing to migrate off shadow-IT tools. Migration is expensive; the platform team's budget is one of the few places that expense can be legitimately absorbed.
5. **Never forbid shadow-IT before the alternative is measurably better.** The tolerance window ends only when the platform's version has beaten the shadow-IT version on the pilot team's own numbers — DORA four keys, cost per verified outcome, developer satisfaction. Forbidding first and improving later is what poisons the next migration attempt.

The failure mode to avoid

The specific pattern the sequence exists to prevent: the platform team announces convergence on the roadmap, declares victory on paper, and the shadow-IT landscape continues unabated because migration was painful and the enterprise did not fund the pain. Six months in, the platform team is measured against adoption metrics that were never met, the shadow-IT is bigger than before (because the deprecation announcement panicked teams into locking in what they already had), and the credibility budget for the next platform initiative is spent.

12.4. The junior pipeline compresses on a three-to-five-year lag

Viewpoint

An orchestration platform that raises the ceiling on verified outcomes per engineer also raises the floor on what an engineer must know to be effective. The market for the resulting role is not the same market the enterprise has been hiring from. Talent strategy is a first-order platform concern because a platform without engineers who can operate it well is a compliance liability.

Implication

Three specific pressures need explicit organizational answers, not optimistic slogans:

- **The junior pipeline compresses.** If entry-level engineers are displaced from tasks that used to teach them the system, the pipeline for mid-level and senior engineers thins out on a 3–5 year

lag. Enterprises that want senior engineers in five years must invest now in learning pathways that survive the compression (see change management above), or accept that they will hire experienced engineers from a smaller and more expensive pool.

- **Senior value shifts to judgment, taste, and system understanding.** The scarce skill becomes deciding **what** to build, **when** to accept an agent's output, and **when** to reject it. Compensation and career ladders that reward code output volume will misallocate rewards. Ladders that reward decision quality, evidence-chain review, and Autonomy Council contribution will attract and retain the people the platform depends on.
- **A subset of specialties becomes rarer and more valuable.** Model evaluation, prompt/tool engineering at the platform level, agent security, and the integration of formal verification with generative approaches are all becoming named specialties. Enterprises need a plan for either developing these in-house or partnering — treating them as generic engineering will fail.

Concrete proposal

Refactor the engineering career ladder within one calendar cycle to name the orchestration mode explicitly. Add or revise rung descriptions to include: leading design of a T3 or T4 capability; contributing to the platform evaluation corpus; sitting on the Autonomy Council for a capability class; operating as a review or operations orchestrator across N teams. Promotion committees receive training on how to evaluate evidence-chain artifacts as first-class career evidence.

Create at least two named specialty tracks — **model evaluation and routing** and **agent security** — with their own compensation bands and hiring pipelines. Treat these tracks the way security engineering and site reliability engineering are treated today: distinct disciplines that partner with generalist engineering rather than sitting inside it.

Redesign the internship, new-grad, and mid-career programs to teach orchestration from the start. The exercise "here is a spec, produce a change and its evidence chain" replaces "here is a spec, write the code." Interns who complete such programs are the leading indicator of whether the pipeline is intact.

Open questions

- What is the appropriate ratio of orchestration-mode engineers to "deep code" engineers, and how does it vary by product area?
- How does the enterprise handle the case where its most productive engineers refuse the transition because they value the craft of manual coding?
- How does compensation adapt when a single engineer, aided by agents, produces the verified outcomes previously delivered by a team of five?

12.5. Cross-stack fluency buys flexibility and sells shallow-familiar review

Viewpoint

Alongside the role permeability discussed earlier, agentic development lowers a second boundary that has quietly shaped how engineering organisations are staffed: the **tech-stack silo**. An engineer

who has spent a decade in backend Go can now, with agent assistance, contribute a plausible React component to a UI they would previously not have opened. A platform engineer can spin up a Python data pipeline for a POC in an afternoon that would have required a data engineer's calendar last year. A team that needs to evaluate a new SDK — a database driver, an observability client, a payments library — can produce a working spike in a language they do not maintain, without a full onboarding cycle for the person doing the work.

As a feature. This is workforce flexibility of a kind the industry has not previously had. Cross-stack contribution reduces the coordination tax on small changes that would otherwise stall waiting for the "right" team. POCs that would have been non-starters — because the cost of a senior engineer learning enough of an unfamiliar SDK to evaluate it exceeded the value of the evaluation — now become tractable. A generalist tier of engineer, augmented by agents, can move fluidly across the parts of the system that most organisations have historically had to staff as separate specialties.



Figure 14. Shallow-familiar

Both look equally secure from standing height, and the difference is invisible from there. Confident enough to merge, not deep enough to catch what should not have been merged.

As a concern. The same fluency lowers the cost of **producing** work in an unfamiliar stack without lowering the cost of **evaluating** it. An engineer flexing muscle they have not built deeply is at exactly the kind of comprehension risk this document addresses in the debt chapter — able to sign off on generated code that looks right, unable to explain why an edge case is or is not handled, unable to recognise idiomatic-versus-anti-pattern choices in the target language. The failure mode is **shallow-familiar**: confident enough to merge, not deep enough to catch what should not have been merged.

Concrete proposal

Treat cross-stack contribution as a **governed capability**, not a free-for-all. Specifically:

- **Attribute the depth risk.** Decision packets for changes outside the reviewer's declared area of depth carry a **cross-stack marker** on the comprehension record. Downstream audit can then distinguish shallow-familiar review from deep-familiar review without penalising either.
- **Route to a deep-familiar reviewer for consequential slices.** For changes above a complexity threshold in a stack the primary author has not declared depth in, the platform routes the packet to a reviewer who **has** declared depth. This is not a permission gate — it is a comprehension-quality mechanism.
- **Preserve the flexibility for POCs and reversible work.** T0 exploration and T1 reversible experiments in unfamiliar stacks require no extra routing — the whole point of the flexibility is that low-consequence spikes should be cheap.
- **Track the trend.** The measurement below picks up how much cross-stack contribution is happening and how well its comprehension records hold up under postmortem re-check.

Business driver

Cross-stack fluency is the single largest source of organisational flexibility the platform delivers. It is also the single most under-discussed source of comprehension debt. Naming both sides, and building the routing mechanism above, lets the organisation capture the flexibility without paying the debt as an unstated externality.

Relationship to the wider plan

Directly extends role permeability (this Part), depends on the comprehension record and reviewer self-report gap mechanisms (the debt chapter), and interacts with the maturity matrix (the maturity-journey chapter) — the cross-stack question is a specific case of the more general question about which cells the platform is ready to shade in colour for which teams.

12.6. Measure whether the organisational shift is real or only announced

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Role permeability index** — fraction of cross-role work items (product-engineering-design overlap, engineering-security overlap, engineering-operations overlap) per team per quarter. Rising permeability supports this chapter thesis; falling permeability signals the platform is under-serving cross-role work.
- **Ambient-agent PM portfolio size and churn** — count of registered ambient agents owned by the ambient PM role, plus the quarter-over-quarter add/retire rate. Non-zero churn demonstrates the sunset discipline; zero churn signals portfolio accretion without pruning.
- **Agent-SRE on-call load** — pages per week to the agent-SRE role, split by category (runaway agent, cost anomaly, feedback-loop detection, constitution violation). Rising load in any category is a signal about a class of ambient agent needing constitution or code changes.
- **Talent-ladder progression rate** — engineers advancing on the judgment-and-platform-contribution track versus the code-only track, per quarter. Rising judgment track is evidence the organisational shift is real; falling ratio is a leading indicator of the deskilling risk this chapter names.

- **Cross-stack contribution share and shallow-familiar rate** — fraction of merged changes authored by engineers outside their declared area of depth, paired with the reviewer self-report gap for those changes. Rising cross-stack share with a stable or shrinking gap = the flexibility is being captured cleanly. Rising cross-stack share with a widening gap = shallow-familiar debt is accumulating.
- **Enterprise-product agentic-participation share** — fraction of enterprise product surfaces exposing agent-safe capabilities versus opaque UI wrappers. The chapter's argument that products must participate depends on this share rising over time.
- **Change-management engagement** — participation rate in alpha cohorts, communities of practice, and evaluation-harness workstreams, per engineer per quarter. Directional; falling engagement signals the change-management platform is not earning its keep.

Six metrics; each maps to a this chapter claim about how the organisation changes as the platform matures.

Chapter 13. Making a product agent-ready

the organizational chapter argues the commercial case: a product that cannot be reached from wherever a user starts work loses the surface on which it is chosen. This chapter is the engineering bill for that reach.

The caller is the thing that changed. It arrives with a token, a task it did not write, no patience, and no eyes — it will not notice that a result looks odd, it will not stop at the first page, and it will combine what you return with material from three other products before anyone sees it. A permission model built for a person browsing a user interface is being asked to hold under a different load.

The claim this chapter turns on: **a product is agent-ready when it can state precisely what a caller may learn, not merely what it may fetch.**

The order below runs outside-in. First what the caller experiences — what may be discovered, what the product exposes as an object, whose authority is being exercised, what happens across an organisational boundary, and what an integrator is owed. Then what has to be true inside the product for those promises to hold, which is where the retrieval machinery lives. Then operating it, and adopting it without a rewrite.

Performance figures here are illustrative design budgets rather than measured results, and the architectures are proposals. Where a claim rests on a published mechanism, the source is named.

13.1. What changes when the caller is an agent

Four properties of agent traffic break assumptions that held for human traffic.

Volume and fan-out. One human question becomes twenty tool calls across four products. Rate limits sized for a person clicking are sized wrong, and a retry storm from one misconfigured agent looks identical to an attack.

Composition. Your output becomes an input to a synthesis you never see, alongside data from systems with different permission models. The audience of that synthesis is not the audience of your response.

No presentation layer. A person reading a result page understands that a count is approximate and a snippet is truncated. A model reads the number and asserts it. Every field is an output, including the ones that were previously decoration.


Your descriptions are prompt content. Tool names, parameter descriptions, and error strings get read by a model as instructions. They are a quality surface and an injection surface at once, and they are written by whoever last edited the schema.

13.2. Discovery is an authorization decision

An engineer asks an agent to investigate a production incident. The agent searches incident reports, source repositories, customer tickets, and deployment records. The engineer can read some of

these, the incident-response service can read others, and the approved model route may process only a subset. A service account with broad read access makes that integration easy to demonstrate, and easy to use to hand the engineer an answer derived from records they could never open.

Point authorization asks whether a principal may perform an action on a known resource. **Set authorization** asks which resources satisfy both the query and the policy, under a defined view of identity, relationships, attributes, and time. The second question governs titles, snippets, citations, facets, counts, ordering, and whether a continuation page exists. Those are observable outputs even when no document body is returned.



Two different questions. Point authorization clears one known resource and is what most product permission models were built to answer. Set authorization constrains discovery, ranking, and every observable output before anything leaves the trusted boundary — and it is the question an agent asks constantly.

Separate the permission to discover an object, to read its content, to process it with a particular model or integration, and to execute an action against it. These need not become four public roles, but they do need an explicit mapping. A principal who can list file names may still be barred from retrieving text for a model; a capability link may grant access to a known object without granting broad search discovery.

The consequence for a product organisation is uncomfortable and worth stating plainly. A search endpoint is a security boundary. A retrieval service is a policy execution engine whether or not anyone calls it one, and its contract has to describe both what the caller may learn and how missing or stale authorization information changes the answer (R377, R378).

13.3. Business entities, not just resources


Start with what the product exposes, because every later decision inherits it. A contract, a claim, a study deviation, or an incident is rarely one file. It has identity, relationships, a lifecycle, provenance, and actions, and a product that exposes only files pushes that modelling work onto every agent developer who then does it differently.

Expose the entity. A deviation with a study identifier, site, status, severity, owner, and evidence files supports a question like "how many open deviations at this site" that counting files with similar names cannot answer honestly. Make explicit whether the entity, its individual fields, its attachments, and its derived summaries have distinct release rules — they usually do, and the common mistake is letting the least sensitive one set the audience.

This is the durable version of a discipline enterprise content platforms have carried for decades: typed records with controlled attributes, lifecycle states with approvals, renditions tied to their originals, and federation across repositories. The opportunity is not inventing those semantics but making them reachable without a six-week integration.

13.4. Delegation across every hop

An agent needs an attributable runtime identity even when acting for a person. Preserve the human or service sponsor, the agent identity, the application or client identity, the task or charter, the session, the intended audience, the permitted tools, and an expiry. An unattended workflow gets explicitly provisioned service authority with an owner and a review date — never a recycled employee session, and never a shared all-powerful integration user that erases attribution.



Effective authority is the intersection of every hop, never the union. A tool being available, an OAuth scope being granted, and a resource permission existing answer three different questions, and all three have to be satisfied at the moment of execution.

A child agent may narrow authority; it may not accumulate the union of unrelated parent grants. Purpose is part of the decision and cannot come from the model — bind it to an approved workflow or a trusted assignment and check that the requested action fits it. Token exchange supplies the actor and delegation concepts for carrying this across services, while attenuation, revocation, and inter-service trust remain deployment decisions; exchanging a token does not invalidate the original (R384).

MCP is where most products will meet this in practice, and the division is clean. Transport authorization establishes who is calling the server. Business authorization establishes what that caller may do, and the protocol has no opinion on whether this principal may summarise this contract. The current specification requires audience-bound token handling and its security guidance rejects token passthrough and addresses confused-deputy risk; pin the protocol versions you support and verify actual server behaviour rather than assuming it (R10, R385).

Three enforcement habits separate a product that survives this from one that demos well:


- **Validate arguments at the service boundary and bind tenant and principal from verified credentials** — never from model-generated arguments. Tool descriptions are guidance; server-side enforcement is the control.
- **A hidden or administratively disabled tool has to reject direct invocation.** Removing it from discovery is not enforcement, and it is the first thing an adversarial caller tries.
- **For consequential writes, authorize the exact target, destination, operation, and version at execution time.** Bind human approval to concrete arguments, use idempotency keys so a retry cannot duplicate the action, and require fresh approval when the plan materially changes.

Reading a document that instructs the agent to export another file creates no authority to export it. That sentence is the whole of prompt-injection defence at the authorization layer, and it holds only if tool policy lives outside the model's persuasion.

13.5. Collaboration across organisations

Most enterprise products support content shared beyond one customer's boundary — external counsel in a deal folder, a supplier in a sourcing workspace, a CRO working on a sponsor's study. Legitimate cross-organisation access is a first-class case rather than an isolation exception, and it is where tenant-shaped thinking fails first.

Consider counsel invited into a deal folder who also holds an expiring link to a supplier-owned contract. Their agent may legitimately compare authorized clauses across both, while the manufacturer's internal pricing file stays out of reach. If the resulting comparison is saved into a broadly shared workspace, the audience of that destination needs checking independently of what the agent was allowed to read.



Each owner domain stays authoritative for its own resources. The broker combines only authorized evidence and checks the destination audience separately, because the right to read three sources is not the right to publish their synthesis.

Four rules make this tractable. Carry owner domain, stable object identifier, version, grant path, classification, and processing obligations on every source. Keep direct collaboration, group-derived access, and link-based access distinguishable, and never infer a permanent searchable grant from a link that resolved once. Declare the score-combination policy, deduplication, and candidate allocation when merging across domains, and let each domain's freshness and failure status survive into the combined response — one unavailable domain reduces coverage and does not license a fall back to a stale external copy. Redact link secrets from prompts, logs, and any provenance shown to a viewer who lacks the underlying access.

For an inseparable synthesis, the default audience is the intersection of recipients permitted to receive every included source, further constrained by processing and export policy. Where the output needs a wider audience, produce an approved release or regenerate from eligible sources.

13.6. What you owe the developer on the other side

Everything above is invisible to the person integrating your product. What they experience is a set of promises that either hold or waste their week, and the difference between an ecosystem product and an API with an MCP wrapper is mostly here.

Publish a capability ledger that distinguishes announced from enabled from verified. An announced control is not a safeguard, and a feature enabled in one tenant is not enabled in theirs. State what is generally available, what requires enablement, what is in preview, and what the tenant administrator can confirm for themselves. Nothing erodes trust faster than a security property that turned out to be a roadmap item.

Ship a conformance suite the customer can run against their own tenant. Correctness claims that only you can verify are marketing. The suite that proves your contract internally is the one that should be published, with the expected decisions for a small reference corpus.

Give three worked examples, not thirty endpoints — a delegated read, an unattended service workflow, and a consequential write — each showing the expected failures and the audit fields they produce. Integrators copy the first example that runs, so make the first example the safe one.

Treat tool schemas as an API with a version and a deprecation policy. A renamed parameter breaks agents that were working yesterday, and unlike a human developer, the caller will not read a changelog. Publish deprecation windows and keep old contracts working through them.

Design errors for a machine that will retry. Deterministic error codes, a stated retry policy, idempotency keys on every mutating operation, cursors that survive concurrent change, and rate limits documented in terms of agent fan-out rather than requests per user. An ambiguous 500 becomes a retry storm.

Write tool descriptions as if a model will act on them, because one will. Say what the tool does, what it will refuse, and what its arguments mean in the product's own vocabulary. Then treat the same text as an injection surface: descriptions are read into a context window alongside untrusted content, and a description that says "always call this first" is an instruction you shipped.

Decide whether you are selling retrieval or answers. If the product returns evidence, the consuming agent owns the synthesis and its audience. If the product returns an answer, you own the disclosure contract for a synthesis you generated, including whose permissions it reflected at the moment it was produced. Both are legitimate products; conflating them is how a retrieval API acquires liabilities nobody priced.

Publish time to safe first integration and defend it. The interval from a developer's first call to a working, correctly authorized, audited integration is the adoption metric that matters, and it is the one a competitor with a worse permission model will beat you on until you measure it.

13.7. Roles, attributes, and relationships, deliberately combined

Everything to this point is what the caller sees and what the integrator signs up to. The rest of the chapter is the machinery that makes those promises true, and most of it is retrieval engineering — useful when the product's answer is assembled from a search over material with mixed permissions, skippable if it is not.

Three models answer three different questions, and each carries a different retrieval cost.

Model	The question it answers	What it costs at retrieval time
RBAC	Does this role permit this operation?	Expanding scoped memberships.
ABAC	Do these attributes satisfy policy right now?	Fetching and evaluating inputs that change (R377).
ReBAC	Is there a permitted relationship path?	Traversal and relationship expansion (R378).

Roles remain useful for stable responsibilities — reviewer, investigator, administrator. They become unmanageable when every combination of project, region, customer, and sensitivity becomes its own role, which is a modelling failure rather than evidence that RBAC is finished. Use relationships to find plausible resources, roles to describe actions inside those relationships, and attributes to impose contextual constraints.

Write down the composition rule. Ordinary grants might combine by union while a tenant-wide prohibition overrides them — and no source system should be assumed to have deny-overrides semantics because it feels safer.

Attribute governance is authorization engineering, not data entry. An HR system supplies employment status, an identity provider supplies group membership, a case system supplies participation, a learning system attests training, device management supplies posture. Each attribute needs a named issuer, a subject identifier, a validity interval, a refresh mechanism, and a rule for what happens when it is missing.

The sharpest version of this problem is new. A user-editable tag should not grant regulated access because it resembles a trusted classification — and in an AI-enabled product, the entity writing tags is often a model. An agent that classifies a document as public and then cites that classification as authority to export it has laundered its own guess into a permission. Keep model-extracted suggestions in a different field from approved policy inputs, carry the extractor version and reviewer with the value, and require an independent path for any change that relaxes protection.

13.8. Correctness, before choosing a search engine

Let `U` be the corpus visible to the trusted service, `A(p, a, d, c, v)` the authorization decision for a principal, action, document, context, and policy version, and `Q(q)` the query's matching set under its documented semantics. The eligible set is `E = { d ∈ U : d ∈ Q(q) and A(p, a, d, c, v) permits }`. The desired result is the highest-ranked k members of E.

That compact definition hides four independent promises, and products routinely ship having tested one of them:

- **Authorization soundness** — every disclosed item is permitted.
- **Authorization completeness** — no eligible item is lost because an eligibility filter was wrong or stale.
- **Retrieval quality** — the search method actually finds the relevant eligible items.
- **Exact top-k** — the returned ordering matches the scoring function across the complete eligible set. Approximate nearest-neighbour search does not provide this, and says so (R379).

Post-filtering is the common shortcut and it is safe without being correct. Suppose the global ranking is D1 through D6 and the caller may read D2, D5, and D6. Fetch the global top three, drop what is not permitted, and one result comes back. The authorized top three were D2, D5, and D6. Overfetching improves the odds; no fixed overfetch factor guarantees enough eligible results across arbitrary permission distributions (R379).

This asymmetry deserves its own pair of tests. A final authoritative check removes false permits from stale candidates. It cannot recover an allowed document that a stale prefilter already excluded. **Revocation safety** and **grant freshness** are separate properties with separate service-level objectives, and a product that measures only the first will quietly under-serve every user whose access was recently widened.

Two smaller traps sit alongside. Hybrid lexical and vector branches need equivalent eligibility constraints, because a safe vector branch does not compensate for an unsafe lexical one. And ranking features disclose: global popularity, click history, and private entity relationships can move visible scores. Decide which features may be reused across audiences, and accept that most products draw a documented practical boundary rather than promising that hidden records have no observable statistical effect.

The response contract should carry citations with source versions, coverage and freshness metadata, and count semantics labelled as exact, approximate, lower bound, or unavailable. A service that hits its deadline should not let partial retrieval become a confident claim that no evidence exists.

13.9. Counts, facets, and errors are disclosure

"Twenty investigations match this executive’s name" discloses something while the records stay hidden. A facet for "acquisition target" reveals a category. A date histogram reveals when an investigation started. Error messages, autocomplete, and the difference between an empty and a non-empty response belong in the same threat model.

Evaluate aggregates over the same authorized population as the corresponding results. Where discovery is permitted but reading is not, decide deliberately whether discovery also permits aggregation rather than inheriting the answer from whichever count field the search engine happens to expose.

A worked case shows how quickly this gets away from a product team. An agent asks how many customers reported a vulnerability. One customer filed twelve tickets, another filed one. Counting passages, tickets, or distinct customers gives three different answers, so the query has to define the business unit of counting before it filters and aggregates. If some tickets are unreadable, the honest answer is "distinct customers in the records available to this session" rather than an implied organisation-wide total.


Exactness is a claim about a named corpus, predicate, identity context, and snapshot. It is not a claim that every real-world record was indexed. Approximate counts still need permission filtering — prefixing a number with "about" removes precision, not disclosure. Where an aggregate is meant to expose more than its underlying records, that is a separate analytical product with its own release policy; minimum group sizes help, repeated differencing queries defeat naive suppression, and differential privacy is a managed budget for statistical release rather than a substitute for

document authorization (R380).

Cursors deserve specific attention because they are the easiest way to hand back access that was removed. Bind a cursor to the principal, the policy revision, the query, and the permitted scope. When authorization changes mid-pagination, either restart or revalidate each page and disclose the changed coverage.

13.10. Policy authority and the retrieval plan

The workable architecture separates policy authority from optimised execution. A control plane owns policy definitions, trusted attributes, relationship semantics, versions, and change propagation. A retrieval plane consumes compiled projections and performs the residual checks. This is a separation of responsibility, not an instruction to create a microservice per box.



Stable authorization inputs are compiled into retrieval projections; volatile conditions stay as runtime checks. The compiler declares which predicates it enforces exactly, which become residual checks, and which it rejects — dropping one silently is the failure that ships, because it makes the query faster and the tests still pass. Content is authorized before it reaches a reranker or a model, and again at release, because the release audience is not always the retrieval principal.

Three execution strategies are all legitimate, and a product can support them under one contract rather than picking a religion. **Search-first with batched checks** suits small corpora or a high eligible fraction, keeps the authority boundary simple, and needs a bounded refill budget with honest partial coverage when access is sparse. **Authorization-first** obtains an eligible set or compact filter and searches inside it, which works for small scopes and compressible groups but can exceed query limits when it materialises millions of identifiers — object-listing cost depends heavily on the relationship model (R381). **Integrated filtering** pushes permissions or stable eligibility terms into the serving layer, avoiding network round trips at the price of a derived security representation that has to be compiled correctly and kept current.

Policy compilation is where the correctness risk concentrates. Partial evaluation substitutes the known principal and context into policy and leaves a residual predicate over documents; the technique is well documented, along with the limits of translating arbitrary policy into a target query language (R382). A compiler should declare which predicates it enforces exactly, turn the rest into residual checks, and reject what it cannot handle. Dropping a predicate silently is the failure that gets shipped, because it makes the query faster and the tests still pass.

Conservative over-inclusion inside a trusted boundary is acceptable when the final check blocks disclosure. Conservative under-inclusion costs completeness and has to be reported rather than absorbed.

13.11. Projections trade read cost for change cost


A projection might store group identifiers on documents, ancestor references, relationship summaries, classification labels, or compressed access bitmaps. The inverse design stores accessible resource sets per principal or cohort. Neither orientation is universally cheaper — it depends on membership churn, hierarchy depth, sharing density, resource count, and query selectivity.

Expanding a large group onto every user-document pair makes reads cheap and makes one membership change expensive. Keeping group identifiers in the index avoids rewriting documents when someone leaves a group, and requires a fresh, bounded principal-group expansion on every query. Folder ancestry reduces duplicated inherited grants, and turns moves into important correctness cases.

Whichever way it goes, keep the source relationship and policy records authoritative and treat every index or bitmap as a replaceable projection with a declared schema, compiler version, source watermark, and rebuild procedure. Propagate by change events with ordering rules, idempotent application, tombstones, retries, and poison-event handling, then reconcile periodically to catch what the events missed.

One failure here is worth naming because each half looks healthy on its own dashboard: an index generation that contains new content and old permissions. Publish content and security projections behind a common activation barrier, use dual generations with a reversible pointer switch, and validate policy equivalence before activation.

The revocation deadline is the number a customer will ask for, and it needs two named endpoints: an authority event such as the committed removal of a collaboration, and a disclosure boundary such as the last permissible release of a newly requested passage. Instrument event detection, projection update, cache invalidation, regional propagation, and in-flight requests separately, because the slowest one is the answer.



The revocation deadline is only meaningful with both endpoints named. Each stage between them is instrumented separately, because the slowest one is the number you can actually commit to — and an average across them hides it. The overlay is the escape hatch for sensitive revocations that cannot wait for the projection.

A freshness token can require reads at least as recent as a policy mutation, and mature authorization systems expose exactly that (R378, R383). A token honoured by the authorization service does not synchronise a separate vector index — the application carries that requirement across both systems or it does not hold. Where the index lags, a fresh authoritative check protects reads while completeness suffers; for sensitive revocations, a small deny overlay or an epoch bump can block access before the projection catches up, provided the overlay itself is bounded, reliably delivered, and reconciled.

13.12. Derived artifacts keep their dependencies

Embeddings, extracted text, thumbnails, summaries, metadata, semantic caches, and conversation history are derived from source material, and the change of format grants no new audience. This is the derived-representation policy inheritance from the foundations chapter, seen from the product side, where the derivations are a feature customers pay for.

Represent a derived artifact as an object with lineage. Where a summary inseparably combines sources A and B, the recipient needs authorization for both unless an approved transformation has produced a genuinely new releasable artifact. Where the material is separable, authorize each passage and recompute from the permitted subset — deleting an inaccessible citation leaves its influence in the prose.

A permissions-only change is the case that breaks naive pipelines. Re-embedding on content change is not enough when the bytes are identical and the audience moved. Shared chunks and deduplicated vectors need indirection to every source binding, or physical isolation where that is simpler; byte equality is not evidence that two tenants have the same rights.

Streaming introduces a race that no amount of policy fixes: emitted tokens cannot be recalled. High-risk workflows can buffer, verify at release, and cancel on a detected revocation; lower-risk workflows can run on bounded leases with stated semantics. Neither retracts what was legitimately disclosed a second before revocation, and a product should distinguish preventing future disclosure from promising retroactive erasure it cannot perform.

Cache keys carry the same burden. Include the authorization context or an equivalence identifier, the security domain, the action, resource and content versions, policy and membership epochs, the model route, and any query parameters that change results. A query-string cache hands one user's answer to another; a per-user key alone still fails after a group removal. Cache decisions and content separately, and remember that logs, traces, and replay stores hold the evidence the user was trying to reach and need their own access controls.

13.13. Enforcement, detection, and response are different jobs

The machinery above decides what may be disclosed. The three sections that follow are about running it — keeping the boundary honest under attack, under load, and under partial failure.

Deterministic authorization prevents disallowed reads and writes. Injection detection identifies suspicious content and triggers a configured response. Behavioural monitoring notices unusually broad or rapid activity that was individually permitted. Audit reconstructs what happened. Four jobs, and the recurring product mistake is letting the second one stand in for the first.

A detector cannot safely replace resource policy, and an alert raised after an export cannot undo the export. Design so the system stays safe when detection misses: a malicious document instructing an agent to summarise every HR file and mail it out is defeated by task scope, tool policy, and destination authorization, with the detector adding evidence rather than being the control.

Response authority needs its own blast-radius limits, which is easy to forget when the responder is itself an agent. Session termination, grant revocation, integration suspension, and quarantine are all reasonable; removing every collaboration in a customer's tenant because an anomaly score moved is not. Measure the interval from a committed containment action to blocked future disclosure separately from detection latency and log-ingestion lag — they are three different numbers and only the first one bounds harm.

13.14. Latency, cost, and the shape of agent traffic

A point-check benchmark is not a retrieval benchmark. End-to-end latency includes identity resolution, relationship expansion, policy planning, search fan-out, candidate checks, reranking, generation, audit persistence, and retries. Measure warm and cold paths, sparse and dense access, large groups, deep hierarchies, tenant skew, and revocation bursts.

A first-order capacity estimate: candidate demand ≈ k / s, where s is the fraction of candidates that survive authorization. For k = 20 and s = 0.02, roughly a thousand candidates are needed, assuming survival is independent of relevance — which it frequently is not. Treat it as intuition for provisioning, not as a bound.

Stage	Illustrative p95	What the measurement has to expose
Identity and policy plan	40 ms	Cold memberships, stale attributes.
Filtered hybrid retrieval	180 ms	Selectivity and tenant fan-out.
Batched residual checks	60 ms	Batch size and authority failure.
Reranking	120 ms	Model route and evidence volume.
Coordination headroom	100 ms	Queueing, retries, serialisation.

That sums to a 500 ms envelope before generation begins. Component p95 values do not compose into an end-to-end p95, so correlated traces have to validate the real distribution. A model call measured in seconds can still sit behind an authorization path that saturates under fan-out.

Isolation and fairness matter more than they did with human traffic. Derive tenant context from trusted credentials and authoritative ownership rather than a request parameter, partition indexes, caches, queues, and keys to the threat model, and enforce query scoping that callers cannot omit. Bound concurrency with per-tenant and per-agent limits, bulkheads around expensive relationship listings, adaptive candidate limits, and cancellation propagation — a retry storm must not consume the capacity that processes revocations.

Then there is the commercial model, which most product organisations discover late. Seat-based pricing assumes a human ceiling on consumption that agents remove, and a single enthusiastic customer integration can generate more retrieval load than a thousand interactive users. Meter what agents actually consume — calls, candidates examined, tokens processed, aggregate operations — attribute it to the sponsoring principal rather than the integration's service account, and expose that attribution to the customer so their own budget owner can see it. Give expensive operations, exact counts in particular, their own opt-in budget and failure policy. A product that cannot attribute cost to a sponsor cannot let customers control it, and will eventually price the

behaviour it wants to encourage.

13.15. Degrading without lying

Failing closed means preventing unauthorized disclosure. It does not mean turning every dependency outage into an empty result, and the difference is most of the perceived quality of an agent-facing product.

Failure	Acceptable degradation	The shortcut that ships anyway
Policy authority unavailable	Use a still-valid bounded lease, or reject	Treat the timeout as a permit
Security projection behind	Fresh checks with partial coverage, or retry	Trust stale grants with no bound
Vector service unavailable	Authorized lexical results with a coverage notice	Query an unfiltered backup
Count budget exhausted	Omit the count, or label a lower bound	Invent an exact total
Audit sink unavailable	Durable local outbox if policy permits, or stop	Discard the evidence quietly
Revocation during generation	Cancel, or revalidate before release	Reuse the existing context

Audit records need the authenticated subject, the agent and application, the operation, a scoped query hash, policy and attribute versions, the security watermark, the decision and its reason category, source identifiers and versions, the model route, result coverage, and a trace identifier. Keep raw query text and secrets out by default, and restrict detailed deny reasons so that diagnostics do not become an oracle for whether an object exists.

Measure unauthorized disclosure as a security incident. Measure false denials, empty-result rates, authorized recall, and stale-grant exposure as quality problems with different owners and different release consequences. Track revocation propagation percentiles and the oldest outstanding security event rather than average indexing lag, which hides exactly the tail that matters.

Proving any of this needs a small exact reference corpus and an authoritative evaluator to compare candidate plans against. Include nested groups, multiple grant paths, folder moves, deleted relationships, expired links, unknown attributes, and cross-tenant identifiers, then run the same cases through search, listing, metadata queries, retrieval-augmented answers, counts, caches, and tool actions. Inject reordered and missing events, stalled replicas, lost cache invalidations, policy-version skew, and revocation between retrieval and release.

13.16. Regulated use and change control

Regulated customers will ask a question the product organisation usually has not framed: which part of this is inside the validated boundary? Classify the use case first — exploratory assistance,

draft generation, controlled decision support, or execution that affects a regulated record — because the obligations differ sharply across those four and the same feature can sit in any of them depending on how a customer wires it.

Record intended use, system boundary, source of truth, human responsibilities, and accepted failure behaviour. A retrieval assistant over approved procedures should bind evidence to approved document versions and effective dates, exclude superseded or draft material by policy, and keep reproducible provenance. Authorization testing does not substitute for use-case validation: a model can produce a wrong answer from perfectly authorized evidence.

AI systems break traditional change control because the parts that change are not all code. Track versions for the model, the prompt and configuration, the tool schema, the retrieval method, the policy compiler, the source schema, and the processing destination. A model substitution changes behaviour while every permission stays identical. Define which of those changes require requalification and which are covered by regression evidence, and keep rollback and incident review procedures that work when the regression is statistical rather than a stack trace.

Retention, access, and deletion are three separate obligations and agent products conflate them routinely. A record under legal hold must be preserved without granting its former readers continued access. A deletion request has to propagate to derived artifacts that no longer resemble the source. Where preservation and deletion obligations genuinely conflict, that is an explicit policy decision with a named owner — not something a cache-eviction schedule should settle by accident.

13.17. Adopting this without a rewrite

Four phases, sequenced by evidence rather than calendar.

Establish semantics. Take one retrieval journey with sensitive material and a clear owner. Define the point and set contracts, enumerate every disclosure surface it touches, and build an exact test corpus with expected decisions. Baseline current latency, permission-change lag, developer effort, and authorized relevance. The exit criterion is agreement on observable behaviour and a reproducible harness — not a design document.

Build the paved road. Provide a policy-aware retrieval adapter, a source-lineage envelope, delegated-call context, and an authorization-aware cache helper, integrated across one lexical and one vector path. Shadow the optimised plan against an authoritative reference on controlled workloads and investigate every disagreement before release. Shadow results stay internal.

Prove change and failure. Exercise group removal, link expiration, classification changes, large folder moves, and regional outages. Demonstrate the revocation deadline end to end, through caches and generated answers. Measure authorized recall under sparse access, and require a tested rollback and a durable owner before extending to another team.

Extend to business workflows. Add permission-aware aggregates, long-running agents, external integrations, and derived business entities once the contracts hold. Validate each new processing destination and action type, then publish migration guidance and compatibility tests so the next integration is routine engineering rather than another negotiation.

Three shortcuts should be rejected explicitly at the start, because each passes a demonstration and

fails in production: broad crawler credentials standing in for end-user authority, post-generation redaction as the primary access control, and cached answers without source dependencies. Demonstrations rarely include conflicting roles or a revocation mid-flight.

Ownership splits across teams that do not usually share a roadmap. Identity and security own principal and policy semantics. Search owns eligible-set planning and authorized relevance. Content owners supply lineage and mutation ordering. The agent platform preserves delegation and tool contracts. SRE owns failure exercises and freshness observability. Product owns what an incomplete result is allowed to claim. A shared semantic contract and a conformance suite prevent fragmentation without requiring one central service to execute every check.

13.18. Eight questions for a design review

1. What may this caller learn from titles, counts, snippets, rankings, and errors?
2. Which identity is accountable, and what authority does each tool receive?
3. Which policy inputs are trusted, fresh, and compilable?
4. Can the system prove every returned item is authorized while separately reporting retrieval completeness?
5. What happens to an in-flight answer when a permission changes?
6. Which derived artifacts and external copies retain their source dependencies?
7. Which failure modes preserve usefulness, and which require refusal?
8. Who operates the projections, the conformance suite, and the revocation objective?

A product should answer these with contracts, tests, and production evidence. A prompt instructing an agent to respect permissions is useful guidance; the enforcement layer is what makes the instruction true.

13.19. How we measure this

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Unauthorized disclosures** — results or actions outside policy, in the conformance corpus and in production. A security outcome, not a quality metric, and the only one whose target is zero.
- **Revocation deadline attainment** — measured interval from the named authority event to the named disclosure boundary, at p95 and worst case, with the oldest unapplied security event tracked separately.
- **Grant freshness** — interval from a widened permission to its appearance in results. Tracked apart from revocation, because the two fail in opposite directions.
- **Authorized recall** — fraction of eligible items returned, measured against an authoritative evaluator over a reference corpus. Falsifies the assumption that a safe system is a useful one.
- **False-denial rate** — permitted material withheld by a filter.
- **End-to-end latency by access selectivity** — p50, p95, p99, split by the fraction of candidates surviving authorization, warm and cold.

- **Cost per authorized retrieval and per permission mutation** — the read and change economics, with mass revocation costed explicitly.
- **Reconciliation drift and recovery time** — projection health: how far a projection strays from source, and how long repair takes.
- **Time to safe first integration** — from a developer's first call to a correctly authorized, audited, working integration. The adoption metric.

Nine metrics across four dimensions that fail independently: disclosure, freshness, usefulness, and adoption. A product can hold the first and lose the third — refusing everything is perfectly secure — which is why authorized recall belongs on the same dashboard as unauthorized disclosure.

Part Five — Review, workspaces, and the evidence chain

The four reference models, in operational detail: AI-first pull-request review, where agent workspaces sit against the enterprise trust boundary, spec-to-production traceability, and the evidence chain that unifies verification, delivery, and operations.

Chapter 14. Reference operating models

One invariant governs everything in this chapter: **every consequential change accumulates a machine-readable evidence chain, from intent through production learning**. The operating models below exist to produce that chain and to keep it unbroken.

the orchestrator chapter argued that engineers move from execution to orchestration and that review, testing, and operations run as parallel agentic disciplines. This chapter names the mechanisms, in the order the work moves through them: the work system holds durable intent, the workspace bounds execution, review turns a change into evidence, and the verification ladder decides what may be promoted.

Where the orchestrator chapter states positions, this chapter specifies mechanisms; the detailed reference architectures are pushed into the appendices to keep this part navigable.

14.1. Work systems anchor traceability without becoming the agent runtime

The work-management system should hold durable intent, ownership, decisions, and status. It should not become a hidden orchestration engine. Agents need to read specifications, propose decomposition, link evidence, and update state through explicit APIs and events while the platform retains execution, identity, policy, and audit responsibilities.

Concrete proposal Define a spec-to-production object model that links signal, opportunity, outcome, specification, acceptance criteria, work item, change set, decision packet, test evidence, deployment, incident, and learning. Use webhooks or service hooks for event-driven transitions; scoped service identities for writes; idempotency keys and correlation IDs for every mutation; and state-machine rules that prevent an agent from declaring completion without the required evidence. Linear's current agent model is instructive: the agent is a delegate while a person remains the assignee and owner. Azure DevOps similarly provides work-item, repository, build, release, service-hook, and MCP surfaces that can participate in the flow (R48–R54).




Figure 15. Spec-to-production evidence chain

Spec-to-production evidence chain. A durable outcome contract accumulates decisions and proof from customer signal through production learning, with every stage depositing evidence into one locked chain. The two green stages are the upstream half (the requirements and discovery chapter); the amber path is rework; the green return runs from production learning back to the opportunity that proposed the work, not to the beginning.

Business driver and expected gain The gain is less translation loss between planning and delivery. Acceptance criteria become test inputs, implementation evidence returns to the work item, release status is derived rather than manually narrated, and incidents can point back to the decision and change lineage that produced them. Managers see flow and exceptions without demanding more status reporting from engineers.

Organizational requirements Product owns outcome and acceptance language; Engineering owns decomposition and technical evidence; the platform team owns integration contracts and identity; Security and Compliance define required approvals and retention; work-system administrators govern schemas without encoding product-specific logic into a central workflow.

Cost and investment Costs concentrate in schema governance, connectors, event delivery, reconciliation, and migration from free-text conventions. Avoid a single large workflow rollout. Start with read-only context and evidence links, then permit bounded writes after reliability and ownership are proven.

Risks and safeguards Risks include accidental reassignment, duplicate issues, misleading status, runaway decomposition, stale specifications, and cross-project data exposure. Safeguards include human ownership, explicit write scopes, preview-before-create for fan-out, rate limits, deduplication, optimistic concurrency, reversible transitions, field-level audit, and a reconciliation process for dropped or reordered events.

Relationship to the wider plan This is the durable-object side of the decision inbox. The work item becomes the stable join point for intent and evidence, while execution stays in agent workspaces and collaboration uses the appropriate protocol boundary.

Supporting material Appendix K defines the canonical objects, event flow, failure handling, and phased rollout.

14.2. Placing agent workspaces against the enterprise trust boundary

the orchestrator chapter argues that agent execution belongs in isolated, identity-bound workspaces. The choice it does not make is **where** those workspaces run — and that choice is the difference between a vendor evaluation and a platform architecture.




Figure 16. Agent workspace and policy plane

Agent workspace and policy plane. One policy contract governs isolation, identity, evidence capture, and teardown regardless of where the workspace runs.

14.2.1. Choose the execution boundary by integration depth

Agentic software-development compute is not a binary between SaaS and self-hosting. The practical spectrum runs from a vendor multi-tenant workspace, through a vendor-managed dedicated tenant or VPC, to an ephemeral runner operated inside the enterprise. The model or orchestration control plane may still remain with the vendor even when execution runs in a customer-controlled environment — Devin documents a cloud-hosted control plane with either Cognition-hosted multi-tenant Devboxes or a Cognition-managed customer-dedicated VPC connected through PrivateLink or IPSec; the Claude Code GitHub Action runs on the customer-selected GitHub runner and dispatches model requests to the configured provider (R274–R277).

The recommended pattern is a **policy-routed hybrid**. Vendor-hosted execution suits trials, public or low-sensitivity repositories, burst capacity, and work that needs little internal context. Customer-controlled ephemeral runners become more attractive as the agent depends on private source, internal build systems, proprietary package registries, test data, developer portals, service catalogs, staging environments, or tightly governed cloud accounts. This keeps the most privileged execution next to enterprise controls without forcing the enterprise to reproduce every vendor capability.




Figure 17. Policy-routed hybrid agent compute

Policy-routed hybrid agent compute. A workspace broker places tasks in vendor-hosted, customer-VPC, or restricted pools while applying one identity, proxy, evidence, and teardown contract.

Execution model	Advantages	Tradeoffs and risks	Best-fit work
Vendor-hosted shared execution	Fast adoption, elastic capacity, vendor-managed images, patching and support; clean session isolation can be built in.	Code and context cross a vendor boundary; private-system connectivity, egress inspection, custom hardware, forensic retention, and enterprise policy integration may be constrained.	Evaluation, public repositories, low-sensitivity maintenance, isolated transformations, burst work.
Vendor-managed dedicated tenant or VPC	Stronger tenant isolation and private connectivity while the vendor retains operational responsibility.	Usually premium; still depends on vendor operations and control plane; network bridging can enlarge trust paths and complicate incident ownership.	Strategic enterprise use where private resources must be reached but managed operations are preferred.

Execution model	Advantages	Tradeoffs and risks	Best-fit work
Customer-operated ephemeral runners	Enterprise controls the image, network, residency, observability, caches, hardware, proxies, and proximity to internal services.	Enterprise owns capacity, patching, autoscaling, image supply chain, cleanup, reliability, and support; persistent runners can leak state across jobs.	Deeply integrated or regulated work using private repositories, internal dependencies, test data, cloud accounts, and proprietary build systems.
Fully self-operated agent stack	Maximum control and reduced dependence on a proprietary execution plane; can support air-gapped or exceptional workloads.	Highest engineering burden and weakest access to proprietary agent features; model hosting, harness, updates, safety, evaluation, and UX all become enterprise responsibilities.	Narrow sovereign, air-gapped, or exceptionally sensitive cases with sufficient platform investment.

Isolation strength varies by runtime, and the choice affects what the platform can promise. Process-level isolation (Codespaces default, Coder), gVisor-style filesystem isolation with a Git proxy (Anthropic Claude Code sandboxes, R258), microVM isolation (E2B, Modal, Runloop, Fly Machines using Firecracker-derived tech), and full VM isolation (AWS Bedrock AgentCore, R278) sit on a spectrum. The workspace broker should surface the isolation tier as a first-class attribute of the workspace class, not a hidden vendor detail.

Regardless of placement, runners should be single-job and short-lived, start from signed and scanned images, receive task-scoped workload identity and short-lived credentials, use controlled package and Git proxies, enforce egress policy, keep production access absent by default, export logs and artifacts before teardown, and prove deletion. GitHub recommends ephemeral rather than persistent self-hosted runners for autoscaling because each runner receives only one job and begins from a clean environment (R275).

Cross-references: the orchestrator chapter (why isolation belongs in the platform); Appendix J (reference architecture, workspace classes, lifecycle, break-glass procedure, minimum controls); glossary for the agent-workspace, task-identity, and delegated-user-identity definitions used above.

14.3. AI pull request review as an evidence-producing control loop

The orchestrator chapter's review-shift-left section states the position; this section names what the platform delivers to make that position real.




Figure 18. AI pull request review as an evidence-producing control

AI pull request review as an evidence-producing control. Findings are classified, measured, and returned to accountable human judgment.

The reviewable output of the platform is one decision packet per pull request, produced by the sequence and control tiers defined in Appendix I. The orchestrator chapter section **Review shifts left but does not disappear** covers why this matters and what the human role becomes; this section commits to what the platform must ship: a review service that assembles the context, runs the checks defined by the risk class, and writes a decision packet whose minimum fields (including SBOM, SLSA provenance, and model version pins) are enumerated in Appendix I. Movement between the T0–T4 tiers uses the canonical autonomy ladder in the glossary, so review, remediation, and operations all reason about authority in the same units.

Cross-references: the orchestrator chapter "Review shifts left but does not disappear" (rationale and human role); Appendix I (operating model, minimum decision packet, break-glass procedure, evaluation scorecard).

14.4. Verification, delivery, and operations as one progressive evidence chain

the orchestrator chapter argued that testing and operations become parallel agentic disciplines. This section names the **evidence ladder** that unifies them so the platform can reason about "safe to promote" in one vocabulary regardless of whether the change comes from an author, an agent, or an operational remediation.

The ladder — static and policy checks, hermetic unit tests, contract tests, integration tests against short-lived real dependencies, isolated end-to-end tests, security and resilience checks, deployment

preview, canary or blue-green release, production health evaluation, and learning capture — is specified in Appendix N. Each stage emits machine-readable evidence with provenance. Promotion between stages uses the same autonomy tiers as review and remediation.

The vendor toolchain that supports each stage is well-covered: OpenTelemetry for signal vocabulary; Pact for consumer-driven contracts; Playwright for browser isolation; Testcontainers (Docker/AtomicJar) for known-state dependencies; Kubernetes with Argo Rollouts for incremental rollout and rollback (R55–R65). The platform's contribution is not another test runner — it is the evidence chain that connects the outputs of these tools into one decision packet the release process can approve or reject.

Cross-references: the orchestrator chapter's sections on testing and operations (rationale, org design, cost); Appendix N (evidence ladder detail, operational autonomy tiers, scorecard); glossary for the canonical autonomy ladder shared with review.

14.5. Evidence is discipline-specific, and so are autonomy ceilings

The evidence ladder above is written in the vocabulary of backend service work, because that is where the automated forms are strongest. Applied unchanged to every discipline it produces a false result: a platform that either refuses to let UI work advance because the evidence does not reduce to a passing suite, or lets it advance on evidence that was never about the thing that matters.

User-interface work is the clearest stress test, and it strengthens the argument rather than breaking it. An agent can produce a large amount of genuine evidence for a UI change — screenshots, visual diffs against the previous state, interaction recordings, accessibility checks, design-system conformance, a browser and device matrix, performance measurements, user-flow results, a live preview to click through, and experiment data where the change is running behind a flag.

What none of that encodes is whether the interaction is confusing, whether the treatment communicates the product's intent, or whether the result is simply wrong in a way a designer will recognise in a second and struggle to write down. Those judgments stay human, and the platform's job is to put a person in front of the running artifact with the automated evidence already gathered, not to invent a score that makes the decision look decidable.

The forms differ by discipline, and each has a different automation ceiling:

Discipline	What establishes correctness
Backend and service	Functional and contract tests, integration against known-state dependencies, performance, resilience, compatibility, rollout health.
Security	Policy checks, static and dynamic analysis, threat-model evidence, secret-exposure and supply-chain checks, authorization validation.
Data and machine learning	Statistical evaluation, dataset provenance, quality measures, reproducibility, drift, and fairness where it applies.

Discipline	What establishes correctness
User interface	Visual comparison, interaction behaviour, accessibility, browser and device compatibility, design-system conformance, performance — plus experiential judgment that does not reduce to any of them.
Operations	Telemetry, canary health, SLO behaviour, rollback evidence, incident and recovery behaviour.

This is why autonomy ceilings are set per task class rather than per agent. A dependency bump in a well-tested service can reach a high tier on evidence alone. A change to how a workflow feels cannot, and saying so is more useful than pretending a threshold exists.

Cheap exploration pays unusually well here. Asking for three materially different treatments that satisfy the same constraints costs little, and the automated checks run against all three. The human then chooses an experience instead of implementing candidates one at a time — which is the optionality argument from the orchestrator chapter, arriving in the discipline where it is easiest to see.

14.6. Measure whether the evidence chain actually completes

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Evidence-chain completeness** — fraction of merged changes carrying a complete evidence chain from intent through production observation. Gaps indicate operating-model breakage; sustained gaps trigger tier regression on the affected task class.
- **Workspace-broker placement distribution** — fraction of agent workspaces placed against each trust boundary (vendor-hosted, customer-VPC, restricted pool), by data class. Placement drift from policy is a this chapter and Part Three signal.
- **Work-system-to-orchestration correlation** — fraction of decision packets that carry a work-system identifier (Jira / Linear / GitHub Issue) versus packets originating outside the work system. Non-zero orphans is either healthy ambient work (the ambient-agents chapter) or an orchestration bypass that must be investigated.
- **PR-review signal-to-noise** — fraction of AI-generated PR review comments accepted by the reviewer versus dismissed, per skill and per repository. Low acceptance signals skill-calibration work; sustained low signal triggers skill retirement.
- **Progressive-delivery incident correlation** — fraction of production incidents caught at each progressive-delivery stage (canary, staged, full). Rising catch-rate at earlier stages is the operating-model working; rising catch-rate at full-rollout is the operating-model failing.
- **Placement-decision review latency** — median time from a new task class needing a workspace-broker placement decision to the placement decision being chartered. Bounds how quickly the platform can absorb novel work.

Six metrics; each is developed further in Appendices I, J, K, and N of the reference operating models.

Part Six — Work with no human trigger

Agents that run on a schedule, a signal, or a threshold rather than a request. The largest share of the opportunity, and the one that fails quietly when it has no inventory, no council, and no budget.

Chapter 15. Autonomous and ambient agents

The previous chapters defined the orchestration platform as the system that turns human intent into verified outcomes. The dominant mental model was a **human-triggered** one: a feature request enters the platform, agents execute bounded work, evidence accumulates, humans decide, the work ships.

That model captures the **visible** work of the engineering organization. It does not capture the majority of the work an AI-native platform should also be doing. A very large fraction of high-value autonomous work is not triggered by a person opening a ticket; it is triggered by a schedule, a signal, an ambient condition, an anomaly, a curiosity, or a continuous obligation. Dependency waves. Fleet migrations. Security scanning. Cost anomaly detection. Runbook synthesis. Model performance monitoring. Customer feedback classification. Cross-team dependency detection. Toil reduction.

This is the **ambient surface** of AI-native development. This chapter names it, gives it a taxonomy, specifies how ambient agents integrate with the orchestration platform, calls out the governance concerns unique to always-on work, models its cost profile, and proposes an adoption sequence.

The framing is deliberately broad: "development" here includes operations, security, data engineering, ML lifecycle, product analytics, customer feedback, and organizational meta-work, not only code writing. The reason is that an AI-native enterprise increasingly does all of these with the same primitive — an agent operating under a constitution against an evidence chain — and treating them as separate disciplines squanders the platform investment.

15.1. Ambient work is the majority of the opportunity

Viewpoint

Google SRE named **toil** as the category of work that is manual, repetitive, automatable, tactical, devoid of enduring value, and grows at least as fast as the service (SRE book, 2016). The SRE framing has been narrowly applied to production operations. AI-native platforms extend the same framing to every engineering-adjacent discipline. Most knowledge work carries a toil tax: dependencies that need bumping, runbooks that need updating, dashboards that need pruning, alerts that need calibrating, docs that drift, tests that grow flaky, spec templates that fall behind reality, retrospectives that never turn into action items.

Reactive AI (feature requests, bug fixes, PR review) reduces the per-item cost of **visible** work. Ambient AI reduces the **volume** of toil that visible work is dragged down by. The two together produce the compounding effect. An organization that only invests in reactive agents ships faster but continues to accumulate ambient debt; an organization that only invests in ambient agents keeps the house clean but does not ship faster. The platform argument requires both.


Implication

The orchestration platform must treat ambient agents as first-class, not as scripts-with-a-personality living in a corner of the org. That means: they use the same workspace broker, decision packet system, autonomy tiers, constitution mechanism, and evidence chain as reactive agents.

Their governance is not a separate discipline; it is the same discipline applied to a different trigger model. Their cost is budgeted; their signal quality is measured; their sunset is planned.

The three axes of an ambient agent

Every ambient agent is characterized by three axes: what triggers it, what it does when triggered, and how it terminates.



The three axes of an ambient agent. Trigger, Action, and Termination combine to define an agent's operating envelope. Governance is attached per-axis: trigger governance controls fan-out; action governance maps to the T0–T4 autonomy ladder; termination governance controls resource lifetime.

Two examples worth naming up front

- A **dependency updater agent** wakes on a schedule (TR1 trigger), opens a decision packet per candidate bump (AC2 action within its policy scope, AC3 for auto-approved patch bumps in trusted crates), and idles until the next cron cycle (ET1). Volume: hundreds per week for a mid-sized enterprise. Cost per action: small. Total cost: significant when multiplied.
- An **anomaly-detection agent for production traffic** runs continuously (TR4 trigger), moves from observe to recommend when a signal exceeds a threshold (AC1→AC2), and stays alive until either the anomaly resolves or a human incident commander takes command (ET2 or ET4). Volume: low events per week but high per-event context cost.

These two agents look nothing alike operationally, but they run on the same platform primitives and are governed by the same constitution mechanism. That is the point.

A peer precedent. Google SRE named toil in 2016 as the class of work most amenable to automation, and paired it with the error-budget mechanism to keep the trade explicit (R357).

Ambient agents are the AI-native generalization: they attack toil across security, docs, dependencies, and operations. The signal-to-noise budget defined for each ambient agent is the direct analogue of an error budget applied to interrupt-worthy output.

Relationship to the wider plan

This chapter is where the platform decisions from the previous chapters compound. Ambient agents depend on: the orchestration platform (Part One), organizational knowledge and MCP/A2A (the foundations chapter), constitution + residency + IP posture + regulation (the trust and governance chapter), roles and adoption (the organizational chapter), the reference operating models (the operating-models chapter). An organization that has **not** built out those foundations will find that ambient agents create more toil than they remove.

15.2. Eight classes of ambient work worth investing in



TL;DR. Eight ambient-agent classes worth investing in: (1) codebase & repository hygiene, (2) fleet-wide refactoring & migration, (3) observability + FinOps + infra optimization, (4) continuous security & compliance, (5) knowledge production & organizational learning, (6) ecosystem & market intelligence, (7) data engineering & ML lifecycle, (8) product analytics / customer feedback / org-meta. Each class carries a worked exemplar, an autonomy-tier default, a cost profile, and governance concerns; the full implementable specifications live in Appendix R.

The categories below are not exhaustive; they are the eight classes most consequential for an AI-native enterprise. Each class carries a worked exemplar and points to the reference pattern in Appendix R.

15.2.1. Class 1 — Codebase and repository hygiene

Agents that keep the shared codebase healthy without being asked. Dependency updates, deprecation migrations, dead-code sweeps, documentation drift correction, comment-quality checks, license compliance, test-flakiness detection and repair, formatter sweeps, lint-rule adoption.

Exemplar. A **deprecation migration agent** runs weekly against every service in the fleet that still calls a deprecated internal SDK method. It opens one PR per service, with the migration applied, the tests re-run, and a decision packet linking the migration guide and the changelog for the method. Trigger: T1 scheduled. Action tier: T2 (reversible; author still merges). Cost profile: burst per weekly run, low continuous. Governance concern: fan-out (one bad migration proposal repeated across 800 services is a problem).

Vendor exemplars. Dependabot / Renovate (R285, R286), OpenRewrite / Moderne (R287, R288), Grit (R289), Codegen (R290).

15.2.2. Class 2 — Fleet-wide refactoring and migration

Agents that carry out large-scale, coordinated changes across many services or many repos. Framework version bumps, cross-service standardization, CVE patch propagation, configuration drift correction, API deprecation waves. Distinct from Class 1 in that a Class-2 agent has a defined

start and end (the migration completes), whereas a Class-1 agent is a continuous background presence.

Exemplar. A **Kafka wrapper standardization agent** runs a one-quarter campaign to migrate every direct Kafka producer/consumer usage in the fleet onto the internal Kafka wrapper library. It works service by service, opens PRs, runs the compatibility test suite, paces itself to N migrations per week to stay within reviewer capacity, and terminates when a defined percentage of services are migrated. Trigger: T2 signal (once the migration is Council-approved) plus T1 scheduled cadence. Action tier: T2. Cost profile: heavy burst over a defined window.

Vendor exemplars. OpenRewrite / Moderne recipes (R287, R288), Grit (R289), Devin scheduled tasks (R291), custom internal migration harnesses.

15.2.3. Class 3 — Observability, FinOps, and infrastructure optimization

Agents that watch production and infrastructure signals and act on them. Anomaly detection with RCA synthesis; SLO trend analysis; cost anomaly detection and remediation; alert quality analysis; capacity planning; Kubernetes resource right-sizing; database index recommendations; query performance analysis; log noise reduction.

Exemplar. A **cost anomaly agent** runs continuously against cloud billing telemetry. When a cost signal deviates from the trailing 7-day baseline by more than a Council-set threshold, it opens a decision packet with the top-3 attributions, links to the responsible teams, and a suggested mitigation (reservation shift, autoscaling policy change, orphaned resource cleanup). Trigger: T4 continuous. Action tier: T2 (proposes; team applies). Cost profile: low continuous with occasional heavy investigation bursts. Governance concern: alert fatigue if the threshold is too tight.

Vendor exemplars. Datadog LLM Observability (R292), Chronosphere (R293), Vantage (R294), Cast AI (R295), Cloudability, custom Prometheus-based agents.

15.2.4. Class 4 — Continuous security and compliance

Agents that treat security as an always-on discipline, not a per-release gate. Continuous threat modeling as code changes; secret rotation; vulnerability triage prioritized by exploit availability; attack-surface monitoring; suspicious-behavior detection (agent-versus-agent); compliance evidence collection for SOC 2 / ISO 27001 / SR 11-7 / EU AI Act; access review automation; third-party dependency risk monitoring; adversarial red-team agents.

Exemplar. An **access-review agent** runs monthly, gathers the last 30 days of access patterns per identity, compares against declared role scope, opens decision packets for identities whose access appears unused or over-scoped. Trigger: T1 monthly. Action tier: T1 (recommends revocation; access owner approves). Cost profile: predictable monthly burst. Governance concern: false positives can break production if applied automatically — the constitution explicitly forbids self-execution.

Vendor exemplars. Wiz (R296), Snyk (R297), GitHub Advanced Security (R298), Semgrep (R299), Prisma AIRS (R300), Vanta, Drata.

15.2.5. Class 5 — Knowledge production and organizational learning

Agents that turn transient events into durable knowledge. Runbook synthesis from incident timelines; post-incident learning extraction into training material; architecture diagram maintenance from code; API doc drift correction; ADR (architecture decision record) maintenance; onboarding material refresh; team-wiki curation; meeting-note synthesis with action-item tracking.

Exemplar. A **runbook synthesis agent** triggers on incident-closure events, reads the incident timeline plus the linked change/commit history plus the postmortem, and drafts a runbook update. The runbook update goes to the incident commander as a decision packet; approved updates land in the paved-road runbook repository with the incident as citation. Trigger: T2 event. Action tier: T2. Cost profile: per-incident. Governance concern: the runbook must not memorize incident-specific customer data.

Vendor exemplars. Glean (R301), Mintlify (R302), Notion AI (R303), Confluence AI, internal implementations built on Anthropic Claude Agent SDK or LangChain.

15.2.6. Class 6 — Ecosystem and market intelligence

Agents that watch external change so the enterprise doesn't have to. Competitor product monitoring; new model / vendor scanning with routing recommendations; open-source dependency health monitoring; standards-body tracking (MCP / A2A / EU AI Act draft revisions); regulatory update monitoring; conference / paper scanning.

Exemplar. A **model landscape agent** runs weekly, scans announced model releases (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Mistral, Cohere, xAI, open-source), pulls capability and pricing information, runs the enterprise evaluation harness against any new frontier release, and emits a decision packet with a routing recommendation for the platform's model router. Trigger: T1 weekly + T2 signal (announced release). Action tier: T1 (recommends; Platform Engineering approves). Cost profile: heavy per-run due to evaluation harness. Governance concern: preventing hallucinated "products" that don't actually exist from entering the router.

Vendor exemplars. Custom internal scanners; Artificial Analysis model comparisons (R304); Papers with Code; Hugging Face Inference Providers dashboards.

15.2.7. Class 7 — Data engineering and ML lifecycle

Agents that keep the data pipeline honest and the ML lifecycle observable. Data quality monitoring; schema drift detection; feature drift; label quality; model performance monitoring; retraining trigger evaluation; dataset labeling assistants; experiment tracking; A/B test analysis; feature-flag rollout monitoring.

Exemplar. A **feature drift agent** runs daily on the production feature store, computes distribution shift statistics per feature per model, opens a decision packet for the model owner when a critical feature drifts beyond a threshold, and suggests either a retraining or a data-source investigation. Trigger: T1 daily. Action tier: T1. Cost profile: predictable daily burst. Governance concern: cascading retraining triggered by an upstream data-quality issue.

Vendor exemplars. MLflow (R305), Weights & Biases (R306), Fiddler (R307), Arize (R308), Great

Expectations (R309), Monte Carlo (R310).

15.2.8. Class 8 — Product analytics, customer feedback, and org-meta

Agents at the edge of the engineering-org perimeter. Bug-report triage and deduplication; feature usage anomaly detection; churn signal detection; support-ticket theme extraction; customer feedback classification and routing; cross-team dependency detection; skill gap analysis; on-call rotation health.

Exemplar. A **support-triage agent** runs continuously against incoming support tickets, classifies by product surface, deduplicates against known issues, links to responsible team, and routes. Confidence-below-threshold tickets are queued for human triage. Trigger: T4 continuous. Action tier: T2 (route + label; a human still owns response). Cost profile: continuous low. Governance concern: mis-routing can hide a P1 signal in noise.

Vendor exemplars. Fin by Intercom (R311), Enterpret (R312), Kraftful (R313), Unwrap (R314), PostHog session AI (R315), Jellyfish (R316), LinearB (R317).

15.2.9. A note on classes that recur


Several capabilities appear across classes: **observation and correlation** (present in every class), **decision-packet emission** (the shared platform primitive), **evidence attachment** (the audit substrate). This is deliberate — an ambient agent that cannot emit a decision packet, cannot attach evidence, and cannot be observed by the platform is not an ambient agent in the sense used here; it is a script.

15.3. Ambient agents use the same primitives; only the identity source changes

Ambient agents use the same platform primitives as reactive agents. This section names how each primitive is applied under the ambient trigger model.

Agent workspaces. Ambient agents run in agent workspaces exactly like reactive agents (see Appendix J). The workspace class is chosen by trigger and action tier: an Observe-only scheduled agent may run in Explore class; an Apply-reversible fleet migration agent uses Change class; a T3 Apply-bounded remediation agent uses Remediation class. Isolation tier (I1–I5) is chosen by data sensitivity, not by "ambient vs reactive."

Standing service identity. An ambient agent typically has no per-task human sponsor. Its identity model is a **standing service identity** combined with a scoped authorization envelope and periodic Autonomy Council reauthorization. The identity is workload-authenticated (SPIFFE/SPIRE, cloud IAM role, or equivalent), carries a constitution reference, and is renewed on a cadence set by its tier (quarterly for T3, monthly for T4). Delegated user identity does not apply, because there is no user; the substitute is **ownership identity** — a named team or role that is accountable when the agent misbehaves.



Identity models compared. A reactive agent's identity is derived from a present human; an ambient agent's identity is derived from an owning team plus a standing workload identity plus a versioned constitution reference. Both compose down to the same task identity primitive.

Decision packets. Ambient agents emit decision packets whenever human judgment is needed (an unusual finding, a policy exception, a class-boundary question). The packet format is identical to a reactive agent's; the difference is in the **routing**. A reactive agent's packet routes to the requesting user; an ambient agent's packet routes to the **ownership identity** of the agent's capability. Route quality is a first-class metric — an ambient agent that consistently routes to the wrong owner is a governance failure that compounds.

Autonomy tier and constitution. Ambient agents obey the canonical T0–T4 ladder (glossary). Their constitution (Section 10.7) is where their governance lives: the constitution names the tier, the class boundaries, the signal-to-noise budget, the fan-out cap, the reauthorization cadence, and the sunset criteria. An ambient agent without a signed constitution runs at T0 only.

Evidence chain. Ambient agents attach to the same evidence chain (Appendix N) as reactive agents. Their outputs (a proposed dependency bump; an anomaly investigation; a runbook update) carry the same provenance, citation, and audit surface as human-initiated work. This is what makes ambient work auditable at scale — a fleet migration that touches 800 services is exactly as auditable as 800 hand-written PRs would have been.

MCP and A2A. Ambient agents are heavy users of MCP tools (read telemetry, browse repos, query the service catalog). Class-6 ecosystem-intelligence agents are among the earliest useful A2A consumers — they discover and delegate to third-party specialist agents (a model-eval agent published by a research collaborator; a CVE-analysis agent published by a security partner) more naturally than reactive agents do.

Cost telemetry. Every ambient agent reports its cost against its ownership identity, per invocation and per unit time. FinOps rolls up cost per ambient class, per capability, and per team, so the "silent army" cost creep failure mode is visible before it becomes material.

15.4. Reactive agents have a human present to notice; ambient agents do not



TL;DR. Reactive agents have a human present to notice things going wrong; ambient agents do not. Six governance concerns unique to always-on work: **runaway detection** (per-minute/hour/day rate caps enforced by the broker), **signal-to-noise budgets** (explicit false-positive ceilings — exceed and demote), **orphan-ownership scans** (weekly; kill anything without an accountable owner), **sunset criteria** (every ambient agent has one at authorization time), **feedback-loop detection** (dependency graph of ambient outputs; monitor for amplifying cycles), and **cost creep** (per-class portfolio budgets, compared to trailing baseline). Constitution drift review is quarterly for T3+.

Reactive agents have a human present to notice when something goes wrong. Ambient agents do not. The governance concerns below are consequences of that difference.

Runaway detection. An ambient agent that silently opens 500 PRs per day, escalates 200 tickets per hour, or spins up 100 workspaces in an hour is a runaway. Every ambient agent has a rate cap in its constitution, enforced by the workspace broker; exceeding the cap triggers automatic demotion to T0 plus a decision packet to the ownership identity and the Autonomy Council. Rate caps apply per minute, per hour, and per day; all three must hold.

Signal-to-noise budget. An alerting agent that cries wolf makes future signals ignored. Every ambient agent that emits interrupt-worthy output (a decision packet requiring human attention) has an explicit **signal-to-noise budget**: the maximum false-positive or low-value-finding rate per window. Exceeding the budget triggers demotion. A capability whose signal-to-noise is measured and enforced is trustworthy; one whose signal is not measured is toil-generating.



Figure 19. The silent army

A small chartered population inside the marked routes, and a much larger one nobody authorised working in the margins. Each faint thread runs back to no owner, which is what makes the portfolio ungovernable rather than merely large.


Orphan ownership. An ambient agent whose ownership identity becomes vacant (team reorganized, capability's original owner left the company, capability spans multiple teams that each think another owns it) is an orphan. Orphaned ambient agents are the most common source of silent failure. The platform must scan the ambient portfolio weekly and demote any capability whose ownership identity is unresolved.

Sunset criteria. Every ambient agent has an explicit sunset condition: a date, a completion condition (fleet migration reaches N%), a superseded-by reference (capability replaced by a paved road), or an evaluation-based condition (usefulness score below threshold for K consecutive weeks). An ambient agent without a sunset condition lives forever, which is a governance failure.

Feedback-loop detection. Ambient agent A's output feeds ambient agent B; A misfires; B propagates the misfire; the misfire feeds back into A's input. The platform must maintain a dependency graph of ambient agent outputs and monitor for cycles that amplify signals. This is the ambient-agent equivalent of a distributed-systems retry storm.

Cost creep. A single ambient agent is cheap. Two hundred of them are not. The platform's FinOps view of the ambient portfolio must track cumulative cost per class, per team, and per residency zone, and must flag creep against the trailing baseline. A doubling of ambient portfolio cost that is not accompanied by a doubling of useful outcomes is a signal to prune.

Constitution drift. An ambient agent whose constitution has not been reviewed in N months is a candidate for drift — the world moved and the constitution didn't. The Autonomy Council reviews the constitutions of T3+ ambient capabilities quarterly; T1 and T2 ambient capabilities are reviewed annually.



Ambient agent lifecycle. Approval sets initial tier; continuous monitoring watches for rate, signal-to-noise, cost, and ownership health; violations demote or kill-switch; sunset criteria retire gracefully with evidence preserved for audit.

15.5. Ambient work trades compute for attention, and the cost ratio inverts

Ambient agents have a fundamentally different cost profile from reactive agents. The worked example in Appendix B modeled a representative reactive change at ~$22 per verified outcome, with human decision time as the dominant term. Ambient work inverts that ratio in some classes and reproduces it in others; both patterns matter for platform budgeting.

Continuous low-burn. A cost anomaly agent that queries billing telemetry every 15 minutes runs the model on a small structured context each time. Model cost per invocation is negligible; total cost is invocation-rate × runtime. A single such agent at ~$0.02 per invocation, 4 invocations/hour, is ~$700/year. Two hundred similar agents are ~$140K/year — real money.

Batch burst. A fleet migration agent processing 800 services with ~50k in / 20k out tokens per service costs ~$40k in tokens alone for the whole migration, plus workspace runtime. The burst nature means FinOps can budget it as a one-time investment against the toil it removes.

Watch-and-deep-dive. An anomaly agent that runs cheaply 99% of the time but performs a heavy investigation on each signal has a long-tail cost distribution — median cost is tiny, 99th percentile is

100× median. Budgeting the mean underestimates; budgeting the 99th percentile overestimates. FinOps models both.

Illustrative cost per ambient class

The table below is order-of-magnitude budgeting inputs, not committed vendor prices. Assumes late-2026 frontier model pricing (blended ~$8 in / $30 out per 1M tokens).

Class	Trigger cadence	$/action (approx.)	$/agent/year (approx.)
Dependency updater (Class 1)	Weekly × ~200 candidates	$0.05	$520
Fleet migration (Class 2)	One-quarter campaign, 800 services	$50	$40k campaign
Cost anomaly (Class 3)	Every 15 min continuous	$0.02	$700
Access review (Class 4)	Monthly, ~2k identities	$0.10	$2.4k
Runbook synthesis (Class 5)	Per incident, ~200/yr	$2.00	$400
Model landscape scan (Class 6)	Weekly + on-release	$30	$2k
Feature drift (Class 7)	Daily, ~100 features	$0.05	$1.8k
Support triage (Class 8)	Continuous, ~1k tix/day	$0.01	$3.7k

Ambient portfolio cost as a whole

An enterprise running one active agent per class, at the volumes above, spends roughly $50K/year in model and compute — small. Scaling each class to 10 active agents each (30 to 80 ambient capabilities in total) is $250K–$500K/year — noticeable, requires FinOps discipline. Beyond that, the platform is running a real ambient portfolio that needs the governance scaffolding above.

The dominant term in most ambient classes is **not** human decision cost (reactive agents' inverted ratio) — it is model call cost, because ambient agents do more per unit of human attention. That inversion is the whole point: ambient agents trade compute for attention. As long as the trade produces net-verified-outcome uplift, it is a good trade. The moment it doesn't (an ambient agent whose signal-to-noise is bad enough that humans spend more attention triaging its output than they save on toil), the trade fails and the agent should be demoted or retired.

15.6. Start with the dependency updater, not the fleet migration

Not every ambient class is equally cheap to start. The proposed sequence below reflects both technical readiness and organizational adoption cost.

Phase 1 (0–90 days) — Prove the pattern.

Start with capabilities where the value is clear and the failure mode is obvious: Class 1 (dependency hygiene) and Class 3 (cost anomaly detection). Both have external product benchmarks (Dependabot / Renovate for Class 1; Datadog / Chronosphere for Class 3) so the enterprise can measure its own implementation against a known good. Both use T1–T2 tiers, so risk is bounded. Success criterion: two ambient capabilities in production with active Council-approved constitutions, evidence chain, and measured signal-to-noise.

Phase 2 (90–180 days) — Extend to security and knowledge.

Add Class 4 (continuous security and compliance) and Class 5 (runbook synthesis, ADR maintenance). Security ambient agents pay for themselves quickly if the enterprise has a compliance obligation (SOC 2, ISO 27001, EU AI Act) that currently consumes person-quarters per year. Knowledge agents pay for themselves the first time an on-call responder finds an accurate runbook that would otherwise not have existed.

Phase 3 (180–360 days) — Scale to fleet-wide and ecosystem.

Add Class 2 (fleet migration campaigns) and Class 6 (ecosystem intelligence). By now the platform has the workspace broker cost maturity to handle bursty campaigns, the Autonomy Council has enough constitution-approval experience to reason about T3 promotions, and the model-router / capability-registry has enough baseline data to usefully accept model landscape recommendations.

Phase 4 (360+ days) — Extend to data/ML and organizational meta.

Add Class 7 (data engineering and ML lifecycle) and Class 8 (product analytics, customer feedback, org meta). These classes require the most upstream investment (feature store, event pipeline, customer feedback pipeline) and are the most sensitive to constitution and IP posture, so they benefit from being last rather than first.

What not to skip

The temptation is to start with the most impressive capability (a fleet migration agent looks visionary) and skip the governance scaffolding. Skipping means the organization deploys three ambient agents in a quarter, one goes runaway, and the resulting incident poisons the well for the whole program. The dependency updater first, with a proper constitution and signal-to-noise budget, is the boring correct answer.

15.7. An ambient portfolio needs a product manager and an on-call

Once the ambient surface has more than a handful of always-on capabilities, two roles emerge that are new enough to name explicitly. Neither belongs in the organizational chapter's **permeable roles** chapter because both are meaningful only against the ambient taxonomy above.

Ambient-agent product manager. Owns the ambient portfolio as a product. Responsibilities: capability roadmap (which ambient class next?), constitution authorship and review, signal-to-noise budget setting, sunset decisions, cross-team coordination with the teams whose work the ambient agents affect. Measures: cumulative net-verified-outcome uplift, portfolio cost, mean ambient signal quality, orphan-ownership incidents avoided. Reporting line: usually Platform Engineering, with a dotted line to Compliance for constitution and to FinOps for cost.

Agent SRE. The on-call for the ambient agents themselves. An ambient agent that runs at T3 or T4 is a production workload with a service-level objective; someone needs to respond when it misbehaves. Responsibilities: runbook ownership for the ambient portfolio, health monitoring, runaway response, feedback-loop detection, cost anomaly response for the portfolio itself, evaluation-harness health. Measures: time-to-detect and time-to-mitigate for ambient-agent incidents, false-positive rate of ambient alerts, evaluation-harness staleness. Reporting line: Reliability Engineering, embedded with Platform Engineering.

Neither role is a rebrand of an existing role. An ambient-agent PM is not a platform PM; a platform PM's remit is the developer-facing platform, whereas the ambient-agent PM's remit is the fleet of always-on capabilities. An agent SRE is not a platform SRE; the platform SRE keeps the platform **running**, the agent SRE keeps the ambient agents **behaving**. Both roles will start informally and get named formally as the ambient portfolio grows.

15.8. Relationship to the wider plan

This chapter closes the loop opened by the orchestrator chapter, which introduced the developer orchestrator managing many reactive agents; this chapter extends the same primitives to the ambient surface. The autonomy ladder (glossary), the constitution mechanism (Section 10.7), the evidence chain (Appendix N), the workspace broker (Appendix J), the decision packet (Appendix I), and the constitution + residency + IP posture from the trust and governance chapter all apply to both surfaces. That is what makes the platform coherent rather than a portfolio of point products.

Supporting material: Appendix R enumerates 20+ named ambient agent patterns with the same implementation fields as Appendix I and Appendix J. Appendix Q.18 catalogs the current vendor landscape of ambient agent products for build/buy analysis.

15.9. Measurement is what guards against the silent army

Metrics tied to this chapter (definitions consolidated in Appendix T):

- **Ambient portfolio inventory** — count of registered ambient agents by class. Every long-

running agent must be in the inventory; unregistered long-running agents constitute the **silent army** failure mode and must be reduced to zero.

- **Signal-to-noise budget adherence** — fraction of ambient agents whose observed signal-to-noise ratio falls within the budget their constitution declared. Below-budget agents are paused or retuned; sustained failure triggers retirement.
- **Reauthorization cycle completion** — fraction of ambient agents whose Autonomy Council reauthorization completed within the required cycle. Reauthorization is not paperwork; it is the mechanism by which portfolio pruning happens on cadence rather than by crisis.
- **Cost per ambient agent** — continuous compute, model calls, storage per registered agent per week. Fed into the FinOps aggregate; agents exceeding budget are paused pending Council review.
- **Silent-army detection** — count of long-running agents detected outside the registered portfolio per quarter. Target: zero. A non-zero count triggers immediate audit and either registration or shutdown.
- **Ambient-attributable outcome share** — fraction of measurable organisational outcomes (toil reduction, cost savings, security findings, knowledge production) attributable to ambient work versus reactive work. The strategic KPI that answers whether the ambient investment is compounding.
- **Ambient runaway response time** — median time from a runaway ambient agent being detected to being paused. Bounds the blast radius of an ambient agent that has drifted.

Seven metrics; the ambient portfolio is the class of platform work whose measurement discipline most directly guards against the silent-army failure mode.

In closing

The thesis restated against its own limits — what the document proposes, what remains a hypothesis, and what it declines to claim.

Chapter 16. Epilogue — the thesis and its limits

16.1. Core propositions

- Engineer execution shifts toward orchestration and judgment.
- AI creates cheap exploration as well as throughput.
- Human attention, ownership, and context reconstruction become new constraints.
- The developer platform should organize decision points and exceptions.
- Organizational knowledge must be delivered at runtime and reused across the lifecycle.
- Paved roads and developer capabilities need agent-accessible interfaces.
- Support latency, cost feedback, security, evaluation, and capability building belong in the platform view.
- Requirements are evidence-bearing artifacts, and cheaper delivery raises the cost of choosing badly rather than lowering it.
- Asynchronous delegation is the normal mode of work, and interactive attention is the escalation path rather than the default.
- The abstraction stays escapable: engineers keep a route from a decision packet down to logs, a shell, a running preview, and an attached debugger.
- A workspace is a logical, shareable, resumable work context rather than a particular runtime, and execution placement follows the work.
- Evidence is discipline-specific, and autonomy ceilings follow the strength of the evidence a discipline can actually produce.
- Capabilities are exposed as governed outcomes; authority is delegated, bounded, observable, and revocable, and is enforced outside the model.

16.2. What remains a hypothesis

- How much end-to-end autonomy is useful for each class of work.
- Whether a wallet is the right durable economic control.
- How quickly automated model routing should replace informed human choice.
- What the right decision-inbox experience looks like beyond PR review.
- Which additional enterprise-product capabilities should graduate from permission-preserving reads to reversible actions and, eventually, consequential operations as evidence accumulates.
- How the enterprise currently approaches MCP, agent gateways, operations, and internal developer-platform architecture.
- Whether traceability on requirements changes what gets built, or only what gets documented about what gets built.

- Which classes of work will stay below a high autonomy tier for a long time because the evidence that would earn it does not exist.
- Where the balance of local and managed execution settles for each discipline, and whether the workspace abstraction survives contact with toolchains that resist it.

The limits are worth stating as plainly as the propositions. Not all work becomes autonomous. Not all correctness is automatically decidable. Not all execution moves to managed infrastructure. Not every agent earns the same authority. Human judgment stays central, and direct engineering depth stays available to anyone who needs it.

16.3. Closing statement

An AI native platform should optimize for humans defining intent and making consequential decisions while agents execute bounded work using organizational knowledge and capabilities. It succeeds when this produces more verified outcomes without exhausting human attention or weakening trust.

Appendix A: Core design principles for an AI-native developer platform

The ten principles state what working this way is like for an engineer. This appendix carries the design principles that follow for the platform: what has to be built, and what shape it has to take, if those invariants are to hold. They are stated as positions rather than as settled architecture.

A.1. A1 A decision request should be a durable platform object

A pull request, ticket, pipeline failure, security alert, or incident action can all generate the same abstract object: a question with an owner, deadline, evidence, options, recommendation, authority requirement, and continuation. If that abstraction is real, the platform can prioritize across tools instead of merely aggregating their notifications.

A.2. A2 Context needs a supply chain

Once organizational knowledge changes agent behavior, it needs the disciplines applied to code and configuration: owners, versions, review, provenance, testing, permissions, staged rollout, monitoring, and retirement. The highest-risk failure may be plausible but stale guidance applied consistently at scale.

A.3. A3 Exploration needs an evaluation budget

Cheap generation does not make evaluation free. Every additional option consumes human comparison, testing, and integration capacity. The orchestrator should stop generating when another alternative is unlikely to change the decision.

A.4. A4 Human attention should be modeled explicitly

A workflow design should identify each possible human interruption, the expected owner, required context, maximum useful wait, and safe default when nobody responds. This makes attention capacity visible during architecture rather than after queues grow.

A.5. A5 Cost feedback is a product-design problem

Budget enforcement alone changes behavior through fear of cutoff. Fast, task-level feedback can create informed choice. The UX should show quality-adjusted alternatives and let a developer explain why the expensive path was justified.

A.6. A6 Operations should feed the knowledge system

An incident, support resolution, or rollback should update more than a postmortem. It may produce a regression test, safer paved road, revised tool description, new approval rule, updated

runbook, or ownership correction. The learning artifact should have a named destination.

Appendix B: The evidence: productivity, quality, cost, and business impact

These sources provide external support for parts of the argument. They should be used carefully: product announcements demonstrate capability and direction; industry surveys show associations and perceptions; standards provide vocabulary and practices; none independently proves the complete architecture thesis.

Topic	Evidence	Sources	Responsible use
AI adoption and organizational system	DORA's 2025 research describes AI as an amplifier of existing organizational strengths and weaknesses. A 2026 DORA discussion reports that 90% of technology professionals use AI at work and more than 80% perceive productivity gains, while also noting increased verification work and a relationship between adoption, throughput, and instability.	R1, R2	Supports measuring the full delivery system rather than code generation alone.
Trust and delivery tension	DORA's earlier generative-AI analysis reported that a 25% increase in adoption was associated with a 1.5% decrease in throughput and 7.2% decrease in stability in that dataset; 39% reported little or no trust. These are associations from a specific study, not universal causal constants.	R3	Useful counterweight to unsupported claims of automatic velocity.

Topic	Evidence	Sources	Responsible use
Agent environments and evidence	OpenAI's Codex introduction says agents perform better with configured environments, reliable tests, and clear documentation, and emphasizes human review and visible logs or test results.	R7	Supports organizational context, reproducibility, and decision packets.
Concurrent agent direction	OpenAI's Codex material recommends well-scoped parallel tasks and describes developers supervising multiple agents.	R7, R8	Supports the orchestration trend; does not establish the safe concurrency limit.
MCP boundaries	The MCP specification defines a host-client-server architecture and resources, prompts, and tools. Its HTTP authorization profile uses OAuth-based mechanisms.	R9, R10	Supports MCP as an integration mechanism, not an entire platform architecture.
Agentic security	OWASP highlights tool misuse, identity or privilege abuse, prompt-driven behavior hijacking, and memory or context threats. NIST supplies lifecycle risk and secure-development frameworks.	R4–R6	Supports independent controls around agent actions.

B.1. Candidate metrics grounded in the thesis

Each metric names its instrument so that the measurement is implementable rather than aspirational. "Intent event" refers to the platform-defined event emitted when a work item is bound to an execution task; "verified-outcome event" refers to the evidence-chain event emitted when the change reaches its terminal state (merged, released, and observed in production without regression) as defined in Appendix N.

Metric	Definition	Instrument
Elapsed time to verified outcome	Wall-clock from intent event to verified-outcome event, split into active agent time, system wait, and human decision wait	Evidence-chain event timestamps; workspace broker task telemetry
Decision packets per outcome	Count of decision packets emitted per verified outcome, and the median human decision latency per packet	Decision-packet ledger
Context reconstruction time	Time a human spends reading context before responding to a decision packet	Client-side timer instrumented into the review UI
Owner-routing accuracy	Fraction of decision packets routed to the first-time-correct owner	Decision-packet ledger with reassignment events
Review precision and recall	Precision and severity-weighted recall of AI review findings against a held-out labeled defect corpus	Evaluation harness (see Appendix I)
Accepted-fix rate	Fraction of proposed patches accepted without material modification	Review UI action log
Escaped defect rate	Escaped defects per verified outcome, attributed to the review that approved the change	Incident ledger joined to decision-packet ledger
Cost per verified outcome	Fully loaded model + tool + workspace cost per verified outcome, by change class	FinOps telemetry joined to evidence chain
Model retry cost	Fraction of model spend that produced no accepted output	Model router telemetry
Knowledge retrieval precision	Precision at k for the context retrieved in support of an agent task, evaluated against human-labeled relevance	Context-retrieval eval harness
Missing mandatory context	Fraction of tasks that completed without one or more mandatory context items	Decision-packet ledger `missing_context` field
Stale-context incidents	Incidents whose root-cause analysis attributes the failure to context that was retrieved but out of date	Incident ledger with `stale_context` cause tag

Metric	Definition	Instrument
Autonomy outcomes by tier	Per T0–T4 capability class: completion rate, intervention rate, rollback rate, unsafe-action attempts, false completions	Autonomy Council quarterly review from Autonomy telemetry
Support-path latency	Time from developer question to correct owner and to useful answer	Support-channel instrumentation

Every metric above is derived from platform-emitted events; no metric requires manual reporting. Metrics that would require manual entry are deliberately omitted because they will not survive contact with day-to-day work.

B.2. Worked cost example

The following is an illustrative unit-economics estimate for a single representative change class — a moderate backend bug fix — under plausible late-2026 pricing. Numbers are round-order-of-magnitude inputs to a build-vs-buy decision, not committed vendor quotes.

Cost input	Unit	Amount	Assumption
Frontier model calls (planning + implementation)	tokens	~120k in / 40k out	~10 turns, 4k avg context; retries included
Frontier model $/1M tokens (blended)	$	$8 in / $30 out	2026 blended list price across major frontier vendors
Model spend per change	$	~$2.15	(120 × 8 + 40 × 30) / 1000
Tool-call MCP surface	calls	~40	Repo read, static analysis, test run, contract check, policy check
Workspace runtime	vCPU-min	~25	Ephemeral runner, single job, cold start amortized
Workspace $/vCPU-min	$	$0.008	Blended enterprise cloud rate 2026
Workspace spend per change	$	~$0.20	
Evidence store + audit retention	$	~$0.05	Amortized cost per packet
Human review time	minutes	~8	Reviewer reads decision packet and approves/redirects
Fully loaded reviewer $/hour	$	$150	Enterprise blended
Human decision cost	$	~$20	The dominant cost
Total cost per verified change	**$**	**~$22.40**	

The dominant term is human decision time, not model or compute spend. This confirms the claim

in the one-page argument: net capacity is limited by attention, and the way to reduce cost per verified outcome is to reduce the attention required per decision (better decision packets, better routing, better context) rather than to squeeze another dollar out of model spend. The ratio is roughly 90% attention, 10% compute — an inversion of the intuition that AI costs dominate.

Multiply this per-change figure by the annual change volume of the enterprise to size the platform investment envelope. A team producing 50,000 verified changes per year at $22 per change is operating a $1.1M/year platform excluding the platform's own build and maintenance cost; the build-and-maintenance cost of the orchestration platform itself needs to be judged against that operating cost, not against $0.

Appendix C: The decisions an AI-native platform must make

This appendix maps the topics likely to arise in any AI-native developer-platform proposal against the coverage in this document. It is intended as a pre-review orientation: which topics does the main argument develop in depth, which are open questions best resolved with specific enterprise context, and what is the provisional interpretation this document adopts in the meantime.

Reference framing prompt: **"How might you reimagine the developer platform for an AI-native software development lifecycle — including agents, MCP, agent gateways, and AI-assisted coding, testing, and operations — while establishing safe, scalable patterns for AI adoption and identifying where AI can fundamentally transform how developers consume and build on the platform?"** This prompt shape recurs across enterprise AI-platform reviews; the coverage table below assumes any similarly shaped conversation.

Topic	Coverage in this document	Existing position	Open questions requiring enterprise context	Provisional interpretation
Agents	Strong	Execution to orchestration; concurrency; exception handling; decision inbox	What is an agent in the enterprise's current usage: coding worker, workflow participant, or broad organizational actor? How much autonomy by task?	Define agent as delegated work with tools, context, budget, evidence, and stopping conditions. Avoid a feature catalog.
Skills, plugins, and shared capability	Developed	Soft rails vs hard rails; eight surfaces classified by invocation and credentials; registry with tiered publication and provisional expiry; local/CI parity; skill supply chain	Who may publish org-wide, and what is the review bar per surface class? Which lifecycle phases have no capability at all today?	Encode the decisions the organisation has already made so nobody re-litigates them in a prompt. Classify by invocation and authority, not by packaging format.

Topic	Coverage in this document	Existing position	Open questions requiring enterprise context	Provisional interpretation
Product participation in AI ecosystems	Developed	Set authorization and disclosure surfaces; delegation across hops; cross-organization collaboration; capability ledger; metering for agent traffic	Which retrieval journey is the pilot, and who owns the conformance suite? Which announced controls are actually enabled per tenant?	A product is agent-ready when it can state what a caller may learn, not only what it may fetch. Prove the current contract before changing the architecture.
Requirements and product discovery	Developed	Signal and opportunity objects in front of the specification; discovery on the autonomy ladder with T4 closed; intent debt; consent scope on customer voice	Who owns the feedback corpus, and does the organisation know its own idea hit rate? Which discovery tools move behind the gateway first?	Specifications carry provenance as a condition of entering delivery. Problem selection stays human; the reading does not.
MCP	Substantially clarified	MCP and documented REST extend the inner loop across code search, work management, Confluence, developer portals, CI, observability, operational tools, and UI design systems	Which capabilities benefit from MCP discovery and which are more reliable through REST? Who owns each interface?	Optimize for reliable agent-accessible capabilities rather than protocol purity. MCP and REST are complementary.

Topic	Coverage in this document	Existing position	Open questions requiring enterprise context	Provisional interpretation
Agent gateways	Strong initial view	MCP use by engineers needs a governed entry point: centralized access, least-privilege policy, inspection, observability, audit, and credential control	Which policies must be tool- or argument-aware? How is human identity propagated? What inspection is safe for sensitive content? Centralized or federated deployment?	Treat "agent gateway" here primarily as an enterprise MCP-governance layer. Keep model-routing and agent-to-agent gateway functions separate unless the enterprise intends the broader term.
AI-assisted coding	Strong	Routine work, proofs of concept, parallel fixes, multiple treatments	Which coding flows make the best first paved road? What completion evidence is required?	Use two scenarios: ten bounded fixes and three alternative prototypes. They reveal different platform needs.
Testing	Strong initial view	Parallel test agent; synthetic fixtures; ephemeral component tests; contract validation; test-impact selection; guarded healing; semantic UI testing; interactive security tests	Which test changes may an agent recommit without review? What confidence allows selective execution? How is meaningful coverage measured?	Make testing independent evidence, not a mechanism for making generated code green. Promote agents from authoring to repair only with measured safeguards.
Operations	Acknowledged and developed	Monitoring and operations run as one system with development; the ambient-agents chapter extends this into an ambient-agent surface	What may an agent read or change in production? What is the SRE and incident-commander boundary?	Start with context assembly and diagnosis. Add narrowly defined, reversible runbook actions later under Autonomy Council authorization.

Topic	Coverage in this document	Existing position	Open questions requiring enterprise context	Provisional interpretation
Safe scalable adoption	Strong ingredients	Security, audit, budgets, evaluation, alpha cohorts, education, vendor scanning	What risk tiers and approval model feel credible? Which tasks graduate toward autonomy?	Use progressive autonomy based on workflow evidence, not a single company-wide switch.
Transform consumption	Strong	Prompt as a new front door; the enterprise's existing content, workflow, and no-code surfaces form the foundation; capabilities graduate through permission-preserving reads, reversible actions, and gated consequential operations	Which additional capabilities should graduate next, and what evidence should authorize each transition?	Expose content-safe business capabilities rather than generic CRUD, preserving identity, classification, purpose, provenance, permission boundaries, and audit across first-party and external agents.
Transform building	Partial	Product managers prototype; disciplines become more permeable; skills encode practice	Who can take work to production? How do roles and ownership change without becoming a jobs discussion?	Frame as shifting centers of gravity and preserved accountability.
Assumptions and decisions	Needs explicit presentation pass	Multi-vendor environment; mature internal tools; model quality changes; humans remain in loop	Which enterprise-specific assumptions will be stated? Which three decisions best demonstrate judgment?	Keep a short assumption slide and narrate trade-offs at the point each decision appears.

Appendix D: MCP, agent gateways, testing, and operations: architecture deep dives

These sections provide an initial position and explicit decision questions for areas that remain dependent on enterprise context.

D.1. D1 MCP

MCP is the open protocol that standardizes how agents communicate with tools and data sources. It is the connective mechanism that makes internal documentation, service catalogs, repositories, CI systems, and paved-road actions consumable from an agent experience. MCP is stewarded by Anthropic together with a community of contributors; it is not a Linux Foundation project (that is A2A — see D3).

Current protocol primitives (Sept 2026). MCP defines five primitive types: **resources** (read-only data addressable by URI), **prompts** (templated instructions the client can invoke), **tools** (callable capabilities with typed inputs and outputs), **sampling** (the server requests the client to run a model call on its behalf, subject to client policy), and **elicitation** (the server requests additional input from the user, which is central to the human-in-the-loop patterns this document depends on). The March 2025 protocol revision replaced the earlier HTTP+SSE transport with **Streamable HTTP** as the canonical transport; the June 2025 revision added the OAuth-based authorization profile; subsequent revisions have refined resource-server metadata, dynamic client registration, and protected-resource discovery.

Technical qualification. A protocol-compliant connection does not automatically create an enterprise governance program. The organization still needs inventory, ownership, policy consistency, credential handling, monitoring, server lifecycle, and defense against malicious or compromised tools. Session semantics matter: Streamable HTTP is either stateful (per session ID) or stateless per call, and the gateway must reason about which model applies to which server so policy state is not lost across a session boundary.

Questions for further opinion: Which capabilities should the enterprise expose or consume through MCP versus REST versus direct integration? What is the publication standard for an internal MCP server (identity, tool description review, evaluation harness, versioning, deprecation)? Who owns its tool descriptions, authorization, evaluation, versioning, and retirement? How does the sampling primitive interact with the enterprise's model-routing policy — must the server declare which model classes its sampling requests target?

D.2. D1B MCP protocol primitives

The protocol names six primitive kinds. An engineer building against MCP should know which primitive their capability is best expressed as.

- **Resources** — read-only content addressable by URI. Files, documents, records, query results, metadata blobs. Retrieval and citation belong here. Resources have no side effects.
- **Tools** — side-effecting functions the agent invokes. Anything that writes, moves, creates,

deletes, or triggers work outside the read plane. Tool policy separation — discover, read, transform, write, share, delete, administer — applies here.

- **Prompts** — parameterised prompt templates the server offers. Useful for capturing an approved way to phrase a request against the server's domain: a "summarise this contract" prompt for a legal document store, a "triage this incident" prompt for an ops system.
- **Roots** — the filesystem or workspace scope the client advertises to the server. Governs which paths a local `filesystem` MCP may read.
- **Sampling** — the server asks the client (agent runtime) to perform a model completion on its behalf. Rare in enterprise; present for cases where the server needs a model call it cannot make itself.
- **Elicitation** — the server asks the client to prompt the human for input mid-workflow. Escalation surface for consent that cannot be pre-authorised.

An enterprise MCP catalogue should classify every capability under one of these six. Mis-classifying a write as a resource loses tool policy. Mis-classifying a read as a tool over-scopes the approval posture and burns human attention on approvals that should have been automatic.

D.3. D2 MCP or agent gateway

Any engineering use of MCP services needs governance controls. The gateway is the controlled entry point through which agents reach MCP servers, avoiding unmanaged direct connections and credential sprawl. Its core responsibilities are centralized access control, least-privilege policy, security inspection, observability, and audit.

The gateway should be able to identify the human, agent, task, requested tool, and relevant parameters; decide whether the call is allowed; route it; inspect requests or results where policy permits; and record discovery, invocation, outcome, and policy decision. A compromised server or poisoned tool description must not gain authority merely because it speaks MCP.

Questions for further opinion: Should the gateway broker short-lived credentials or pass an end-user token? How granular should authorization become—server, tool, parameter, resource, transaction, or task? How should sensitive payload inspection work? What is the fail-closed behavior, emergency path, and revocation model? Is a single gateway practical, or should policy be central while enforcement is distributed?

Scope caution: vendors use “agent gateway,” “AI gateway,” and “MCP gateway” inconsistently. The narrowest grounded interpretation is governed access from engineering agents to MCP services. Model routing, prompt filtering, inference cost, and agent-to-agent communication may be adjacent gateway responsibilities, but they should not be bundled into the gateway scope without an explicit decision.

D.4. D3 A2A and agent collaboration

A2A matters when the SDLC pipeline spans independently operated specialist agents. It was donated to the Linux Foundation in June 2025 and, as of the April 2026 Linux Foundation update, had support from 150+ organizations (R31). This document treats A2A as a live interoperability

protocol, not a speculative future, while distinguishing between the protocol's maturity and the enterprise governance work that still surrounds it.

MCP and REST let an agent use code search, Jira, Confluence, CI, developer portals, design tools, and operational systems. A2A lets that agent discover and delegate work to another agent that may own its own tools, memory, workflow, and execution environment.

Meaning for the platform. Publish approved specialist agents through a trusted catalog; use Agent Cards as discovery metadata rather than as proof of trust; carry the initiating identity and bounded authority into delegated tasks; preserve task, message, artifact, and decision provenance; and make long-running status visible to the orchestrator and the human decision inbox. A2A itself does not specify a registry or catalog — those are enterprise-added scaffolding around the protocol; that scaffolding is where most of the operational work lives.

Questions for further opinion: Where does the enterprise need cross-team or cross-vendor agent interoperability rather than internal subagents? Who attests an Agent Card and approves an agent for use? Can an agent delegate again, and how deep? Which artifacts require scanning or independent validation? How do cancellation, timeout, cost budgets, loop detection, and emergency revocation work across organizations? Should one gateway mediate MCP and A2A, or should they share policy while using different enforcement paths?

Caution. Standard transport and task semantics do not create trustworthy collaboration. A2A adds distributed-systems failure modes and a broader trust boundary. Start where ownership boundaries make interoperability valuable, and require the same evidence, least privilege, and progressive authority expected elsewhere in the platform.

D.5. D4 Testing

Possible meaning: AI helps design, generate, execute, diagnose, and maintain tests, while the platform evaluates the agentic workflow itself. These are related but separate concerns.

Questions: How do we know generated tests are meaningful? Which historical failures form the benchmark? How do we test nondeterministic agent outcomes? Do we require independent models or deterministic checks? What release evidence changes by risk tier?

Caution: more test code and higher line coverage are weak success measures. Prefer tests that detect realistic faults and trace to acceptance or risk.

D.6. D5 Operations

Possible meaning: agents assemble incident context, correlate deploys and telemetry, explore hypotheses, run safe diagnostics, propose remediation, and convert production learning into development knowledge.

Questions: Read only first? Which runbook actions are narrow and reversible enough for approval or autonomy? How are production credentials scoped? Who remains incident commander? How do we prevent malicious log content from instructing an agent?

Caution: diagnosis and mutation need different authority. A persuasive hypothesis is not observed

fact; incident timelines must preserve provenance.

D.7. D6 Enterprise gateway governance capabilities

The gateway enforces the **agent constitution** (see Section 10.7) at every call boundary. The constitution supplies the policy; the gateway supplies the enforcement.

Governance capability	What the gateway or surrounding control plane should provide
Constitution enforcement	Load the current signed constitution for the calling agent + capability; evaluate machine-readable rules on every call; refuse calls that violate constitutional constraints; record constitution version on every audit entry.
Inventory and admission	Register approved MCP servers, tools, versions, owners, environments, data classes and side effects; block or quarantine unapproved endpoints.
Authentication	Verify the developer, agent host, agent workload and MCP server; integrate with corporate identity and workload posture.
Authorization	Apply least privilege at server and tool level and, where needed, at resource, parameter, transaction, task and environment level; preserve the authority of the person on whose behalf the agent acts.
Credential mediation	Use short-lived, audience-bound credentials; exchange or attenuate identity rather than copying long-lived developer tokens into agent configuration.
Injection and tool-poisoning controls	Treat tool descriptions, retrieved content and results as untrusted; detect suspicious instructions, tool shadowing, schema changes and attempts to make data act as privileged instructions.
Data protection	Classify and redact sensitive arguments or results, apply egress and residency policy, minimize retained content, and prevent secrets from entering prompts or logs.
Action policy	Distinguish discovery, read, write, delete, deploy and external communication; require approval for irreversible or high-blast-radius operations and bind approval to exact arguments and expiry.

Governance capability	What the gateway or surrounding control plane should provide
Auditing and provenance	Record identity, task, server and tool discovery, parameters or protected hashes, policy version and decision, downstream action, result, latency and human approval in a correlated trace.
Observability and anomaly detection	Measure tool selection, denials, failures, unusual chains, data volume, retries, latency and cost; alert on behavior inconsistent with the declared task or normal use.
Reliability and containment	Provide rate limits, budgets, timeouts, circuit breakers, loop detection, kill switches, server isolation, revocation and fail-closed behavior for privileged actions.
Lifecycle governance	Test descriptions and schemas, stage changes, monitor behavioral drift, rotate credentials, handle incidents, deprecate safely and retire servers without hidden dependencies.

MCP tool and agent gateway relationship

Agent host • User consent and session • MCP clients per server	›	**Agent gateway • Identity and authorization • Policy, routing, audit, and cost**	›	**MCP servers • Resources, prompts, and tools • Narrow capability contracts**	›	**Enterprise systems • Repos, CI, cloud, and tickets • Docs, catalogs, and telemetry**

Provisional relationship for discussion: MCP exposes focused resources and tools; a gateway may enforce cross-cutting enterprise controls; domain systems retain their own semantics and ownership.

Appendix E: Architecture lessons: what works, what fails, and why

Architecture pattern	Consequential lesson	Connection to this thesis
Evaluation before selection	Agree on the decision process before debating the outcome. Use golden repositories, replayable changes, human labels, economics, security, procurement, and practitioner feedback to make a multi-vendor decision defensible.	Continuous evaluation, model and vendor strategy, AI review, and adoption.
Invariant-preserving migration	Protect invariants and make migration part of the platform. Dual feeds, shadow comparison, per-consumer cutover, rollback, and compatibility handling make high-risk ecosystem changes manageable.	Agent execution boundaries, evidence, progressive rollout, and operations.
Capability to platform	A capability becomes a platform through useful paved roads, durable ownership, experimentation, intentional extension points, and product-team control of domain intent.	Organizational knowledge, agent-accessible platform services, and evaluation.
Bounded architecture experiment	Turn architectural disagreement into a bounded, representative experiment with decision-grade evidence.	Cheap optionality, proof of concept, and cost-quality trade-offs.
Staged platform direction	A large platform vision lands when expressed as staged capabilities and tied to immediate pain. Technical readiness without migration ownership does not create adoption.	Phased roadmap, organizational capability, and explicit ownership.

Architecture pattern	Consequential lesson	Connection to this thesis
Unattended operational reliability	Reliability and support burden can be more consequential than visible feature work. Design for unattended operation and recovery when a system is expected to run without continuous supervision.	Long-running agents, stuck work, operational ownership, and exception handling.

Appendix F: Sources, evidence quality, and how to read the references

This short appendix explains how in-body citations of the form [Rn] are organized and what weight to place on each class of source. The full authoritative list of references (R1–R407) lives in a single place: Appendix P — Sources and background reading. F was previously a partial list (R1–R35); those entries have now been merged into P so that every citation in the book resolves to exactly one location.

F.1. Organization

References are numeric and stable: R1 through R407. Numbers are assigned once and never renumbered — an in-body citation of [R48] or [R255–R260] in any chapter always points to the same entry in Appendix P.

Within P, entries are clustered chronologically by topic rather than alphabetized:

- R1–R35 cover the foundational material: DORA, NIST, OWASP, MCP and A2A specifications, early product announcements, and the initial gateway, testing, and SRE literature.
- R36–R81 cover concrete product and platform documentation (Copilot, Codespaces, Kubernetes, Linear, OpenTelemetry, Pact, Playwright, Google Cloud Deploy, DORA program pages, MCP and A2A overview pages).
- R82–R254 cover the broader tool landscape — coding agents, IDEs, observability, evaluation harnesses, AI gateways, vector search, integration platforms, data and ML platforms, low-code and no-code, notebooks, orchestration.
- R255–R283 cover the agent-security control plane — NIST CAISI and agent-identity work, OpenAI and Anthropic sandboxing posts, GitHub Copilot hooks, sandbox providers (Modal, E2B), runtime protection products (Palo Alto Prisma AIRS, Check Point/Lakera, Cisco AI Defense, Microsoft Defender, NVIDIA NeMo, Bedrock guardrails, Noma, HiddenLayer), identity (Microsoft Entra Agent ID), Model Armor, Devin Enterprise, self-hosted runners, Claude Code Action, Bedrock AgentCore harness, and enterprise-content vendors' agent security material.

F.2. Evidence-quality convention

Not all references carry the same evidential weight, and the argument in the body does not depend on any single one:

- **Product announcements and vendor documentation** (the majority of R36–R407) demonstrate that a **capability exists** and is claimed by a credible vendor. They are not independent proof that the capability performs as advertised in a customer's context.
- **Industry surveys** — principally DORA (R1, R2, R3, R68, R69) — show statistical **association** between practices and outcomes across a large population. They are directional and should not be read as cause-and-effect for any individual organization.
- **Standards and specifications** (NIST AI RMF and SSDF profile, OWASP, MCP, A2A,

OpenTelemetry, SLSA, Sigstore) provide **shared vocabulary, threat models, and interoperability contracts**. They anchor the language used in the book but do not by themselves settle design questions.

- **Vendor engineering blogs** (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google SRE, Snowflake, Datadog, and similar) describe **how a serious operator currently thinks** about a problem. They should be read as one expert perspective, not a definitive answer.
- **Practitioner syntheses** — a catalogue, a taxonomy, an infographic that has found an audience (R405) — record **how a community has agreed to carve a space up**. That is worth citing when the book borrows the carving, and it is the weakest class here: no method, no review, and often no stable URL. Where one appears, the claims it groups are sourced separately to their own papers, and anything the book asserts on top of the grouping is the book's own.

No single reference independently proves the whole thesis of the book. The argument rests on the **convergence** of these sources: standards that define the problem, surveys that establish the outcome shape, and vendor material that shows the industry is building toward the same architectural pattern.

F.3. Where to find the full list

The single authoritative list is Appendix P — Sources and background reading (R1–R407). Any URL marked `[verify URL before publication]` or `[URL pending verification]` in Appendix P should be resolved by the editor before print; the underlying source is believed to exist in every case, but the deep link needs confirmation against the vendor's current documentation host.

Appendix G: How to present the AI-native platform strategy

A thirty-minute presentation should not reproduce this document. It should make a small number of claims memorable and use the appendices for questions.

G.1. 1 The future direction

Engineers shift from execution toward orchestration. Enterprise products and internal platforms must become agentically consumable.

G.2. 2 The changed constraint

AI increases throughput and exploration, but human attention, ownership, and context reconstruction become bottlenecks.

G.3. 3 The platform response

Decision inbox, organizational knowledge at runtime, agent-accessible paved roads, AI-first review, and linked lifecycle workflows.

G.4. 4 Trust and adaptation

Continuous security, cost feedback, evaluation, vendor flexibility, and organizational capability building.

G.5. 5 Open threads to discuss

Offer a considered but provisional treatment of MCP, agent gateways, testing, and operations; state the decisions that still depend on the enterprise's own context.

G.6. Possible discussion questions for the panel

- Where is the enterprise already seeing the bottleneck move from execution to human decision capacity?
- Which internal platform capabilities are currently difficult for agents to discover or invoke?
- How is the enterprise thinking about MCP for tool interoperability, A2A for agent collaboration, and the enterprise-control boundary across both?
- Which operational actions would the enterprise consider safe enough for bounded agent execution?
- What evidence would the enterprise require before increasing autonomy for a workflow?

Keep at least fifteen minutes for discussion. The unresolved areas are not weaknesses if they are

framed as explicit decisions contingent on context rather than hidden behind false certainty.

Appendix H: What to build first: priority, maturity, risk, and readiness

This appendix inventories the principal ideas in the proposal and grades them as a portfolio. Scores are directional starting points for discussion, not estimates derived from a specific enterprise architecture assessment. Importance, value, urgency, evidence, and readiness use 5 as highest or strongest. Cost, organizational effort, delivery complexity, operational risk, and security risk use 5 as greatest. Parent-theme scores summarize the combined portfolio beneath them and should not be added to the child scores.

Confidence. Every score below carries an implicit confidence: low where the score is inferred from a small number of vendor announcements or a single research report; high where the score is grounded in multiple independent sources plus internal experience. Where a score would materially change decisions, the reader should treat it as an input to further evaluation rather than a settled position. A follow-on revision will add a confidence column; in this revision, confidence is called out inline in the **Interpretation** section where relevant.

Reconciliation with the main body. This revision brings several scores into alignment with the emphasis of the main body:

- **A2A agent collaboration** (row 2.2.4) was previously scored "Readiness 2 / Horizon Later." Given the Linux Foundation adoption update of April 2026 (R31) and the treatment in the foundations chapter and Appendix D, this revision raises A2A to Readiness 3 / Horizon Next, reflecting that the protocol is live but the enterprise scaffolding around it (registry, attestation, cross-org authority) is still active work.
- **Agentic operations** (row 1.7) was previously scored "Readiness 2 / Horizon Next" while the main body devotes a full chapter to operations and the operating-models chapter names the evidence chain. This revision raises the theme row to Readiness 3 / Horizon Now, keeping the individual subrows at their previously calibrated values; the theme roll-up now reflects the main-body emphasis.
- **Usage visibility and wallets** (row 3.1.1) previously carried Readiness 5 — the highest score in the whole table — with no supporting evidence beyond a single option in the cost chapter. This revision lowers Readiness to 4 to reflect that wallets are a near-term option but not yet a settled answer.

Where a score below appears misaligned with the main body, treat the score as the argument the appendix wishes to make (that the capability is less mature than the body's emphasis suggests) and use the disagreement as a decision point.

H.1. Strategic priority and maturity

ID	Idea	Level	Importance	Business value	Urgency	Evidence maturity	Readiness	Horizon
1	**Engineer as orchestrator and the agentic SDLC**	**Theme**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**3**	**3**	**Now**
1.1	Execution shifts to orchestration	Viewpoint	5	5	5	4	4	Now
1.2	Throughput and cheap exploration	Viewpoint	4	5	4	3	4	Now
1.3	Human attention and flow constraints	Viewpoint	5	5	5	3	3	Now
1.4	Decision inbox	Capability	5	5	4	2	3	Next
1.5	AI-first review	Capability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
1.6	Parallel agentic testing	Capability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
1.6.1	Test creation alongside implementation	Subcapability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
1.6.2	Test impact selection	Subcapability	4	4	4	3	3	Next
1.6.3	CI diagnosis and bounded repair	Subcapability	4	5	4	3	3	Next
1.6.4	UI and end-to-end testing	Subcapability	4	4	4	4	4	Now
1.6.5	Security and compliance testing	Subcapability	5	5	5	4	3	Now
1.7	Agentic operations	Capability	5	5	4	3	3	Now
1.7.1	Continuous system review	Subcapability	5	5	4	3	4	Now
1.7.2	Deployment risk assessment	Subcapability	5	5	5	3	4	Now

ID	Idea	Level	Importance	Business value	Urgency	Evidence maturity	Readiness	Horizon
1.7.3	Progressive deployment analysis	Subcapability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
1.7.4	Early fault detection	Subcapability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
1.7.5	Investigation and RCA	Subcapability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
1.7.6	Bounded automatic remediation	Subcapability	5	5	3	3	2	Later
1.7.7	Multi-zone and multi-region assurance	Subcapability	5	5	4	4	3	Next
1.7.8	Operational learning loop	Subcapability	5	5	4	3	3	Next
2	**Platform foundations for agentic work**	**Theme**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**Now**
2.1	Organizational knowledge at runtime	Viewpoint	5	5	5	4	4	Now
2.2	Agent-accessible paved roads	Viewpoint	5	5	5	4	4	Now
2.2.1	MCP tool access	Subcapability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
2.2.2	Direct REST and SDK access	Subcapability	5	5	5	5	5	Now
2.2.3	MCP and agent gateway governance	Subcapability	5	5	5	3	3	Now
2.2.4	A2A agent collaboration	Subcapability	4	4	3	3	3	Next
2.3	Developer support and organizational latency	Viewpoint	5	5	5	3	4	Now

ID	Idea	Level	Importance	Business value	Urgency	Evidence maturity	Readiness	Horizon
3	**Trust economics and continuous adaptation**	**Theme**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**Now**
3.1	Cost model quality and fast feedback	Viewpoint	5	5	5	4	4	Now
3.1.1	Usage visibility and wallets	Subcapability	4	4	5	4	4	Now
3.1.2	Model selection and routing	Subcapability	4	5	3	3	2	Next
3.2	Continuous evaluation and platform learning	Viewpoint	5	5	5	4	3	Now
3.3	Continuous and embedded security	Viewpoint	5	5	5	4	4	Now
4	**Organizational and product implications**	**Theme**	**5**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**Next**
4.1	More permeable engineering roles	Viewpoint	4	4	4	3	3	Next
4.2	Organizational capability building	Capability	5	5	5	4	4	Now
4.3	Enterprise products in agentic workflows	Viewpoint	5	5	4	3	3	Next

H.2. Delivery burden and risk

Risk is scored before the listed safeguard. A high score therefore identifies where stronger controls and staged authority are required; it is not an argument to discard the capability.

ID	Idea	Level	Cost	Org effort	Delivery complexity	Operational risk	Security risk	Primary safeguard
1	**Engineer as orchestrator and the agentic SDLC**	**Theme**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**4**	**4**	**Explicit accountability and authority boundaries**

ID	Idea	Level	Cost	Org effort	Delivery complexity	Operational risk	Security risk	Primary safeguard
1.1	Execution shifts to orchestration	Viewpoint	3	4	4	3	3	Keep service ownership with people
1.2	Throughput and cheap exploration	Viewpoint	3	3	3	2	2	Limit options by evaluation capacity
1.3	Human attention and flow constraints	Viewpoint	3	5	4	3	2	Measure queues and protect focus
1.4	Decision inbox	Capability	4	5	5	4	4	Evidence, owner, deadline and safe default
1.5	AI-first review	Capability	3	3	3	3	3	Human ownership for consequential judgment
1.6	Parallel agentic testing	Capability	4	4	4	4	3	Separate implementation and test reasoning
1.6.1	Test creation alongside implementation	Subcapability	3	3	3	3	2	Review assertions and boundary cases
1.6.2	Test impact selection	Subcapability	4	3	4	4	2	Mandatory suites and periodic full runs
1.6.3	CI diagnosis and bounded repair	Subcapability	4	3	5	4	3	Block weakened assertions and silent baseline changes
1.6.4	UI and end-to-end testing	Subcapability	3	3	4	3	2	Assert user outcomes, not screenshots alone
1.6.5	Security and compliance testing	Subcapability	4	4	5	4	5	Reproducible findings and disclosure process
1.7	Agentic operations	Capability	5	5	5	5	5	Progressive authority and emergency stop
1.7.1	Continuous system review	Subcapability	4	4	4	3	4	Owned findings with evidence and expiry

ID	Idea	Level	Cost	Org effort	Delivery complexity	Operational risk	Security risk	Primary safeguard
1.7.2	Deployment risk assessment	Subcapability	4	3	4	3	4	Explain factors and preserve hard gates
1.7.3	Progressive deployment analysis	Subcapability	4	4	4	4	3	Deterministic exposure and rollback limits
1.7.4	Early fault detection	Subcapability	4	3	4	3	3	Confidence, customer impact and alert quality checks
1.7.5	Investigation and RCA	Subcapability	4	4	5	4	4	Maintain competing hypotheses and allow inconclusive results
1.7.6	Bounded automatic remediation	Subcapability	5	5	5	5	5	Reversible actions, preflight, verification and kill switch
1.7.7	Multi-zone and multi-region assurance	Subcapability	5	5	5	5	4	Human-approved experiments and bounded blast radius
1.7.8	Operational learning loop	Subcapability	3	5	4	2	3	Named destination for every learning artifact
2	**Platform foundations for agentic work**	**Theme**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**4**	**5**	**Incremental adoption with common controls**
2.1	Organizational knowledge at runtime	Viewpoint	4	5	5	4	4	Provenance, freshness, tests and retirement
2.2	Agent-accessible paved roads	Viewpoint	4	5	4	4	4	Supported interfaces and conformance tests
2.2.1	MCP tool access	Subcapability	3	3	3	4	5	Allowlist tools and validate inputs and outputs
2.2.2	Direct REST and SDK access	Subcapability	3	3	3	3	4	Least privilege and compatibility discipline

ID	Idea	Level	Cost	Org effort	Delivery complexity	Operational risk	Security risk	Primary safeguard
2.2.3	MCP and agent gateway governance	Subcapability	5	5	5	4	5	Independent enforcement and deny-by-default
2.2.4	A2A agent collaboration	Subcapability	4	4	5	4	5	Trust boundaries, delegation limits and traceability
2.3	Developer support and organizational latency	Viewpoint	4	5	4	3	3	Easy escalation and provenance
3	**Trust economics and continuous adaptation**	**Theme**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**Independent controls and transparent policy**
3.1	Cost model quality and fast feedback	Viewpoint	3	4	4	2	2	Guidance before enforcement and exception path
3.1.1	Usage visibility and wallets	Subcapability	3	4	3	2	2	Near-real-time feedback and justified overrides
3.1.2	Model selection and routing	Subcapability	5	4	5	3	3	User override and regression monitoring
3.2	Continuous evaluation and platform learning	Viewpoint	5	5	5	3	4	Versioned evaluations and rollback criteria
3.3	Continuous and embedded security	Viewpoint	5	5	5	5	5	Deterministic enforcement and human escalation
4	**Organizational and product implications**	**Theme**	**4**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**Treat forecasts as hypotheses and measure adoption**
4.1	More permeable engineering roles	Viewpoint	3	5	4	3	2	Preserve deep expertise and review boundaries
4.2	Organizational capability building	Capability	4	5	4	2	2	Measured trials and published lessons
4.3	Enterprise products in agentic workflows	Viewpoint	5	5	5	4	5	Stable contracts, consent and tenant isolation

H.3. Value dependency and recommended action

ID	Idea	Level	What it offers	Principal dependency	Recommended next step
1	**Engineer as orchestrator and the agentic SDLC**	**Theme**	**A whole-lifecycle operating model**	**Leadership alignment and platform foundations**	**Define target operating model and pilot workflow**
1.1	Execution shifts to orchestration	Viewpoint	More leverage per engineer	Task decomposition and evidence capture	Pilot bounded tasks with named owners
1.2	Throughput and cheap exploration	Viewpoint	Parallel delivery and more options	Disposable environments and evaluation criteria	Run time-boxed multi-option experiments
1.3	Human attention and flow constraints	Viewpoint	Shorter decision and waiting time	Ownership data and workflow telemetry	Baseline human wait and context-recovery time
1.4	Decision inbox	Capability	Prioritized context-rich intervention	Common decision packet and routing	Prototype PR and CI decision queue
1.5	AI-first review	Capability	Cleaner changes before human review	Standards, code context and feedback data	Pilot on selected repositories
1.6	Parallel agentic testing	Capability	Verification grows with generation	Test intent, environments and quality policy	Pilot spec-to-tests on bounded services
1.6.1	Test creation alongside implementation	Subcapability	Earlier and broader test coverage	Acceptance criteria and testable design	Generate tests in parallel on pilot work
1.6.2	Test impact selection	Subcapability	Faster CI feedback	Dependency graph and execution history	Measure missed-impact rate
1.6.3	CI diagnosis and bounded repair	Subcapability	Shorter failure-to-fix loop	Logs, diffs, flake history and branch access	Start recommendation-only
1.6.4	UI and end-to-end testing	Subcapability	More resilient journey testing	Stable semantic interfaces and browser environments	Pilot on critical journeys
1.6.5	Security and compliance testing	Subcapability	Adversarial verification in the PR	Threat models and controlled targets	Add priority abuse cases to CI

ID	Idea	Level	What it offers	Principal dependency	Recommended next step
1.7	Agentic operations	Capability	Lower detection, diagnosis and recovery time	Telemetry, topology, runbooks and actuation controls	Begin with read-only investigation
1.7.1	Continuous system review	Subcapability	Find latent reliability and security gaps	Current topology, config and ownership	Review critical services and regional drift
1.7.2	Deployment risk assessment	Subcapability	Release plan matched to change risk	Diff, history, criticality and rollback data	Score changes without blocking first
1.7.3	Progressive deployment analysis	Subcapability	Smaller blast radius and earlier rollback	Canary controls and business health signals	Add AI interpretation to existing canaries
1.7.4	Early fault detection	Subcapability	Detect weak signals before impact expands	High-quality telemetry and health models	Pilot on SLO and dependency anomalies
1.7.5	Investigation and RCA	Subcapability	Faster evidence correlation and diagnosis	Cross-telemetry access and incident history	Deploy read-only incident investigator
1.7.6	Bounded automatic remediation	Subcapability	Lower time to restore for known failures	Executable runbooks and deterministic control plane	Automate one low-risk proven action
1.7.7	Multi-zone and multi-region assurance	Subcapability	Expose paper resilience before outages	RTO, RPO, topology and fault-injection capacity	Review one mission-critical journey
1.7.8	Operational learning loop	Subcapability	Incidents improve tests and platform standards	Post-incident ownership and knowledge lifecycle	Link postmortems to regression and runbook work
2	**Platform foundations for agentic work**	**Theme**	**Shared substrate for safe agent execution**	**Enterprise architecture and ownership**	**Choose initial platform services**
2.1	Organizational knowledge at runtime	Viewpoint	Company-specific decisions inside agent work	Owned, versioned and permission-aware knowledge	Curate one domain knowledge supply chain
2.2	Agent-accessible paved roads	Viewpoint	Agents reuse approved capabilities	Service catalog, APIs and platform ownership	Expose highest-value paved road

ID	Idea	Level	What it offers	Principal dependency	Recommended next step
2.2.1	MCP tool access	Subcapability	Standardized agent-to-tool interaction	Reliable servers and permission model	Pilot read-only developer tools
2.2.2	Direct REST and SDK access	Subcapability	Stable fallback and broad integration	High-quality schemas, docs and credentials	Improve machine-readable API documentation
2.2.3	MCP and agent gateway governance	Subcapability	Central policy, audit and credential control	Identity, policy, inventory and inspection	Define gateway responsibilities and pilot
2.2.4	A2A agent collaboration	Subcapability	Cross-agent and vendor interoperability	Agent identity, discovery and task semantics	Track standard and test contained use case
2.3	Developer support and organizational latency	View point	Faster resolution and captured learning	Ownership graph, diagnostics and knowledge	Pilot context-rich support routing
3	**Trust economics and continuous adaptation**	**Theme**	**Freedom within measurable enterprise controls**	**Shared governance and evaluation data**	**Establish cross-functional control model**
3.1	Cost model quality and fast feedback	View point	Economically informed model use	Usage attribution and task-level telemetry	Expose task cost and outcome feedback
3.1.1	Usage visibility and wallets	Subcapability	Spend awareness and budget control	Identity, attribution and manager process	Pilot dashboards before hard limits
3.1.2	Model selection and routing	Subcapability	Better quality-adjusted cost	Task taxonomy and comparative evaluations	Start with recommendations
3.2	Continuous evaluation and platform learning	View point	Adaptation as models and workflows change	Representative cases and outcome telemetry	Build initial cross-lifecycle evaluation set
3.3	Continuous and embedded security	View point	Security review throughout the lifecycle	Security ownership, identity and audit data	Integrate AI findings into existing controls
4	**Organizational and product implications**	**Theme**	**Align roles and products with agentic work**	**Executive sponsorship and product strategy**	**Run role and product design workshops**

ID	Idea	Level	What it offers	Principal dependency	Recommended next step
4.1	More permeable engineering roles	View point	Faster cross-disciplinary experimentation	Skills, accountability and career frameworks	Pilot cross-functional outcome teams
4.2	Organizational capability building	Capability	Faster learning in a changing market	Cohorts, community, training and experiment budget	Create enablement team and alpha cohort
4.3	Enterprise products in agentic workflows	View point	Capabilities reachable wherever work begins	Product APIs, partner ecosystem and governance	Prioritize agent-consumable product journeys

H.4. Interpretation

The matrix suggests a practical sequence. Establish the orchestration model, context supply, agent-accessible interfaces, AI-first review, testing, cost visibility, embedded security, and evaluation first. Introduce operational agents initially for read-only investigation, change-risk assessment, and resilience review. Expand into bounded production action only after runbooks, actuation controls, rollback, evaluation, and ownership are demonstrably mature. A2A, broad model routing, and end-to-end autonomy remain important options, but they should follow rather than precede the foundations that make them governable.

Appendix I: AI code review: from agent analysis to accountable merge

I.1. Purpose

This appendix separates assisted review from accountable approval. The platform may assemble evidence, find defects, propose patches, and rerun checks. A repository's merge policy still determines who can approve and which gates are mandatory.

I.2. Review sequence

- 1. Author loop. In the agent workspace, the agent summarizes the diff, runs repository checks, identifies unresolved questions, and proposes a self-review before publication.
- 2. Intake. The server binds the pull-request head SHA, repository policy, owners, linked work item, and change classification into an immutable review request.
- 3. Context assembly. Retrieve only applicable architecture decisions, service contracts, threat models, recent incidents, dependency policy, and code ownership. Record every source and version.
- 4. Parallel analysis. Run deterministic checks first, then specialized reviewers for correctness, security, reliability, data, API compatibility, accessibility, performance, and operational readiness as warranted by the risk class.
- 5. Synthesis. Deduplicate findings, separate evidence from inference, show confidence and missing context, and rank by expected impact. A finding without a code, test, policy, or trace anchor is a question—not a defect assertion.
- 6. Repair loop. Suggested patches are created only on an isolated branch, retested, and returned as inspectable commits. The agent does not silently rewrite the author's branch.
- 7. Human decision. Owners accept, reject, defer, or request more evidence. The disposition becomes evaluation data and is visible in the audit trail.
- 8. Merge and learning. Required checks and approvals remain authoritative. After deployment, escaped defects and rollback signals are linked to the decision packet to improve future evaluations.

I.3. Autonomy tiers for AI review

The review platform uses the canonical five-tier ladder defined in the glossary. Applied to pull-request review:

Tier	Name in review	Behaviour in the PR context
T0	**Observe**	Summary and questions only; no findings written to the PR.

Tier	Name in review	Behaviour in the PR context
T1	**Recommend**	Line findings and patch proposals posted as review comments; no writes to the branch.
T2	**Apply reversible**	Branch-scoped edits on a suggestion branch, tests re-run, results posted; the author's branch is never rewritten.
T3	**Apply bounded**	Selected deterministic policies (lint, license, SBOM, signed provenance) block merge automatically for the covered classes.
T4	**Autonomous within class**	A narrowly defined low-risk change class (documentation-only, dependency-patch within pinned range) may auto-merge when repository rules, evidence, rollback, and ownership conditions are satisfied.

Movement between tiers requires measured performance against the Evaluation scorecard below and explicit Autonomy Council authorization (see Autonomy Council). Tier assignment is per capability and per repository class, not per agent.

The **agent constitution** (Section 10.7) is the artifact the Autonomy Council reviews when authorizing tier promotion. For the AI review agent specifically, the constitution names the signal-to-noise budget, the maximum findings per PR, the confidence threshold below which the agent stays silent, and the auto-merge class boundaries at T4. A change to any of those parameters is a constitution version bump and requires re-authorization.

I.4. Minimum decision packet

Every AI-assisted PR review emits a decision packet with the fields below. Fields marked **(required)** must be populated for the packet to be considered valid; a review that cannot populate them advances at T0 only.

- **(required)** Bound work item, repository, base/head revisions, author, agent identity, delegated user identity, task identity, model and prompt version pins (including any tool versions used), and timestamps.
- **(required)** Supply-chain attestations: SBOM diff for the change, SLSA provenance level of the build (R133), signed provenance attestation (Sigstore/R132), and dependency vulnerability posture before and after the change.
- Change summary, affected services and interfaces, risk class, data or migration impact, declared rollout plan, and blast-radius estimate.
- Findings with severity, evidence anchor, reasoning, confidence, suggested action, and disposition.
- Commands, tests, policies, contracts, and security scans run; exit results; artifacts; and known gaps.
- **(required)** Model and tool-call transcript hash, so the reasoning that produced each finding can

be replayed under audit without re-running the model.

- Human approvals, overrides, waivers, unresolved questions, and final merge identity.
- Post-deployment health, rollback or incident linkage, and escaped-defect feedback.

The packet is immutable once merged; corrections attach as follow-on packets that reference the original.

I.5. Break-glass procedure

When the review system is degraded or a P0 incident requires a fix that cannot wait for the full evidence pipeline, a documented break-glass path applies. Two humans (author plus a named approver from the repository's on-call rotation) may co-sign a **provisional decision packet** that carries only: bound revisions, author, approver, incident reference, and the minimum tests that were run. The provisional packet is queued for post-merge reconciliation within 24 hours, at which point the full packet is assembled and any gaps are flagged for follow-up. Break-glass merges are counted separately in the scorecard and reviewed weekly by the Autonomy Council.

I.6. Evaluation scorecard

Evaluate on a held-out corpus before enforcement. Track actionable-findings precision, severity-weighted defect recall using known incidents and seeded defects, accepted-fix rate, duplicate rate, median reviewer time, time to first useful finding, false-block rate, change-failure rate, and cost per reviewed change. Segment results by language, repository, risk class, and reviewer. Comments per pull request is not a success metric.

Appendix J: Secure agent workspaces: isolation, execution, and control

J.1. Reference flow

Human sponsor or workflow event → workspace broker → policy decision → signed environment image plus repository configuration → task identity and short-lived credentials → isolated compute and network boundary → approved tools and context → evidence and artifacts → review/promotion → teardown and retention.

J.2. Isolation strength as a first-class workspace attribute

Different runtimes provide different isolation strengths. The workspace broker records the isolation tier as an attribute of the workspace class rather than an implementation detail:

Tier	Boundary	Representative runtimes (Sept 2026)
I1 Process	OS process isolation, shared kernel	Codespaces default, Coder
I2 gVisor / Git-proxy filesystem	Filesystem + syscall boundary with mediated Git and network access	Anthropic Claude Code sandboxes (R258)
I3 microVM	Firecracker-derived microVM with dedicated kernel	E2B, Modal, Runloop, Vercel Sandbox, Fly Machines
I4 Full VM	Full virtual machine boundary	AWS Bedrock AgentCore (R278), customer-operated ephemeral VMs
I5 Physical / air-gapped	Dedicated hardware or air-gapped network	Sovereign-cloud / classified workloads

The workspace class binds a required minimum isolation tier (Explore may accept I1; Change requires at least I2; Production Diagnostic requires at least I3; Remediation requires at least I3 with a policy-approved actuation gateway).

J.3. Workspace classes

- **Explore**: read-only source and documentation; restricted egress; no repository writes; short lifetime; minimum I1.
- **Change**: branch-scoped repository write; build and test access; pull-request creation; no production credentials; minimum I2.
- **CI verification**: immutable revision; clean environment; artifact-signing identity; one job per environment; minimum I2.
- **Production diagnostic**: read-only, time-bounded access to approved telemetry and runbooks;

stronger approval, logging, and redaction; minimum I3.

- **Remediation**: exceptional, service-specific, policy-bound actions with blast-radius limits, staged execution, explicit rollback, and elevated approval; minimum I3 plus approved actuation gateway.

J.4. Lifecycle and controls

- Admission: authenticate sponsor and workload, authorize repository and tools, classify risk, resolve budgets, and pin image and configuration digests.
- Provision: create a fresh VM or sandbox for stronger isolation where required; run as non-root; drop capabilities; enforce quotas and a maximum lifetime.
- Context: mount least-privilege data; label provenance and sensitivity; prevent untrusted repository content from redefining platform policy.
- Secrets: issue just-in-time, audience-bound credentials; never bake them into images, prebuilds, logs, or caches; revoke at teardown.
- Network: deny by default; allow named destinations and protocols; proxy outbound tool traffic through governed gateways; log policy decisions.
- Execution: capture commands, tool calls, file mutations, resource use, and model/tool versions; redact sensitive values before storage.
- Output: sign build artifacts and attest provenance; publish only from verified revisions; quarantine unexpected binaries or network behavior.
- Teardown: revoke credentials first, export approved evidence, destroy compute, expire temporary branches and caches, and verify deletion.

J.5. Per-workspace cost caps and budget enforcement

Every workspace class carries a **maximum cost budget** per task, enforced by the broker. The budget covers compute minutes, model spend routed through the workspace's task identity, storage of evidence and artifacts, and cross-region egress. Behavior on exhaustion is explicit per class:

- **Explore, Change, CI verification**: task pauses, decision packet raised to the sponsor requesting budget extension or task abort; default abort after 15 minutes with no response.
- **Production diagnostic**: hard cap; task terminates and evidence is preserved; no auto-extension.
- **Remediation**: hard cap plus paging to on-call; the actuation gateway refuses further calls until an accountable human authorizes extension.

Budgets are recorded on the decision packet and rolled up per team, per capability, and per residency zone for FinOps reporting.

J.6. Break-glass procedure

When the broker or policy plane is degraded, or an incident requires work that cannot wait for the

full admission and evidence flow, a documented break-glass path applies:

- **Author**: any engineer with the on-call role for the affected service.
- **Approver**: a second, named engineer from the same on-call roster who did not author the change.
- **Workspace**: a pre-provisioned break-glass workspace class (minimum I3, tighter egress limits, mandatory session recording, no model-router discretion — a pinned model with full indemnification is used).
- **Evidence**: minimum decision packet (bound revisions, author, approver, incident reference, tests run) written directly to the evidence store; the full packet is reconciled within 24 hours.

Break-glass usage is counted separately in the scorecard, reviewed weekly by the Autonomy Council, and any capability that requires break-glass more than three times per quarter is a candidate for demotion or re-scoping.

J.7. Platform SLOs and FinOps

Measure median and tail startup time, task success by workspace class, policy-denial quality, environment drift, secret exposure events, teardown completion, cache hit rate, compute minutes per accepted change, cost per accepted change (see Appendix B), and idle waste. Warm pools and prebuilds improve latency but must preserve tenant separation and must never contain user secrets. GitHub Codespaces similarly separates prebuild-time secrets from user secrets and treats development-container configuration as executable code (R40–R42).

Data residency: every workspace class declares its residency zone (US, EU, UK, JP, IN, sovereign, customer-attested). The broker refuses to place a task whose declared inputs cross the workspace class's residency zone. Cross-zone tasks decompose into per-zone subtasks whose results are combined by a policy-approved reducer.

Appendix K: From specification to production: the end-to-end work model

K.1. Canonical objects and relationships

- Signal: an atomic piece of customer or operational evidence — support ticket, interview excerpt, call recording, session replay, verbatim, funnel measurement. Carries source system and identifier, date, tenant and segment, consent scope, retention class, and references to the derived representations built from it.
- Opportunity: a clustered, sized problem statement linked to the signals it rests on. Carries a named owner, sample size and segment coverage, a validation state (hypothesis, evidenced, validated, invalidated), the outcome it would serve, and its disposition history.
- Outcome: the customer or business result and owner.
- Specification: problem, scope, constraints, non-goals, acceptance criteria, risk assumptions, and decision history, linked to the opportunity it derives from.
- Work item: a bounded unit of accountable work linked to the specification; a human remains owner even when an agent is delegated.
- Execution task: a time-bounded agent run with workspace, identity, budget, and correlation ID.
- Change set: repository and immutable revisions plus generated provenance.
- Decision packet: review findings, tests, policies, contracts, approvals, and gaps.
- Release: artifact identity, environment, rollout policy, health criteria, and rollback path.
- Operational event: alert, incident, rollback, customer report, or SLO change linked to the release and work lineage.
- Learning: validated improvement to policy, context, test, runbook, or platform capability — and the measured outcome written back against the originating opportunity, so the loop closes at the signal rather than at the platform.

K.2. State-transition rules

An opportunity does not enter delivery commitment without a named owner and a validation state; committing to a hypothesis is legitimate, committing without knowing it is a hypothesis is not. An invalidated opportunity retains its evidence so the next proposal of the same idea can see what happened. A specification entering delivery with no linked signal is flagged at the entry gate — the upstream analogue of a change set arriving without tests. An agent may propose decomposition, but fan-out beyond a configured threshold requires preview and approval. “In progress” requires a live execution task or named human. “Ready for review” requires an immutable change set and minimum decision packet. “Ready to release” requires repository policy satisfaction and artifact identity. “Done” derives from the configured release or acceptance event; it is not asserted by prose. Reopened work preserves the prior evidence and records the reason.

K.3. Integration reliability

Prefer events to polling. Sign webhook payloads, store event IDs, process idempotently, preserve ordering keys per object, and retry with bounded backoff. Every write carries actor, reason, correlation ID, and expected version. A reconciliation job compares source-of-truth objects and repairs missed events without replaying side effects. Rate-limit pressure should degrade to delayed synchronization rather than silent data loss. [R48–R54]

K.4. Phased adoption

- Phase 0: signal and opportunity objects registered, with traceability reported but not enforced.
- Phase 1: read-only context retrieval and evidence links.
- Phase 2: suggested field updates requiring human confirmation.
- Phase 3: bounded automatic transitions driven by authoritative CI/CD events.
- Phase 4: agent delegation and decomposition with visible sessions, budgets, and cancellation.
- Phase 5: closed-loop learning from delivery and operational outcomes.

Appendix L: Enterprise capabilities as agent tools: the MCP catalog

L.1. Inventory principle

MCP is a protocol boundary for exposing tools, resources, and prompts to an agent host; it is not, by itself, an enterprise control plane. Inventory capabilities by business domain and risk, then decide whether the appropriate integration is an official remote MCP server, an internally governed MCP adapter, or an existing API, CLI, or event stream. Prefer vendor-supported surfaces, least-privilege user authorization, and gateway policy. Do not wrap every API merely to claim protocol coverage.

L.2. Confirmed official MCP surfaces as of September 4, 2026

- GitHub MCP server: repository and code access, issues, pull requests, workflows, and security-related tools. Access inherits GitHub permissions and enterprise policy; OAuth or carefully scoped tokens should be used. [R70–R71]
- Atlassian Rovo MCP server: Jira and Confluence search and actions through OAuth 2.1, with user permissions respected and tool groups spanning read, write, search, delete, and administrative capabilities. Administrative controls and documented rate or compliance limitations still apply. [R72–R75]
- Azure DevOps MCP server: official local and remote surfaces for work items, repositories, pull requests, builds, test plans, and documentation. The remote service uses Microsoft Entra authentication and is suited to governed agent mode. [R54]
- Atlassian’s out-of-the-box third-party catalog documents vendor-provided MCP connections for Figma, Canva, Box, Amplitude, HubSpot, Intercom, Gamma, and Replit, with availability and admin enablement varying by product and release status. Treat the catalog as discovery, then validate each vendor server, scopes, data path, and contract before enterprise use. [R76]

L.3. Capability domains to inventory

- Source and delivery: repositories, code search, pull requests, builds, artifacts, deployments, feature flags, and rollback.
- Work and knowledge: specifications, work items, decisions, documentation, comments, ownership, and portfolio data.
- Design and product: design files, component libraries, research, analytics, experimentation, and customer feedback. The discovery surfaces belong here — roadmap and feedback tools (R104), feedback analysis (R312–R314), session replay (R315), support systems, call recording, and research repositories. This domain carries raw customer voice, so registry entries record consent scope alongside data classification and the servers stay behind the gateway even when the vendor offers a direct integration.
- Quality and security: test management, contract registries, vulnerabilities, dependencies,

secrets, policies, and attestations.

- Operations: logs, traces, metrics, incidents, on-call, service catalog, change history, runbooks, and status communication.
- Business systems: CRM, support, finance, procurement, identity, learning, and HR—normally higher sensitivity and narrower permitted actions.

L.4. Required registry fields

Record owner, vendor and server identity, transport and endpoint, environments, supported protocol/spec version, tools/resources/prompts, read/write/delete classification, authentication method, delegated-user versus workload identity, requested scopes, data classifications, consent scope where the surface carries customer voice, residency, retention, rate limits, audit coverage, approval requirements, destructive-action behavior, dependency health, change history, evaluation results, and kill switch. The MCP roadmap itself notes that workload identity, delegation chains, audit, and policy remain active enterprise work; do not assume human-browser OAuth solves autonomous service execution. [R77–R79]

Appendix M: Agent-to-agent collaboration: boundaries, protocols, and trust


M.1. Boundary

Use MCP when an agent host needs tools, resources, or prompts from a capability server. Use A2A when an independent agent needs to discover and collaborate with another agent whose internal reasoning, tools, and execution environment remain opaque. They are complementary: an A2A agent may use MCP internally, and the caller should not inherit the callee's tool credentials. [R79–R81]

M.2. Core A2A components

- Agent Card: discoverable identity, endpoint, capabilities, skills, security schemes, and supported protocol features. Enterprise discovery should come from a trusted registry, not arbitrary network crawling.
- Message: a conversational turn composed of typed parts. Messages carry requests, clarifications, and status but are not the durable work product.
- Task: the stateful unit of work with a lifecycle. The caller should handle **submitted**, **working**, **input-required**, **completed**, **failed**, **canceled**, and **rejected** outcomes without inventing completion. The task state machine is shown below.
- Artifact: the result produced by a task, composed of parts and potentially updated over time. Artifacts should retain provenance and classification.
- Context: a grouping for related tasks and messages. Context boundaries should align with authorized business scope and retention.
- Streaming and push notification: mechanisms for long-running work. Callback endpoints require authentication, replay protection, subscription lifecycle, and tenant-safe routing.
- Extensions: negotiated additions to the base protocol. Unsupported extensions must fail safely and cannot weaken enterprise policy.

M.3. A2A task state diagram



A2A task lifecycle. Terminal states (completed, failed, canceled, rejected) are the only correct signals to the caller that work has ended; a working task with no recent state change is not the same thing as completed and must not be treated as such.

M.4. Enterprise choreography

A coordinator resolves an agent from the enterprise registry, validates its Agent Card and policy posture, creates a task with a correlation ID and bounded objective, then observes state transitions. Input-required returns a decision request to the human or originating workflow. Completed returns signed artifacts and evidence; failed or rejected returns a reason without exposing internal secrets. Cancellation propagates explicitly. Every hop records caller, callee, delegated authority, purpose, data classification, and cost.

M.5. A2A authentication and audit

A2A hops need auth semantics that survive the confused-deputy attack MCP's authorization spec warns against. Three architectural choices carry most of the weight.

Token exchange between hops, not token passthrough. The coordinator holds the delegated authority the user granted. When a specialist agent needs to act on the same delegation, the coordinator performs a token exchange (RFC 8693) to mint a short-lived, audience-bound token scoped to that specialist's capability set. The specialist never sees the coordinator's credentials; the coordinator never hands out its full authority.

Workload identity per specialist. Every specialist runs under a distinct SPIFFE identity, verified via mTLS at the coordinator boundary. Compromise of one specialist does not grant access to the coordinator's other specialists — a property that ordinary API-key sharing across a specialist pool would lose.

Per-hop audit event. The coordinator emits an audit record for every A2A hop: caller identity, target identity, delegated principal, task class, evidence pointer, timestamp. The record threads via a correlation ID that ties the task back to its originating decision packet. A specialist that hops to another specialist adds a link to the same correlation ID.

From the audit surface a security reviewer can reconstruct the full path a piece of authority took —

from human user through the coordinator, through the specialist chain, to the tool call, to the data touched — without any single point in that path holding more authority than it needs.

The pattern composes with, rather than replaces, other mechanisms. Pure OAuth without a coordinator-held delegation leaves the specialists holding user tokens; pure mTLS gives you identity without a delegation model. Both alone are insufficient.


M.6. Guardrails

Do not create an unrestricted agent mesh. Require registered identities, authenticated channels, least-privilege task scopes, schemas for high-value artifacts, time and spend budgets, loop detection, rate limits, policy checks at each trust boundary, and human escalation for material decisions. Agent Cards are claims to verify, not trust anchors by themselves. Treat cross-agent content as untrusted input and keep tool credentials local to the executing agent.

Appendix N: From code to production: verification, deployment, and operations

N.1. Evidence ladder

The evidence ladder is a sequence of ten stages. Each stage produces machine-readable evidence that accumulates on the change; promotion to the next stage requires the current stage to have passed against policy. The Learning stage feeds back into Intent for the next change in the same class, closing the loop between operations and development.


Intent
Acceptance criteria
testable, risk-linked
Static
Types · deps · secrets
licenses · policies
Unit & property
Fast isolated tests
independent oracles
Contract
Consumer/provider
compatibility
Integration
Real deps
known state · teardown
next change in class
End-to-end
Critical journeys
isolated browser
Resilience & security
Fault injection · authz
supply chain · recovery
Progressive delivery
Canary or blue/green
SLO-gated
Production verification
Traces · metrics · logs
correlated to deploy
Learning
Blameless RCA
tests · runbooks · policy

Evidence ladder. Each stage emits machine-readable evidence for the next stage's promotion decision. The dashed green feedback loop shows how production learning updates the acceptance criteria and test suites of the next change in the same class.

N.1.1. Intent checks

Acceptance criteria are specific, testable, linked to risks, and separated from implementation assumptions.

N.1.2. Static checks

Formatting, types, dependency policy, secrets, licenses, security rules, and architecture constraints run cheaply and deterministically.

N.1.3. Unit and property checks

Fast isolated tests exercise invariants; generated cases are evaluated against independent properties rather than copied implementation logic.

N.1.4. Contract checks

Consumers publish executable expectations and providers verify compatibility before deployment. A broker can answer whether a version combination is deployable. [R57–R58]

N.1.5. Integration checks

Short-lived real dependencies start in known state; test data is synthetic or governed; teardown is verified. [R61]

N.1.6. End-to-end checks

Critical journeys run in isolated browser contexts with controlled authentication state and evidence capture. Stored auth state is treated as secret. [R59–R60]

N.1.7. Resilience and security checks

Failure injection, authorization boundaries, supply-chain attestations, migration rehearsal, and recovery paths match the change risk.

N.1.8. Progressive delivery

Canary or blue-green stages evaluate service and business health; rollout pauses or rolls back when policy thresholds fail. [R62–R65]

N.1.9. Production verification

Traces, metrics, logs, and deployment annotations share correlation identifiers so the platform can compare expected and observed behavior. [R55–R56]

N.1.10. Learning

Incidents and rollbacks produce factual, blameless analysis and owned corrective actions that update tests, policy, runbooks, context, and platform capabilities. [R66–R69]

N.2. Operational autonomy tiers

Operations uses the same five-tier autonomy ladder defined in the glossary and applied by Appendix I to review. The table below expands each tier along three axes — the agent's contribution, the human role that remains, and the controls that must be in place before a capability may operate at that tier. The same ladder governs review and operational remediation; the platform enforces one ladder, not several.

Tier	Agent contribution	Human role	Required controls
T0 Observe	Translate queries, summarize telemetry, retrieve runbooks, correlate evidence	Investigates and performs every action	Read-only access, provenance and query limits
T1 Recommend	Run iterative queries, rank hypotheses, propose remediation with expected effect and rollback	Validates conclusion, chooses and executes the response	Bounded tools, evidence trace, explicit inconclusive state
T2 Apply reversible	Draft CVE fixes, config changes, rollout plans, runbooks; run allowlisted diagnostics; apply reversible mitigations with automatic verification and rollback	Reviews evidence, authorises promotion from a reversible surface to production	Reproducible tests, ownership, cohort and rollback plan; independent verification of the reversible action
T3 Apply bounded	Execute a specific validated rollback, traffic shift, or capacity action within a pre-approved class	Approves the class definition; the specific action is applied under audit	Independent actuation gateway, preflight checks, post-action verification, synchronous audit path

Tier	Agent contribution	Human role	Required controls
T4 Autonomous within class	Handle a proven low-risk incident or maintenance pattern end to end	Owns the class definition, receives exceptions, can stop the fleet	Narrow action catalog, dynamic downgrade, kill switch, continuous evaluation, periodic Autonomy Council re-authorization

Supporting evidence and boundary

Google SRE describes a maturity path from human-driven work through assisted investigation, human-approved actuation, and bounded high autonomy. It also separates the reasoning agent from an actuation control plane that performs dry runs, validates justification, can downgrade authority, verifies results, and exposes emergency stop controls (R23). This supports the operational direction but does not by itself determine the appropriate authority boundary for a specific enterprise; each organization must set its own class definitions and promotion criteria.

Terse mapping to operational behaviour

For quick reference, the tiers map to operational behaviour as follows:

Tier	Name	Operational behaviour
T0	**Observe**	Collect and correlate evidence; explain symptoms, changes, hypotheses, and uncertainty; no action.
T1	**Recommend**	Propose diagnostic queries or remediation with expected effect and rollback; a human executes.
T2	**Apply reversible**	Run allowlisted read-only diagnostics, or perform pre-approved reversible mitigations (feature-flag flip, canary pause, cache invalidation) with automatic verification and rollback.
T3	**Apply bounded**	Coordinate incident response: maintain timeline, route decisions, apply pre-approved runbook actions on named classes of alert, draft communications; accountable humans retain command; actions are audited synchronously.
T4	**Autonomous within class**	Narrow, repeatedly evaluated scenarios (a specific class of memory pressure, a known-good failover pattern) with explicit SLOs, kill switches, and post-action review by the Autonomy Council.

Class definitions for T3 and T4 are owned by the Autonomy Council and reviewed on the cadence defined in the trust and governance chapter. A capability starts at T0 and is promoted only after evaluation evidence meets the tier's promotion criteria.

Operational agents that run on schedule or continuous triggers (cost anomaly, alert quality, capacity right-sizing, runbook synthesis, etc.) are governed as ambient agents rather than as one-off tools — their constitutions, signal-to-noise budgets, sunset criteria, and portfolio management are specified

in the ambient-agents chapter, with implementable patterns in Appendix R.


N.3. Scorecard

Measure lead time to trustworthy evidence, change lead time, deployment frequency, failed-deployment recovery time, change fail rate, deployment rework rate, escaped defects, flaky-test rate, contract incompatibilities caught before release, rollback effectiveness, incident detection and mitigation time, evidence cost per accepted change, and percentage of operational learning converted into owned work. DORA's current program treats AI-assisted software delivery as a system-performance question and has evolved its delivery measures as the research has matured. [R67–R69]

Appendix O: Who decides what: executive, product, engineering, security, and platform responsibilities

O.1. For Vice Presidents

The strategic decision is whether to fund an enterprise execution system or tolerate fragmented assistants. The platform case rests on cycle time, reliable change, reusable controls, and lower organizational latency. Sponsor a small number of end-to-end product flows, insist on outcome and reliability measures, and make identity, isolation, evidence, and interoperability shared capabilities. Avoid productivity claims based on generated code or seats purchased. Decide the risk appetite and the conditions under which autonomy can increase.



Shared platform, distinct stakeholder value. Executives, product leaders, principal engineers, and engineers consume the same evidence through different decision lenses.

O.2. For Product leaders

Specifications become executable inputs. Product should strengthen problem framing, constraints, acceptance criteria, non-goals, and decision history while resisting the temptation to over-specify implementation. The new feedback advantage is faster exploration with traceable evidence. Decide which customer and business signals may drive prioritization, what must remain a human judgment, and how product outcomes are linked to work and releases.

Four decisions sit with this group specifically. Whether specifications carry their evidence — the

tickets, calls, and sample size behind them — as a condition of entering delivery. Whether the autonomy ladder applies to discovery agents at all, and where it stops. What the organisation's own idea hit rate is, given that it almost certainly does not measure it today. And whether customer-contact hours are protected as agents absorb the reading. the requirements and discovery chapter develops each.

O.3. For Principal and Staff engineers

Architecture increasingly appears as machine-consumable constraints, examples, contracts, and decision records. Principals should define trust boundaries, paved-road interfaces, evaluation suites, service invariants, and migration patterns; review whether agent output preserves system qualities that local tests cannot see; and lead learning across repositories. Decide where standardization reduces cognitive load and where domain autonomy remains essential.

O.4. For Engineering Managers

The management unit shifts from task assignment toward flow, decisions, capability, and exception handling. Managers should protect review quality, calibrate autonomy by team and change class, monitor cognitive load and agent-induced work, and ensure that humans remain owners even when agents are delegated. Decide staffing for platform adoption, evaluation, and operational learning—not merely tool rollout—and watch for hidden work transferred into verification.

O.5. For Engineers

The craft moves toward precise intent, context selection, decomposition, orchestration, verification, and accountable judgment. Engineers should treat agent output as untrusted until supported by evidence; work inside governed environments; preserve small reversible changes; record uncertainty; and improve the tests, contracts, runbooks, and context that future agents will use. Escalating a decision is a successful outcome when uncertainty exceeds authority.

O.6. Shared 90-day decisions

- Select two or three representative value streams and baseline flow, review, reliability, and cost measures.
- Define workspace classes, task identities, and minimum evidence packets.
- Publish the first MCP capability registry and distinguish confirmed vendor MCP servers from API/CLI/event integrations.
- Pilot AI review in advisory mode against a held-out defect corpus before enabling enforcement.
- Link one work-system flow from specification through immutable change, verification, release, and operational outcome.
- Define an autonomy council or equivalent review mechanism with Product, Engineering, Security, Reliability, and Compliance representation.
- Report what evidence changed a decision—not how many agent tasks ran.

Appendix P: Sources and further reading (R1–R407)

This appendix is the single authoritative list of numeric references used throughout the book. Every in-body citation of the form `[Rn]` resolves here. Entries R1–R81 were accessed September 4, 2026; R82–R385 were accessed September 5, 2026. Where a URL has been marked `[verify URL before publication]` or `[URL pending verification]`, the underlying source is believed to exist but the deep link needs a final editorial pass before print. See also Appendix F for a short note on how the reference system is organized and what weight to place on each class of evidence.

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R284 and beyond — ambient agents, constitution, and supporting sources

The entries below were added when the ambient-agents chapter and Appendix R were introduced, and when Appendix Q.18 was added. Product URLs point to canonical vendor documentation or product pages; foundational papers point to arXiv or the original publisher. [verify URL before publication] flags URLs whose exact slug should be confirmed before external publication.

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R392 Datadog. State of DevSecOps 2025. Measured from customer CloudTrail logs: 58% of organizations using AWS with GitHub Actions still authenticate pipelines with long-lived IAM-user credentials (down from 63% in 2024) while 63% use OIDC (up from 58%). Measures credential longevity rather than credential scope, over one vendor's customer base. https://www.datadoghq.com/state-of-devsecops-2025/

R393 Wang, Z., Gao, Y., Wang, Y., Liu, S., Sun, H., Cheng, H., Shi, G., Du, H. and Li, X. MCPTox: A Benchmark for Tool Poisoning Attack on Real-World MCP Servers. arXiv:2508.14925. Instructions embedded in tool **metadata** rather than tool output, across 45 live MCP servers, 353 authentic tools, 1,312 test cases and 20 agents: attack success up to 72.8% (o1-mini), with the highest refusal rate under 3%. The empirical basis for treating a tool or skill description as executable input. https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14925

R394 Model Context Protocol. Specification 2025-06-18 — Server Features: Tools. "Clients MUST

consider tool annotations to be untrusted unless they come from trusted servers." The caveat is scoped to annotations; the `description` field carries no equivalent statement. https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/server/tools

R395 Zhou, Y., Shu, W., Su, Y., Du, W., Fang, Y. and Lin, X. A Comprehensive Survey on Agent Skills: Taxonomy, Techniques, and Applications. arXiv:2605.07358. Defines a skill as "reusable procedural artifacts that coordinate tools, memory, and runtime context under task-specific constraints"; organises the field by a four-stage lifecycle (representation, acquisition, retrieval, evolution) and classifies skills by backing resource as text-backed, code-backed or hybrid. Its platform table reports public marketplaces at 700k+, 300k+, 90k+, 80k+ and 40k+ entries. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.07358

R396 Liu, T. Contractual Skills: A GovernSpec Design Framework for Enterprise AI Agents. arXiv:2605.22634. Packages a capability with its goals, input boundaries, permissions, human approval points, evidence requirements, output contracts, quality criteria, verification steps and handoff rules. Reports mean quality rising from 4.692 to 4.914 and critical-error rate falling from 0.083 to 0.013 on public skills benchmarks, and is explicit that contractual skills work as a governance layer making intent and acceptance criteria explicit rather than as a standalone safety mechanism. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.22634

R397 SkillRet: A Large-Scale Benchmark for Skill Retrieval in LLM Agents. arXiv:2605.05726. Built on 16,129 public agent skills. Off-the-shelf retrievers struggle on realistic large-scale libraries; task-specific fine-tuning improves NDCG@10 by 12.9 points over the strongest prior skill retriever and 16.2 over the strongest off-the-shelf one, and the authors state that skill retrieval "remains far from solved." https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.05726

R398 Anthropic. Claude Code — Create plugins, and Plugin evals. The component list a plugin may carry: skills, commands, agents, hooks, MCP servers, LSP servers, background monitors, executables on PATH, and default settings. Also documents distribution through curated and community marketplaces with commit-SHA pinning, and `claude plugin eval`, which runs a prompt set repeatedly with and without the plugin loaded to measure what it contributes. https://code.claude.com/docs/en/plugins https://code.claude.com/docs/en/plugin-evals

R399 VoltAgent. awesome-agent-skills. A community collection of 1,497+ agent skills drawn from vendor and individual publishers — among them Stripe, Supabase, HashiCorp, Cloudflare, Sentry, Trail of Bits, Microsoft, Figma, Redis, NVIDIA and Google Cloud — advertising compatibility across Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, OpenCode and Windsurf. Evidence of cross-tool portability in practice rather than a quality ranking. https://github.com/VoltAgent/awesome-agent-skills

R400 enterprise-agent-skills. A framework-agnostic library of 34 engineering skills across six domains — engineering, backend, database, security, frontend, production — spanning requirements through architecture, API and service design, data access, OWASP review, secrets management, accessibility, containers, CI/CD, observability and deployment. Documents a deliberate choice not to publish framework-specific variants, on the reasoning that separate skills for NestJS, React or Next.js duplicate the same guidance and drift apart. https://github.com/mehedi0-007/enterprise-agent-skills

R401 Agentic AI for Software: thoughts from the Software Engineering community. arXiv:2508.17343. Names the field’s open problems rather than its results: that the core difficulty is

deciphering and clarifying developer intent; that trust becomes the central question as automation increases, requiring AI-based verification and validation of AI-generated code; that software engineering is much more than programming, so architecture exploration and requirements enforcement matter more than prompt-based generation; and that the volume of generated code entering codebases is itself an emerging problem. https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.17343

R402 Yao, S., Zhao, J., Yu, D., Du, N., Shafran, I., Narasimhan, K. and Cao, Y. ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models. arXiv:2210.03629, 2022. Introduces the interleaving of reasoning traces and task-specific actions — "allowing for greater synergy between the two," where reasoning updates the plan and actions gather information the model does not hold. The reference for the reason–act loop, and for the interpretability argument that a trace is itself evidence. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.03629

R403 Shinn, N., Cassano, F., Berman, E., Gopinath, A., Narasimhan, K. and Yao, S. Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learning. arXiv:2303.11366. Turns a failure signal into natural-language guidance held in episodic memory rather than into weight updates, reporting 91% pass@1 on HumanEval against 80% for the model without it. The reference for the reflexive shape — and for its limit, since the evaluator may be the model itself. https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11366

R404 Anthropic. Building Effective AI Agents. Draws the sorting question this document adopts: a workflow orchestrates models and tools "through predefined code paths" while an agent has the model "dynamically direct their own processes and tool usage." Names prompt chaining, routing, parallelisation, orchestrator-workers and evaluator-optimiser as composable patterns, and advises finding "the simplest solution possible," which "might mean not building agentic systems at all." https://www.anthropic.com/research/building-effective-agents

R405 GenAI Works. "AI Agent Design Patterns" (practitioner infographic). The source of the grouping this document uses for the five agent shapes — single-shot, iterative ReAct, planner–executor, reflexive, and verifier-gated — together with its own per-pattern notes on fit, cost and failure. Cited for the taxonomy and its sequence, not as evidence for any claim: the individual patterns are sourced to their primary papers at R402 and R403, and the tier ceilings this document attaches to them are its own. https://genai.works/ [verify URL before publication]

R406 Cui, Z., Demirer, M., Jaffe, S., Musolff, L., Peng, S. and Salz, T. The Effects of Generative AI on High-Skilled Work: Evidence from Three Field Experiments with Software Developers. SSRN 4945566, 2025. Three randomised controlled trials at Microsoft, Accenture and an anonymous Fortune 100 company, 4,867 developers, reporting a 26% increase in completed tasks with an AI coding assistant and larger gains for less experienced developers. The cleanest causal evidence available on assistance. It does not test an orchestration architecture, and completed tasks are not verified outcomes. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4945566

R407 Stack Overflow. Developer Survey 2025, AI section. Self-reported practitioner experience at scale: 69% of agent users report higher productivity, and 45% of 31,476 respondents report that debugging AI-generated code takes more time. Survey self-report, not measurement — the debugging figure records perceived friction rather than an observed increase. https://survey.stackoverflow.co/2025/ [verify URL before publication]

P.1. Reading order

Begin with DORA (R1, R2, R3, R68, R69) for the organizational-system argument; MCP architecture and authorization (R9, R10, R113) and the A2A specification (R29, R30, R80, R81, R118) for cross-agent interoperability; NIST and OWASP (R4, R5, R6, R255, R256) for lifecycle risk and agentic threats; OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google SRE (R7, R8, R11, R23, R66, R67, R257, R258) for current agent patterns and operations; Datadog and Google Cloud Deploy (R20, R21, R65, R137) for release and telemetry practice; Testcontainers, Pact, and Playwright (R25, R26, R27, R28, R57–R61, R125–R127) for testing; and the agent-security cluster (R255–R278) for the control-plane view of sandboxing, identity, mediation, hooks, runtime inspection, and evidence.

Appendix Q: The AI developer platform landscape: products, platforms, and build-vs-buy choices

Q.1. Q.1 How to read the landscape

This appendix maps current products and projects to the engineering operating system proposed in the thesis. Each category answers a practical question: what role can this capability play between intent and production, what integration boundary does it expose, and what must the enterprise still govern? Product inclusion is illustrative, not exhaustive or an endorsement. Products that share a category are not necessarily interchangeable.

Q.1.1. Q.1.1 Scope and last verified date

The landscape reflects official product, company, protocol and project documentation available on September 5, 2026. Availability, packaging and status can change quickly. The cited page is the basis for each concise capability statement; procurement still requires a current vendor confirmation for region, plan, price, service level, certification and contract terms.

Q.2. Q.2 Lifecycle and capability map

Lifecycle stage	Primary product categories	Evidence or control expected
Intent and specification	Work management, product management, knowledge systems	Outcome, owner, constraints, acceptance criteria, decision history and source provenance
Planning and orchestration	Engineering agents, workflow engines, A2A and work systems	Bounded task, sponsor, budget, dependencies, delegated authority and cancellation
Isolated execution	Cloud development environments, sandboxes, ephemeral jobs	Identity, image, repository revision, secrets, network policy, commands, artifacts and teardown
Coding	AI assistants, agentic IDEs and asynchronous agents	Diff, context sources, tool calls, tests run, unresolved questions and model or tool versions
Review security and testing	AI review, AppSec, supply chain and test platforms	Findings with evidence, policy result, contract compatibility, provenance and human disposition
Delivery	CI CD, GitOps, feature management and progressive delivery	Signed artifact, environment approval, rollout stage, health criteria, exposure and rollback

Lifecycle stage	Primary product categories	Evidence or control expected
Operations and learning	Observability, AIOps, incident and evaluation platforms	Telemetry, incident timeline, action authority, outcome, corrective work and updated knowledge
Human decisions and governance	Portals, engineering intelligence, decision surfaces and gateways	Decision request, alternatives, evidence, accountable owner, approval, exception and audit trail

Q.2.1. Q.2.1 Selection caveats

- Product boundaries overlap. A source-control platform may also provide agents, CI, security and work management; a portal may expose scorecards, actions and MCP tools.
- Features move quickly and may differ by plan, region, deployment model or version. “Available” in documentation does not establish contractual enterprise availability.
- Integration depth varies. An API, webhook, IDE extension, MCP server and A2A endpoint create different identity, latency, audit and failure semantics.
- Enterprise controls must be verified in the target configuration. A protocol label does not establish least privilege, data residency, retention, audit or safe destructive actions.
- Architecture should preserve portable intent, source, tests, contracts, telemetry and evidence so a product can be replaced without losing the operating model.

Q.3. Q.3 AI coding assistants agentic IDEs and coding agents

Industry term: AI coding assistant and agentic IDE.

Role in the thesis: Coding and local orchestration. These products shorten the edit explain and test loop. They belong inside the governed workspace and evidence model; they do not define merge authority or production policy.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
GitHub Copilot — GitHub [R82]	IDE and CLI assistance, repository-aware chat, agent features, and GitHub workflow integration.	IDE, CLI, GitHub app, MCP client/host features. Current product; feature availability varies by plan.	Verify model and data controls, repository policy, audit coverage, seat plus premium-request consumption, and GitHub coupling.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
GitLab Duo Agent Platform — GitLab [R83]	Agentic chat and flows integrated with GitLab projects, merge requests, CI/CD, and security context.	GitLab UI, IDE, REST and runner-based flows. Several capabilities have feature-specific GA or beta status.	Evaluate composite identity, runner isolation, self-managed model options, credits, and dependence on GitLab objects.
Cursor — Anysphere [R84]	Agentic editor with cloud agents that edit and test code asynchronously in isolated remote environments.	Desktop IDE, GitHub app, remote agents, API in beta where documented.	Review privacy mode, code retention, internet egress, repository permissions, VM isolation, and usage pricing.
JetBrains AI Assistant — JetBrains [R85]	AI assistance embedded across JetBrains IDEs for code generation, explanation, refactoring, and development tasks.	IDE plugins and JetBrains AI service.	Check supported IDE and language coverage, model routing, data handling, enterprise administration, and license portability.
Amazon Q Developer — AWS [R86]	IDE and command-line assistance with AWS-aware development and code review capabilities.	IDE, CLI, AWS services and Git provider integrations; some features carry preview notices.	Track AWS identity, telemetry and content policy, service-region support, and the announced IDE-plugin support timeline.
Gemini Code Assist — Google Cloud [R87]	Coding assistance and agentic development in supported IDEs with Google Cloud context.	IDE extensions, cloud console and enterprise administration.	Validate data governance, supported regions, repository context boundaries, quotas, and Google Cloud affinity.
Claude Code — Anthropic [R163]	Terminal-based coding agent with IDE integrations, hooks, GitHub Actions, MCP connectivity and enterprise administration documented by Anthropic. Claude Code is distinct from the Claude workplace application.	CLI, IDE integrations, GitHub Actions and MCP; local execution by default with officially documented web and remote surfaces where available.	Verify permissions, command approval, managed settings, network access, provider and retention policy, audit and separation between local and remote execution.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Windsurf — Cognition	Agentic IDE (formerly Codeium's Windsurf editor) now under Cognition following the 2024–2025 acquisition; supports Cascade-style multi-file edits and agentic flows.	Desktop IDE with provider-hosted models and enterprise plans.	Reverify current ownership, model provider list, code retention, deployment options and overlap with Cognition Devin.
Sourcegraph Cody and Amp — Sourcegraph	Cody provides codebase-aware chat and edits across large monorepos using Sourcegraph's code graph; Amp is Sourcegraph's autonomous coding agent built on the same context service.	IDE plugins, CLI, code-graph backend and enterprise self-hosted or cloud deployment.	Assess index scale, permission fidelity, model choice, self-hosted operations, data handling and licensing per developer.
Cline — open-source project	Open-source agentic coding extension running inside VS Code with tool use, browser control and MCP support, using the user's model credentials.	VS Code extension, MCP client, BYO model provider keys. Open source/community.	Confirm credential custody, tool allowlists, sandbox for shell/browser actions, and absence of vendor telemetry when self-managed.
Aider — open-source project	Terminal-based pair-programming assistant that edits repository files and creates git commits using user-configured models.	CLI, git integration, BYO model provider. Open source.	Model routing, secret handling, commit authorship and review workflow are the operator's responsibility.
Continue — Continue and open-source project	Open-source IDE assistant framework with configurable providers, custom rules and MCP support; commercial hub for shared configurations.	VS Code and JetBrains extensions, config hub, BYO models. Open source with hosted options.	Governance of shared configurations, provider credentials, telemetry opt-out and enterprise administration require review.
Zed AI — Zed Industries	AI assistance built into the Zed editor including inline edits, chat and agentic panels wired to configurable providers.	Native desktop editor with hosted or BYO model providers.	Editor maturity, provider terms, team plans, data handling and platform coverage should be evaluated.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Tabnine — Tabnine	AI coding assistant with hosted, private and air-gapped deployment options and enterprise administration for completion, chat and agentic actions.	IDE plugins, self-hosted and SaaS deployments, enterprise admin.	Model provenance, private model options, code exposure boundary, audit and support for regulated environments are the primary evaluation dimensions.
Augment Code — Augment	Context engine and agentic assistant marketed for large enterprise codebases with retrieval-focused reasoning across repositories, docs and tickets.	IDE plugins, code-graph backend, enterprise SaaS.	Verify indexing scope, permission preservation, retention, model provider list, admin controls and pricing per developer.

Q.3.1. Q.3.1 Autonomous and asynchronous software engineering agents

Industry term: Autonomous software engineering agent.

Role in the thesis: Planning orchestration isolated execution and coding. These services accept a bounded engineering task, work in a remote environment, and return a change or evidence. Their useful enterprise unit is the attributable task with budget, environment, artifacts, and human sponsor.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
OpenAI Codex — OpenAI [R88]	Parallel cloud and local coding tasks that inspect repositories, edit files, run commands and tests, and produce reviewable changes.	CLI, IDE, desktop and cloud task surfaces; integration options vary by account and environment.	Evaluate environment configuration, repository permissions, network policy, retention, model usage, auditability, and human review.
Devin — Cognition [R89]	Remote software-engineering sessions with repositories, knowledge, playbooks, secrets, pull requests, APIs, service users and usage metrics.	Web app, Git providers, Jira/Linear/Slack/Teams origins and REST API. Enterprise endpoints document RBAC and audit access.	Examine dedicated deployment, service-user scope, secret handling, ACU budgets, session evidence, tenancy, and cancellation.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
GitHub Copilot coding agent — GitHub [R82]	Works on GitHub issues in a cloud environment and opens pull requests for human review.	GitHub issues, pull requests, Actions-backed execution and MCP configuration.	Protected-branch controls, Actions consumption, custom agent instructions, network access, repository policy, and evidence quality matter.
Google Jules — Google [R90]	Asynchronous coding agent for repository tasks with plans, code changes and reviewable results. Jules has been folded into the Gemini Code Assist and Antigravity family and is no longer positioned as a standalone peer product to Devin or Codex; treat the row as historical context for the capability rather than a current standalone SKU.	Web service and GitHub-connected workflow as documented; procurement now runs through Gemini Code Assist / Antigravity plans.	Confirm supported repositories, data use, quota, regional and enterprise controls, current packaging under the Gemini family and availability before procurement.
SWE-agent — open-source project [R91]	Research-led open-source agent that uses language models to resolve repository issues through a configurable runtime.	Python package, CLI, containers and source code. Open source/community .	Offers inspectability and portability but leaves hosting, identity, hardening, support, model governance and evaluation to the operator.

Q.3.2. Q.3.2 AI pull request review and code quality agents

Industry term: AI code review agent.

Role in the thesis: Review security testing and human decision. The category can reduce context assembly and routine defect detection. It should emit evidence and questions into normal branch protection, not replace accountable approval.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
GitHub Copilot code review — GitHub [R92]	Reviews pull requests, suggests fixes, uses repository instructions and can use configured MCP context.	GitHub pull request reviewer and precommit CLI review. Current feature; plan and policy conditions apply.	Validate findings, restrict MCP tools, preserve required reviewers, measure false positives, and account for premium requests and Actions minutes.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
GitLab Code Review Flow — GitLab [R93]	Agentic merge-request review with repository context and custom instructions, executed as a CI/CD job.	GitLab UI, REST API and runner. Official documentation marks the agentic flow generally available and records version history.	Runner trust, self-managed availability, credits, service identity, advisory limits, and separation from security review require review.
CodeRabbit — CodeRabbit [R94]	Automated pull-request review and conversational follow-up across supported source-control workflows.	Git provider app, pull-request comments and documented integrations.	Inspect repository scopes, data retention, custom instruction precedence, audit/export, pricing per developer or repository, and noisy-review controls.
Qodo Merge — Qodo [R95]	Pull-request analysis and suggestions with repository configuration and CI or provider integration.	GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket and CLI or CI surfaces documented by the vendor.	Confirm deployment and data options, permission scopes, policy enforcement limits, cost unit, and portability of learned rules.

Q.4. Q.4 Workplace AI platforms and enterprise work agents

Frontier-model and platform companies increasingly pair coding products with broader work surfaces. Claude Enterprise and Team support general knowledge work and connectors; ChatGPT Business and Enterprise provide shared workspaces, projects, apps and enterprise controls; Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Studio connect work context and agent building; Gemini for Google Workspace and Gemini Enterprise connect productivity and enterprise search; Atlassian Rovo works across Jira and Confluence. These are separate products from Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot and Gemini Code Assist even when they share models or vendors. [R164–R169]

The thesis implication is organizational. Developer platforms become one domain within a broader enterprise agent platform. Identity, context, policy, audit, cost allocation and durable decision packets may need to span product, engineering, support, sales, legal and operations without granting every agent the same tools or data.

Vendor family	Coding surfaces	Workplace and builder surfaces	Lifecycle implication
Anthropic [R163][R164]	Claude Code CLI, IDE, CI and MCP	Claude Team and Enterprise, projects and connectors	Shared model family; keep product identity, permissions and execution evidence separate.

Vendor family	Coding surfaces	Workplace and builder surfaces	Lifecycle implication
OpenAI [R165][R166]	Codex CLI, IDE, desktop and cloud tasks	ChatGPT Business and Enterprise, projects, apps and connectors	Connect intent and organizational context to bounded coding tasks without merging governance planes.
Microsoft and GitHub [R167][R168]	GitHub Copilot IDE, CLI, review and coding agent	Microsoft 365 Copilot, Power Platform and Copilot Studio	GitHub-native delivery and Microsoft work context can share identity while retaining explicit scopes.
Google [R169][R170]	Gemini Code Assist, Gemini CLI and Jules	Gemini for Workspace, Gemini Enterprise, AppSheet and Vertex AI Agent Builder	Workspace and data context can feed cloud agents and builders; region and product status remain surface-specific.
Atlassian [R171]	Rovo Dev and development integrations	Rovo in Jira and Confluence plus Rovo Studio	Work items remain accountable objects while agents contribute under user and administrative policy.

Q.5. Q.5 Cloud agent execution sandboxes and asynchronous coding

Industry term: Cloud development environment and code execution sandbox.

Role in the thesis: Isolated execution. This category supplies the governed execution boundary. Developer environments optimize interactive work; sandboxes optimize programmatic task isolation; batch schedulers supply primitives rather than a complete workspace product.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
GitHub Codespaces — GitHub [R96]	Managed development environments from repository configuration with lifecycle, prebuild, secrets and organization policy.	Browser and desktop IDE, devcontainer, CLI and GitHub API.	Review VM isolation, egress, secret boundaries, retention, regional availability, compute and storage billing, and GitHub dependence.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Coder — Coder Technologies [R97]	Self-hosted remote workspaces provisioned from infrastructure templates and accessed through IDE or command-line clients.	Terraform-backed templates, web, CLI, SSH and IDE access.	Supports infrastructure control but requires capacity, image, identity, network and upgrade operations; assess template portability.
Daytona — Daytona [R98]	Programmatic isolated computers for AI-generated code with dedicated kernel, filesystem, network stack, snapshots, SDKs, API and CLI.	API, SDKs, CLI and OCI-compatible environments.	Validate region, tenancy, egress, snapshots, persistence, secrets, deletion proof, consumption pricing and workload hardening.
E2B — E2B [R99]	Cloud sandboxes designed for agents to run code and tools through SDKs.	SDK and API with sandbox templates.	Verify isolation boundary, internet policy, secrets, region, retention, limits, audit events and fallback strategy.
Kubernetes Jobs — Kubernetes project [R100]	Batch workload primitive that runs pods to completion and can underpin an internal ephemeral task service.	Kubernetes API, controllers and ecosystem operators. Open source.	The enterprise must build identity, images, tenancy, policy, network controls, evidence capture, quotas, cleanup and support.
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore — AWS [R278]	Managed agent runtime with Firecracker-derived microVM isolation packaging compute, sandbox, identity, networking, memory and observability under one AWS service.	AWS APIs, SDKs and Bedrock console; integrates with IAM, VPC and CloudWatch.	Evaluate isolation boundary, region coverage, egress and identity model, memory/state retention, consumption pricing, portability of agent definitions and lock-in to Bedrock.
OpenAI Codex cloud sandbox — OpenAI	Ephemeral cloud environments that back Codex cloud tasks, running generated code with per-task filesystem, process and network isolation.	Codex web/CLI/IDE surfaces and API where documented.	Verify tenancy, network policy, credential injection, snapshot behavior, retention, region and how sandbox lifecycle maps to task evidence.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Modal — Modal Labs	Serverless Python-first compute platform frequently used for agent tool execution, code interpretation and background AI tasks with per-container isolation.	Python SDK, CLI, REST API and container images.	Assess tenancy, egress, secret handling, cold-start latency, GPU availability, consumption pricing and evidence export.
Runloop — Runloop	Managed devbox and code-execution sandboxes designed for coding agents with snapshot/restore, blueprint images and API-driven lifecycle.	REST API, SDKs and blueprint images.	Review isolation model, snapshot retention, region and residency, credential injection, image provenance, pricing and admin controls.
Vercel Sandbox — Vercel	Programmatic sandbox environments for running untrusted or AI-generated code alongside Vercel-hosted applications.	SDK and API under the Vercel platform.	Confirm isolation boundary, egress policy, tenancy, region, retention, integration with Vercel identity and separation from production project credentials.
Northflank — Northflank	Container and job platform used to run AI-generated code or agent workloads on managed or bring-your-own Kubernetes with per-workload isolation.	Web console, API, CLI and BYO cluster support.	Evaluate isolation strength, node pool tenancy, image provenance, egress policy, secrets, pricing and operational ownership when using BYO clusters.
Fly Machines — Fly.io	API-driven Firecracker microVMs that can be started, snapshotted and destroyed per task, suitable for agent sandboxes and per-tenant workloads.	REST API, flyctl and language SDKs.	Verify region coverage, isolation guarantees, egress controls, private networking, secrets, tenancy model and consumption pricing.

Q.5.1. Q.5.1 Hosted customer-controlled and hybrid execution

Industry terms: Managed agent execution, dedicated tenant, customer VPC deployment, self-hosted runner, bring your own compute and hybrid agent execution.

Selection should separate four questions that vendors often blend together: where the model runs, where the agent harness and durable session state run, where generated code executes, and where credentials, logs and artifacts are retained. A claim of self-hosted execution may describe only the

runner; it does not necessarily mean that the model, agent brain, telemetry or administration plane is self-hosted.

Decision dimension	Favor vendor-hosted	Favor customer-controlled	Required evidence
Integration depth	Mostly public SaaS endpoints and standard repositories.	Private SCM, registries, build farms, test labs, internal MCP tools and developer portals.	Dependency and destination inventory; tested network paths; proxy policy.
Data and compliance	Low-sensitivity code and synthetic test data; vendor controls meet policy.	Regulated source, customer data, sovereignty constraints or restricted forensic custody.	Data-flow map, retention and deletion terms, subprocessors, residency and audit export.
Security control	Vendor isolation, patching and managed guardrails are stronger than the available internal platform.	Enterprise requires its own identity, EDR, egress, artifact, secrets, SIEM and admission controls.	Threat model, isolation boundary, control ownership, escape testing and incident runbook.
Operations and economics	Variable demand, rapid rollout, limited platform capacity, or vendor economics are favorable.	Stable high volume, specialized hardware, existing runner platform, internal caches or predictable reserved capacity.	Cost per accepted change including idle capacity, support, network, storage and control-plane fees.
Portability and resilience	Speed and vendor-native features outweigh switching concerns.	Workload continuity, provider substitution, controlled upgrades or degraded-mode operation are priorities.	Exportable task and evidence schema, reproducible image, alternate model path and exit test.

Q.5.2. Representative deployment patterns

- Cognition Devin. Enterprise Cloud places both brain and Devbox in Cognition's multi-tenant cloud. Customer Dedicated Deployment keeps the brain in Cognition Cloud while Cognition operates an autoscaling, single-tenant environment connected to the customer through PrivateLink or IPSec. This is dedicated managed execution, not complete customer operation of the stack. [R274]
- Anthropic Claude Code Action. The action executes on the GitHub runner selected by the workflow, including enterprise self-hosted runners, while model calls go to Anthropic or a configured cloud provider. Anthropic supports workload identity federation so GitHub OIDC can be exchanged for a short-lived Anthropic credential rather than storing a static API key. [R276, R277]
- GitHub Actions self-hosted runners. Enterprises control hardware, images, networking and software, but also inherit patching, scaling, cleanup and isolation duties. GitHub recommends

ephemeral autoscaled runners rather than persistent runners and supports proxy-based outbound communication and Kubernetes-based scale sets. [R275]

- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore. A managed harness packages compute, sandbox, identity, networking, memory and observability behind AWS APIs (see the Q.5 table row above for the first-class catalogue entry). It illustrates the opposing choice: buy an integrated runtime when platform speed and consistent managed controls outweigh the need to operate the execution plane directly. [R278]

Q.5.3. Recommended enterprise posture

Do not mandate one execution location for every agent. Establish a workspace broker and risk classes that route tasks to approved execution pools. Keep a vendor-hosted pool for bounded work, a customer-controlled ephemeral pool for deeply integrated work, and an exceptional restricted pool for high-sensitivity tasks. Apply the same identity, proxy, policy, evidence and teardown contract across all pools so placement can change without redesigning governance.

Q.6. Q.6 Work management specifications and spec to production

Industry term: Application lifecycle management and product management system.

Role in the thesis: Intent specification planning and human decisions. These systems should remain durable sources of intent, ownership and decisions. Agents may read and make bounded writes through APIs and events, while completion derives from evidence.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Linear — Linear [R101]	Issues, projects and documents with an agent delegation model that keeps the human assignee as owner.	GraphQL API, webhooks and agent sessions.	Evaluate service accounts, delegated write scopes, webhook reliability, field history, rate limits, retention and pricing.
Jira with Rovo agents — Atlassian [R102]	Work items and project context with agents that can collaborate on assigned work under user permissions.	UI, REST, automation, webhooks and official Rovo MCP.	Confirm Rovo credit model, app scopes, data residency, audit, agent attribution and boundaries between Jira and external orchestration.
Azure Boards — Microsoft [R103]	Work items, backlogs, boards and traceability integrated with Azure Repos and Pipelines.	REST API, service hooks, CLI and official Azure DevOps MCP.	Review Entra identities, project permissions, process customization, retention, regional and Azure DevOps coupling.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Productboard — Productboard [R104]	Product discovery and planning system that links insights, features, objectives and roadmaps.	Web application, APIs and integrations as documented.	Assess evidence provenance, role permissions, export, customer-data classification, automation limits and handoff to engineering systems.


Q.7. Q.7 Data Engineering in an AI Native Enterprise

AI changes the data and model lifecycle as directly as the code lifecycle. Natural-language discovery and SQL reduce query friction; agents can draft pipelines, transformations and quality checks; notebooks and semantic layers support collaborative analysis; model and prompt teams need datasets, experiments, registries, evaluations and human review; production systems require serving, retrieval, gateways, monitoring and incident response. The platform must preserve lineage from source data and consent through feature, prompt, model, evaluation, deployment and business outcome.

Mechanism	Representative official products	Role in the evidence and learning loop	Platform requirement
Data and analytics platforms	Databricks Mosaic AI [R172], Snowflake Cortex AI [R173], BigQuery and Vertex AI [R174], Microsoft Fabric and Azure AI Foundry [R175], SageMaker and Bedrock [R176]	Governed data, analysis, retrieval, model or agent construction and serving.	Identity, residency, lineage, cost, environment promotion and portable artifacts.
Pipelines transformations and quality	dbt [R177], Apache Airflow [R178], Dagster [R179], DataHub [R180], Great Expectations [R181]	Executable transformations, orchestration, catalog lineage and quality evidence.	Data contracts, idempotency, test data, ownership, freshness and failure recovery.
Experiment model and dataset lifecycle	MLflow [R182], Weights and Biases [R183], Hugging Face Hub [R184], Labelbox [R185]	Experiments, artifacts, registries, datasets, labeling and review.	Reproducibility, IP, consent, access, evaluation sets, model cards and promotion policy.
Evaluation and monitoring	Arize Phoenix [R186], LangSmith [R141], Langfuse [R142], Braintrust [R143], Weave [R187]	Offline and online evaluation, traces, feedback, drift and model or agent quality.	Human-calibrated graders, sensitive trace policy, business outcomes and incident linkage.

Mechanism	Representative official products	Role in the evidence and learning loop	Platform requirement
Retrieval and online features	Pinecone [R150], Weaviate [R188], Milvus [R189], pgvector [R190], Feast [R191]	Runtime retrieval and feature delivery for ML and agent applications.	Permission-aware context, freshness, point-in-time correctness, deletion and portability.

Data and AI paved roads should package governed workspaces, source connectors, semantic models, pipeline templates, dataset and prompt versioning, evaluation harnesses, model gateways, deployment and observability. They should measure reproducible decisions and business outcomes rather than notebook activity or model-call volume.



AI-native data engineering. Governed data products combine contracts, lineage, quality, transformation, semantic meaning, and accountable automation.

Q.7.1. Q.7.1 The work and accountability of data engineering

Data engineering remains responsible for trustworthy, timely, governed, discoverable and usable data products. The unit of accountability is not a pipeline that ran; it is a data product whose meaning, freshness, access, quality, lineage, cost and recovery behavior are fit for its consumers. Engineers own ingestion, transformation, schemas and contracts, orchestration, privacy, retention and production reliability. AI can accelerate implementation and investigation, but a person or team still owns business semantics, exceptions and consequences.

Q.7.2. Q.7.2 AI assisted ingestion transformation and pipeline development

Coding agents can draft connectors, mappings, SQL, Python and dbt models; infer candidate schemas; propose schema-evolution changes; generate tests and documentation; interpret lineage; migrate code; and assemble first-pass incident hypotheses. These mechanisms reduce boilerplate and context search. They also move engineering effort into contracts, architecture, policy, review, cost control and validation. Generated transformations must remain inspectable and reproducible, with source and target schemas, assumptions, tests, owners and deployment evidence. [R208–R214]

Q.7.3. Q.7.3 Zero ETL CDC federation streaming batch and reverse ETL

No single movement pattern replaces the others. Managed zero-ETL integrations can replicate supported operational data into an analytics service with less connector code; change data capture propagates source changes; streaming supports event-time and low-latency processing; federation queries data in place; batch remains useful for replay, bulk computation, stable snapshots and cost-efficient reproducibility; reverse ETL or activation sends governed warehouse results back to operational systems. Selection depends on freshness, consistency, source load, movement, failure recovery, portability, governance and cost. AWS documents Redshift zero-ETL integrations and Database Migration Service CDC; Google documents BigQuery federated queries and Datastream; Trino documents federated query through connectors. [R215–R219]

Pattern	Use when	Primary tradeoff	Evidence required
Managed zero ETL replication	A supported source and target need near-real-time analytical copies with minimal custom pipeline code.	Service and region constraints, replication lag, source impact and vendor coupling.	Supported objects, lag, reconciliation, failure state, cost and recovery test.
CDC and streaming	Consumers need ordered changes or event-time processing.	Duplicates, ordering, schema evolution, replay, state and operational complexity.	Offsets, schema version, watermark, replay result and consumer contract.
Federation or query in place	Movement is constrained or occasional access is more valuable than local optimization.	Source load, latency, availability, pushdown limits and cross-system policy.	Query plan, source identity, row and column policy, cost and provenance.
Batch	Replay, bulk processing, snapshots or predictable cost matter more than immediacy.	Staleness and longer feedback cycles.	Input snapshot, code version, schedule, checksums, tests and rerun outcome.
Reverse ETL and activation	Curated data must drive CRM, support or operational workflows.	Side effects, identity mapping, consent, idempotency and destination drift.	Audience definition, consent, mutation log, retries and rollback.

Q.7.4. Q.7.4 Declarative models data contracts semantic layers and data products

Declarative systems shift work rather than remove it. Teams state desired transformations, assets, schedules, tests, metrics or contracts; compilers and orchestrators plan execution. Engineering responsibility moves into model design, contract compatibility, semantic definitions, policy, performance, test coverage and operational controls. dbt documents declarative models and its Semantic Layer; Dagster models software-defined assets; Airflow supports dataset-aware scheduling; dlt documents schema inference and evolution; Apache Iceberg and Delta Lake define table formats that separate durable data from one compute engine. [R208–R214][R220–R222]

Data contracts should name owners, schema, semantics, quality expectations, classification, compatibility and service commitments. A semantic layer centralizes governed metric definitions, but it cannot resolve disputed business meaning automatically. Data mesh and data-as-a-product practices distribute ownership only when platform standards, discoverability and federated governance prevent incompatible local definitions.

Q.7.5. Q.7.5 Orchestration lineage quality and observability

Orchestration coordinates dependencies, retries, schedules and backfills. Catalogs and lineage establish what produced a dataset and who owns it. Quality and observability test expected structure, values, freshness and behavior and help diagnose incidents. Agents can correlate orchestrator state, warehouse history, catalog lineage and anomaly evidence, then propose a bounded remediation. They should not silently rewrite production data or suppress an alert. [R211–R214][R223–R228]

Q.7.6. Q.7.6 Agent access to data platforms

Data agents may use SQL and query APIs, notebooks, SDKs, catalogs, orchestration APIs, events and MCP servers. These are complementary interfaces. MCP can describe governed tools and context, but it is not a database authorization system and does not supply semantic governance. Default access should be read-only; bind every query or mutation to a human or workload identity, purpose, tenant, budget and audit record; enforce row and column policy, result limits and timeouts; cite source objects and versions; and require approval for destructive or high-cost operations. Treat retrieved data and tool descriptions as untrusted input because prompt injection and poisoned metadata can redirect an agent. [R113][R229]

Q.7.7. Q.7.7 Representative product landscape for data engineering

Industry category	Representative products and projects	Verified role and interface	Enterprise considerations
Integration ELT and CDC	Fivetran [R230], Airbyte [R231], dlt [R214], Debezium [R232], Confluent [R233]	Managed or open connectors, CDC, schema handling and APIs or configuration for moving data.	Source credentials, residency, schema drift, replay, connector quality, volume pricing and exit.

Industry category	Representative products and projects	Verified role and interface	Enterprise considerations
Transformation and analytics engineering	dbt [R208], SQLMesh [R234]	Declarative SQL models, tests, environments and planning through CLI or service APIs.	Semantic ownership, compiler behavior, warehouse cost, state, promotion and artifact portability.
Orchestration and data assets	Airflow [R212], Dagster [R211], Prefect [R213]	Workflow or asset orchestration through Python, APIs, schedules and events.	Worker identity, retries, backfills, secrets, tenancy, observability and upgrade operations.
Warehouses lakehouses and fabrics	Databricks [R172], Snowflake [R173], Microsoft Fabric [R235], BigQuery [R236], Redshift [R215]	Storage, SQL, governance, ingestion and increasingly integrated AI workloads.	Open formats, egress, workload isolation, catalog policy, regional features and consumption economics.
Federation and open tables	Trino [R219], Starburst [R237], Iceberg [R220], Delta Lake [R221], Hudi [R238]	Query across sources or store interoperable table metadata and files.	Connector semantics, consistency, catalog choice, compaction, concurrency and format evolution.
Catalog lineage and governance	DataHub [R180], OpenMetadata [R223], Collibra [R224], Microsoft Purview [R225]	Metadata catalog, lineage, ownership, classification, policy and discovery.	Permission fidelity, scanning credentials, metadata freshness, deletion, audit and stewardship.
Quality and data observability	Great Expectations [R181], Soda [R226], Monte Carlo [R227], Anomalo [R228]	Tests or anomaly monitoring across data products and pipelines.	Independent checks, alert quality, sensitive samples, lineage integration, false positives and cost.
Semantic and metrics layers	dbt Semantic Layer [R209], Cube [R239], Looker modeling [R240]	Governed metrics and semantic models exposed to BI or applications through queries and APIs.	Definition ownership, versioning, access policy, caching, compatibility and metric drift.

Q.7.8. Q.7.8 Developer portals and paved roads for data and software

Industry term: Internal developer portal and internal developer platform.

Role in the thesis: Context paved roads governance and ownership. Portals expose ownership, templates, documentation, scorecards and actions. They can become the agent-accessible front door

to paved roads when their catalog and actions are governed. (Numbered here as a Q.7 subsection because portals are placed physically adjacent to the data platform sections; the capability itself is cross-cutting and also supports software engineering paved roads discussed elsewhere in the appendix.)

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Backstage — CNCF project [R105]	Open-source framework for developer portals built around a software catalog, templates, plugins and TechDocs.	Web app, plugin platform, catalog descriptors and APIs. Open source; MCP support is documented separately.	High portability and extensibility come with build-and-operate responsibility, plugin supply-chain risk and catalog governance.
Port — Port [R106]	Commercial internal developer portal with a configurable software catalog, scorecards, self-service actions and integrations.	APIs, webhooks, integrations and automation.	Evaluate data model ownership, action credentials, audit, hosted data location, pricing unit and export or exit path.
Cortex — Cortex [R107]	Service catalog and engineering platform for ownership, scorecards, initiatives and developer workflows.	API, integrations, CLI and portal workflows.	Verify source-of-truth reconciliation, permissions, audit, scorecard semantics, consumption model and portability.
OpsLevel — OpsLevel [R108]	Service catalog with maturity rubrics, checks and actions plus GraphQL API and CLI.	GraphQL API, CLI, integrations and portal actions.	Assess catalog synchronization, credential delegation, rule ownership, hosted controls, pricing and export completeness.

Q.7.9. Q.7.9 Enterprise knowledge and permissions aware context

Industry term: Enterprise knowledge management and retrieval.

Role in the thesis: Runtime organizational context and learning. These products hold policies, decisions and working knowledge. The platform must retrieve authorized, current fragments with provenance rather than copying entire corpora into prompts. (Placed within Q.7 for physical adjacency to data and retrieval discussions; enterprise knowledge is a cross-cutting concern relevant to every category in this appendix.)

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Confluence — Atlassian [R109]	Collaborative documentation and knowledge spaces connected to Jira and Rovo.	REST APIs, webhooks, search and official Rovo MCP.	Space permissions, data residency, retention, page history, external sharing and Rovo processing boundaries matter.
Notion — Notion Labs [R110]	Workspace for documents, databases and project knowledge with a public integration API.	REST API, webhooks and OAuth integrations.	Verify page-level authorization, export fidelity, retention, automation limits, data location and integration-token scope.
Glean — Glean [R111]	Enterprise search and knowledge platform that connects governed sources and exposes developer interfaces.	APIs, connectors and agent or search interfaces documented by Glean.	Source-permission fidelity, indexing latency, deletion propagation, residency, connector scopes and usage pricing are central.
Box AI Platform — Box [R112]	AI services over governed Box content through platform APIs.	Box APIs and developer platform.	Confirm enterprise-content permissions, model-provider terms, retention, residency, audit, rate limits and whether output retains file provenance.

Q.8. Q.8 Data Science and Machine Learning in an AI Native Enterprise

Q.8.1. Q.8.1 The work and accountability of data science

Data science turns data into defensible knowledge, decisions, predictions and model behavior. Its durable responsibilities are problem framing, assumptions, experimental design, data suitability, evaluation, uncertainty, causal limits, fairness and safety, reproducibility and communication. AI can accelerate exploration and implementation; it cannot decide whether the question is meaningful or the evidence supports the conclusion.



AI-native data science and machine learning. Assistants accelerate the loop while human judgment remains explicit at consequential gates.

Q.8.2. Q.8.2 AI assisted discovery analysis notebooks and hypothesis generation

Conversational discovery, natural-language SQL, notebook generation, visualization and statistical explanation can shorten the first analysis loop. Agents can propose hypotheses and experiments, but those proposals are search aids, not findings. Human review must guard against automation bias, p-hacking, leakage, confounding, invalid causal inference and fabricated explanations. Preserve queries, data snapshots, environment, code, random seeds and rejected alternatives. [R241–R244]

Q.8.3. Q.8.3 Features labels synthetic data and evaluation datasets

Agents can suggest features, preprocessing, labels and synthetic examples. Every derived feature needs point-in-time correctness and lineage; generated labels need sampling, adjudication and error analysis; synthetic data needs provenance, privacy review and validation against the intended distribution. Golden evaluation sets should include routine, boundary, adversarial and abstention cases and remain separated from prompt and model tuning. Labelbox, Hugging Face datasets, Snorkel and Feast provide different parts of this lifecycle. [R184][R185][R191][R245]

Q.8.4. Q.8.4 Experiment tracking reproducibility model selection and human judgment

AutoML, hyperparameter search and coding assistance expand the number of experiments a team can run. The scarce resource becomes valid comparison. Track dataset, features, code, parameters, environment, metric definitions and artifacts; register candidates; predefine decision criteria; and

compare against meaningful baselines. MLflow and Weights and Biases provide experiment and registry mechanisms, while Vertex AI, SageMaker and Azure Machine Learning document managed AutoML and model development. [R174–R176][R182][R183]

Q.8.5. Q.8.5 Predictive ML generative AI and agentic systems

Predictive ML maps inputs to scores or predictions evaluated against statistical and operational targets. Generative systems produce open-ended content and require prompt, context, grounding, safety and human-quality evaluation. Agentic systems add tools, state, planning and side effects, so evaluation must include task completion, tool selection, permissions, recovery, cost and downstream consequences. RAG requires corpus construction, retrieval evaluation and citation; fine-tuning requires data rights and holdout evaluation; agent design requires tool contracts, memory policy, red teaming, guardrails and escalation. [R141–R145][R186][R187][R246–R249]


Q.8.6. Q.8.6 Representative product landscape for data science and ML

Industry category	Representative products and projects	Lifecycle role	Decision boundary
Collaborative notebooks and analytics	Jupyter [R241], Databricks notebooks [R242], Hex [R243], Colab Enterprise [R244]	Interactive analysis, code, visualization, collaboration and managed compute.	Environment reproducibility, data access, review, scheduled execution and promotion.
AutoML and model development	Vertex AI [R174], SageMaker [R176], Azure AI Foundry [R175], Databricks Mosaic AI [R172]	Training, tuning, model and agent development through notebooks, SDKs and managed services.	Problem validity, leakage, baseline, metric choice, region, compute budget and model governance.
Experiments and registries	MLflow [R182], Weights and Biases [R183]	Track runs, artifacts, models and evaluation evidence.	Dataset and environment lineage, access, retention, reproducibility and promotion rules.
Labeling and curation	Labelbox [R185], Snorkel [R245], Hugging Face Hub [R184]	Human or programmatic labels, datasets and collaborative artifacts.	Consent, IP, annotator quality, disagreement, provenance and dataset versioning.

Industry category	Representative products and projects	Lifecycle role	Decision boundary
Agent frameworks	LangGraph [R246], LlamaIndex [R247], Semantic Kernel [R248], DSPy [R249], CrewAI, AutoGen (Microsoft), Pydantic AI, Mastra, Anthropic Claude Agent SDK, OpenAI Agents SDK	Compose tools, retrieval, state, workflows or optimized language-model programs, with per-framework differences in role-based multi-agent patterns, typed tool contracts, TypeScript vs Python surfaces and vendor-provided runtimes.	Runtime identity, state, evaluation, framework churn, portability, vendor-runtime coupling and production support.
Evaluation tracing and guardrails	LangSmith [R141], Langfuse [R142], Phoenix [R186], Braintrust [R143], Weave [R187], OpenTelemetry [R144]	Datasets, traces, scorers, feedback and portable telemetry.	Sensitive traces, grader validation, sampling, status, cost and connection to business outcomes.
Retrieval and feature stores	Pinecone [R150], Weaviate [R188], Milvus [R189], pgvector [R190], Feast [R191]	Online retrieval or governed feature delivery.	Freshness, point-in-time correctness, permissions, deletion, latency, cost and exit.

Q.9. Q.9 Customer facing AI builders and composable application surfaces

Builder surfaces let customers create applications, interfaces, workflows and agents from natural-language intent and composable services. They turn configuration users into constrained developers and operators. Professional developers and platform teams therefore own the runtime, identity, component contracts, test path, observability and support boundary even when the customer generates the experience.



Customer-facing agentic builder. Governed components become a tailored application that remains connected to the core enterprise product ecosystem.

Builder archetype	Representative verified examples	Generated artifact or runtime	Production requirement
UI and application generation	Builder.io Visual Copilot and Fusion [R192], Replit Agent [R193], v0 by Vercel [R194], Bolt by StackBlitz [R195]	Source code, web application or deployable interface.	Repository ownership, design-system constraints, tests, accessibility, secrets, deployment and handoff.
Low code enterprise applications	Microsoft Power Apps [R196], Google AppSheet [R197], Mendix [R198], OutSystems [R199]	Managed app and data runtime.	Environment promotion, connectors, DLP, role policy, ALM, performance and exit.
Workflow and iPaaS automation	Workato [R154], MuleSoft [R155], Boomi [R200], n8n [R156], Zapier Agents [R201]	Connector graph, recipe or durable automation.	Credential delegation, idempotency, audit, retries, cost, ownership and failure support.
Agent builders	Microsoft Copilot Studio [R168], Salesforce Agentforce Builder [R202], ServiceNow AI Agent Studio [R203], Vertex AI Agent Builder [R170], AWS Bedrock Agents [R204]	Configured agent, tools, knowledge and orchestration.	Evaluation, tool policy, identity, escalation, versioning, spend and production monitoring.

Builder archetype	Representative verified examples	Generated artifact or runtime	Production requirement
Embedded product and extension surfaces	Atlassian Forge and Rovo Studio [R205], Retool [R206], Bubble [R207]	Extension, internal tool or customer-specific application.	Tenant isolation, extension review, API stability, support ownership and marketplace policy.

Q.9.1. Q.9.3 What builder surfaces change

Development teams must publish stable components and acceptance tests rather than treating generated code as disposable. DevEx teams must provide approved templates, sandboxes, deployment paths, telemetry and ownership transfer. Product teams must expose capabilities through task-level semantics, APIs, events and embeddable UI. Security, legal, support and finance must govern customer-generated applications as production systems, including credentials, data use, billing, incidents and deprecation.

Q.10. Q.10 AI and ML Product Engineering

Q.10.1. Q.10.1 Moving from experiment to dependable product

AI and ML product engineering bridges scientific evidence and customer-facing reliability. It combines architecture, software quality, APIs, serving, caching, feature and vector stores, model gateways, quotas, latency objectives, privacy, evaluation gates, progressive delivery, rollback, telemetry and incident response. The design should keep a deterministic core around probabilistic components, support confidence and abstention, route uncertain cases to people, and degrade safely when models or retrieval fail.

Q.10.2. Q.10.2 Serving gateways stores and runtime orchestration

Production systems need versioned model, prompt, retrieval and tool configurations; routing and fallbacks; request and token budgets; feature freshness; cache policy; tenant isolation; and stable APIs. Managed serving such as SageMaker endpoints, Vertex AI endpoints and Databricks model serving can coexist with model gateways such as LiteLLM or Kong and feature or vector stores such as Feast and Pinecone. These products are not interchangeable: serving runs models, gateways govern routes, and stores supply runtime state or context. [R146–R150][R250–R252]

Q.10.3. Q.10.3 Online evaluation telemetry drift feedback safety and incidents

Offline evaluation is necessary but insufficient. Production telemetry must connect model, prompt, retrieval corpus, tool versions and user outcome without capturing prohibited content. Use shadow or canary traffic, explicit health and quality thresholds, rollback, abuse protection, feedback-integrity checks and incident ownership. Drift is one possible signal; teams must also monitor calibration, retrieval quality, latency, cost, refusal or abstention, unsafe actions and business harm. Agents may generate tests, analyze traces and propose remediation, but accountable owners approve release and material operational action.

Q.10.4. Q.10.4 Responsibilities across the product lifecycle

Role	Primary accountability	Evidence before release
Product management	Outcome, user harm, acceptable uncertainty and human-decision policy.	Acceptance criteria, failure experience, escalation and business metric.
Data science	Problem formulation, datasets, experiments, model behavior and uncertainty.	Evaluation report, baselines, limitations, slices and model or system card.
Data engineering	Trusted sources, contracts, features, retrieval corpus and lineage.	Freshness, quality, point-in-time and access evidence.
ML and platform engineering	Training and serving platform, registry, gateway, cost and promotion.	Artifact provenance, environment, load, fallback and rollback tests.
Application engineering	Customer workflow, APIs, deterministic controls and user experience.	Integration, contract, accessibility, security and end-to-end tests.
Security and privacy	Threat model, data use, consent, abuse and policy.	Red-team findings, mitigations, scopes and approved exceptions.
SRE and operations	SLOs, telemetry, incident response and recovery.	Canary criteria, dashboards, alerts, runbooks and exercised rollback.

Q.10.5. Q.10.5 Representative production platform landscape

Production capability	Representative products or projects	Thesis contribution
Managed model serving	Vertex AI endpoints [R250], SageMaker endpoints [R251], Databricks Model Serving [R252]	Versioned deployment, scaling and runtime telemetry within a cloud or data platform.
Model gateways and routing	LiteLLM [R146], Kong AI Gateway [R147], Azure API Management [R149]	Policy, provider routing, quotas, budgets and request evidence.
Feature and vector stores	Feast [R191], Pinecone [R150], Weaviate [R188], Milvus [R189]	Low-latency governed features or retrieval context.
Evaluation and observability	LangSmith [R141], Langfuse [R142], Phoenix [R186], Braintrust [R143], Weave [R187], OpenTelemetry [R144]	Trace and evaluation evidence connected to versions and outcomes.
Safety and guardrails	NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails [R253], Guardrails AI [R254], provider safety controls	Input, output and tool policies that complement application authorization and human escalation.
Progressive delivery	Argo Rollouts [R135], LaunchDarkly [R134]	Canary, exposure control, health evaluation and rollback around probabilistic changes.

Q.10.6. Q.10.6 Workforce operating model and safeguards

Discipline	Primary outcome	AI assisted mechanisms	Human judgment boundary	Main evidence and measures
Data Engineering	Trustworthy governed data products	Connector, SQL, model, test, documentation and incident-assistance generation	Business semantics, contracts, exceptions, access, economics and production recovery	Freshness, quality, lineage, reliability, cost and consumer outcome.
Data Science and ML	Defensible knowledge, predictions and model behavior	Discovery, EDA, code, features, experiments, labels and evaluation assistance	Question validity, experimental rigor, causal limits, uncertainty, fairness and interpretation	Dataset and experiment lineage, baselines, slices, reproducibility and decision quality.
AI and ML Product Engineering	Dependable customer-facing probabilistic systems	Test and eval generation, deployment artifacts, trace analysis and bounded experiments	Architecture, release, authority, user harm, SLOs, rollback and incidents	Evaluation gates, latency, cost, safety, change failure, recovery and business outcome.

AI does not remove these disciplines. It reduces manual connector glue, routine SQL and code, documentation and first-pass diagnosis while increasing the importance of semantics, contracts, experiment quality, governance, architecture, evaluation, cost and production accountability. Guard against skill atrophy, opaque transformations, metric drift, false confidence, silent corruption, leakage, runaway compute, duplicated pipelines and weak ownership through peer review, independent tests, lineage, budgets, ownership, sampling, incident learning and periodic manual exercises.

Q.11. Q.11 Product ecosystems for agentic customers and builders

An enterprise content platform must support two related customer journeys: an external agent such as Claude, ChatGPT, Copilot or Gemini acts on content under delegated authority; and a customer builds a tailored application or workflow that composes the product with other systems. The competitive product surface is therefore no longer only the human user interface. APIs, events, semantics, permissions, evidence and embeddable components become first-class product behavior.

Maturity level	Customer capability	Required product mechanisms
API accessible	A developer can read and mutate product objects.	Stable versioned APIs and SDKs, schemas, structured errors, quotas and deprecation policy.
Automation ready	A workflow can react reliably and perform repeatable tasks.	Durable signed events, ordering and replay, idempotency, long-running tasks, status, cancellation, retries and test tenants.
Agent consumable	An agent can discover and invoke bounded business capabilities.	Task semantics, machine-readable examples, fine-grained OAuth, acting-user and service identity, consent, provenance, citations, audit and tool-poisoning defenses.
Builder composable	A customer can create a governed experience from product capabilities.	Headless APIs, UI primitives, extension points, design-system assets, mocks, contract tests, sample data, marketplace review and reference implementations.
Governed ecosystem	Partners and customers can operate supported solutions at scale.	Certification, entitlements and metering, DLP and content safety, shared responsibility, support and incident model, backward compatibility, evaluation kits and commercial terms.

Q.11.1. Q.11.1 Responsibility model

Actor	Accountability
Product teams	Treat APIs, events, object semantics, task behavior, UI primitives and compatibility as supported product surfaces.
Platform and DevEx	Provide identity, sandboxes, paved roads, contract tests, observability, partner tooling and reusable deployment patterns.
Security legal and finance	Define delegated authority, data and content policy, audit, commercial entitlements, high-volume agent use and shared responsibility.
Data and AI teams	Provide retrieval, evaluation, model and prompt governance, provenance, quality monitoring and feedback datasets.
Operations and support	Own customer-generated application telemetry, incident routing, safe rollback, version support and escalation boundaries.
Partners and customer administrators	Use certified components, assign owners, approve scopes, monitor usage and accept application-specific operational responsibility.

Q.11.2. Q.11.2 Customer journey from intent to production

A customer describes a retention-review application in a builder. The builder discovers approved enterprise content, search, metadata and workflow capabilities; requests scoped consent; creates a versioned application from certified components; runs against sample data in a test tenant; executes contract, security and policy checks; presents evidence and unresolved decisions to an administrator; deploys through an approved environment with metering and audit; and monitors

mutations, citations, user outcomes and incidents. A later policy or API change produces a migration task rather than silently breaking the application.

Q.11.3. Q.11.3 Market white space and open questions

The market still lacks a portable contract for delegated business authority, a cross-product evidence bundle for customer-generated applications, and a durable decision packet that survives movement between an agent, builder, enterprise product and support organization. An enterprise-content ecosystem must decide which tasks may be exposed, who supports generated solutions, how partners are certified, how high-volume agent use is priced, and when an application becomes the customer's responsibility rather than the platform's.

Q.12. Q.12 MCP A2A APIs events and interoperability

Industry term: MCP host server gateway and registry.

Role in the thesis: Context tools and governed capability access. MCP standardizes agent-to-tool and agent-to-resource access. A server exposes capability; a host invokes it; a registry supports discovery; a gateway may enforce policy. Protocol support alone does not supply enterprise governance.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Model Context Protocol — Anthropic and community [R113]	Open protocol defining hosts, clients, servers, tools, resources, prompts, transports and authorization profiles. Stewarded by Anthropic with an open community of contributors; not a Linux Foundation project.	Protocol specification and SDK ecosystem. Open source/community with released and draft features.	Enterprise deployment still needs identity, delegated authority, inventory, policy, audit, lifecycle, data classification and tool-risk controls.
Official MCP Registry — MCP project [R114]	Metadata registry for discovering publicly available MCP servers.	Registry API and published metadata.	Discovery is not approval. Mirror or curate allowed entries, verify publisher identity, pin versions and retain a kill switch.
GitHub MCP Server — GitHub [R115]	Official server exposing selected GitHub repository, issue, pull-request, workflow and security operations.	Remote or local MCP server with GitHub authorization.	Tool access inherits GitHub permissions; administrators still need tool allowlists, audit, token strategy and destructive-action policy.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Atlassian Rovo MCP Server — Atlassian [R116]	Official remote MCP access to Jira, Jira Service Management, Confluence, Bitbucket and related work under user permissions.	Remote streamable HTTP endpoint and OAuth 2.1.	Verify scopes, tenant selection, write/delete tool groups, admin controls, rate limits, residency and client support.
Backstage MCP Actions Backend — Backstage project [R117]	Exposes selected Backstage catalog queries and software-template actions as MCP tools.	Backstage plugin and MCP server capability.	Treat actions as privileged paved-road entry points; bind identity, restrict templates, record provenance and operate the plugin stack.

Q.12.1. Q.12.1 Agent to agent interoperability and orchestration

Industry term: Agent interoperability protocol and agent orchestration framework.

Role in the thesis: Planning delegation and cross agent collaboration. A2A supports collaboration between opaque agents; orchestration frameworks coordinate agents inside an application. Neither defines business approval or delegated enterprise authority by itself.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
A2A Protocol — Linux Foundation project [R118]	Open protocol for discovery, messages, stateful tasks, artifacts, streaming and collaboration between independent agents.	HTTP-based protocol, Agent Cards and official SDKs. Open source.	Require a trusted agent registry, authenticated endpoints, delegation records, task budgets, loop controls, artifact provenance and cancellation.
Google Agent Development Kit — Google [R119]	Framework for building agents and multi-agent systems with documented A2A exposing and consuming support.	Python, Java and Go SDKs; A2A support status varies by language and release.	Framework portability, runtime hosting, state, model choice, evaluation, identity and production support remain architectural decisions.
LangGraph Agent Server — LangChain [R120]	Agent runtime that can expose assistants through an A2A endpoint and Agent Card.	Deployment runtime and A2A endpoint.	Confirm documented version requirement, state model, authentication, tenancy, tracing, deployment boundary and exit to standard artifacts.

Q.13. Q.13 Testing security delivery observability and operations

Industry term: CI CD platform and GitOps continuous delivery.

Role in the thesis: Verification and delivery. These systems turn repository events into reproducible evidence and promotion. They should consume immutable revisions and emit signed artifacts, attestations, deployment state and rollback evidence.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
GitHub Actions — GitHub [R121]	Repository-native workflows for build, test, security and deployment on hosted or self-hosted runners.	YAML workflows, marketplace actions, API and webhooks.	Pin dependencies, isolate untrusted code, prefer ephemeral runners, scope tokens, protect environments, retain logs and allocate minutes.
GitLab CI CD — GitLab [R122]	Integrated pipelines, runners, artifacts, environments, security reports and deployment automation.	YAML, APIs, webhooks, runners and reusable components.	Runner trust, job-token scope, secrets, self-managed operations, artifact retention, credits and GitLab coupling matter.
Argo CD — CNCF project [R123]	Declarative GitOps continuous delivery for Kubernetes that reconciles desired state from Git.	Kubernetes controllers, CRDs, CLI, API and Git repositories. Open source.	Strong portability within Kubernetes; teams must operate controllers, credentials, policy, multi-tenancy, drift handling and upgrade paths.
Azure Pipelines — Microsoft [R124]	Hosted and self-hosted build and release pipelines integrated with Azure DevOps.	YAML, REST, service hooks, agents and environments.	Review Entra/service connections, agent pools, secrets, approvals, retention, parallel-job pricing and Azure dependence.

Q.13.1. Q.13.1 Test automation and AI assisted testing

Industry term: Software test automation platform.

Role in the thesis: Review verification and evidence. The category spans independent test types. AI may generate or repair tests, but trustworthy gates require independent oracles, controlled data, repeatability and explicit failure evidence.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Playwright Test — Microsoft open-source project [R125]	Browser automation and end-to-end test runner with isolated browser contexts, tracing and cross-browser support.	CLI, APIs, CI integrations and trace artifacts. Open source.	Protect stored authentication state, control test data, reduce flakiness, pin browsers, retain traces and separate generated tests from acceptance truth.
Testcontainers (Docker) — open-source project [R126]	Libraries that start short-lived real dependencies such as databases, queues and browsers for integration tests.	Language libraries, containers and CI environments. Open source with commercial services around it.	Image provenance, registry policy, runtime privileges, network isolation, startup cost and deterministic fixtures require governance.
Pact — open-source project [R127]	Consumer-driven contract testing and broker workflows for verifying service compatibility.	Language libraries, Pact files, broker API and CI/CD integration.	Contract ownership, sensitive examples, version tagging, broker tenancy, deployability policy and non-HTTP coverage should be assessed.
Grafana k6 — Grafana Labs [R128]	Open-source load testing with scripted tests, metrics and managed execution options.	CLI, JavaScript tests, CI integrations, OpenTelemetry-compatible telemetry options and cloud service.	Control test traffic, credentials, data location, distributed-load cost, result retention and production-test authorization.

Q.13.2. Q.13.2 Application and software supply chain security

Industry term: Application security testing and software supply chain security.

Role in the thesis: Security review verification and artifact trust. No single scanner covers code, dependencies, secrets, infrastructure, containers and provenance. The platform should normalize findings and policies while preserving source evidence and tool-specific strengths.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Snyk — Snyk [R129]	Scans source, open-source dependencies, containers and infrastructure as code with IDE, repository, CLI and CI workflows.	SCM apps, CLI, IDE, APIs and CI integrations.	Review repository scopes, broker or private connectivity, data ingestion, policy, fix-PR permissions, test consumption, retention and false-positive handling.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Semgrep — Semgrep [R130]	Static analysis, supply-chain and secrets products using rules and repository or CI integrations.	CLI, CI, SCM integration and APIs. Open-source engine plus commercial platform.	Rule provenance, engine choice, code upload, deployment model, triage workflow, audit, pricing and portability of custom rules matter.
GitHub Advanced Security — GitHub [R131]	Code scanning, secret protection and dependency security integrated with GitHub repositories.	GitHub UI, CodeQL, APIs, pull-request checks and Actions.	GitHub-native evidence simplifies workflow but increases platform coupling; confirm licensing, repository coverage, custom queries, retention and alert governance.
Sigstore and SLSA — OpenSSF projects [R132][R133]	Sigstore signs and verifies artifacts with transparency records; SLSA defines provenance and supply-chain security levels.	Open-source tools, specifications, attestations and transparency services.	Choose public or private trust roots, protect build identities, retain verification material, avoid unverifiable attestations and define policy at deploy time.

Q.13.3. Q.13.3 Feature management and progressive delivery

Industry term: Feature flag management experimentation and progressive delivery.

Role in the thesis: Delivery rollback and learning. Flags separate deployment from exposure; progressive delivery evaluates health during rollout. They must connect to ownership, change evidence, metrics and rollback rather than become permanent hidden configuration.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
LaunchDarkly — LaunchDarkly [R134]	Managed feature flags, targeting, experimentation and release controls through SDKs and APIs.	SDKs, REST API, webhooks and integrations.	Evaluate SDK behavior, relay or network options, flag and context data, audit history, approvals, pricing by context or usage, export and stale-flag controls.
Argo Rollouts — CNCF project [R135]	Kubernetes controller for canary and blue-green rollout with analysis and rollback behavior.	Kubernetes CRDs, controller, CLI and metric providers. Open source.	Requires Kubernetes operations, reliable analysis metrics, policy, controller security, rollback testing and application compatibility.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Flagger — Flux project [R136]	Progressive delivery operator that automates canary promotion or rollback using service-mesh and metric checks.	Kubernetes operator, CRDs, GitOps and metric providers. Open source.	Assess supported traffic providers, metric quality, controller permissions, failure semantics, multi-tenancy and operational ownership.

Q.13.4. Q.13.4 Observability incident response and reliability automation

Industry term: Observability platform AIOps and incident management.

Role in the thesis: Operations human decisions and learning. These products correlate telemetry, changes and response work. The thesis requires their evidence to flow back to review, tests, specifications and platform knowledge; alert summaries alone do not close the loop.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Datadog Bits AI — Datadog [R137]	AI investigation and assistance across Datadog telemetry, changes and operational context.	Datadog web and documented integrations or APIs.	Validate which actions are advisory or executable, telemetry access, retention, regional processing, audit, model terms, consumption and remediation approval.
Dynatrace Davis AI — Dynatrace [R138]	Causal and generative AI capabilities over Dynatrace observability data and topology.	Dynatrace platform, APIs and automation integrations.	Review topology accuracy, action authority, private connectivity, data residency, retention, licensing units and export of incident evidence.
PagerDuty Operations Cloud — PagerDuty [R139]	On-call, event orchestration, incident response and automation capabilities.	Events API, REST API, webhooks, integrations and runbook automation.	Identity, schedules, escalation policy, action credentials, audit, regional hosting, event volume pricing and failure modes are critical.
incident.io — incident.io [R140]	Incident coordination, workflows, timeline, communications and learning integrated with operational tools.	Slack or Teams, APIs, webhooks and integrations.	Assess chat tenancy, sensitive incident data, timeline fidelity, retention, audit, export, automation permissions and pricing.

Q.13.5. Q.13.5 Agent evaluation tracing and guardrails

Industry term: LLM observability agent tracing evaluation and guardrails.

Role in the thesis: Verification learning and governance. This category measures model and agent behavior, but the enterprise still needs domain-specific evaluation sets and business outcomes. Trace volume is not quality.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
LangSmith — LangChain [R141]	Tracing, datasets, experiments, evaluators and production monitoring for LLM and agent applications.	SDKs, APIs, framework integrations and OpenTelemetry-related options.	Inspect trace payloads, sampling, retention, regional or self-hosted options, RBAC, cost and export to portable telemetry.
Langfuse — Langfuse [R142]	Open-source LLM engineering platform for traces, prompts, evaluations, datasets and metrics.	SDKs, APIs, OpenTelemetry support and self-hosted or cloud deployment.	Open source improves deployment choice; teams still own scaling, upgrades, encryption, retention, tenancy and evaluator governance.
Braintrust — Braintrust [R143]	Evaluation datasets, experiments, scoring, tracing and production feedback for AI applications.	SDK, API, proxy and integrations.	Review data plane, evaluator code, retention, access, model credentials, consumption pricing, exports and reproducibility.
OpenTelemetry GenAI conventions — OpenTelemetry project [R144]	Vendor-neutral semantic conventions for generative AI events, metrics, model spans and agent-related telemetry.	OpenTelemetry APIs, SDKs and Collector ecosystem; portions may be development status.	Treat evolving attributes carefully, avoid sensitive prompt capture, control cardinality, pin convention versions and retain raw business outcomes separately.
OpenAI Evals — OpenAI [R145]	Platform guidance and APIs for defining and running evaluations against model outputs.	OpenAI platform API and evaluation tooling.	Separate provider-specific evaluation from portable datasets, control sensitive examples, budget repeated runs and validate graders against human judgment.

Q.13.6. Q.13.6 Model gateways routing and AI FinOps

Industry term: AI gateway LLM gateway and AI FinOps.

Role in the thesis: Governed model access and cost feedback. A gateway can normalize model access, route traffic, enforce budgets and record use. It cannot make unlike models interchangeable

or replace application-level safety and evaluation.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
LiteLLM Proxy — open-source project [R146]	OpenAI-compatible gateway and SDK across many providers with routing, retries, virtual keys, budgets, rate limits and spend tracking.	Proxy, Python SDK, APIs and containers. Open source plus enterprise options.	Operate the data plane, secure master and virtual keys, test provider parity, pin versions, validate telemetry and design direct-provider exit paths.
Kong AI Gateway — Kong [R147]	Gateway policies for model routing, usage governance, data governance, guardrails, transformations and network-isolated deployment.	Kong control and data plane, APIs and plugins.	Review edition and feature availability, deployment topology, plugin trust, latency, logging of sensitive content, pricing and dependency on Kong policy models.
Portkey AI Gateway — Portkey [R148]	Gateway for model routing, fallbacks, observability, budgets and guardrail integrations.	OpenAI-compatible endpoint, SDKs and APIs.	Validate hosted versus private deployment, key custody, logs, retention, model coverage, policy semantics, consumption pricing and export.
Azure API Management generative AI gateway — Microsoft [R149]	API Management policies for model endpoints including authentication, quotas, load balancing, semantic caching and token metrics where documented.	Azure API Management policies and Azure Monitor.	Strong fit for Azure estates; verify tier, regional availability, model-provider coverage, policy portability, latency, cost and non-Azure exit.

Q.13.7. Q.13.7 Data platforms search and retrieval infrastructure

Industry term: Vector database vector search and enterprise RAG infrastructure.

Role in the thesis: Runtime organizational context. Retrieval systems can provide grounded context, but quality depends on source permission, freshness, chunking, metadata, evaluation and deletion propagation. A vector index is not a knowledge authority.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Pinecone — Pinecone [R150]	Managed search supporting full-text, dense, sparse and hybrid retrieval for application context.	APIs and SDKs.	Assess tenancy, namespaces, region, encryption, metadata filters, deletion, backups, usage pricing, export and retrieval evaluation.
Elasticsearch vector search — Elastic [R151]	Vector, lexical and hybrid retrieval integrated with Elasticsearch indices and security controls.	REST APIs, clients and Elastic deployment options.	Can consolidate search but requires sizing, mapping, relevance tuning, license review, sensitive-field controls and cluster operations.
Databricks AI Search — Databricks [R152]	Managed vector and hybrid search built into the Databricks platform with Delta synchronization and REST queries.	Databricks service, REST API and Unity Catalog context.	Evaluate region, endpoint cost, index sync, model choice, Unity Catalog policy, source portability and Databricks dependence.
Snowflake Cortex Search — Snowflake [R153]	Managed hybrid search service over Snowflake data for retrieval-augmented applications.	SQL-managed service and REST access.	Review roles, warehouse and service cost, region, model processing, refresh lag, result controls and dependence on Snowflake data governance.

Q.13.8. Q.13.8 Workflow automation integration and durable execution

Industry term: iPaaS workflow automation and durable execution.

Role in the thesis: Cross system orchestration. These systems move events and data between enterprise applications or execute durable workflows. They can carry lifecycle events, but agent tool use still needs identity, policy, evidence and bounded authority.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Workato — Workato [R154]	Enterprise automation recipes and connectors across SaaS and business systems.	Connectors, APIs, webhooks and event automation.	Connector credentials, workspace separation, audit, recipe versioning, data residency, task pricing and exit to documented APIs matter.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
MuleSoft Anypoint Platform — Salesforce [R155]	API management and integration platform for designing, governing and operating enterprise integrations.	APIs, connectors, event and runtime products.	Strong governance can bring runtime and license complexity; verify identity propagation, deployment topology, policy, monitoring and portability.
n8n — n8n [R156]	Workflow automation with nodes, code steps, webhooks and self-hosted or cloud deployment.	Webhooks, APIs, connectors and self-hosted runtime. Source-available product.	Review license, credential vault, multi-tenancy, execution isolation, audit, scaling, node supply chain and workflow export.
Temporal — Temporal Technologies and open-source project [R157]	Durable workflow execution with persisted state, retries, timers and worker code.	SDKs, service API, self-hosted open source or managed cloud.	Useful orchestration primitive but requires workflow design, versioning, worker identity, payload encryption, visibility, capacity and operational expertise.
ServiceNow Workflow Automation — ServiceNow [R158]	Enterprise workflows and integrations across IT and business records on the Now Platform.	Platform workflows, APIs, spokes and connectors.	Assess record authority, role and delegated-development controls, subscription model, upgrade compatibility, data location and platform lock-in.

Q.13.9. Q.13.9 Engineering intelligence and decision support

Industry term: Engineering intelligence and software delivery intelligence.

Role in the thesis: Human decisions governance and learning. These products approximate parts of the decision platform through delivery metrics, allocation, change risk and scorecards. None of the reviewed products supplies the thesis end state: one durable cross-lifecycle decision packet with evidence, bounded delegated authority and closed-loop learning.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
LinearB — LinearB [R159]	Engineering workflow and delivery metrics connected to source control, work systems and team practices.	SaaS integrations, APIs and workflow automation as documented.	Define acceptable metrics, protect individual privacy, verify source access, identity mapping, retention, pricing and export.

Product and provider	Verified relevant capability	Integration and status	Enterprise considerations
Jellyfish — Jellyfish [R160]	Engineering management platform connecting engineering work and investment views.	Integrations with source and work systems.	Use for portfolio evidence rather than individual surveillance; validate classification logic, permissions, data history, retention and export.
DX — DX [R161]	Developer experience and engineering intelligence platform combining surveys, system data and organizational metrics.	SaaS integrations, APIs and data collection.	Govern survey confidentiality, metric definitions, identity joins, retention, regional processing, pricing and reproducibility outside the vendor.
Sleuth — Sleuth [R162]	Deployment tracking and change intelligence linking changes, deploys and delivery metrics.	SCM, CI/CD, incident and observability integrations.	Validate deployment detection, service mapping, change-failure logic, data retention, integration scopes and export.
Port or Cortex scorecards — Port and Cortex [R106][R107]	Catalog scorecards can surface standards and ownership exceptions near the service record.	Portal workflows, catalog data, rules and actions.	They are useful decision surfaces, but the enterprise must add cross-tool evidence, approval semantics, delegated authority and durable decision history.

Q.14. Q.14 Developer portals knowledge context orchestration and engineering intelligence

This matrix identifies the primary contribution of each category. A filled role does not mean a product provides the whole operating model; most categories contribute one evidence source or execution boundary.

Category	Primary lifecycle role	Evidence contribution	Control boundary
A	Coding; local planning	Diff and local execution evidence	Assistant remains inside repository and policy boundaries
B	Planning; execution; coding	Task, workspace, change and run evidence	Bounded authority and human sponsor
C	Review	Findings, suggested fixes and dispositions	Human approval and branch protection

Category	Primary lifecycle role	Evidence contribution	Control boundary
D	Execution	Environment, identity, command and artifact provenance	Isolation, network and secret policy
E	Intent; planning; decisions	Specification, ownership and state	Durable source of intent, not hidden runtime
F	Context; governance	Catalog, ownership, standards and actions	Paved-road access and scorecards
G	Context; learning	Authorized knowledge with provenance	Freshness, permissions and deletion
H	Context and tools	Tool/resource call and server metadata	Gateway, registry and tool-level policy
I	Planning and delegation	Agent Card, task state and artifact	Trusted registry and delegated authority
J	Verification; delivery	Pipeline, artifact, approval and deploy evidence	Immutable revision and environment protection
K	Verification	Test result, trace, contract and performance evidence	Independent oracle and reproducibility
L	Security; artifact trust	Finding, SBOM, signature and provenance	Policy at review and deployment
M	Delivery; learning	Exposure, experiment and rollback evidence	Flag lifecycle and health criteria
N	Operations; learning	Telemetry, incident, action and outcome	Action limits and feedback to backlog
O	Verification; learning	Trace, evaluation score and feedback	Domain dataset and sensitive-data policy
P	Governed model access	Route, tokens, cost and policy result	Provider portability and application safety
Q	Context retrieval	Index source, retrieval result and freshness	Source permission and exit format
R	Cross-system flow	Event, workflow state, retry and side effect	Identity propagation and idempotency
S	Decisions; governance	Metrics, change context and exception	Avoid surveillance and preserve definitions

Q.15. Q.15 Agent security control plane and guardrails

Industry terms: Agent security platform, AI security posture management, AI runtime security, AI firewall, agent identity and authorization, agent gateway, MCP gateway, secure code execution sandbox, and agent detection and response.

Role in the thesis: Independent enforcement across agent execution. This category protects both developer agents and agentically enabled products by combining isolation, identity, mediated access, deterministic policy, runtime inspection, evidence, and response. No single product currently supplies the entire control plane, and prompt or response filtering covers only part of the risk.

Q.15.1. Q.15.1 Architecture and selection model

Evaluate security coverage by control point rather than by a generic claim to provide guardrails. The relevant control points are build and configuration, execution environment, identity and delegation, tool discovery, pre-action authorization, network and data mediation, prompt and content inspection, multi-step behavior, output and transaction validation, audit, investigation, revocation, and recovery. Products often cover several adjacent points but rarely all of them.

Q.15.2. Q.15.2 Enterprise resources that require isolation or mediation

Enterprise resource	Required control	Preferred enforcement point	Evidence to retain
Source control and code review	Repository and branch allowlists; read versus commit, push, merge and administration; public-destination block; signed commits; protected branches.	Git proxy or source-control app with task-scoped token; branch protection and pre-action hook.	Repository, ref, operation, destination, diff, actor, policy decision and resulting commit or PR.
Packages dependencies and artifacts	Approved registries; malware, vulnerability, license and provenance checks; separate read, publish and promote rights.	Package and artifact proxy; immutable cache; signing and attestation service.	Resolved versions, source registry, hashes, SBOM, scan result, signature and promotion record.
CI CD and test systems	Approved workflows and inputs; fork and secret rules; environment separation; bounded runners; deployment approvals.	CI broker or narrowly scoped API; ephemeral runner sandbox; deployment gate.	Revision, workflow, inputs, runner image, test evidence, artifacts, approval and deployment state.
Cloud and infrastructure control planes	Account, project, region, resource type, quota and cost boundaries; plan before apply; deny destructive or public exposure by default.	Cloud action broker; policy as code; admission control; just-in-time workload identity.	Plan, policy evaluation, caller, affected resources, cost estimate, approval, change and rollback.

Enterprise resource	Required control	Preferred enforcement point	Evidence to retain
Production services and administration	Read-only diagnosis by default; action catalog rather than general shell; tenant and data-class checks; dual control for high impact.	Operations gateway, runbook service, database proxy or service-owned task API.	Purpose, tenant, query or action, rows or objects affected, before and after state, approver and verification.
Work management documentation and support	Constrain project, space, visibility and audience; prevent public publication; redact sensitive content; preserve provenance.	Jira, documentation, support and collaboration proxies or governed MCP tools.	Object IDs, visibility, content classification, citations, mutations, notifications and owner.
MCP A2A and external tools	Trusted registry; server and agent identity; tool schema and argument validation; delegation depth; destination and capability allowlists.	MCP or agent gateway with identity propagation, rate limits, inspection and kill switch.	Discovery, selected capability, delegated authority, tool calls, artifacts, task state and downstream agents.
Open web email and outbound communications	Deny by default for autonomous execution; destination and method restrictions; anti-exfiltration checks; explicit approval for sending or publishing.	Egress proxy, browser isolation, mail or publishing broker, DLP and content policy.	Destination, method, payload classification, approval, response metadata and retained evidence.

Q.15.3. Q.15.3 Harness hooks and hard stops

Agent harnesses increasingly expose lifecycle hooks before and after tool use. GitHub Copilot documents preToolUse controls that can allow, deny, ask, or modify a call, plus post-tool and session hooks; Anthropic documents comparable Claude Code hook and sandbox mechanisms. These are valuable enforcement and telemetry points, but their trust level depends on where configuration and code live. Organization-controlled policy must take precedence over user and repository configuration, critical checks should fail closed, and a hook should never hold broader credentials than the action it is inspecting. GitHub's documentation, for example, notes that cloud-agent tool calls are otherwise pre-approved and that hook timeouts can fail open, which must be considered in threat modeling. [R258–R260]

- Pre-session: validate repository trust, task sponsor, requested autonomy, base image, network policy, tool registry, and credential plan.
- Pre-tool: canonicalize the action, validate arguments and destination, apply policy, redact or replace credentials, and deny unsafe operations before they leave the harness.

- Post-tool: record result and side effects, scan returned content for indirect injection or secrets, compare expected with actual state, and constrain what re-enters model context.
- Pre-commit and pre-push: enforce protected destinations, secret scanning, signing, provenance, policy checks, and public-repository hard stops independently of the model's intent.
- Pre-deploy and production action: require immutable revision evidence, change risk, authorization, tenant and environment checks, rollback readiness, and human approval at the defined tier.
- Stop and response: detect loops, budget exhaustion, scope drift or anomalous sequences; revoke credentials, terminate execution, quarantine artifacts, and retain an incident-ready trace.

Q.15.4. Q.15.4 Representative agent security product landscape

Industry category	Representative products and approaches	Primary contribution	Enterprise evaluation focus
Agent security platform and AI SPM	Palo Alto Networks Prisma AIRS (the platform packaging Palo Alto's 2025 Protect AI acquisition; product naming may shift as the portfolio consolidates); Noma Security; Check Point AI Agent Security incorporating Lakera technology (packaged product name and boundaries may shift); HiddenLayer AISec Platform; Microsoft's agent-security posture, which is not a single "Defender agent runtime protection" SKU but a capability spread across Defender for Cloud AI security posture management, Microsoft Purview data and DLP controls, and Entra Agent ID for identity.	Discovery, posture, agent and MCP inventory, risk mapping, runtime visibility, policy and response across deployed agents. [R263–R267, R270–R271]	Verify actual coverage for endpoint coding agents, homegrown agents and SaaS builders; enforcement path; identity integration; session reconstruction; multi-step detection; deployment mode and latency. Because several of these are recently rebranded or assembled from acquisitions, verify the current product name, SKU composition and support model at procurement time.

Industry category	Representative products and approaches	Primary contribution	Enterprise evaluation focus
AI runtime security and AI firewall	Palo Alto Prisma AIRS Runtime Security (product naming and packaging still shifting after the Protect AI acquisition); Cisco AI Defense; Google Model Armor; Check Point Lakera Guard (packaged within Check Point AI Agent Security; naming may shift); NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails; Amazon Bedrock Guardrails.	Prompt, response, retrieved-content and sometimes tool-interaction inspection for injection, jailbreak, data leakage, malicious content and policy violations. [R263–R269]	Test indirect injection through tool results, structured and multimodal data, false-block rate, tenant policy, streaming, fallback behavior and whether blocking is independently enforced. Reverify current product names and SKU boundaries at procurement.
Agent identity and delegated access	Microsoft Entra Agent ID (preview / evolving — capabilities, GA scope and Conditional Access integration are still maturing and should be reverified at procurement); cloud workload identity, OAuth 2.0, SPIFFE and enterprise IAM components.	Distinct agent identities, sponsors, lifecycle, Conditional Access (where available in preview), authentication, authorization and logged resource use. [R256, R272]	Identity alone does not express purpose, transaction limits or complete delegation, and preview features may not carry standard enterprise SLAs. Test short-lived credentials, user-on-behalf-of flows, revocation, non-repudiation and ownership transfer, and confirm which Entra Agent ID capabilities are GA versus preview at the time of procurement.
Agent and MCP gateways	Kong AI Gateway and MCP Gateway; Cloudflare AI Gateway; Solo agentgateway; Gravitee; WSO2; TrueFoundry AI Gateway; service-specific brokers.	Centralized model or tool access, identity propagation, policy, routing, schema controls, quotas, observability and a place to integrate runtime security. [R17, R273]	A generic gateway may see messages but not operating-system actions or business transaction semantics. Verify protocol support, streaming, tool-level authorization, audit export and fail behavior.

Industry category	Representative products and approaches	Primary contribution	Enterprise evaluation focus
Secure code execution and cloud sandboxes	OpenAI Codex cloud sandboxes; Claude Code sandboxing and web execution; E2B; Modal Sandboxes; Daytona; Runloop; Kubernetes or microVM platforms assembled in-house.	Ephemeral isolated compute for generated or untrusted code, with filesystem, process, network, resource and lifecycle boundaries. [R257, R258, R261–R262]	Compare container versus stronger isolation, egress policy, inbound exposure, credential injection, cache separation, snapshot retention, tenant isolation, image provenance, teardown and evidence export.
Harness hooks and policy enforcement	GitHub Copilot hooks and policy hooks; Claude Code hooks; OpenAI Codex sandbox and approval policies; Noma Open Enforcement; OPA or Cedar-based enterprise policy services.	Pre-action allow, deny, ask or argument mutation; post-action inspection; organization policy; logging; escalation and integration with external enforcement. [R257–R260, R270]	Determine who controls hooks, whether repository content can bypass them, timeout and error behavior, sensitive logging, coverage of subprocesses and whether enforcement remains outside the model.
AI red teaming evaluation and model supply chain	Palo Alto Prisma AIRS Red Teaming and Model Security; HiddenLayer Model Scanner and runtime security; Noma AI Red Teaming; Protect AI tooling; established application security scanners.	Adversarial testing, model and artifact scanning, AI bills of materials, vulnerability and malicious-model detection, and continuous control validation. [R263, R270–R271]	Use representative multi-turn agent workflows and real tools; preserve reproducibility; separate model, application, tool, identity and infrastructure findings; convert validated failures into production policy and tests.

Q.15.5. Q.15.5 Recommended enterprise baseline

- Inventory every agent, harness, MCP server, tool, model, identity, owner and reachable data or system; record risk class and kill-switch state.
- Default autonomous compute to ephemeral isolation, no ambient credentials, restricted writable storage, no inbound access, deny-by-default egress, quotas, time limits and verified teardown.

- Use per-run workload identity and short-lived delegated credentials; bind authority to sponsor, task, purpose, tenant, resource, permitted operations, budget and expiry.
- Broker access to source control, CI, artifacts, packages, cloud control planes, production services, data, ticketing, documentation, communications, MCP and A2A. Prefer task APIs and action catalogs over general shells.
- Place deterministic policy before side effects through administrator-controlled hooks, gateways, branch protection, admission controllers and transaction checks; make public publication, credential export, destructive production changes and authority expansion hard stops.
- Inspect untrusted prompts, retrieved content, tool descriptions, tool results and outputs; validate transaction arguments at the destination; monitor multi-step behavior rather than isolated messages.
- Retain redacted but reconstructable agent-native telemetry and side-effect evidence; correlate it with the work item, human sponsor, repository revision, deployed artifact and production outcome.
- Exercise revocation, cancellation, rollback, quarantine and global stop paths; continuously evaluate prompt injection, data exfiltration, malicious dependencies, poisoned repositories, confused-deputy behavior, scope drift and runaway loops.

Q.15.6. Q.15.6 Market interpretation

The market is consolidating but remains layered. Cloud and model providers offer native guardrails; security vendors are expanding from AI posture and prompt inspection into agent discovery, identity context, tool-call visibility and runtime enforcement; coding-agent vendors are adding sandboxes, approvals and hooks; gateway vendors are extending model traffic control toward MCP and agents; and sandbox vendors provide execution primitives. The likely enterprise architecture is compositional. Security teams should select control points and evidence contracts first, then decide which layers to buy, assemble, or require from platform vendors. Product claims and integrations should be rechecked quarterly because this category is changing rapidly.

Q.16. Q.16 Build buy partner procurement portability maturity and market white space

Buy when the capability is a differentiated managed service whose operational burden would distract from the platform, provided the enterprise can preserve identity, evidence and exit. Build when the capability encodes proprietary policy or provides a shared control boundary that products must not fragment. Partner when a vendor supplies specialized execution or data while the enterprise retains the orchestration contract and evidence ledger.

Decision factor	Bias toward buy	Bias toward build	Partner or hybrid pattern
Differentiation	Commodity workflow with mature integrations	Policy, decision semantics or context are strategic	Vendor engine behind enterprise API or gateway

Decision factor	Bias toward buy	Bias toward build	Partner or hybrid pattern
Control boundary	Vendor controls satisfy target risk	Identity, egress, secrets or approval require local enforcement	Dedicated data plane or customer-managed runner
Time and skill	Rapid pilot has measurable outcome	Team can operate the capability reliably	Vendor implementation plus internal platform owner
Interoperability	Open API, events and export are sufficient	Core artifacts risk proprietary lock-in	Canonical internal schema with replaceable adapters
Economics	Consumption aligns with verified value	Scale or vendor margin makes operation economical	Committed capacity with budget and routing controls
Learning	Vendor feedback loop is acceptable	Cross-tool learning is the strategic asset	Export traces and outcomes into enterprise evaluation

Q.16.1. Q.16.1 Evaluation criteria by category

- Coding and agents: accepted changes, reviewer time, escaped defects, task completion with evidence, cancellation behavior and cost per accepted change.
- Execution environments: startup latency, isolation test results, secret exposure, egress policy, reproducibility, teardown proof and compute per task.
- Review security and testing: severity-weighted precision, known-defect recall, false block rate, deployability, flaky results and time to trustworthy evidence.
- Delivery and operations: change lead time, change failure, recovery time, blast radius, rollback success, incident evidence quality and learning converted to owned work.
- Context and retrieval: permission fidelity, source freshness, citation accuracy, deletion propagation, retrieval quality, latency and cost per useful context packet.
- Gateways protocols and integration: identity propagation, policy coverage, tool or route inventory, audit completeness, failure isolation, version compatibility and exit rehearsal.
- Decision and intelligence surfaces: decision latency, evidence completeness, ownership clarity, reversibility, privacy, metric reproducibility and fewer manual status requests.

Q.16.2. Q.16.2 Interoperability portability and maturity

Q.16.3. Q.16.3 Portability assessment

Layer	Prefer	Warning sign	Exit evidence
Protocols	Documented HTTP APIs, OAuth or workload identity, webhooks, OpenTelemetry, MCP or A2A where appropriate	Undocumented automation or protocol label without authorization semantics	Contract tests and replaceable adapter
Data	Bulk export, stable identifiers, source links, timestamps and deletion APIs	Opaque embeddings, summaries or scores as the only record	Periodic tested export and re-import
Artifacts	Git commits, OCI images, SBOMs, attestations, JUnit or SARIF, Pact and OTel	Vendor-only evidence that cannot be independently verified	Signed copies in enterprise retention store
Identity	User and workload identities with scopes, delegation and revocation	Shared long-lived tokens or agent acting as administrator	Credential rotation and emergency disable test
Events	Signed, idempotent events with ordering keys and replay or reconciliation	Polling-only state or side effects without correlation IDs	Event archive and reconciliation runbook
Economics	Attributable usage, budgets, limits and exportable billing data	Bundled credits that hide unit cost or runaway retries	Cost baseline and provider substitution exercise

Q.16.4. Q.16.4 Maturity map as of September 5 2026

Maturity	Usable examples	Interpretation
Usable now	IDE assistants, cloud workspaces, CI CD, test tools, AppSec, flags, observability, incident systems, portals, APIs and webhooks	Mature enough for governed pilots or production when conventional enterprise controls are verified.
Emerging	Asynchronous coding agents, AI review, agent sandboxes, MCP registries and gateways, A2A endpoints, agent evaluation and AI operations assistance	Capabilities are real, but feature status, interoperability, identity and evaluation vary. Use narrow scopes and explicit fallbacks.

Maturity	Usable examples	Interpretation
Thesis gap	Cross-lifecycle decision packet, unified evidence and provenance, portable bounded delegation, autonomy earned from outcomes, and learning that updates every stage	No reviewed product provides the complete operating system. The enterprise platform must compose these capabilities and retain the durable control model.

Q.16.5. Q.16.5 White space in the current market

Current products cluster around one surface: code, a pull request, a workspace, a pipeline, a service, an incident, or an evaluation trace. The thesis requires a durable object that follows a consequential question across those surfaces. That object must preserve the alternatives considered, cited evidence, delegated authority, accountable human decision, downstream result and later learning. No reviewed product fully implements that chain.

- Durable cross-lifecycle decision packet and inbox. Existing work items and incident channels can host decisions, but they do not consistently bind evidence, authority, expiry and outcome across tools.
- Unified provenance and evidence. Individual platforms record their own runs, findings and artifacts; the enterprise still needs a canonical lineage joining specification, context, agent task, code, review, test, release and production outcome.
- Bounded delegated authority. OAuth scopes and roles grant access, but they rarely express purpose, budget, blast radius, time limit, permitted side effects, required evidence and escalation in one portable delegation.
- Learning loops across tools. Evaluation platforms learn about model behavior and incident systems capture corrective actions, but validated lessons do not automatically update specifications, context, tests, policy, paved roads and autonomy tiers.
- Portable enterprise agent registry. MCP and A2A provide useful discovery mechanisms, yet approved identity, risk classification, ownership, versions, evaluation, cost and kill-switch state remain enterprise responsibilities.

Q.17. Q.17 Reference stack patterns

These patterns show how categories can align around an operating model. They are starting points for evaluation, not recommendations or claims of complete compatibility.

Read these patterns in the light of Q.16.4 and Q.16.5. Each stack represents the closest coherent bundle of products an enterprise can assemble today; none of them closes the gaps identified in Q.16. The durable cross-lifecycle decision packet, unified provenance ledger, portable bounded delegation, outcome-earned autonomy tiers and cross-tool learning loop remain enterprise responsibilities that the buyer must build or compose on top of these stacks. Treat the patterns as starting configurations for the paved road, not as a shipped operating system.

Enterprise posture	Illustrative components	Control plane emphasis	Primary risks to test
Microsoft and GitHub centric	GitHub Copilot and coding agent; Codespaces; Actions; Advanced Security; Azure Boards and Pipelines; Azure API Management; Azure Monitor or existing observability	Entra and GitHub identity, protected environments, Actions evidence, Azure policy and cost allocation	Cross-tenant identity, runner and MCP permissions, premium-request spend, regional data paths and GitHub/Azure exit
Atlassian and GitLab centric	GitLab Duo, CI CD and security; Jira and Confluence with Rovo MCP; Backstage or commercial portal; existing observability and incident tools	Composite agent identity, runner isolation, Jira ownership, Rovo scopes and GitLab evidence	Agent credit model, duplicated workflow state, self-managed operations, MCP write permissions and cross-vendor correlation
Cloud neutral and open source	Backstage; Dev Containers or Coder; Kubernetes Jobs; SWE-agent or selected coding client; GitHub/GitLab-compatible CI; Argo CD/Rollouts; Sigstore/SLSA; OTel; Langfuse; LiteLLM	Enterprise identity gateway, Kubernetes policy, artifact standards, OTel evidence and replaceable adapters	Operational burden, plugin and image supply chain, fragmented support, upgrades, tenancy and hidden integration labor
Regulated enterprise	Customer-managed or dedicated workspaces; private model gateway; approved coding assistant; conventional CI/CD and AppSec; signed provenance; restricted MCP registry; read-only operations agents	Workload identity, deny-by-default egress, data residency, immutable audit, segregation of duties, approval and retention	Vendor subprocessors, prompt or code retention, privileged connectors, evidence admissibility, incident access and recovery when AI services fail

Q.17.1. Q.16.6 Procurement pilot and maintenance checklist

Q.18. Security and data

- Document every data class sent to the service, including code, prompts, tool results, telemetry, customer content, secrets and generated artifacts.
- Confirm whether customer data is used for model training or product improvement; record opt-out, zero-retention and subprocessors in the contract.
- Verify tenancy, encryption, data residency, retention, deletion, backup, legal hold, breach notification and administrative audit.
- Test identity and credentials for humans and workloads: SSO, SCIM, RBAC, scopes, delegation,

rotation, revocation, just-in-time access and emergency disable.

- For execution products, test isolation, non-root behavior, image provenance, network egress, secret redaction, cache boundaries, teardown and malicious repository instructions.

Q.19. Reliability operations and evidence

- Define service levels, rate limits, quotas, concurrency, queue behavior, timeout, cancellation, retry, idempotency and degraded mode.
- Observe the product itself: task state, commands or tool calls, model and version, cost, policy decisions, errors, latency and artifact lineage.
- Require evidence export in useful formats and correlate every task to a sponsor, work item, repository revision, environment and outcome.
- Exercise failure behavior before production: unavailable model, revoked credential, partial write, duplicated event, stale context, unsafe suggestion and runaway loop.
- Define rollback for product configuration and for changes produced or executed by the product. Keep a non-AI path for critical delivery and response.

Q.20. Economics evaluation and exit

- Name the cost unit: seat, premium request, token, compute minute, agent session, workflow task, indexed data, telemetry volume or managed capacity.
- Set pilot budgets and measure cost per accepted outcome, not demonstrations or generated lines. Include human verification and integration labor.
- Use a representative, held-out evaluation set with routine work, high-risk changes, ambiguous specifications, prompt injection, failures and cancellations.
- Define success and stop conditions before the pilot. Record false positives, unsafe actions, work transferred to reviewers, reliability and user override patterns.
- Test export, credential revocation, adapter replacement, artifact continuity and data deletion. Price the effort to leave before accepting enterprise lock-in.

Q.20.1. Q.16.7 Quarterly maintenance guidance

Review this appendix quarterly. For every retained product, verify the cited page, product and company name, availability status, supported integrations, identity model, region, retention, price unit and deprecation notices. Record additions or removals as dated changes. Move a product between maturity bands only when official documentation and enterprise testing support the change.

Q.21. Q.18 Ambient and autonomous agent product landscape

The categories below correspond to the eight ambient-agent classes in the ambient-agents chapter. Products marked **"ambient by design"** are built as always-on agents; products marked **"ambient**

via configuration" are general platforms that can be operated in an ambient mode. Products marked **"emerging"** are not yet in general availability as of Sept 2026 and should be evaluated with a preview caveat. Verify status and pricing at the cited source before selection.

Q.21.1. Q.18.1 Codebase and repository hygiene

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
Dependabot (GitHub)	Ambient by design	Dependency version updates with security and compatibility awareness; scheduled per repo	R285
Renovate (Mend)	Ambient by design	Multi-platform dependency updater with richer policy language than Dependabot	R286
Snyk Open Source	Ambient by design	Vulnerability-informed dependency updates with reachability analysis	R297
OpenRewrite (open source)	Ambient via configuration	Recipe-driven source transformation, runs at fleet scale	R287
Moderne (commercial OpenRewrite)	Ambient via configuration	Managed OpenRewrite platform for multi-repo campaigns	R288
Grit	Ambient via configuration	Pattern-based codemods and migrations across languages	R289
Codegen (Codegen Inc)	Ambient via configuration	AI-native code transformation platform	R290
Sourcegraph Amp	Ambient via configuration	Batch code changes and autonomous coding across the graph	R318

Q.21.2. Q.18.2 Fleet-wide refactoring and migration

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
OpenRewrite / Moderne	Ambient via configuration	Framework version campaigns (Spring, JUnit, JDK) at fleet scale	R287, R288
Devin (scheduled tasks)	Emerging	Long-running autonomous coding agent; supports scheduled multi-repo work	R291
GitHub Copilot autonomous agent	Emerging (preview)	Agent that can accept multi-step issue work asynchronously	R319
Cursor Bugbot	Emerging	Autonomous bug-fix agent operating asynchronously on issue backlog	R320
Refraction	Ambient by design	Language-model-based bulk refactors	R321

Q.21.3. Q.18.3 Observability, FinOps, and infrastructure optimization

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
Datadog LLM Observability	Ambient by design	Continuous observation of LLM applications and cost	R292
Chronosphere	Ambient by design	Observability platform with continuous anomaly and cost analysis	R293
Vantage	Ambient by design	Cloud cost analytics with anomaly detection	R294
Cast AI	Ambient by design	Kubernetes cost optimization with autonomous right-sizing	R295
Kubecost (IBM)	Ambient by design	Kubernetes cost allocation and anomaly detection	R322
Cloudability (Apptio/IBM)	Ambient by design	Multi-cloud cost anomaly and rightsizing	R323

Q.21.4. Q.18.4 Continuous security and compliance

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
Wiz	Ambient by design	Cloud security posture with continuous scanning and prioritization	R296
Snyk (Code / Container / Cloud)	Ambient by design	Continuous vulnerability scanning across surfaces	R297
GitHub Advanced Security	Ambient by design	Repo-embedded continuous secret and dependency scanning	R298
Semgrep	Ambient via configuration	Continuous static analysis rule engine	R299
Prisma AIRS (Palo Alto)	Ambient by design	AI-specific runtime security and posture (subject to product-name evolution)	R300
Vanta	Ambient by design	Continuous compliance evidence collection	R324
Drata	Ambient by design	Continuous compliance monitoring for SOC 2 / ISO 27001	R325
Secureframe	Ambient by design	Continuous compliance with AI-assisted evidence collection	R326

Q.21.5. Q.18.5 Knowledge production and organizational learning

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
Glean	Ambient by design	Enterprise knowledge search with agentic retrieval	R301
Mintlify	Ambient via configuration	AI-assisted documentation with continuous drift detection	R302
Notion AI	Ambient via configuration	Assisted knowledge work; can be operated in ambient mode	R303
Confluence AI (Atlassian)	Ambient via configuration	Wiki AI assistance with content operations	R327
Backstage TechDocs	Ambient via configuration	Docs-as-code with continuous drift check	R328

Q.21.6. Q.18.6 Ecosystem and market intelligence

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
Artificial Analysis	Ambient by design	Continuous frontier model benchmarking and pricing	R304
Hugging Face Inference Providers	Ambient via configuration	Model routing / hosting; landscape metadata via API	R329
Papers with Code	Ambient by design	Continuous ML paper + code linkage	R330

Ecosystem intelligence is under-served as a commercial category; most enterprises assemble their own scanners on top of public feeds. Custom implementation with Anthropic Claude Agent SDK or LangChain is common.

Q.21.7. Q.18.7 Data engineering and ML lifecycle

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
MLflow (Databricks)	Ambient via configuration	Model tracking + registry; ambient triggers configurable	R305
Weights & Biases	Ambient via configuration	Experiment tracking with drift monitoring	R306
Fiddler AI	Ambient by design	Continuous model performance and drift monitoring	R307
Arize AI	Ambient by design	Continuous model observability and drift	R308
Great Expectations	Ambient by design	Continuous data quality validation	R309

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
Monte Carlo	Ambient by design	Data observability with autonomous anomaly detection	R310
Anomalo	Ambient by design	Autonomous data quality monitoring	R331
Soda	Ambient by design	Data quality monitoring with anomaly detection	R332

Q.21.8. Q.18.8 Product analytics, customer feedback, and org-meta

Product	Ambient status	What it does	Reference
Fin by Intercom	Ambient by design	Continuous customer conversation classification and response	R311
Enterpret	Ambient by design	Continuous customer feedback classification and routing	R312
Kraftful	Ambient by design	Product feedback analysis with continuous synthesis	R313
Unwrap	Ambient by design	Customer feedback aggregation with continuous theme extraction	R314
PostHog Session AI	Ambient by design	Session recording with continuous AI analysis	R315
Jellyfish	Ambient by design	Engineering intelligence with continuous team-flow analytics	R316
LinearB	Ambient by design	Engineering benchmarking with continuous team-health monitoring	R317
Swarmia	Ambient by design	Engineering effectiveness with continuous review-cycle analytics	R333

Q.21.9. Q.18.9 Build vs buy analysis for ambient agents

Ambient agents split naturally into two build-vs-buy categories:

Buy first, differentiate later. Categories where commercial products are mature and the differentiator is not the agent but the enterprise context that surrounds it: dependency updating (Dependabot/Renovate), security scanning (Wiz/Snyk), compliance evidence (Vanta/Drata), cost anomaly (Vantage/Cast AI), data quality (Monte Carlo/Great Expectations), feedback classification (Enterpret/Kraftful). Adopt the best-fit commercial product, wrap it in the enterprise constitution mechanism, and route its output into the enterprise decision-packet system. Building from scratch here is not a good use of platform engineering.

Build first, buy specific components. Categories where the value is in enterprise-specific

behavior: fleet migration agents, runbook synthesis agents, ecosystem intelligence agents, ADR maintenance agents, cross-team dependency detection. Commercial products exist (OpenRewrite/Moderne for migration, Glean for knowledge) but the enterprise-specific configuration is more consequential than the platform. Build on top of an agent framework (Anthropic Claude Agent SDK, LangChain, or an internal harness) with commercial components where they clearly fit.

Hybrid, common. Model landscape scanning, complex compliance evidence assembly, and organizational-meta agents are typically hybrid — assembled from a commercial telemetry base plus a custom analysis layer plus enterprise-specific routing.

Q.21.10. Q.18.10 Emerging category: ambient-agent management platforms

A small but growing category of **management platforms for ambient agents** is emerging in 2026 (LangGraph deployments, LangSmith agent observability, Anthropic Agent SDK operators, custom internal platforms). No commercial product yet occupies the full "ambient portfolio + constitution + governance" position described in Part Six; enterprises building at scale currently assemble this from components.

Q.21.11. Q.18.11 Quarterly maintenance for Q.18

Ambient-agent vendors move faster than most categories in this appendix; product names, capabilities, and even category boundaries shift on a per-quarter cadence. Reverify every row of Q.18 before citing in a procurement decision. Watch specifically for: acquisitions that consolidate categories, model-vendor bundling that changes pricing, and new entrants in the ambient-agent management platform category (Q.18.10) which is where the most movement is expected in 2027.

Appendix R: Ambient agents: 20+ patterns for always-on engineering work

This appendix names 24 ambient agent patterns worth building or buying, one per implementer-ready specification. Each pattern uses the same fields so the catalog can be compared row-to-row and extended cleanly:

- **Class** — the ambient-agents chapter taxonomy class (1 through 8)
- **Purpose** — what the agent produces
- **Trigger** — scheduled / signal / event / continuous / curiosity
- **Autonomy tier (default)** — canonical T0–T4; may be authorized higher after evaluation
- **Ownership** — the team or role that is accountable
- **Constitution rules (key)** — the two or three principles that matter most; the full constitution is longer
- **Evidence produced** — what lands in the evidence chain
- **Cost profile** — continuous-low / batch-burst / watch-deep-dive
- **Governance concerns** — the failure modes to design against
- **Vendor examples** — market products that implement the pattern in whole or in part

The patterns are organized by class. An enterprise adopting ambient agents does not need to implement all 24; picking two from Phase 1 of the adoption sequence (the ambient-agents chapter) is a reasonable start.

R.1. Class 1 — Codebase and repository hygiene

R.1.1. R.1 Dependency updater

Purpose

Keeps dependency manifests current with a policy that respects semantic versioning, license compatibility, and CVE severity.

Trigger

T1 scheduled (typically daily or weekly per repo).

Autonomy tier

T2 for patch bumps in trusted crates; T1 for minor; T0 for major (requires human evaluation).

Ownership

Platform Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never bump a major version without opening a decision packet for the service owner.

- Never bump when CVE data is unavailable.
- Fail closed if the supply-chain attestation is missing.

Evidence produced

Version diff, changelog excerpt, CVE posture before and after, test-run results, signed provenance.

Cost profile

Continuous low.

Governance concerns

Fan-out (one bad update repeated across many services); dependency confusion attacks; false CVE positives.

Vendor examples

Dependabot (R285), Renovate (R286), Snyk update suggestions (R297).

R.1.2. R.2 Deprecation migration

Purpose

Converts callers of a deprecated API to the replacement, one service at a time, across the fleet.

Trigger

T1 scheduled + T2 signal (Council approves the migration campaign).

Autonomy tier

T2 (proposes; author merges).

Ownership

Owner of the API being deprecated.

Constitution rules

- Never migrate services outside the declared scope.
- Never touch a service whose owning team has not opted in.
- Pace to N migrations per week to respect reviewer capacity.

Evidence produced

Per-service PR link, test results, migration guide citation, before/after behavior comparison where possible.

Cost profile

Batch burst over the migration window.

Governance concerns

Widening scope beyond declared services; misinterpreting the migration guide.

Vendor examples

OpenRewrite / Moderne recipes (R287, R288), Grit (R289), Devin scheduled tasks (R291).

R.1.3. R.3 Dead code sweep

Purpose

Identifies unreachable code, unused exports, unused configuration flags, and unused feature toggles; opens decision packets proposing removal.

Trigger

T1 scheduled (monthly per repo).

Autonomy tier

T1 (always recommends; author reviews).

Ownership

Repository owning team.

Constitution rules

- Never propose removal of code without a full call-graph analysis.
- Respect explicit `@keep` annotations.
- Never remove feature-flag machinery without checking the flag's production usage.

Evidence produced

Call-graph analysis, usage telemetry query results, git-blame context for the affected code.

Cost profile

Batch burst monthly.

Governance concerns

Chesterton's fence — removing code the agent does not understand the purpose of; missing dynamic dispatch; missing test fixtures that reference the code.

Vendor examples

Sourcegraph Amp (R318), custom internal tools.

R.1.4. R.4 Documentation drift correction

Purpose

Detects when documentation no longer matches the code it describes and proposes corrections.

Trigger

T3 event (on merge that changes public API) + T1 scheduled sweep.

Autonomy tier

T2 (opens PR against docs repo; docs owner merges).

Ownership

The team that owns the documented capability.

Constitution rules

- Never rewrite documentation without citing the code change that prompted it.
- Never remove examples; propose replacements.
- Preserve tone and voice of surrounding documentation.

Evidence produced

Diff of the affected code, current documentation excerpt, proposed replacement, cite to the API definition.

Cost profile

Per-merge low + monthly sweep burst.

Governance concerns

Documentation regressions if the agent's understanding of the API is wrong.

Vendor examples

Mintlify (R302), Notion AI (R303), custom implementations using Anthropic Claude Agent SDK.

R.1.5. R.5 Test flakiness detection and repair

Purpose

Watches CI results, identifies tests with intermittent failures uncorrelated with code changes, and proposes stabilization patches or quarantine.

Trigger

T3 event (on each CI run).

Autonomy tier

T2 (proposes; test owner reviews).

Ownership

Quality Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never delete a test.
- Never mark a test as skipped without opening a decision packet.
- Distinguish flakiness from real intermittent bugs.

Evidence produced

Historical failure pattern, hypothesis of cause, proposed fix, quarantine metadata.

Cost profile

Continuous low.

Governance concerns

Masking real bugs by treating them as flake.

Vendor examples

Datadog Flaky Test Management (R292), CircleCI Test Insights, custom implementations.

R.1.6. R.25 Technical debt inventory

Purpose

Maintains a per-service, per-surface **debt inventory** with citations, prioritization by risk × leverage, and DORA-attributed outcome tracking. See the debt chapter for the larger operating model this pattern serves.

Trigger

T1 daily incremental + T1 weekly full pass. Autonomy tier:: T1 (recommends; owning team decides which items enter a campaign).

Ownership

Platform Engineering + service owning team.

Constitution rules

- Every finding cites the specific file/function/dependency plus at least one incident, changelog entry, or dependency-vulnerability record supporting the debt claim.
- No finding without a proposed remediation approach (Mikado seed, Strangler wrap, in-place fix, or explicit "accept as documented constraint").
- Prioritization ranks by **reversibility-adjusted leverage**: high- blast-radius but easy-to-undo work ranks above high-blast-radius but hard-to-undo work of the same estimated value.
- Never propose autonomous remediation of items whose risk class the Autonomy Council has not blessed for the current tier.

Evidence produced

Per-service debt score with trend line; per-finding citation bundle; suggested remediation approach with Mikado/Strangler applicability flag; DORA-attribution correlation IDs so downstream campaigns can be measured.

Cost profile

Continuous low (incremental) plus weekly heavier full-pass burst.

Governance concerns

- Debt scoring becomes a KPI on people rather than a health signal on code; the ownership section of every finding names a **system** first, a **team** second, and never an individual.
- Findings become noise if the signal-to-noise budget is not enforced — set an explicit budget and demote to T0 if exceeded.
- Comprehension check: the agent must produce a short explanation of the surrounding code as part of every finding; a reviewer either accepts the explanation or corrects it, and the correction feeds back into agent context.

Vendor examples

Sourcegraph Amp (R318) and OpenRewrite/Moderne (R287, R288) for the mechanical parts; SonarQube and Snyk for some finding types; the full pattern is custom on top of these

components. No commercial product yet occupies the whole "debt inventory + Mikado harness + DORA attribution" position.

R.2. Class 2 — Fleet-wide refactoring and migration

R.2.1. R.6 Framework version bump campaign

Purpose

Coordinates a fleet-wide upgrade of a major framework version (Spring, Django, Rails, Node LTS) with per-service compatibility testing.

Trigger

T2 signal (Council-approved campaign) + T1 pacing.

Autonomy tier

T2 (proposes per-service PR; owner merges).

Ownership

Framework-owning platform team.

Constitution rules

- Respect the pacing cap of N services per week.
- Never advance if the previous week's error budget was exceeded.
- Preserve service-specific customizations noted in the manifest.

Evidence produced

Per-service diff, test suite result, compatibility-matrix update, framework changelog cite.

Cost profile

Heavy batch burst.

Governance concerns

Cascading failure if a per-service issue is misdiagnosed as universal.

Vendor examples

Moderne recipes (R288), OpenRewrite (R287), Codegen (R290).

R.2.2. R.7 CVE patch propagation

Purpose

Detects a newly disclosed CVE affecting a fleet-wide dependency and propagates the patch to affected services with priority informed by exploitability.

Trigger

T2 signal (CVE disclosure via NVD / GitHub advisory).

Autonomy tier

T3 for reversible patches in low-blast-radius classes; T2 otherwise.

Ownership

Security Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never bypass the standard test suite even for security patches.
- Priority ordering is exploitability × exposure × blast radius.
- Emit an incident record if a patch cannot be applied within SLA.

Evidence produced

CVE record, affected-services list, per-service patch PR, test results, deployment status.

Cost profile

Signal-triggered burst.

Governance concerns

Panic patching that introduces regressions.

Vendor examples

GitHub Advanced Security (R298), Wiz (R296), Snyk (R297), Semgrep Supply Chain (R299).

R.2.3. R.8 Configuration drift correction

Purpose

Compares live production configuration against declared policy (IaC, Kubernetes manifests, feature flags), flags drift, and proposes reconciliation.

Trigger

T1 daily.

Autonomy tier

T2 for known-safe reconciliations (adding missing labels, aligning resource requests); T1 for structural drift.

Ownership

Reliability Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never reconcile without a linked change ticket if the drift is larger than a single field.
- Never touch break-glass configuration.
- Respect declared "known drift" annotations.

Evidence produced

Diff between declared and observed, proposed reconciliation plan, related change history.

Cost profile

Continuous low with occasional burst.

Governance concerns

Reconciling drift that was intentional firefighting.

Vendor examples

Argo CD drift detection, Datree, custom implementations.

R.3. Class 3 — Observability, FinOps, and infrastructure optimization

R.3.1. R.9 Cost anomaly detection

Purpose

Watches cloud billing telemetry, detects deviations from baseline, attributes to responsible teams, proposes mitigations.

Trigger

T4 continuous (aggregated every 15 minutes).

Autonomy tier

T1 (recommends; team applies).

Ownership

FinOps.

Constitution rules

- Never auto-apply cost mitigations that require production downtime.
- Distinguish transient spikes from sustained shifts.
- Respect declared "expected burn" annotations from Product.

Evidence produced

Cost signal, baseline comparison, attribution breakdown, top-3 mitigation suggestions with expected savings.

Cost profile

Continuous low, occasional deep-dive burst.

Governance concerns

Alert fatigue if the threshold is too tight.

Vendor examples

Vantage (R294), Cast AI (R295), Datadog LLM Observability cost views (R292), Cloudability, Kubecost.

R.3.2. R.10 Alert quality analysis

Purpose

Watches alert firing patterns, identifies alerts that consistently fire but do not correlate with real incidents, proposes tuning or removal.

Trigger

T1 weekly.

Autonomy tier

T1 (recommends tuning; alert owner approves).

Ownership

Reliability Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never propose removal of an alert without checking the SLO it protects.
- Consider seasonality before flagging.
- Preserve compliance-required alerts regardless of value score.

Evidence produced

Alert firing history, correlated incident record (if any), false-positive rate, proposed threshold or removal.

Cost profile

Weekly batch.

Governance concerns

Removing an alert that was the only signal for a rare but consequential failure.

Vendor examples

Chronosphere (R293), custom implementations on Prometheus/Alertmanager.

R.3.3. R.11 Capacity and right-sizing recommendation

Purpose

Analyzes resource utilization across the fleet, recommends right-sizing for over-provisioned services and scale-up for hot services.

Trigger

T1 weekly.

Autonomy tier

T1 (recommends; service owner applies via IaC).

Ownership

Reliability Engineering + service owners.

Constitution rules

- Never propose scale-down below the declared minimum for availability-SLO reasons.
- Consider seasonal load patterns.
- Distinguish idle from warm-cache workloads.

Evidence produced

Utilization data, seasonal-adjusted recommendation, expected savings or performance impact.

Cost profile

Weekly batch.

Governance concerns

Recommending scale-down that trades cost for SLO risk.

Vendor examples

Cast AI (R295), Kubecost, custom implementations.

R.4. Class 4 — Continuous security and compliance

R.4.1. R.12 Continuous threat modeling

Purpose

On each significant code change, re-evaluates the threat model of affected services and flags newly exposed surfaces.

Trigger

T3 event (on merge that changes a security-relevant path).

Autonomy tier

T1 (opens a decision packet for the security owner).

Ownership

Security Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never claim absence of threats — only newly **added** surfaces.
- Preserve the threat model artifact under version control.
- Cite the specific code change that introduced the change in posture.

Evidence produced

Delta in threat model, affected trust boundaries, proposed mitigations.

Cost profile

Per-merge low.

Governance concerns

False confidence that "no new threats" means "safe."

Vendor examples

Semgrep (R299), custom implementations.

R.4.2. R.13 Vulnerability triage with exploit prioritization

Purpose

Aggregates scanner output, correlates with exploit availability, deduplicates across scanners, prioritizes remediation.

Trigger

T4 continuous (scanners fire; agent aggregates hourly).

Autonomy tier

T1 (recommends; security team owns triage decision).

Ownership

Security Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never suppress a finding without an explicit owner acknowledgment.
- Cite the exploit data source and its confidence.
- Distinguish reachable from unreachable vulnerabilities.

Evidence produced

Deduplicated vulnerability list with priority score, reachability analysis, exploit-availability posture.

Cost profile

Continuous low.

Governance concerns

Missing a vulnerability that scanners flagged but the agent deprioritized.

Vendor examples

Wiz (R296), Snyk (R297), Prisma AIRS (R300).

R.4.3. R.14 Continuous compliance evidence collection

Purpose

Continuously collects the evidence required for standing compliance regimes (SOC 2, ISO 27001, SR 11-7, EU AI Act) so audit season is not a person-quarter of scrambling.

Trigger

T4 continuous.

Autonomy tier

T0/T1 (collects and organizes; humans certify).

Ownership

Compliance + Security Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never claim compliance status; only present evidence.
- Preserve tamper-evident storage for collected evidence.
- Cite the specific control the evidence addresses.

Evidence produced

Control-mapped evidence records, gap reports.

Cost profile

Continuous low + spike near audit dates.

Governance concerns

Evidence that goes stale between audits.

Vendor examples

Vanta, Drata, Secureframe, custom implementations using the enterprise evidence chain.

R.4.4. R.15 Access review automation

Purpose

Monthly per-identity access-usage analysis; opens decision packets for over-scoped identities.

Trigger

T1 monthly.

Autonomy tier

T1 (recommends revocation).

Ownership

IAM team.

Constitution rules

- Never self-execute revocation.
- Distinguish stale access from cyclic-use access.
- Respect break-glass access annotations.

Evidence produced

Per-identity access-usage matrix, proposed revocation list.

Cost profile

Monthly batch.

Governance concerns

False positives disrupt legitimate work.

Vendor examples

Okta Identity Governance, SailPoint, custom implementations.

R.5. Class 5 — Knowledge production and organizational learning

R.5.1. R.16 Runbook synthesis from incidents

Purpose

On incident closure, drafts or updates the runbook for the affected class of incident.

Trigger

T2 event (incident-closed event).

Autonomy tier

T2 (drafts runbook update; incident commander approves).

Ownership

Reliability Engineering + service owning team.

Constitution rules

- Never include customer-specific data in a runbook.
- Preserve the incident timeline as citation.
- Include the diagnostic steps that **worked**, not every attempted step.

Evidence produced

Runbook diff, incident cite, list of diagnostic commands and their exit conditions.

Cost profile

Per-incident.

Governance concerns

Runbook memorizes incident-specific data; runbook accumulates stale entries.

Vendor examples

Glean (R301), custom implementations using Claude Agent SDK.

R.5.2. R.17 ADR maintenance

Purpose

Watches design-decision-relevant changes (dependencies, architecture) and prompts the owning team to draft or update the relevant ADR.

Trigger

T3 event (on merge that touches architecture-tagged files).

Autonomy tier

T1 (prompts; team owns the ADR).

Ownership

Architecture team.

Constitution rules

- Never author an ADR autonomously.
- Preserve authorship attribution to the deciding humans.

Evidence produced

Draft ADR prompt with the change context, cite to related ADRs.

Cost profile

Per-relevant-merge low.

Governance concerns

ADR fatigue if the trigger is too broad.

Vendor examples

Backstage plugins, custom implementations.

R.5.3. R.18 Architecture-diagram maintenance from code

Purpose

Extracts current service dependency graphs, event flows, and data lineage from live code and configuration; updates the canonical diagrams.

Trigger

T1 weekly.

Autonomy tier

T2 (updates the diagram artifact; architecture team reviews).

Ownership

Architecture team.

Constitution rules

- Preserve human annotations on the diagram.
- Cite the source of every extracted relationship.

Evidence produced

Diagram diff, extraction sources, unresolved edges.

Cost profile

Weekly batch.

Governance concerns

Diagrams that lose their explanatory value because they are literal renderings of code.

Vendor examples

Backstage TechDocs, IcePanel, custom implementations using Structurizr or Mermaid.

R.6. Class 6 — Ecosystem and market intelligence

R.6.1. R.19 Model landscape scanner

Purpose

Weekly scan of announced model releases with capability + pricing extraction; runs the enterprise eval harness against new frontier releases; recommends model-router changes.

Trigger

T1 weekly + T2 signal (announced release).

Autonomy tier

T1 (recommends; Platform Engineering approves).

Ownership

Platform Engineering (model routing team).

Constitution rules

- Never route to a model that has not passed the enterprise eval.
- Never route to a model whose IP posture does not match the capability class's IP requirements.
- Cite the eval evidence.

Evidence produced

New-model summary, evaluation results, routing recommendation, IP posture note.

Cost profile

Weekly with occasional heavy eval bursts.

Governance concerns

Hallucinated "products" that don't exist.

Vendor examples

Artificial Analysis (R304), Hugging Face Inference Providers dashboards, custom implementations.

R.6.2. R.20 Standards and regulation tracker

Purpose

Monitors standards body updates (MCP, A2A, W3C, ISO), regulatory drafts (EU AI Act implementing regulations, US executive orders), and industry advisories; drafts an internal

briefing per change.

Trigger

T4 continuous with T2 signal on RSS/announcement.

Autonomy tier

T1 (drafts briefing for Compliance/Platform review).

Ownership

Compliance + Platform Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never claim regulatory conclusions; present the change and cite Legal for interpretation.
- Preserve source URL and change date.

Evidence produced

Change briefing, source citation, impacted enterprise capabilities.

Cost profile

Continuous low with per-change burst.

Governance concerns

Missing a change; false positives that flood Compliance.

Vendor examples

Custom implementations; no strong commercial offering as of Sept 2026.

R.7. Class 7 — Data engineering and ML lifecycle

R.7.1. R.21 Feature drift detector

Purpose

Daily statistical monitoring of feature-store distributions per model per feature; opens decision packet on drift beyond threshold.

Trigger

T1 daily.

Autonomy tier

T1 (recommends investigation or retraining).

Ownership

Model owning team + Data Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never trigger retraining autonomously.
- Distinguish drift from data pipeline outage.

- Preserve historical baselines for audit.

Evidence produced

Distribution statistics, comparison to baseline, recommended investigation path.

Cost profile

Daily batch.

Governance concerns

Cascading retraining triggered by upstream data-quality issue.

Vendor examples

Fiddler (R307), Arize (R308), Weights & Biases (R306).

R.7.2. R.22 Data quality monitor

Purpose

Continuously validates data against declared expectations (freshness, volume, schema, referential integrity); opens decision packets for owning teams on violations.

Trigger

T4 continuous + per-batch signal.

Autonomy tier

T1 (surfaces violations; team decides on remediation).

Ownership

Data Engineering + data-owning team.

Constitution rules

- Never quarantine data without an explicit team acknowledgment.
- Preserve data-lineage citation on every finding.

Evidence produced

Violation record, lineage trace, downstream consumer list.

Cost profile

Continuous low.

Governance concerns

False positives that erode trust in the monitor.

Vendor examples

Great Expectations (R309), Monte Carlo (R310), Anomalo, Soda.

R.8. Class 8 — Product analytics, customer feedback, org-meta

R.8.1. R.23 Support triage and routing

Purpose

Continuously classifies incoming support tickets, deduplicates against known issues, routes to responsible team.

Trigger

T4 continuous.

Autonomy tier

T2 (routes and labels; humans respond).

Ownership

Support Engineering.

Constitution rules

- Never auto-close a ticket without human sign-off.
- Confidence-below-threshold tickets go to human triage queue.
- Preserve customer-privacy in the routing metadata.

Evidence produced

Classification, deduplication references, routing decision, confidence.

Cost profile

Continuous low.

Governance concerns

Mis-routing that hides a P1 signal in noise.

Vendor examples

Fin by Intercom (R311), Zendesk AI, Enterpret (R312), Kraftful (R313), Unwrap (R314).

R.8.2. R.24 Cross-team dependency detection

Purpose

Reads work-management data, code-ownership records, and production dependencies to identify implicit cross-team dependencies that are not represented in team topology or planning artifacts.

Trigger

T1 monthly.

Autonomy tier

T1 (surfaces dependencies for planning).

Ownership

Engineering Excellence / Platform.

Constitution rules

- Never draw conclusions about team performance from dependency data.
- Distinguish healthy from unhealthy coupling.

Evidence produced

Dependency map, comparison to team topology, coupling metrics.

Cost profile

Monthly batch.

Governance concerns

Data misinterpreted as performance evaluation.

Vendor examples

Jellyfish (R316), LinearB (R317), Swarmia, custom implementations.

R.8.3. R.26 Discovery signal clustering

Purpose

Reads the discovery corpus — support tickets, call transcripts, verbatims, session-replay summaries, funnel anomalies — clusters recurring problems, and links each cluster to existing opportunities or opens a draft for a named product manager.

Trigger

T4 continuous with a weekly synthesis pass.

Autonomy tier

T1 upstream (drafts with citations; a product manager owns and edits). T3 for filing and deduplication inside a single product area.

Ownership

Product Operations, with Platform Engineering owning the corpus and the retrieval path.

Constitution rules

- Never present a cluster without the signal identifiers, sample size, and segment coverage behind it.
- Never emit a claim about an individual customer or user; clusters are the unit of output.
- Retrieval respects tenant scoping and consent scope; signal outside the requester's authorisation is not summarised, not paraphrased, and not counted.
- Report segment coverage on every cluster so that loudest-signal bias is visible rather than implied.

Evidence produced

Cluster membership with signal identifiers, sample size, segment coverage, trend direction, links to existing opportunities, deduplication references.

Cost profile

Continuous low, with a heavier weekly synthesis batch.

Governance concerns

Amplifying the sampling bias of whoever files tickets; drift from clustering toward profiling individual customers; product managers accepting clusters without reading the underlying signal.

Vendor examples

Enterpret (R312), Kraftful (R313), Unwrap (R314), PostHog session-replay analysis (R315), Productboard (R104).

R.9. How the catalog is meant to be used

The catalog is a **shopping list**, not a mandate. An organization adopting ambient agents picks a Phase 1 pair (per the ambient-agents chapter's adoption sequence), builds or buys against the pattern, verifies the governance surface is measured, and only then adds a second pair. Each pattern's **Constitution rules** section is the seed of that capability's real constitution document — the seed grows as the capability's evaluation harness and operational experience mature.

A pattern is not authoritative. If a team can articulate a different constitution that measurably produces better net-verified outcomes at the same or lower cost, the pattern should be replaced or forked. The Autonomy Council owns the catalog and revises it quarterly.

Appendix S: The road to autonomous agents: how the industry is approaching it

The market has produced a set of well-funded, publicly-vocal positions on what the agent-development journey looks like and what its target state should be. This appendix summarises the positions of six of the most consequential vendors as of mid-2026, notes the specific claims each makes, and compares each position against the thesis in the main document. The comparison is meant as an aid to due diligence, not as endorsement or refutation.

The reader looking for a single takeaway will find it in the **synthesis** at the end: the industry has largely converged on the **what** (agents move from completion to orchestration; the developer's job is to direct outcomes) and diverged on the **how** (per-developer IDE experience versus organisational platform; per-PR governance versus systemic governance; individual productivity versus enterprise-wide operating model). The doc's thesis lives predominantly in the second half of each divergence.

S.1. What to look for in a vendor position

Four attributes distinguish a serious platform position from a polished product pitch. When reading any vendor's public material, look for:

- **Stated target state.** Does the vendor describe an end state and the intermediate steps to reach it, or does it describe only the next feature ship?
- **Governance surface.** Does the position acknowledge that autonomy requires organisational governance, or does it assume the individual developer is the accountable owner?
- **Data-plane treatment.** Is customer data treated as a governed egress event with explicit contract obligations, or is it treated as opaque model input?
- **Debt / cognitive-load acknowledgement.** Does the position address the risk that generated code accumulates debt the organisation cannot afford, or does it frame velocity as an unambiguous win?

S.2. Cognition / Devin

Position. Devin is positioned as **"the world's first autonomous AI software engineer"** — end-to-end scoping, execution, testing, and iteration on complex tasks. The company's public roadmap describes near-term **multi-agent orchestration** (specialised Devins for frontend, backend, DevOps working together) and a longer-term **self-healing codebase** in which agents continuously monitor production and autonomously write and deploy patches. Enterprise partnerships with Microsoft (Azure integration) and Cognizant (scale rollout) are the delivery channels. Goldman Sachs is a named early enterprise adopter targeting a **hybrid workforce** delivering ~20% efficiency gains.

Notable claim. Cognition reports that **Devin now produces approximately 25% of Cognition's own code**.

Agrees with this doc. End-to-end autonomy as the target; multi-agent coordination as the near-

term architecture; the **self-healing codebase** concept is a specific case of the ambient-agents chapter's continuous-security and continuous-FinOps patterns.

Differs or is silent on. Governance surface is thin — the autonomy story is told at the individual-task and hybrid-workforce level, not at the organisational-autonomy-council level. Data-plane treatment is enterprise-tier via Azure but the customer-data-as-egress framing is not central. Debt / cognitive-load risk is not acknowledged in public material; velocity metrics dominate. The matrix of **what is viable today at what tier** is absent — the pitch is "autonomous engineer" rather than "here is the current tier map, here is the journey."

Verdict. Devin is closest to the doc's target-state description of any vendor surveyed, but it treats the target as the **product** rather than as the destination of a governed journey. Enterprises using Devin should overlay the platform primitives from Parts One, Two, and Three of this document on top of it.

Sources. cognition.com [https://cognition.com/] · Cognizant × Cognition Jan 2026 announcement [https://news.cognizant.com/2026-01-28-Cognizant-and-Cognition-Partner-to-Scale-Autonomous-Software-Engineering-and-Deliver-Business-Value-Across-Enterprise-Operations] · Microsoft Azure customer story [https://www.microsoft.com/en/customers/story/24262-cognition-ai-azure]

S.3. Cursor / Anysphere

Position. Cursor's core premise, in the company's own framing, is that **"most code will be written by AI agents and the developer's job is to orchestrate them."** The product evolution reflects this: Agent Mode (autonomous multi-step task execution across files), Background Agents (parallel long-running work), Cloud Agents (isolated cloud VMs with full dev environment), and Automations (always-on agents triggered by Slack, Linear, GitHub, PagerDuty, and generic webhooks).

Notable claim. Automations, launched March 2026, is explicitly ambient — event-driven and scheduled agents running outside the developer's active session.

Agrees with this doc. The **orchestration framing** is essentially the doc's central thesis, stated by a vendor. Cloud Agents in isolated VMs is the workspace-broker pattern (Appendix J) delivered as a product. Automations is a direct product realisation of the **ambient agents** argument in the ambient-agents chapter.

Differs or is silent on. The platform sits at the **IDE boundary**, not the organisational boundary. There is no Autonomy Council equivalent, no cross-team constitution mechanism, no systemic customer-data-as-egress framing — these are treated as the customer enterprise's problem. Debt and cognitive-load risk are not central to the pitch; the Automations story is about **doing more**, not about **doing more without accumulating comprehension debt**. Cross-repository sweep as a first-class capability is absent from the public positioning.

Verdict. Cursor validates the doc's orchestration and ambient-agents thesis at the individual-developer and small-team tier. An enterprise adopting Cursor needs to build the governance layer this document proposes **on top of** Cursor, not expect it inside the product.

Sources. cursor.com [https://www.cursor.com/] · April 2026 Agent Mode overhaul writeup [https://agentmarketcap.ai/blog/2026/04/05/cursor-april-2026-agent-mode-overhaul-background-agents-ide-

convergence]

S.4. Augment Code

Position. Augment is positioned as an **enterprise-native** retrieval-augmented coding platform. The differentiator is context — indexing the customer's full codebase, cross-repository dependencies, and organisational documentation, then delivering that context to the agent at the point of work. Augment's public blog series **"The AI-native transformation path, end to end"** explicitly describes a journey model: initial bug scan and PR triage by risk level, with low-risk changes auto-approved and higher-risk changes routed to collaborative review with the agent surfacing key risks and architectural decisions.

Notable claim. An enterprise customer reports that developers were spending 30% of their week blocked on code review, dropping to under 10% within three weeks of agent-driven triage.

Agrees with this doc. The **retrieval-augmented context** architecture is a direct product realisation of the **skills as compiled organisational knowledge** argument in the foundations chapter. **Risk-tiered auto-approval** is a specific case of the T0–T4 autonomy ladder and the auto-approval-at-the-trivial-band pattern described in the maturity-journey chapter. The **journey framing** itself is closer to this doc's approach than any other vendor surveyed.

Differs or is silent on. Governance is stronger than most vendors but still sits inside the product — an Autonomy Council equivalent is not a public concept. Customer-data-as-egress framing is more mature than most (enterprise contracts are central to the pitch) but not exposed to the customer as a per-request auditable event. Cross-repository sweep as a first-class governed capability is not part of the public positioning even though the underlying retrieval infrastructure would support it.

Verdict. Augment's position is the closest to the doc's thesis of any vendor surveyed on the **foundations** side (Part Two) and the **maturity journey** side (the maturity-journey chapter). Enterprises adopting Augment already have the platform posture the doc argues for; the remaining gaps are governance-council formality and the systemic debt-management layer.

Sources. The AI-native transformation path, end to end [https://www.augmentcode.com/blog/the-ai-native-transformation-path-end-to-end] · Reimagining software engineering through AI [https://www.augmentcode.com/blog/reimagining-software-engineering-through-ai] · Meet Augment Agent [https://www.augmentcode.com/blog/meet-augment-agent]

S.5. GitHub Copilot (Microsoft)

Position. GitHub Copilot has evolved from an in-editor completion assistant to an **autonomous coding agent** platform. Agent Mode (multi-file, cross-file, terminal-command autonomous execution), the Coding Agent (issue → PR in the background), Plan Mode (goal decomposition), and sub-agents (specialised agents under a coordinator) are the primary autonomy features. The public positioning frames Copilot as **"a genuine collaborator in the development process"**, sitting inside the widest install base of any vendor surveyed.

Notable claim. Copilot is used by approximately 90% of Fortune 100 companies and has grown to ~20 million total users, ~4.7 million paid subscribers, as of January 2026. Agent Mode reached full

parity across VS Code and JetBrains in March 2026.

Agrees with this doc. Issue-to-PR autonomous background execution is a direct product realisation of the **reactive ambient agents** pattern. Sub-agents under a coordinator is the A2A pattern (Appendix M). The scale of adoption means the doc's argument about **organisational readiness** is being tested at Fortune-100 scale — the outcomes will inform how this doc's later revisions frame the ladder in the maturity-journey chapter.

Differs or is silent on. Public roadmap is dominated by **features**, not by a stated **journey with a target state**. Governance features (approval policies, custom agent constitutions) exist inside the product but are not framed as Autonomy-Council-style systemic governance. Customer-data handling is enterprise-tier via Microsoft Azure contracts but the framing is contractual, not architectural. Debt and cognitive load are largely absent from the public pitch; velocity dominates. Cross-repository sweeps and mandated organisational changes are not first-class capabilities.

Verdict. The largest install base and the most product breadth, but the **thinnest** stated position on the journey and target state. Enterprises adopting Copilot at scale must supply their own maturity model, their own governance, and their own debt-management framework. This document is intended to be a credible fit.

Sources. GitHub Copilot: the agent awakens [https://github.blog/news-insights/product-news/github-copilot-the-agent-awakens/] · Coding Agent press release [https://github.com/newsroom/press-releases/coding-agent-for-github-copilot] · Agent Mode press release [https://github.com/newsroom/press-releases/agent-mode]

S.6. Anthropic Claude Code

Position. Claude Code's May 2026 **Code with Claude** event formalised a shift from terminal-chat assistant to **high-orchestration autonomous worker**. Version 2.1 introduced Agent View (a visualisation of the running agent's state) and the `/goal` command (run until a stated condition is met, with success criteria and verification steps). Auto mode moved permission decisions to a classifier screening for destructive actions and prompt injection. Worktree tooling gives Claude Code an enter-and-exit primitive for isolated branch work. Anthropic's stated roadmap includes higher judgment and code taste, near-infinite effective context, and improved multi-agent coordination.

Notable claim. Anthropic reports that **approximately 80% of new production code inside Anthropic is authored by Claude**. Teams using Claude Code in agentic mode are reported to complete 40–60% more tickets per sprint without additional headcount.

Agrees with this doc. The `/goal` command with explicit success criteria and verification steps is a direct product realisation of the **decision packet** concept in the orchestrator chapter. Worktrees as an enter-and-exit primitive is the **agent workspace** pattern (Appendix J). The Auto mode classifier for destructive actions is a specific case of the **independent security control plane** argument in the trust and governance chapter.

Differs or is silent on. Governance is per-invocation and per-developer, not systemic — an Autonomy Council equivalent is not part of the public positioning. Customer-data handling is contractual (Zero Data Retention enterprise offering) but per-request outbound-flow audit is a customer-side concern. Debt and cognitive load are not central; the productivity claims dominate

the pitch. Cross-repository sweeps are not a first-class capability.

Verdict. Anthropic's product surface aligns closely with several of the primitives this document argues for (decision packets via `/goal`, workspaces via worktrees, classifier-based guardrails). The gaps are consistently at the **organisational** layer — the systemic governance, the debt accounting, and the sweep orchestration — which vendors of this size treat as the customer's problem rather than the platform's.

Sources. Anthropic 80% code claim (VentureBeat) [https://venturebeat.com/technology/anthropic-says-80-of-its-new-production-code-is-now-authored-by-claude-how-your-enterprise-can-keep-up] · Code with Claude announcements (InfoQ) [https://www.infoq.com/news/2026/05/code-with-claude/] · Enterprise agents webinar [https://resources.anthropic.com/webinar-ai-agents-in-enterprise]

S.7. Sourcegraph Amp (formerly Cody)

Position. Sourcegraph rearchitected its coding agent from a completion assistant (Cody) into a purpose-built autonomous agent (Amp), launched in preview in May 2025 and general availability shortly after. The pitch: Amp **"reads context, edits files, compiles, runs tests, and loops until a job is done — operating more like a junior engineer than a chat bot."** The distinguishing architectural claim is that Amp was **designed from the start as an agent**, combining a decade of code-search and code-intelligence infrastructure with a frontier-model agent runtime, rather than retrofitting agent features onto an autocomplete tool.

Notable claim. Amp has **no artificial usage caps** — a positioning choice signalling that autonomous long-running tasks are the product's centre of gravity, not a bolt-on.

Agrees with this doc. The **code-intelligence-as-retrieval** architecture is a foundation for the **skills registry** argument in the foundations chapter. The **loop-until-done** semantics is a direct product realisation of the goal-with-verification pattern.

Differs or is silent on. Governance is minimal in public positioning — the pitch is per-developer, per-task. Customer-data handling is contractual. Debt and cognitive load are not central. Cross-repository sweep as a first-class governed capability is not part of the public positioning, despite Sourcegraph's underlying code-intelligence infrastructure being well-suited to it.

Verdict. Amp is a serious product on the **foundations** side — particularly the retrieval infrastructure — but sits at the per-developer tier of the market. The organisational governance and journey framing this document argues for are the customer's job to layer on top.

Sources. ampcode.com [https://ampcode.com/] · Introducing Amp [https://sourcegraph.com/blog/introducing-amp] · Sourcegraph Amp Agent writeup [https://amplifilabs.com/post/sourcegraph-amp-agent-accelerating-code-intelligence-for-ai-driven-development]

S.8. Synthesis

Reading the six positions together produces four consistent observations.

Convergence on the what. All six vendors have publicly adopted the framing that agents move from completion to orchestration and that the developer's role becomes directing outcomes. Cursor

states this most bluntly; the others state it through product moves (Devin as end-to-end engineer; Claude Code's `/goal`; Copilot's Coding Agent; Amp's loop-until-done; Augment's tiered auto-approval). **The debate over whether the orchestrator framing is correct is effectively over. What remains is the debate over the platform, the governance, and the target state.**

Divergence on the how. The vendors split cleanly on where they place responsibility for the organisational layer. Augment places significant responsibility inside the product (risk-tiered auto-approval, retrieval-augmented context, journey framing in public material). Devin places it inside the product for the target-state case but does not operationalise it as a customer-facing capability today. Cursor, Copilot, Claude Code, and Amp explicitly leave the organisational layer to the customer enterprise. **This document is one attempt to fill the gap that four of the six leave.**

Systematic silence on debt and cognitive load. No vendor surveyed leads with the debt argument. Anthropic's 80% Claude-authored claim and Cognition's 25% Devin-authored claim are velocity metrics with no debt counter-metric published. The METR gap (+24% felt / −19% measured; see the debt chapter) is directly incompatible with a self-report-heavy velocity pitch — and no vendor engages the incompatibility publicly. **This document treats debt as first-class engineering concern; the vendor market treats it as an unstated externality today.**

Systematic silence on customer-data as governed egress. Every vendor offers enterprise-tier contract terms (Zero Data Retention, data-processing addenda, sub-processor commitments). None publicly frames **every prompt as a governed data-egress event** with per-request tenant-queryable audit. Customer-side subject-access-request obligations are treated as **contractual** rather than **architectural**. the trust and governance chapter treats them as architectural. **This is the second gap this document is trying to fill.**

The practical implication for the reader is that the vendor market can be used to **fund the primitives** — workspaces, skills registries, gateway-mediated tool calls, ambient triggers, goal-directed autonomy — while the **governance, journey management, and debt accounting** remain organisational work. The document you are holding is meant to be a credible plan for that organisational work, in a form that is legible to a CFO, a CISO, a Chief Data Officer, and the engineering organisation that has to operate it.

Appendix T: Measuring the AI-native SDLC: outcomes, metrics, and anti-metrics

Every claim in the platform earns its keep on evidence — not on vendor promises, not on internal self-report, and not on velocity alone. This appendix consolidates the measurement categories, per-metric definitions, cadences, leading-versus-lagging classification, and thresholds referenced from the **How we measure this** subsections in each Part.

The reader looking to build a measurement dashboard should read this appendix as a menu, not a mandate. Every organisation will select a subset appropriate to its scale, maturity, and risk appetite. The categories are stable; the specific thresholds and targets are contextual.

The reader looking to critique the platform should read this appendix as a **falsifiability contract** — the platform proposes these measurements as the standard it wants to be judged against. If these numbers do not move over time, the platform is not delivering the outcomes it claims.

T.1. Measurement principles

Six principles that constrain what belongs in this framework and what does not.

The meter is net-verified-outcome per unit of scarce human attention. Every other metric is either an input to that ratio, a counterweight to velocity claims that would otherwise appear positive on partial data, or a health indicator for the system that produces the meter. If a proposed metric cannot be justified by one of those three roles, it does not belong here.

Leading beats lagging where the two conflict. Deployment frequency is a lagging indicator of the pipeline; comprehension record completion rate is a leading indicator of downstream debt. Where a lagging metric will move only after the harm has accumulated, the leading indicator earns priority.

Every metric names its unit and its cadence. A metric without "per week" or "per quarter" attached is not a metric — it is a number that will be quoted in the wrong direction. Every metric below states unit and cadence explicitly.

Every metric names its counter-metric. A metric that only ever moves in one direction becomes a proxy for another goal — usually the wrong one. Deployment frequency without change-failure rate becomes a licence to ship broken code faster. Every category below pairs velocity-shaped metrics with quality-shaped ones.

Aggregation hides the tail. Averages are dangerous; medians are usable; percentiles are honest. Where the doc names a metric without a percentile qualifier, read **p50** by default and know that platform decisions should consider p90 and p99 explicitly.

Attribute to autonomy tier where possible. A metric that combines T0 auto-approved changes with T4 human-signed-off changes will hide the interesting variation. Where the metric can be attributed to a tier, attribute it.

T.2. Category A — DORA baseline

The four canonical DORA metrics are necessary, not sufficient. They anchor the platform against decades of enterprise-engineering research. They do not answer the debt question or the attention question.

Table 3. Category A metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Deployment frequency	Successful production deployments per service per week	Weekly	Lagging
Lead time for changes	Median time from first commit on a merged branch to production availability, per service	Weekly (p50, p90)	Lagging
Change-failure rate	Fraction of deployments causing a service impairment or requiring a rollback, remediation, or fix-forward, per service	Monthly	Lagging
Mean time to restore (MTTR)	Median time from customer-visible impact start to service restoration, per severity tier	Monthly (p50, p90)	Lagging

Related mechanisms. Progressive delivery (the operating-models chapter), evidence chain (Appendix N), work-systems-as-source-of- truth for intent.

Sources. Standard DORA methodology (R1, R2, R3).

Counter-metric. Deployment frequency without change-failure rate paired = velocity licence to ship broken code. Never publish one without the other.

T.3. Category B — Attention economy

These metrics operationalise the meter the platform is measured on. They are the least available in most engineering organisations today because the shape of the underlying data — decision packets — is a platform-native object that this document is introducing.

Table 4. Category B metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Human-attention-per-verified-outcome, by matrix cell	Average accountable-engineer minutes spent per merged, verified change, attributed to the (complexity band, SDLC phase) cell it occupied. The meter.	Quarterly (per cell)	Leading
Decision-packet volume	Packets opened per accountable engineer per week	Weekly (p50, p90)	Leading
Attention-per-packet	Median accountable-engineer time from packet-open to sign-off, per packet class	Weekly (p50, p90)	Leading

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Deduplication rate	Fraction of new packets that the platform deduplicated against existing packets or resolved packets	Weekly	Leading
Escalation rate	Fraction of packets that expired without human action and escalated to a secondary owner	Weekly	Lagging
Auto-approval share	Fraction of merged changes at each autonomy tier that were auto-approved under evidence (T4 threshold)	Quarterly (by tier)	Leading

Related mechanisms. Decision packet (the orchestrator chapter), decision inbox, T0-T4 autonomy ladder (the glossary), Autonomy Council (the trust and governance chapter).

Counter-metric. Attention-per-packet dropping while escalation rate rising = human attention being routed away from work that needed it. Both must trend in the same direction (packets faster, escalations flat or falling).

T.4. Category C — Cognitive & comprehension

These metrics make the risk that the doc calls **comprehension debt** and **cognitive debt** visible. They are proxies for a class of harm that traditional metrics do not surface until it manifests in production incidents or engineer attrition.

Table 5. Category C metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Comprehension-record completion rate	Fraction of T2+ decision packets with a valid comprehension record at sign-off (reviewer named what changed, why, what risk, what tests trusted)	Weekly	Leading
Reviewer self-report gap	Delta between reviewer's self-assessed understanding (survey at sign-off) and their actual understanding (postmortem re-check on a sampled subset)	Quarterly (sampled)	Leading
Time-to-sign-off	Median time from PR-ready to human sign-off, per PR complexity band. Not "faster is better" — a linear drop with volume growth suggests reduced attention per PR.	Weekly (p50, p90, by band)	Leading
METR gap (org-specific replication)	Delta between engineers' self-reported productivity and measured task-completion time, sampled on a rotating cohort of the org's own engineers. Baseline: METR 2025 (+24% felt / -19% measured).	Quarterly (rotating cohort)	Leading

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Team shared-model score	Structured team retrospective on shared understanding of the system, scored against a written rubric per system per quarter	Quarterly (per system)	Leading
Cross-stack contribution share	Fraction of merged changes authored by engineers outside their declared area of depth. Rising share = the workforce-flexibility argument in the organizational chapter is being realised.	Monthly	Leading
Shallow-familiar rate	Reviewer self-report gap measured specifically on the subset of changes flagged as cross-stack. Isolates the shallow-familiar comprehension risk from the general comprehension gap.	Quarterly (sampled)	Leading

Related mechanisms. Comprehension record (the debt chapter), Autonomy Council debt trajectory review, agent constitutions (the glossary).

Sources. METR 2025 (R354), Anthropic RCT via Osmani (R350), Liu et al. 2026 (R353), Storey cognitive-debt writing (R355).

Counter-metric. Comprehension-record completion rate at 100% means either the process is trivial (bad) or the review is a rubber-stamp (worse). Pair with reviewer self-report gap; if the gap grows while completion holds at 100%, the record has become theatre.

T.5. Category D — Debt trajectory

Category D operationalises the **three debts** argument in the debt chapter. These metrics answer whether the platform is accumulating debt faster than it is delivering outcomes.

Table 6. Category D metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Debt delta	Machine-readable per-change delta: added lines, removed lines, cyclomatic-complexity delta, test-coverage delta, dependency delta, doc-freshness delta. Aggregated per system per week.	Weekly (per system)	Leading
Debt trajectory per system	Direction of debt-delta rolling sum over the last 8 weeks per system. Flat or improving = green; worsening two consecutive quarters = platform intervention.	Quarterly (per system)	Leading
AI-authored-issue persistence rate	Fraction of AI-introduced issues still present in the repository's latest version, sampled on a rotating cohort of systems. Baseline: Liu et al. 2026 (22.7%).	Quarterly (rotating cohort)	Lagging

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Agent-authored code share	Fraction of merged code, weighted by line count and by business-impact score, authored by agents. Split by autonomy tier.	Monthly (by tier)	Leading
Agent-rewrite (slop) rate	Fraction of agent output revised before merge (pre-merge slop) and materially modified within N days after merge (post-merge slop). Two separate metrics.	Weekly	Leading
Rework rate	Fraction of merged changes reverted or materially modified within 30 days of merge	Monthly	Lagging
Production issue rate attributable to autonomy tier	Production incidents per merged change, attributed to the autonomy tier of the change	Monthly (by tier)	Lagging

Related mechanisms. Debt delta (the debt chapter), comprehension record, Autonomy Council debt trajectory review, retirement as a first-class action.

Sources. Liu et al. 2026 (R353), McKinsey debt baseline (R345), Osmani comprehension debt (R350).

Counter-metric. Agent-authored code share rising while debt trajectory holds flat = the platform is delivering. Agent- authored share rising while debt trajectory worsens = the platform is externalising debt onto the customer organisation.

T.6. Category E — Autonomy movement

These metrics operationalise the **maturity journey** argument in the maturity-journey chapter. They answer whether the platform is moving up the maturity matrix at the rate the journey plan committed to.

Table 7. Category E metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Cells advanced per quarter	Number of (complexity band, SDLC phase) cells that advanced one autonomy tier or better in the quarter, minus cells that regressed	Quarterly	Leading
Coverage share	Fraction of PRs, by count and by business-impact score, that fall inside cells currently shaded green or blue on the tier map	Monthly	Leading
Time from capability first-shipped to full auto-approval	For each row-1 subclass, elapsed time from the first platform-managed application to sustained T4 status. Directional; faster is better where the underlying evidence supports it.	Quarterly (rolling)	Leading
Auto-approval blast radius	Average number of files, services, and downstream callers touched by an auto-merged change. Sanity check on the T4 threshold.	Weekly (by class)	Leading

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Autonomy-tier drift	Fraction of task classes whose observed autonomy tier differs from the tier the Autonomy Council chartered. Non-zero indicates either uncharted expansion (unsafe) or unclaimed restriction (waste).	Quarterly	Leading

Related mechanisms. Maturity matrix, tier map, 12-month journey plan (the maturity-journey chapter), Autonomy Council.

Counter-metric. Cells advancing while coverage share stagnates = the platform is advancing capabilities nobody uses. Both must move together.

T.7. Category F — Ambient & sweep

Category F operationalises the **ambient agents** argument in Part Six and the **cross-repo sweeps** argument in the maturity-journey chapter. These metrics answer whether the ambient portfolio is delivering compound value and whether sweep capability is collapsing the coordination cost the doc argues it should.

Table 8. Category F metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Ambient portfolio inventory	Count of registered ambient agents, by class. Non-registered long-running agents = **silent army** — must be zero.	Continuous (dashboard)	Leading
Signal-to-noise budget adherence	Fraction of ambient agents whose actual signal-to-noise ratio falls within the budget their constitution declared. Below budget = agent is generating noise; must be paused or retuned.	Weekly	Leading
Reauthorization cycle completion	Fraction of ambient agents whose Autonomy Council reauthorization completed within the required cycle (typically quarterly)	Quarterly	Leading
Cost per ambient agent	Continuous compute, model calls, storage, per registered ambient agent. Fed into the FinOps aggregate; agents exceeding budget paused pending Council review.	Weekly (by agent)	Leading
Sweep throughput	Number of sweeps executed per quarter, split by class (CVE class, telemetry rollout, deprecation removal, cross-service migration)	Quarterly (by class)	Lagging
Coordination-hour reduction	Human hours consumed per sweep versus the pre-platform baseline for the same class of change	Quarterly (per class)	Leading

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Sweep failure and rollback rate	Fraction of sweeps that hit the failure budget and auto-paused, plus fraction that required rollback. Attribution to root cause (sweep-spec error, per-repo readiness gap, unforeseen dependency)	Quarterly	Lagging

Related mechanisms. Ambient portfolio inventory (the ambient-agents chapter), sweep orchestration (the maturity-journey chapter), FinOps integration, standing service identity.

Counter-metric. Sweep throughput rising while sweep failure rate rising = the platform is executing sweeps faster than readiness supports. Pause and audit tier-3+ readiness.

T.8. Category G — Repository readiness

Category G operationalises the **agentic readiness ladder** from the maturity-journey chapter. These metrics answer whether repositories are advancing along the ladder at a rate that supports the maturity-matrix journey.

Table 9. Category G metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Repository distribution across tiers	Histogram of repositories at each readiness tier (0-4). Direction of the histogram matters more than any single count.	Quarterly	Leading
Tier lift per quarter	Repositories that advanced one tier or better in the quarter, minus repositories that regressed	Quarterly	Leading
Correlation of tier with matrix-cell autonomy	Cross-check: repositories that anchor row-5 or row-6 automation should be at tier 3 or 4. Non-zero mismatch = safety-check required.	Quarterly	Leading
Tier-2 lift investment	Platform-team hours spent lifting repositories from tier 1 to tier 2 in the quarter. Argued as the highest-return tier boundary.	Quarterly	Leading

Related mechanisms. Agentic-readiness ladder (the maturity-journey chapter), maturity matrix.

Counter-metric. Tier lift rising while matrix coverage share holds flat = the platform is investing in ladder work that is not paying off in autonomy movement. Pause and reassess.

T.9. Category H — Discovery and intent

These metrics cover the half of the lifecycle upstream of the specification. They are the newest and the least instrumented: most organisations can produce DORA numbers within a quarter and cannot answer "what fraction of what we shipped traces to a customer signal" at all. Start with the first metric; it is cheap and it is the entry gate.

Table 10. Category H metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Signal-traceability rate	Fraction of specifications entering delivery with at least one linked signal in the discovery corpus. The upstream analogue of test coverage on a change set.	Weekly	Leading
Validation-state mix at commitment	Share of committed work carrying each validation state — hypothesis, evidenced, validated. A healthy portfolio holds hypotheses deliberately; the failure is not knowing which is which.	Quarterly	Leading
Idea hit rate	Fraction of shipped changes that moved the metric they were designed to move, measured where an experiment or a target metric exists. Reference point: roughly one-third at Microsoft (R373).	Quarterly	Lagging
Feature-usage share at 90 days	Fraction of shipped features with meaningful usage three months after launch. Baseline for comparison: ~80% of cloud-product features rarely or never used (R374).	Quarterly	Lagging
Specification rework rate	Fraction of specifications materially rewritten after implementation began. Separates discovery that stopped too early from delivery that started too late.	Monthly	Lagging
Signal-to-decision latency	Median time from a signal entering the corpus to appearing in a committed opportunity or being explicitly set aside.	Monthly (p50, p90)	Leading
AI-surfaced opportunity precision	Fraction of agent-clustered opportunities a product manager accepts without material reframing. Falling precision means the clustering is fitting the corpus rather than the customer.	Monthly	Leading
Customer-contact hours per product manager	Direct customer conversation hours per product manager per month. The counter-metric for the whole category.	Monthly	Leading
Consent-scope violations	Retrievals or outbound egress events against signal outside its consent class. Target zero.	Continuous	Lagging

Related mechanisms. Signal and opportunity objects (Appendix K), validation state, consent scope, discovery tier map (the requirements and discovery chapter).

Counter-metric. Synthesis throughput rising while customer-contact hours fall is the category's characteristic failure: the platform has automated the activity that was producing the judgment. Signal-traceability rate rising while idea hit rate stays flat is the second failure — traceability became a box to tick rather than evidence to act on.

T.10. Category I — Product agent-readiness

These metrics apply when the organisation **sells** a product that other people's agents call, rather than only operating a platform its own engineers use. They fail independently of each other, which is the point: a product can hold perfect disclosure discipline and be useless, because refusing everything is secure.

Table 11. Category I metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Unauthorized disclosures	Results or actions outside policy, counted in the conformance corpus and in production. A security outcome rather than a quality measure; the only metric in this framework whose target is zero.	Continuous	Lagging
Revocation deadline attainment	Measured interval from the named authority event to the named disclosure boundary, at p95 and worst case. Reported with the oldest unapplied security event, which the percentile hides.	Weekly	Lagging
Grant freshness	Interval from a widened permission to its appearance in results. Tracked apart from revocation because the two fail in opposite directions and a single "permission lag" number conceals both.	Weekly	Leading
Authorized recall	Fraction of eligible items actually returned, measured against an authoritative policy evaluator over a reference corpus.	Monthly	Leading
False-denial rate	Permitted material withheld by an eligibility filter.	Monthly	Lagging
End-to-end latency by access selectivity	p50, p95, p99, split by the fraction of candidates surviving authorization, warm and cold. A single average hides the sparse-access case that agent workloads produce.	Weekly	Leading
Cost per authorized retrieval and per permission mutation	Read and change economics, with mass revocation costed explicitly — the cheapest query plan is often the most expensive plan during a large permission change.	Monthly	Leading
Reconciliation drift and recovery time	How far a security projection strays from its source, and how long repair takes once detected.	Weekly	Lagging
Time to safe first integration	Elapsed time from an external developer's first call to a correctly authorized, audited, working integration. The adoption metric for an agent-facing product.	Quarterly	Leading

Related mechanisms. Set authorization, eligible set, security projection, revocation deadline, capability ledger (the product agent-readiness chapter); MCP gateway and derived-representation policy inheritance (the foundations chapter).

Counter-metric. Unauthorized disclosures at zero while authorized recall falls is the category's characteristic failure — the product became safe by becoming useless, and only one of those two numbers is usually on a dashboard. Latency improving while reconciliation drift grows is the second: someone made the fast path faster by trusting a projection further than it has earned.

T.11. Category J — Shared capability layer

The soft-rail layer is the one most organisations build without ever measuring, which is why catalogues accrete entries nobody invokes. These metrics separate three different failures: the layer does not exist in practice, it exists only where code is written, or it exists and has gone stale.

Table 12. Category J metrics

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Soft-rail reuse rate	Fraction of agent sessions that loaded at least one organisation-published capability. The adoption number; near zero means the registry is a folder.	Weekly	Leading
Lifecycle coverage	How many SDLC phases have at least one maintained capability. Coverage is typically uneven, and the gap is usually downstream of code generation.	Quarterly	Leading
Staleness exposure	Sessions that loaded a capability past its review date, plus consumers pinned to deprecated versions.	Weekly	Lagging
Graduation and expiry rate	Provisional entries that graduated, and provisional entries that expired unused. Both non-zero in a healthy registry; nothing expiring means the catalogue is accreting.	Quarterly	Leading
Parity failures	Capabilities that behaved differently across laptop, workspace, CI, and ambient runtimes, caught by the parity suite rather than by an engineer.	Monthly	Lagging
Time from ad-hoc to shared	Median interval from a script's third use to a registered team capability. The friction measure on the graduation path.	Quarterly	Leading
Consumer visibility	Whether the platform can list every consumer of a capability and disable it inside an hour. Recorded as a tested drill, not an assertion.	Quarterly	Lagging

Metric	Definition	Cadence	Type
Convention divergence	Rework attributable to house-convention violations in agent-authored changes. The outcome the layer exists to move, and the hardest of these to measure honestly.	Monthly	Lagging

Related mechanisms. Skill, plugin, soft rail, hard rail (the soft-rails chapter); skills registry and managed context repositories (the foundations chapter); agent constitution (the trust and governance chapter).

Counter-metric. Reuse rate climbing while convention divergence stays flat means capabilities are being loaded and ignored, or the wrong ones are being loaded. Graduation rate climbing with nothing expiring means the review bar is a formality.

T.12. How the categories compose into a quarterly review

The Autonomy Council reviews the platform against these categories on a quarterly cadence. The review is not a set of disconnected dashboards; it is one composite story.

Slide 1 — the meter. Human-attention-per-verified-outcome (Category B) by matrix cell, quarter over quarter. Movement here is the primary signal.

Slide 2 — velocity paired with quality. DORA metrics (Category A) paired with change-failure rate and MTTR. Both moving in the right direction, or the win is illusory.

Slide 3 — the debt counter-signal. Debt trajectory (Category D) per system, plus METR-gap replication (Category C). If either worsens while Slides 1 and 2 improve, the platform is externalising debt.

Slide 4 — journey progress. Cells advanced and coverage share (Category E) against the 12-month journey plan. Delta from plan becomes the input to next-quarter journey plan revision.

Slide 5 — ambient and sweep economics. Ambient portfolio health (Category F) plus sweep throughput and coordination-hour reduction. Sanity-check that ambient work is compounding rather than accumulating noise.

Slide 6 — readiness. Repository tier histogram (Category G). Trend direction more than absolute numbers.

Slide 7 — anti-metrics. One slide dedicated to metrics that would appear positive on partial data but are being paired against their counter-metric here. Deployment frequency without change-failure rate. Agent-authored share without persistence rate. Cells-advanced without coverage-share. Etc.

Slide 8 — one decision. The Council names one adjustment to policy, portfolio, or investment coming out of the quarter. If no adjustment is warranted, the Council names why not.

The seven-slide format is the point. Longer reviews attract optimisation of the review itself; shorter

reviews cannot represent the composition.

T.13. Anti-metrics — what NOT to optimize for

Metrics that would appear positive on partial data but harm the system if optimised in isolation. Every serious measurement framework needs its own anti-metrics list; this is the platform's.

Total agent invocations. Rewards spending model budget without regard to outcome. If the platform's total agent invocations are rising while human-attention-per-verified-outcome is not falling, the platform is generating agent activity without producing outcomes.

Lines of code authored by agents. Rewards generation without regard to persistence, comprehension, or debt. Pair with the Liu persistence rate and the debt-delta trajectory before ever publishing this number.

Time from ticket-open to ticket-closed. Rewards closure without regard to whether the underlying change was correct or the customer was satisfied. Pair with rework rate and production issue rate before publishing.

Reviewer-approved PR count per week. Rewards approval throughput without regard to comprehension. Pair with comprehension-record completion and the reviewer self-report gap. A team publishing this number without both counter-metrics is optimising for process theatre.

Automation coverage percentage. Rewards process substitution without regard to whether the substitution was safe. Pair with autonomy-tier drift and production issue rate by tier.

Agent Slack / notification count. Rewards agent activity that interrupts humans. The doc's whole framing is that interruption is the scarce resource being **conserved**. This metric, if rising, indicates the platform is defeating its own purpose.

The pattern across all of these: any metric that measures agent activity, or process substitution, or throughput of an intermediate step, must be paired with a quality-shaped counter-metric before it belongs on a dashboard. The seven categories above are constructed to make that pairing automatic; the anti-metric list is a reminder of what happens when the pairing is skipped.

Appendix U: Commercial tooling: gateways, agents, sandboxes, security, and operations

The main text names patterns and mechanisms. This appendix names products that ship those mechanisms today. Every entry cites public product material; the list is not an endorsement and is not exhaustive.

Five categories:

- AI gateways — identity, scope, routing, audit at the tool-call layer
- Agent identity and OAuth for agents — delegated authority primitives
- Agent observability and evaluation — per-run traces, quality scoring, cost telemetry
- Runtime sandboxes for agents — ephemeral compute with placement and teardown
- Model-vendor governance — cross-reference to Part Three

U.1. AI gateways

Product	What it does
Portkey	Model routing across 200+ providers, per-request logging, policy enforcement, cost and latency budgets. SaaS or self-hosted.
LiteLLM Proxy	Open-source router in front of major providers with a uniform OpenAI-compatible interface. Per-team budgets, rate limits, audit logs to Postgres or Prometheus.
Kong AI Gateway	AI-specific plugin surface on Kong. Routing, transformations, prompt guarding, PII masking, RAG injection.
Cloudflare AI Gateway	Edge-hosted gateway in front of major providers. Caching, rate limiting, per-request logs, analytics. Zero infrastructure to operate.
Pomerium AI	Identity-aware gateway extending Pomerium's zero-trust authorisation to agent traffic. Policy-based model-endpoint access keyed to user, device, and context.
TrueFoundry AI Gateway	Enterprise AI gateway with routing, fallback, budgets, and compliance controls. Kubernetes-native.
MLflow AI Gateway (formerly MLflow Deployments)	Databricks-adjacent option for teams already on MLflow. Route management with unified interface.

U.2. Agent identity and OAuth for agents

Product	What it does
Descope Agentic Identity	Identity primitives designed for agents. Outbound-token issuance, delegated flows, inbound verification for user-agent interactions.
WorkOS AuthKit for AI Agents	Standard OAuth 2.1 flows adapted for agents. Device flows, long-lived refresh, workload identity for machine callers.
Auth0 for AI Agents	Okta / Auth0 preview product focused on agent-specific grants and audit trails.
SPIFFE / SPIRE	Open standard plus reference implementation for workload identity. Not agent-specific, but the substrate several agent-identity products build on.
HashiCorp Boundary + Vault	Session-based access mediation plus secret issuance. Useful where agents need short-lived credentials to enterprise systems.

U.3. Agent observability and evaluation

Product	What it does
Braintrust	Eval harness, dataset management, in-flight scoring, trace inspection. Fits the per-capability eval workflow named in Part Three §multi-vendor active routing.
LangSmith	Traces, datasets, evals, monitoring from the LangChain team. Framework-agnostic in practice.
LangFuse	Open-source alternative to LangSmith. Traces, scoring, cost tracking, self-hosted.
Traceloop / OpenLLMetry	OpenTelemetry-native LLM observability. Vendor-neutral, feeds into Datadog, Honeycomb, Grafana.
Arize AI	Model observability with drift detection, embedding analysis, prompt monitoring. Broader ML-Ops scope than LLM-only.
Datadog LLM Observability	Extension of Datadog APM into LLM calls. Natural fit when the enterprise is already on Datadog.
Weights & Biases Weave	Traces, evals, dataset versioning as part of the W&B platform.
Helicone	Open-source LLM observability with a proxy-based architecture. Deployable in front of provider APIs.

U.4. Runtime sandboxes for agents

Product	What it does
E2B	Firecracker-backed ephemeral cloud sandboxes built for agent code execution. Language-agnostic, hundreds of concurrent sessions.
Modal	Serverless Python execution with sandboxing, fast cold start, GPU access. Popular for agent runtime and eval workloads.

Product	What it does
Daytona	Open-source developer environment sandboxing. Fits the workspace broker's customer-hosted placement class.
Northflank	Sandboxed compute with lifecycle policies and network isolation.
Firecracker (AWS OSS)	Microvm technology under most of the above. Direct use where an enterprise runs its own sandbox pool.
Anthropic Claude Code sandbox / **OpenAI Codex sandbox**	Vendor-provided execution surfaces attached to their agent products. Useful for consumer-tier scenarios; enterprise use carries the same customer-data-egress considerations named in Part Three.

U.5. Model-vendor governance (cross-reference)

Fully covered in Part Three §customer data and model-vendor access. Six enterprise-tier vendor postures the platform routes across:

- **Anthropic ZDR** — Zero Data Retention contract; suitable for regulated data with redaction applied
- **OpenAI Enterprise** — SOC 2 Type II, GDPR DPA, ZDR posture
- **Google Vertex AI (no-log)** — regional residency, DPA
- **AWS Bedrock** — no-log by default, customer-managed encryption keys
- **Azure OpenAI Service** — GDPR-compliant regional deployments
- **Salesforce Einstein Trust Layer** — peer example, not a routing target for the developer platform

U.6. A note on scope

This list omits consumer-facing tools (Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Claude Code, Devin, Amp) which are surveyed as vendor positions in Appendix S. It omits training-time tooling (fine-tuning platforms, dataset labelling) which is outside the scope of a developer-platform document. And it omits open-source frameworks (LangChain, LlamaIndex, DSPy) which are libraries agents use rather than platform capabilities the enterprise runs.

Where a category is thin — agent-native SIEM integration, agent policy-as-code — the current market has not yet coalesced around named products. The pattern is real; the tool naming will follow.

Appendix V: Engineering Intelligence: a companion volume and reading map

This document argues that authority should follow evidence. It says much less about how the evidence is produced, validated and governed, because that is a discipline in its own right and it has its own book.

Engineering Intelligence is a publication-length treatment of measuring, understanding and optimising modern software engineering as a socio-technical and economic system. Eighteen chapters and eleven appendices, with source notes per chapter.



Engineering Intelligence — live document

https://geekychris.github.io/engineering-intelligence/

Source repository

https://github.com/geekychris/-Engineering-Intelligence

V.1. The division of labour between the two

This document is about **building** the platform. The companion is about **knowing whether it worked**.

That split is not cosmetic. Almost every claim here that ends with "measure it before expanding" is a claim this document does not cash. The autonomy ladder moves a change class on "demonstrated evidence"; the upside case is a range to be verified rather than a result; the adoption plan's second step is "baseline" and says little about how. Those are the seams where the companion picks up.

Two vocabulary differences are worth holding in mind before cross-reading, because the words collide.

The unit of analysis differs. The companion's central object is the **Engineering Change** — a reconstructed graph of the work that produced a change, spanning commits, reviews, builds and deployments, defined so that cost and outcome can be attributed to it. This document's central object is the **decision packet** — the durable work item an agent carries and a human acts on. They overlap but are not the same thing: an Engineering Change is a unit of measurement reconstructed after the fact, while a decision packet is a unit of work that exists while the work is happening. A platform that emits good decision packets makes Engineering Change reconstruction much easier, which is an argument for building them well that this document does not make.

"Autonomy tiers" appear in both, with different jobs. Here the T0–T4 ladder grants authority. There, autonomy and risk tiers are a measurement stratification — a way to avoid comparing outcomes across work of different consequence. Reading one as the other will produce confusion.

V.2. Cross-reference by topic

Each row names a topic in this document and the companion reading that goes deepest on it.

V.2.1. Part 1 — the orchestrator and the maturity journey

Topic here	Companion reading
Human attention as the bottleneck (Part 1)	Ch. 4, *Human Attention and Cognitive Load* — the cognitive work model, latent burden proxies, context switching and attention residue, review as cognitive work, and why comment counts are weak measures.
"Measure verified outcomes and attention, not agent activity"	Ch. 5, *Measuring Engineering Systems* — the measurement hierarchy, properties of a good metric, direct versus derived, leading versus lagging, local versus system-level.
The decision packet as a durable object	Ch. 3, *The Engineering Change* — why the pull request is insufficient as a unit, formal definition, lifecycle states, and deterministic versus probabilistic reconstruction.
The maturity journey and widening the frontier	Ch. 15, *Implementation and Rollout* — pilot selection criteria, the minimum viable evidence path, and the phase model. Appendix J is a maturity assessment and adoption roadmap.
Review shifts left but does not disappear	Ch. 11, *Review metrics*. Ch. 12, Playbook 5, risk-based specialist review.

V.2.2. Part 2 — foundations, agents, and soft rails

Topic here	Companion reading
What an agent is; the five agent shapes	Ch. 7, *Levels of AI participation* and *Agents and multi-step tasks* — a participation taxonomy that cuts the same space by autonomy rather than by control flow.
MCP, capability catalogues, and selection accuracy	Ch. 11, *AI metrics* — what to instrument on tool use. Ch. 8, *Enterprise Instrumentation*, for the event envelope that carries it.
Soft rails, skills, and whether they change behaviour	Ch. 6, *Experimentation and Causal Inference* — this is the chapter to read before claiming a skill helped. Ch. 12, Playbook 2, ranked versus unranked AI findings, is the closest worked analogue.
Evaluating what agents produce	Ch. 7, *Evaluating AI code generation*, *Evaluating AI review*, and *Ground truth and golden data*.

V.2.3. Part 3 — trust, security, economics, and debt

Topic here	Companion reading
Cost per verified outcome	Ch. 2, *Engineering Economics* — the total cost of an Engineering Change, decomposed into human effort, tool and AI cost, infrastructure and coordination. Ch. 11, *Economic metrics*. Appendix E is an economic evaluation and business-case standard.
The upside case, and the 20–40% range	Ch. 6, *Experimentation and Causal Inference* — randomised, cluster, switchback and staggered-rollout designs. Ch. 16, *The Science of Engineering Intelligence*, on falsifiable hypotheses and the difference between descriptive, predictive, causal and prescriptive claims.
The autonomy ladder and what moves a change class	Ch. 7, *Autonomy and risk tiers* and *Trust calibration*. Note the vocabulary collision described above.
Agent security as an independently enforced control plane	Ch. 13, *Governance for AI agents*, *Auditability*, and *Model governance*. Ch. 8, *Immutable raw evidence*, for the audit substrate.
Debt, comprehension, and the cognitive-debt wall	Ch. 7, *Cognitive offload and reload*, *Human learning and skill*, and the worked example on measuring net cognitive offload from an AI reviewer. Ch. 4 for the underlying model.
Model, prompt and policy drift	Ch. 7, *Model, prompt, and policy drift*. Ch. 16, *Calibration* and *Measurement invariance*.

V.2.4. Part 4 — the organisational model

Topic here	Companion reading
The Autonomy Council and who signs what	Ch. 13, *Governance bodies*, *Metric rights*, and *Handling metric disputes*.
Changing engineering roles	Ch. 17, *The Learning Engineering Organization*.
Which work to fund, and in what order	Ch. 14, *Portfolio and Executive Decision-Making* — portfolio value model, multidimensional capacity, opportunity cost, option value, and value of information.
Metrics that get gamed once they are targets	Ch. 13, *Goodhart's Law and metric corruption* and *Incentive-aware metric design*. Read this before publishing any dashboard built from this document's measurement appendix.

V.2.5. Part 5 — the operating model

Topic here	Companion reading
The evidence chain	Ch. 8, *Enterprise Instrumentation* — canonical event envelope, event versus ingestion versus processing time, delivery semantics and idempotency, immutable raw evidence, schema management.
Blast radius and change classes	Ch. 9, *Complexity, Blast Radius, and Repository Topology* — the complexity dimensions (implementation, domain, architectural, verification, organisational) are a sharper decomposition than this document's.
Platform architecture	Ch. 10, *The Engineering Intelligence Platform* — service boundaries, canonical APIs, storage and stream processing. Appendix F is a technical reference architecture.

V.2.6. Part 6 and the ambient portfolio

Topic here	Companion reading
Ambient agent patterns and their portfolio	Ch. 7, *Agents and multi-step tasks* and *Experiment patterns*. Ch. 18, *The Future of Engineering Intelligence*.
Deciding whether an ambient class is earning its keep	Ch. 14, *Value of information*. Ch. 11, *Metric lifecycle* and *Review and retirement* — the discipline of retiring a metric applies equally to retiring an agent.

V.3. The strongest overlap, and what to do about it

Appendix T of this document sets out a measurement framework for the AI-native lifecycle. It is the thinnest part of this document relative to how much weight the argument puts on it, and it is the part the companion covers in greatest depth.

If one thing crosses over, make it this. Ch. 11, the metrics catalogue, and Appendix B, the metric specification standard, give each metric an owner, a definition, a computation, a known failure mode and a retirement condition. That is the level of specification Appendix T gestures at and does not reach.

V.4. A reading path

For someone who has read this document and wants the measurement half:

1. Ch. 5, *Measuring Engineering Systems* — the vocabulary everything else uses.
2. Ch. 3, *The Engineering Change* — the unit of analysis, and the place where the two books' objects meet.
3. Ch. 2, *Engineering Economics* — what "cost per verified outcome" decomposes into.
4. Ch. 6, *Experimentation and Causal Inference* — how to establish that any of this worked.

5. Ch. 7, *AI-Assisted Engineering* — the chapter with the most direct overlap with this document's subject.
6. Ch. 13, *Governance, Ethics, and Organizational Adoption* — before any of it reaches a performance conversation.

Chapters 12 and 15 are operational and best read when there is a specific pilot to run. Chapter 16 is the methodological foundation and rewards reading when a result is being disputed.

Appendix W: The CVE workflow as an integration stack: tools, triggers, and agentic seams

Part 2 walks the CVE remediation workflow as eight stages. That telling is tool-free by design, which makes it portable and leaves the practical question unanswered: what runs at each stage, and where does an agent attach to it?

This appendix answers it three ways, each a different question.

- **What is involved** — the steps across the top, the systems along the foot, and the touch points between them.
- **What kind of thing runs** — trigger, deterministic process, model inference, gate. This is the one that shows where the controls belong.
- **How it is wired** — the topology, and what returns evidence to where.

Then the seven layers as vocabulary, the stages in prose, and the thirteen steps that descriptions of this workflow usually leave out.

W.1. What is involved at each step

The lifecycle across the top, the systems underneath along the foot, and between them the touch points: what each step does, to which system, and the gate that ends it.




Figure 20. What is involved at each step, and which system it touches

Every touch is stamped with the system it reaches — GIT, JIRA, SCANNER, CONTEXT, WORKSPACE, CI, ROLLOUT, TELEMETRY — and tinted to match the bank at the foot. The tag does the identifying and the colour does the grouping; an earlier version left the colour to do both, and it made the reader trace every chip back to the key.

Connector lines were the obvious drawing and the wrong one. Eight stages against eight systems produces enough crossings to stop being readable, and the tags carry the same mapping without them.

Two patterns show up once the touches are laid out this way.

No step touches only one system. The thinnest stage still reaches three, and the planning stage reaches four. That is the integration work, and it is the part usually underestimated — not the agent, but the number of contracts each step depends on holding.

Source control and the tracker appear at both ends. The tracker opens the sweep and closes it; source is read at planning for dependency resolution and written at patch, merge and release. They are the two systems a sweep cannot route around, which makes them the first two integrations worth hardening.

W.2. What kind of thing runs at each stage

The first question is not which product runs a stage but what **kind** of mechanism it is, because that

decides where the controls go.

Four kinds, and they behave differently under failure.

Trigger
: What fires the stage.

Process
: Deterministic — same input, same output, and it can be re-run to check itself.

Inference
: Model judgment, used where the answer is not computable.

Gate
: A decision point with a defined set of outcomes.

	1 · Detect	2 · Frame and plan	3 · Prepare workspace	4 · Patch and test
TRIGGER what fires it	Scanner event or feed poll	Sweep opened	Plan approved task dispatched	Workspace ready
INFRA what it runs on	Scanner, SBOM store dependency graph	Call-graph service service catalog	Container platform secret broker	Workspace build cache, runners
PROCESS deterministic	Match advisory to lockfile versions	Reachability analysis dependency resolution	Start workspace, mint scoped creds, mount context	Build and run the suites
INFERENCE model judgment	— none —	Scope and priority test-adequacy verdict plan authoring	— none —	Patch authoring test authoring failure diagnosis
GATE decision point	— none —	PLAN GATE signed once for many repositories	ADMISSION scope and budget checked before start	BUDGET / LOOP ceiling enforced by the runtime

	5 · Review and gate	6 · Release	7 · Verify production	8 · Close and learn
TRIGGER what fires it	Agent signals done change proposed	Merge to trunk	Deploy event + soak window	Health confirmed or exception filed
INFRA what it runs on	Git host, policy engine analysis service	Build runners, artifact registry, attestation	Rollout controller telemetry, scanner	Tracker, SBOM store capability registry
PROCESS deterministic	Static analysis, API diff, debt delta	Build, sign, attest, publish artifact	Canary comparison vs baseline; rescan	Write evidence, update inventory, close
INFERENCE model judgment	Risk assessment review summary reviewer selection	— none —	Anomaly correlation containment proposal	What skill, test or runbook should change
GATE decision point	MERGE GATE allow · deny · require evidence · route approval	PROMOTION deploy authority is not build authority	PROMOTE / ABORT auto on analysis; escalate if uncertain	EXCEPTION named owner and an expiry, or it stays open

Inference is absent at three of the eight stages, and is never the last word: every stage that infers is followed by a deterministic check or a gate.

Figure 21. Trigger, process, inference, gate — what each stage actually is

Read the amber row on its own and the safety argument becomes visible without reading anything else.

Inference is absent at three of the eight stages. Detection is a lookup — match the advisory against lockfile versions. Workspace preparation is scheduling and credential minting. Release is build, sign, attest, publish. None of those involves judgment, and none of them should: they are the stages where a wrong answer is most expensive and most silent, so they are kept computable on purpose.

Where inference does appear, it is never the last word. Every inferring stage is followed by a deterministic check, a gate, or both.

The plan is inferred and then gated. The patch is authored by a model and then run against suites whose pass criteria the model did not write. Risk is assessed by a model and then evaluated against policy the model cannot edit. A containment proposal is a proposal.

The gate row is the control surface. Seven gates across eight stages, each with a defined set of outcomes rather than a boolean:

Plan gate	The sweep plan is signed once for many repositories, which is the property that makes a sweep cheaper than the changes in it.
Admission	Requested scope and budget are checked before the workspace starts, not after it has run.
Budget and loop ceiling	Enforced by the runtime rather than by the agent, because the failure mode is a loop that does not know it is looping.
Merge gate	The four outcomes: allow, deny, require evidence, route an approval.
Promotion	Deploy authority is separate from build authority. Producing an artifact is not permission to ship it.
Promote or abort	Decided on canary analysis against the baseline; escalates rather than guessing when the signal is ambiguous.
Exception	An asset that will not be fixed closes as an accepted risk with a named owner and an expiry, or it stays open. There is no third option.

The triggers are worth reading as a row too. Only the first is external; the rest fire on the completion of the previous stage or on a deploy event. A pipeline whose stages are triggered by people is a pipeline whose throughput is bounded by people, which is the thing this proposal is trying to move.

W.3. The same thing as an architecture

The two views above are matrices, which are good at coverage and bad at topology. This one is the wiring: the systems, what they talk to, and the numbered stage that traverses each edge.




Figure 22. Reference architecture — the orchestration plane drives systems that already exist

Three things are worth reading off the wiring rather than the tables.

Everything returns to the orchestrator. The telemetry verdict, the rescan result and the gate outcome all come back to one place, which is what lets a single work item know whether it succeeded. A pipeline where each stage reports to its own dashboard cannot answer that question without a person assembling the answer.

The gateway sits on the agent's path, not around the perimeter. Tool calls from the harness pass through it, and so does the merge decision. A ring drawn around the capability layer would let anything inside it call anything else, which is the failure described in the MCP notes.

The workspace holds no durable authority. Credentials arrive from the broker scoped to the task and expire with it; the skills arrive mounted; the pod is torn down at stage 5. Nothing in that subgraph survives the work item, which is what makes a resumable workspace safe to resume somewhere else.

W.4. The seven layers

L1 Signal and intake	Where the work originates and where it is finally confirmed gone: advisory feeds, scanners, the SBOM, the dependency graph.
L2 Work management	The issue tracker. Holds the sweep's shape, its ownership and its audit trail, and is the surface most humans look at.

L3 Orchestration and control	Triggers, the planner, decision packets, the agent harness, gate evaluation. This layer is new; everything else already exists in most organisations.
L4 Context and capability	The constitution, the skills, the service catalogue, the runbooks, the SLO definitions. What the agent is allowed to know and the supported method it is expected to follow.
L5 Execution substrate	Where code actually runs: the ephemeral workspace, its scoped credentials, the build runner.
L6 Verification and gates	Tests, static analysis, API diffing, branch protection, provenance, canary analysis. The evidence producers.
L7 Delivery and operations	The pipeline, the progressive rollout, production telemetry, the rollback path.

Governance is drawn as a band across the foot rather than as an eighth layer, because identity, delegated authority, policy, isolation, budget, revocation and audit apply to every cell. A governance row would imply it acts at one point in the stack, which is the failure this document argues against throughout.

W.5. Stage by stage, with the integration seam named

W.5.1. Stage 1 — Detect

The scanner already exists and already fires. What is new is what happens to its output.

The seam is a webhook from the scanner into the orchestrator, which opens a **sweep** rather than a ticket. The distinction matters: a sweep is one object with many affected assets, and it is the thing that can be reported on, escalated, and closed.

Encoding in the tracker. One epic per CVE, one child issue per affected asset. The epic carries the advisory, the CVSS vector and the reachability verdict. Each child carries a machine-readable link to the asset it belongs to.

```
EPIC  SEC-1000  CVE-2026-1234  ·  transitive dep in libfoo
  labels: cve-sweep, cvss:8.1, reachable:true, sla:2026-10-01
   │
   ├── SEC-1001  payments-api     asset:svc-payments   autonomy:T3
   ├── SEC-1002  billing-worker   asset:svc-billing    autonomy:T3
   └── SEC-1003  notify-gateway   asset:svc-notify     autonomy:T1
```

Three design notes on that encoding, each learned by getting it wrong somewhere.

The asset identifier is a **custom field carrying the service-catalogue id**, not a label. Labels are free text, drift, and cannot be joined against the catalogue. The autonomy tier is also a field, because it is read by the gate evaluator and a typo in a label should not widen what an agent may do.

Labels carry **state that automation reads** — `cve-sweep` to scope queries, `reachable:true|false` to

separate real exposure from inventory noise, `sla:<date>` for escalation. The board is a view over those fields, not the data model. A workflow encoded in board columns cannot be queried, cannot be audited, and breaks the first time someone drags a card.

The evidence link goes **on the child issue**, not in a comment. A comment is prose; a field is queryable, and "show me every change in this sweep merged without a passing security scan" has to be a query.

W.5.2. Stage 2 — Frame and plan

Four things happen here, and three of them are the steps most descriptions of this workflow omit.

Reachability analysis (L1). Call-graph analysis against the vulnerable symbol, not merely "this version is in the lockfile". This is the difference between a sweep of 137 repositories and a sweep of six, and it is the single biggest determinant of whether any of this scales. Unreachable findings still get a child issue, marked `reachable:false`, so the inventory is honest — they do not get a workspace.




Figure 23. Reachability is what makes a sweep tractable

Ownership resolution (L4). A service-catalogue lookup per asset yields the owning team, the criticality and the on-call rotation. Without it the child issues land in a queue nobody owns, which is how sweeps die quietly.

Feasibility pre-flight (L5). Resolve the upgrade before leasing a workspace: does the target version exist, does it resolve against the transitive tree, does it cross a major boundary? This is a dependency resolution, not a build, and it costs seconds. Skipping it means paying for a workspace that cannot succeed.

Test-adequacy assessment (L6). Could the existing suite detect a regression in the affected surface at all? A repository whose tests do not exercise the vulnerable path cannot be remediated unattended at any tier, and that judgment belongs here rather than being discovered after the patch is written. The output is a tier cap on the child issue.

The planner then emits a **decision packet** per asset, and the sweep plan itself is reviewable once

for many repositories — which is the property that makes a planner–executor shape worth the complexity.

W.5.3. Stage 3 — Prepare workspace

The seam is a workspace broker that leases an execution substrate and binds context to it.

A Kubernetes pod from an immutable base image, non-root, with resource quotas and explicit teardown. Its credentials are **minted outside the pod and scoped to this work item** — a repository-scoped, branch-scoped Git token with an expiry shorter than the task budget, and nothing else. No cloud credentials, no registry publish rights, no production anything.

The four integration points worth naming:

- **Credential brokering.** The pod requests capability, not secrets. A Git broker restricts repository, branch, ref and operation.
- **Revocation reach.** Withdrawing authority mid-task has to stop the running pod, not just the next model call.
- **Context mount.** The constitution, the remediation skill and the scoped project context are mounted at start, before any code is read.
- **Budget attachment.** A token and wall-clock ceiling on the work item, enforced by the runtime and not by the agent.

W.5.4. Stage 4 — Patch and test

The agent harness runs a reason–act loop inside the sandbox.

For a straight dependency bump the work is mechanical: change the manifest, resolve, build, run the suites. For anything else — a patched call site, a changed API, a backport — code is authored against the **remediation skill** and the internal SDK context, which is what keeps the fix on the supported path rather than on a plausible one.

Where the suite is thin, the agent authors tests **first**, targeting the vulnerable path specifically, so that the patch has something to prove itself against. A test written after a passing patch tends to encode the patch rather than the requirement.

W.5.5. Stage 5 — Review and gate

The seam is branch protection wired to the gate evaluator rather than to a human's calendar.

The gate reads the decision packet, the test results, a static-analysis pass, an API-diff report and the debt delta on the touched surface, and answers with one of the four outcomes: allow, deny, require evidence, or route an approval.

Condition	T3 dependency bump	T1 code change
Tests pass, no API diff, debt delta ≤ 0	Auto-approve; merge proceeds	Decision packet to the named reviewer

Condition	T3 dependency bump	T1 code change
API surface changed	Route an approval	Route an approval
Suite thin for the touched path	Require evidence — the agent adds tests and resubmits	Route an approval
Static analysis raises a new finding	Route an approval	Route an approval

The asterisk in the figure's autonomy band is this table: a T3 bump is unattended **conditionally**, and the conditions are mechanical enough to evaluate without a person.

The workspace is torn down at this point and its evidence retained. Keeping a credentialed pod alive while a human decides is a standing privilege waiting to be misused.

W.5.6. Stage 6 — Release

Build produces the artifact and a **provenance attestation** binding it to the reviewed source. Build authority and deploy authority are separate: producing an artifact is not permission to ship it.

The seam is the pipeline handing off to a progressive-delivery controller with an analysis template attached, rather than to a deploy step that reports success and stops.

W.5.7. Stage 7 — Verify production

The step most demonstrations omit, and the one that decides whether any of this was real.

Automated canary analysis (L6) compares error rate, latency and saturation against the baseline captured before the change, and promotes or aborts on that comparison rather than on elapsed time. **Rescan** (L1) confirms the deployed version no longer carries the vulnerable component — proving the remediation, not the deployment.

Rollback deserves a specific warning in this workflow: **rolling back a CVE patch restores the vulnerability**. The containment plan agreed in stage 2 has to say what happens instead — a feature flag, a WAF rule, traffic shifting, or an accepted risk with an expiry.

W.5.8. Stage 8 — Close and learn

Evidence is written back to the child issue, the SBOM and inventory are updated, and the epic closes when every child is verified or formally excepted.

The exception path is part of the design, not a failure of it. Some assets cannot be patched — an unmaintained dependency, a breaking change nobody can absorb this quarter. Those close as an accepted risk with a named owner, an expiry date, and a compensating control, and the expiry re-opens them.

What is learned becomes durable: a new remediation skill if the fix generalises, a new test if the gap was in coverage, a runbook update if the containment plan was wrong.

W.6. Steps most descriptions of this workflow leave out

Collected, because each one is a place a demonstration succeeds and a real sweep fails.

Missing step	Why it matters
Reachability analysis	Decides whether the sweep is six repositories or a hundred and thirty-seven. Everything downstream scales off this number.
Ownership resolution	Child issues without an accountable owner do not get done and do not get escalated.
Grouping and dedup	One CVE across many assets is one sweep. Treated as many independent tickets, it has no completion state.
Priority and SLA derivation	CVSS alone over-escalates. CVSS combined with reachability and data classification produces a deadline worth honouring.
Feasibility pre-flight	Cheap check that avoids leasing a workspace for an upgrade that cannot resolve.
Test-adequacy assessment	Determines the autonomy ceiling. Autonomy on top of a suite that cannot detect a regression converts a slow process into a fast wrong one.
Baseline capture	Stage 7 needs something to compare against. Captured after the change, it is worthless.
Credential brokering and revocation reach	A resumable workspace without re-brokered credentials is a way to carry standing privilege around the estate.
Runtime budget enforcement	Estimating cost at planning and not enforcing it at execution is how a loop that never terminates becomes expensive rather than merely slow.
Automated canary analysis	Without it, "progressive rollout" is a human watching a dashboard, which does not scale with concurrency.
Rescan and inventory update	Closes the loop to the system that raised the alert. Without it the scanner re-raises the same finding.
The exception path	Some assets will not be fixed. An accepted risk with an expiry is a decision; a stalled ticket is not.
Fleet sequencing	If a shared internal library is itself affected, it must be remediated and published before its dependants, or every downstream workspace fails identically.

W.7. What is actually new

Read down the figure and most of the stack is unchanged. The scanner, the tracker, the catalogue, the pipeline, the rollout controller and the telemetry are all systems a mature organisation already runs, and this workflow reuses every one of them.

Three things are new. **L3 in its entirety** — the trigger, the planner, the decision packet, the gate

evaluator, the harness. **L4 as a governed product** — most organisations have runbooks and SDK docs, but not versioned, owned, evaluated capabilities an agent can load. And **the ephemeral, credential-scoped workspace** at L5, which some organisations have for CI and few have for interactive agent work.

That is the honest scope of the build. It is smaller than the diagram looks, and the integration work — making these systems return reliable evidence to a single work item — is larger than it sounds.

Appendix X: Reference implementations: twenty repositories worth reading

Twenty of the author's personal projects worth a look. Each entry carries a one-line description, a QR code, and a direct URL. Grouped by category. The full public inventory of ~230 repositories is at https://github.com/geekychris — this appendix curates twenty that give a good cross-section of the work.

X.1. AI-native platforms and evaluation



ai-native-sdlc — https://github.com/geekychris/ai-native-sdlc

The source repository for this document — AsciiDoc source, Makefile, CI, case-study conditional build, and the reproducible pipeline that produces the PDF/HTML/DOCX artifacts.



-Engineering-Intelligence — https://github.com/geekychris/-Engineering-Intelligence

Publication-length AsciiDoc book on measuring, understanding, and optimizing modern software engineering as a socio-technical and economic system. Published at https://geekychris.github.io/engineering-intelligence/ and cross-referenced against this document in Appendix V.



cloud-stack — https://github.com/geekychris/cloud-stack

Self-hosted, Kubernetes-backed operating environment for software development and agents. A concrete take on the customer-operated ephemeral runner tier described in Appendix J.



claude-session-analyzer — https://github.com/geekychris/claude-session-analyzer

Native desktop analyzer for Claude Code JSONL sessions — ingests `~/.claude/projects` into SQLite, derives episodes, cost, and behavior.



code_graph_search — https://github.com/geekychris/code_graph_search

Multi-language code analysis platform (Java, Go, Rust, TypeScript, C/C++, Markdown, YAML/JSON) that builds a RocksDB-backed searchable graph — REST, web UI, and MCP server for AI-assistant integration.

X.2. Security and data protection



cryptfs — https://github.com/geekychris/cryptfs

Linux kernel module providing **transparent, per-file AES-256-GCM encryption** over an underlying filesystem. Applications see plaintext files; on-disk contents are encrypted.



securevault — https://github.com/geekychris/securevault

Vaultrix — secrets management system with AES-256-GCM at rest, seal/unseal via Shamir's Secret Sharing, hierarchical access, versioned secrets, multi-node replication, and client libraries for Go, Java, Python, and Rust.



AOEE_Attribute_object_enterprise_edition — https://github.com/geekychris/AOEE_Attribute_object_enterprise_edition

AOEE (Attribute Object Enterprise Edition) — high-performance Rust-based attribute-object system, used as the social-graph cache under the enterprise-social-platform project.

X.3. Enterprise event and data infrastructure



webhook_infra — https://github.com/geekychris/webhook_infra

Event Conduit — enterprise outbound event delivery platform: consumes internal ECST events from Apache Kafka, matches them to subscribers, translates to CloudEvents v1.0, and delivers via webhook batches (HTTPS + HMAC-SHA256) or WebSocket streaming.



kafka_broker_abstraction — https://github.com/geekychris/kafka_broker_abstraction

Java library that automates Kafka broker discovery and provides a consistent facade over the Kafka client — the layer between application code and cluster topology.



structured-logger — https://github.com/geekychris/structured-logger

Metadata-driven structured-logging framework that generates type-safe loggers for Java and Python, publishes to Kafka, and auto-ingests logs into Apache Iceberg data-warehouse tables via Spark Streaming.



warehouse-sync — https://github.com/geekychris/warehouse-sync

Metadata-driven incremental Postgres → Iceberg replication. Sister project to structured-logger — same lakehouse stack, config-driven ethos, but reads from database tables instead of application log calls.

X.4. Search and analysis



local_log_search — https://github.com/geekychris/local_log_search

Desktop log search and analysis tool — Java + Lucene backing a local UI for indexing, faceting, and querying log files.



ELSA-entity-level-sentiment — https://github.com/geekychris/ELSA-entity-level-sentiment

ELSA — high-performance Java library for extracting **entity-level** sentiment from text via an ONNX-Runtime-backed layered ML pipeline. Identifies named entities, sentiment toward each, and who holds the opinion.



distributed_web_crawler — https://github.com/geekychris/distributed_web_crawler

Scalable, distributed web crawler in Java — Kafka for URL queue, Cassandra for metadata, S3/MinIO for content, Spring Boot for the core engine.

X.5. Enterprise apps and platforms



enterprise_social_platform — https://github.com/geekychris/enterprise_social_platform

Full-featured social networking platform — Spring Boot + React
PostgreSQL + OpenSearch, with AOEE (see above) as the Rust-based social-graph cache. Home feed, entity extraction, moderation, and event pipeline.



mac_transformer — https://github.com/geekychris/mac_transformer

macOS menu-bar app that converts documents to PDF, text, audio, or summary via a pluggable pipeline. Optionally publishes to Books, Music, Reading List, Obsidian, or Notion.



citymap — https://github.com/geekychris/citymap

TOGAF-inspired city-map editor for enterprise architecture — React Spring Boot + SQLite + MCP.

X.6. Utilities and messaging



event_watch — https://github.com/geekychris/event_watch

Low-latency pub/sub event notification service — Go server with client libraries in six languages.



rest_router — https://github.com/geekychris/rest_router

Reactive API gateway (Spring WebFlux) with identity-aware rate limiting — token buckets keyed by authenticated principal, backed by Redis so limits hold across N instances.